Leibniz's later position on monads : as not infinitely nested but as having a bottom, a final resting place
Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad by Daniel Garber Review by: Justin E. H. Smith HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science , Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 153-157 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Article DOI: 10.1086/656672 Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/656672 In this later monadological view, Leibniz has certainly not eliminated the complex world of corporeal substances, nested in one another to infinity. This world is still very much a part of Leibniz抯 picture. Indeed, he often (though not always) continues to use the terminology that he had used in his earlier writings, calling its constituents composite substances, compound substances, or even corporeal substances. But in the monadological metaphysics there is something new, a metaphysical sub-basement of simple substances added to the earlier view of bugs in bugs, a kind of absolute grounding for that world, a domain of genuine metaphysical unities that don抰 themselves contain any further unities. The above is part of a review. The complete text of the book is given at http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/13/9780199693092.pdf Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/11/2013 See my Leibniz site at http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough DreamMail - Your mistake not to try it once, but my mistake for your leaving off. use again www.dreammail.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Fictionalism!
On 10 Jun 2013, at 20:04, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2013, at 18:25, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 12:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 2:40 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jun 2013, at 11:20, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 17:55, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2013 1:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 05:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/7/2013 4:00 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Yes, if there was a text of this it would be nice... I found this: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ A fictionalist account holds that some things are fictional, i.e. don't exist even though their complete description is self-consistent. Everythingists apparently reject this idea. Platonists seem to equate 'true' with 'exists'. If you believe 17 is prime you must believe 17 exists. I think this is wrong. If you believe that a flying pink elephant is pink, must you believe a flying pink elephant exists? Flying pink elephants are pink and not pink. That's why flying pink elephant can't exist. A pink elephant is pink by construction. Exact. But the flying pink elephant are also not pink. By logic. Or show me a flying pink elephant living on this planet which isn't not pink. Bruno, how are flying pink elephants any different from things that I remember but am not experiencing this very moment? I add explanation. Here you describe two 1p events. They are similar, although I guess you don't have precise memory of having actually seen a Flying Pink Elephant in your life, except in cartoon or dreams. For example, I've been to Brussels but I'm not there right now. Brussels is an abstraction in my mind, but I believe it's the capital of Belgium. That's part of the Brussels abstraction, in the same sense that being pink is part of the flying pink elephant abstraction. No? I do not dispute that fact. Pink elephant are pink. But the pink elephant on this planet happens also to be brown rampant worms. And I'm afraid that is only a classical logician's joke. (x = Flying Pink Elephant) - (x = Brown Rampant Worms) is true on this planet because (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, on this planet (I think), But (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, is an empirical proposition. I agree. Not one you can prove from arithmetic or logic. But the point was that true propositions, like Flying pink elephants are pink don't imply the existence of anything; just like 17 is prime doesn't imply the existence of 17. But how do you formalize flying pink elephant are pink ? I am simpled minded, so I formalized it in a first order logical formula: if x is an elephant which is pink and which is flying then x is pink. This does not entail Ex( x = an elephant which is pink and which is flying) For the same reason that: if x is a prime number, which is even, and bigger that 3 then x is bigger than 3 does not entail Ex(x = even prime number bigger than 3). Actually it does. Let y=x is a prime number which is even and bigger than three. Then, if y anything; in classical logic everything follows from a contradiction. But we were talking about the metalogical relation of true/false and fictional/real. I don't think two are parallel. It's true that 17 is prime - but it doesn't follow that 17 is real. It's true that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street, but it doesn't follow that he existed. The difference comes from the fact that in arithmetic e can prove Ex(x = 17), but we cannot prove in your theory that Ex(= Sherlock Holmes). Of course something described by a contradiction can't exist. But a contradiction is dependent on an axiomatic system. So a pink elephant doesn't exist, but There is a pink elephant. is not a contradiction; it's just a falsehood and it's not the case that everything follows from a falsehood. It is the case that everything follows from a falsehood. (0=1) does implies everything. f - q is a tautology. It is equivalent with ~f V p. that is with t V q. p - everything in all words where p is false, even if there are worlds were p is true. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop
Re: Fictionalism!
On 10 Jun 2013, at 22:06, Stephen Paul King wrote: So numbers do not exist? Why? In most elementary (first order) theory of arithmetic, you can prove the following: Ex(x = 0) Ex(x = s(0)) Ex(x = s(s(0))) etc. Bruno On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 1:52 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 10 Jun 2013, at 18:25, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 12:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 2:40 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jun 2013, at 11:20, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 17:55, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2013 1:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 05:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/7/2013 4:00 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Yes, if there was a text of this it would be nice... I found this: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ A fictionalist account holds that some things are fictional, i.e. don't exist even though their complete description is self-consistent. Everythingists apparently reject this idea. Platonists seem to equate 'true' with 'exists'. If you believe 17 is prime you must believe 17 exists. I think this is wrong. If you believe that a flying pink elephant is pink, must you believe a flying pink elephant exists? Flying pink elephants are pink and not pink. That's why flying pink elephant can't exist. A pink elephant is pink by construction. Exact. But the flying pink elephant are also not pink. By logic. Or show me a flying pink elephant living on this planet which isn't not pink. Bruno, how are flying pink elephants any different from things that I remember but am not experiencing this very moment? I add explanation. Here you describe two 1p events. They are similar, although I guess you don't have precise memory of having actually seen a Flying Pink Elephant in your life, except in cartoon or dreams. For example, I've been to Brussels but I'm not there right now. Brussels is an abstraction in my mind, but I believe it's the capital of Belgium. That's part of the Brussels abstraction, in the same sense that being pink is part of the flying pink elephant abstraction. No? I do not dispute that fact. Pink elephant are pink. But the pink elephant on this planet happens also to be brown rampant worms. And I'm afraid that is only a classical logician's joke. (x = Flying Pink Elephant) - (x = Brown Rampant Worms) is true on this planet because (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, on this planet (I think), But (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, is an empirical proposition. I agree. Not one you can prove from arithmetic or logic. But the point was that true propositions, like Flying pink elephants are pink don't imply the existence of anything; just like 17 is prime doesn't imply the existence of 17. But how do you formalize flying pink elephant are pink ? I am simpled minded, so I formalized it in a first order logical formula: if x is an elephant which is pink and which is flying then x is pink. This does not entail Ex( x = an elephant which is pink and which is flying) For the same reason that: if x is a prime number, which is even, and bigger that 3 then x is bigger than 3 does not entail Ex(x = even prime number bigger than 3). Bruno Brent and in classical logic f implies everything. If you want, (x = Flying Pink Elephant) - (x = Brown Rampant Worms)is an expression equivalent to f - whatever which is a tautology. It is the way to diplomatically assert that we do not believe in the existence of some x which would be equal to a flying pig elephant. The popular saying with ifs and buts you can put Paris in a bottle express a similar thing. Ok, I'm convinced. Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/_ONFIcyntY4/unsubscribe?hl=en . To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To
Re: Fictionalism!
On 10 Jun 2013, at 22:49, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 1:06 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: So numbers do not exist? They don't exist like elephants do. They may exist like Christmas or Sherlock Homes do. Is Sherlock Holmes a human? Please give us your theory of human, so that we can discuss if he exists or not. In some reasonable theory of humans, humans possess a body decomposable locally in biochemical components. This is not the case for fictional characters. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Leibniz's later position on monads : as not infinitely nested but as having a bottom, a final resting place
On 11 Jun 2013, at 09:14, Roger Clough wrote: Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad by Daniel Garber Review by: Justin E. H. Smith HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science , Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 153-157 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Article DOI: 10.1086/656672 Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/656672 In this later monadological view, Leibniz has certainly not eliminated the complex world of corporeal substances, nested in one another to infinity. This world is still very much a part of Leibniz’s picture. That's why I think Leibniz is still a weak materialist, that is an Aristotelian metaphysician. It is that point which is unreasonable with comp, and with Everett QM, which is based on comp. Indeed, he often (though not always) continues to use the terminology that he had used in his earlier writings, calling its constituents composite substances, compound substances, or even corporeal substances. But in the monadological metaphysics there is something new, a metaphysical sub-basement of simple substances added to the earlier view of bugs in bugs, a kind of absolute grounding for that world, a domain of genuine metaphysical unities that don’t themselves contain any further unities. Adding such substance will not help, unless you abandon computationalism. Bruno The above is part of a review. The complete text of the book is given at http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/13/9780199693092.pdf Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/11/2013 See my Leibniz site at http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough DreamMail - New experience in email software www.dreammail.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Leibniz's later position on bugs within bugs (infinite monadic nesting)
Leibniz's later position on monads : as not infinitely nested but as having a bottom, a final resting place Daniel Garber, Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad by Daniel Garber Review by: Justin E. H. Smith HOPOS: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science , Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2011), pp. 153-157 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science Article DOI: 10.1086/656672 Article Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/656672 In this later monadological view, Leibniz has certainly not eliminated the complex world of corporeal substances, nested in one another to infinity. This world is still very much a part of Leibniz抯 picture. Indeed, he often (though not always) continues to use the terminology that he had used in his earlier writings, calling its constituents composite substances, compound substances, or even corporeal substances. But in the monadological metaphysics there is something new, a metaphysical sub-basement of simple substances added to the earlier view of bugs in bugs, a kind of absolute grounding for that world, a domain of genuine metaphysical unities that don? themselves contain any further unities. The above is part of a review. The complete text of the book is given at http://fds.oup.com/www.oup.com/pdf/13/9780199693092.pdf Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/11/2013 See my Leibniz site at http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough DreamMail - The first mail software supporting source tracking www.dreammail.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
ROADMARKERS ON THE ROAD NOT TAKEN (LEIBNIZ VS MATERIALISM)
ROADMARKERS ON THE ROAD NOT TAKEN (LEIBNIZ VS MATERIALISM) A.EXISTENCE LEIBNIZ-- Mental (Nonphysical) + Physical MATERIALISM-- Physical, only in spacetime B. REALITY LEIBNIZ-- Only mental is real MATERIALISM- Only physical is real C. SPACETIME LEIBNIZ Exists only around physical bodies MATERIALISM The nonphysical is beyond spacetime, the physical is within it. D. IDEAS LEIBNIZ-- Exist mentally MATERIALISM --Do not exist , since not phjysical E. MATHEMATICS LEIBNIZ-- Only logic and numbers mentally exist. MATERIALISM-- Does not exist F. PHYSICS LEIBNIZ--Mentally exists as descriptions of particle behavior according to God's Pre- `existing Harmony MATERIALISM—Ill-defined. Physics seems to be embedded (?) in the particles F. GOD LEIBNIZ--Is the only active agent (doer and perceiver) in the universe-- and so is necessary for existence. MATERIALISM-- Is a fairy tale. G. NOTHING LEIBNIZ--- The space vacuum. The absence of a particle MATERIALISM--Can exist everywhere H. HUMAN AFFAIRS LEIBNIZ-- Incorporates psychology and can be applied to sociology MATERIALISM-- Seems to avoid the subject. I. PERCEPTION LEIBNIZ-- The ultimate perceiver is God. MATERIALISM-- Omits the ultimate perceiver since it cannot explain self. J. SCIENTIFIC ACCEPTANCE LEIBNIZ-- Unexplored by science or explored only to the extent that God, spirit, souil nd mind are seen to be necessary nonphysical entities necessary for existence. Endorsing eibniz is a career-buster. MATERIALISM-- Enthusiastically accepted and utilized. It acts as a cult. K. QUANTUM MECHANICS, NONLOCAL OR OTHERWISE LEIBNIZ-- All corporeal bodies share and partcipate in the space of existence according to their capabilities, which means that more dominant quanta dominate the less dominant and would seem to participagte in a wider range of differences. MATERIALISM-- QM is not possible since only physical entities exist. L. PHYSICAL VS NONPHYSICAL LEIBNIZ-- The physical is within spacetime, the nonphysical (the spiritual or mental orld) is outside of spacetime. MATERIALISM-- Only the physical exists. M. THE PARANORMAL LEIBNIZ-- The paranormal is normal, but based on the nonphysical world outside of spacetime. MATERIALISM-- Up front is always not to be taken seriously. N. COSMOLOGY--ORIGIN OF THE UNIVERSE LEIBNIZ-- Every monad has an indestructable soul which has been here from the creation of the universe, or else has been created or destroyed by God . My personal view is that this would allow for creation of matter from mind such as in the Big Bang”. MATERIALISM-- The classic position is that the universe has always been, but there are modern scientific theories of the “Big Bang”. O. LIFE LEIBNIZ-- Everything in the universe is alive. MATERIALISM-- There are vaious materialistic accounts of the formation of life. P. DEATH LEIBNIZ-- Everything in the universe is alive. Each living things “unfolds” from its soul or monad as a seed unfolds into a living plant. At death, the rotting body stays attached to its monad, just as in Christianity we sleep after death until resurrected with a new body in the Second Coming MATERIALISM-- The termination of what is believed to be life. Q. DETERMINISM LEIBNIZ-- Every body in the universe moves according to a “Pre-established Harmony (PEH)”. In my personal view this allows for what might be called “effective free choice”, meaning that only choices in accord with the PEH are possible. MATERIALISM-- The termination of what is believed to be life. R. DIVINE INTERVENTION IN THE WORLD LEIBNIZ-- No divine intervention is possible or needed, since during the week of Creation, God drew up his Pre-established Harmony (the PEH) and rested on the 7th day, while the universe plays out according to this script without God's interventions. Since the PEH foresaw and acted according to all events, good or bad, this would allow for prayer to work or not work. Thus the PEH can be thought of as a divine musical composition or all-knowing computer program running on its own. In a sense, the PEH is God asleep. MATERIALISM-- Since there is no God, there can be no divine intervention. S. INTELLIGENCE LEIBNIZ-- The ability to make choices autonomously, not by some computer program. Every body in the universe moves according to a “Pre-established Harmony” (PEH) . MATERIALISM-- Matter may be intelligent, but we do not know its language. There is something call “artificial intgelligence” used in computerbut a computer, but e termination of what is believed to be life. T. CONSCIOUNESS LEIBNIZ-- Internal perception (see above), requiring a subject (self) and object. MATERIALISM-- Seems to me to be impossible, since materialism has no self to perceive or be conscious. U. MIND-BODY PROBLEM LEIBNIZ-- Since mind and body are both mental, there is no such problem. MATERIALISM-- Seems to me to be impossible, since materialism has no self to perceive or be conscious. V. THE
Re: Fictionalism!
On 6/11/2013 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2013, at 20:04, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2013, at 18:25, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 12:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 2:40 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jun 2013, at 11:20, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 17:55, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2013 1:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 05:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/7/2013 4:00 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Yes, if there was a text of this it would be nice... I found this: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ A fictionalist account holds that some things are fictional, i.e. don't exist even though their complete description is self-consistent. Everythingists apparently reject this idea. Platonists seem to equate 'true' with 'exists'. If you believe 17 is prime you must believe 17 exists. I think this is wrong. If you believe that a flying pink elephant is pink, must you believe a flying pink elephant exists? Flying pink elephants are pink and not pink. That's why flying pink elephant can't exist. A pink elephant is pink by construction. Exact. But the flying pink elephant are also not pink. By logic. Or show me a flying pink elephant living on this planet which isn't not pink. Bruno, how are flying pink elephants any different from things that I remember but am not experiencing this very moment? I add explanation. Here you describe two 1p events. They are similar, although I guess you don't have precise memory of having actually seen a Flying Pink Elephant in your life, except in cartoon or dreams. For example, I've been to Brussels but I'm not there right now. Brussels is an abstraction in my mind, but I believe it's the capital of Belgium. That's part of the Brussels abstraction, in the same sense that being pink is part of the flying pink elephant abstraction. No? I do not dispute that fact. Pink elephant are pink. But the pink elephant on this planet happens also to be brown rampant worms. And I'm afraid that is only a classical logician's joke. (x = Flying Pink Elephant) - (x = Brown Rampant Worms) is true on this planet because (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, on this planet (I think), But (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, is an empirical proposition. I agree. Not one you can prove from arithmetic or logic. But the point was that true propositions, like Flying pink elephants are pink don't imply the existence of anything; just like 17 is prime doesn't imply the existence of 17. But how do you formalize flying pink elephant are pink ? I am simpled minded, so I formalized it in a first order logical formula: if x is an elephant which is pink and which is flying then x is pink. This does not entail Ex( x = an elephant which is pink and which is flying) For the same reason that: if x is a prime number, which is even, and bigger that 3 then x is bigger than 3 does not entail Ex(x = even prime number bigger than 3). Actually it does. Let y=x is a prime number which is even and bigger than three. Then, if y anything; in classical logic everything follows from a contradiction. But we were talking about the metalogical relation of true/false and fictional/real. I don't think two are parallel. It's true that 17 is prime - but it doesn't follow that 17 is real. It's true that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street, but it doesn't follow that he existed. The difference comes from the fact that in arithmetic e can prove Ex(x = 17), but we cannot prove in your theory that Ex(= Sherlock Holmes). But E in those two propositions don't have the same meaning. In the first it means that the axioms of arithmetic imply there is an x=17. In the second it means there was person who had all or most of the characteristics described in Conan Doyle's stories. Of course something described by a contradiction can't exist. But a contradiction is dependent on an axiomatic system. So a pink elephant doesn't exist, but There is a pink elephant. is not a contradiction; it's just a falsehood and it's not the case that everything follows from a falsehood. It is the case that everything follows from a falsehood. (0=1) does implies everything. In classical logic. But logic is just supposed to formalize good reasoning. There is a pink elephant. may mean no more than That looks like an elephant painted pink. It's not an axiom of a formal system. I deliberately included flying because it makes the identification as elephant problematic. If we found an animal that looks like an elephant painted pink, we'd certainly call it a pink elephant. But if we found an animal that looked like an elephant with wings that could fly, we'd only call it a flying elephant metaphorically. Brent f - q is a tautology. It is
Re: Fictionalism!
On 6/11/2013 1:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2013, at 22:49, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 1:06 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: So numbers do not exist? They don't exist like elephants do. They may exist like Christmas or Sherlock Homes do. Is Sherlock Holmes a human? Please give us your theory of human, so that we can discuss if he exists or not. In some reasonable theory of humans, humans possess a body decomposable locally in biochemical components. This is not the case for fictional characters. Exactly. But fictional characters can satisfy existential propositions: Ex(x=friend of Dr. Watson), because E is context dependent. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Fictionalism!
From the video: What we do is we use the story of math, which is very good and very complete I think that summarizes the error of fictionalism. To believe math is a human created invention requires believing that everything we can ever know about math comes from the starting assumptions we choose. We now know this to be untrue, our picture (or anyone's picture) of math will always be incomplete, there is always more math out there to discover. We make progress in math the same way we do in all the other sciences, making observations, drawing conclusions, seeing if our theories are consistent, etc. Over time we develop our accepted axioms the same way we develop our fundamental physical theories. We observe and explore other mathematical structures/universes through the tool of simulation (either using our brains or using computers), and that is how information about other universes enters our own. Jason On Thu, Jun 6, 2013 at 5:31 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.netwrote: For your entertainment: https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embeddedv=TbNymweHW4E#! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Fictionalism!
Laughing stock: how can so many excellently educted and smart(est) scientists SERIOUSLY debate on farces like flying pink elephants? JM On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 12:28 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/11/2013 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2013, at 20:04, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2013, at 18:25, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 12:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 2:40 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jun 2013, at 11:20, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 17:55, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2013 1:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 05:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/7/2013 4:00 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Yes, if there was a text of this it would be nice... I found this: http://plato.stanford.edu/**entries/fictionalism-**mathematics/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ A fictionalist account holds that some things are fictional, i.e. don't exist even though their complete description is self-consistent. Everythingists apparently reject this idea. Platonists seem to equate 'true' with 'exists'. If you believe 17 is prime you must believe 17 exists. I think this is wrong. If you believe that a flying pink elephant is pink, must you believe a flying pink elephant exists? Flying pink elephants are pink and not pink. That's why flying pink elephant can't exist. A pink elephant is pink by construction. Exact. But the flying pink elephant are also not pink. By logic. Or show me a flying pink elephant living on this planet which isn't not pink. Bruno, how are flying pink elephants any different from things that I remember but am not experiencing this very moment? I add explanation. Here you describe two 1p events. They are similar, although I guess you don't have precise memory of having actually seen a Flying Pink Elephant in your life, except in cartoon or dreams. For example, I've been to Brussels but I'm not there right now. Brussels is an abstraction in my mind, but I believe it's the capital of Belgium. That's part of the Brussels abstraction, in the same sense that being pink is part of the flying pink elephant abstraction. No? I do not dispute that fact. Pink elephant are pink. But the pink elephant on this planet happens also to be brown rampant worms. And I'm afraid that is only a classical logician's joke. (x = Flying Pink Elephant) - (x = Brown Rampant Worms) is true on this planet because (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, on this planet (I think), But (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, is an empirical proposition. I agree. Not one you can prove from arithmetic or logic. But the point was that true propositions, like Flying pink elephants are pink don't imply the existence of anything; just like 17 is prime doesn't imply the existence of 17. But how do you formalize flying pink elephant are pink ? I am simpled minded, so I formalized it in a first order logical formula: if x is an elephant which is pink and which is flying then x is pink. This does not entail Ex( x = an elephant which is pink and which is flying) For the same reason that: if x is a prime number, which is even, and bigger that 3 then x is bigger than 3 does not entail Ex(x = even prime number bigger than 3). Actually it does. Let y=x is a prime number which is even and bigger than three. Then, if y anything; in classical logic everything follows from a contradiction. But we were talking about the metalogical relation of true/false and fictional/real. I don't think two are parallel. It's true that 17 is prime - but it doesn't follow that 17 is real. It's true that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street, but it doesn't follow that he existed. The difference comes from the fact that in arithmetic e can prove Ex(x = 17), but we cannot prove in your theory that Ex(= Sherlock Holmes). But E in those two propositions don't have the same meaning. In the first it means that the axioms of arithmetic imply there is an x=17. In the second it means there was person who had all or most of the characteristics described in Conan Doyle's stories. Of course something described by a contradiction can't exist. But a contradiction is dependent on an axiomatic system. So a pink elephant doesn't exist, but There is a pink elephant. is not a contradiction; it's just a falsehood and it's not the case that everything follows from a falsehood. It is the case that everything follows from a falsehood. (0=1) does implies everything. In classical logic. But logic is just supposed to formalize good reasoning. There is a pink elephant. may mean no more than That looks like an elephant painted pink. It's not an axiom of a formal system. I deliberately included
Re: Fictionalism!
Sadly, John, many people don't get the existence question! On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 5:18 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Laughing stock: how can so many excellently educted and smart(est) scientists SERIOUSLY debate on farces like flying pink elephants? JM On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 12:28 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 6/11/2013 12:51 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2013, at 20:04, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Jun 2013, at 18:25, meekerdb wrote: On 6/10/2013 12:19 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 2:40 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 09 Jun 2013, at 11:20, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 9:23 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 17:55, meekerdb wrote: On 6/8/2013 1:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 08 Jun 2013, at 05:15, meekerdb wrote: On 6/7/2013 4:00 PM, Stephen Paul King wrote: Yes, if there was a text of this it would be nice... I found this: http://plato.stanford.edu/**entries/fictionalism-**mathematics/http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fictionalism-mathematics/ A fictionalist account holds that some things are fictional, i.e. don't exist even though their complete description is self-consistent. Everythingists apparently reject this idea. Platonists seem to equate 'true' with 'exists'. If you believe 17 is prime you must believe 17 exists. I think this is wrong. If you believe that a flying pink elephant is pink, must you believe a flying pink elephant exists? Flying pink elephants are pink and not pink. That's why flying pink elephant can't exist. A pink elephant is pink by construction. Exact. But the flying pink elephant are also not pink. By logic. Or show me a flying pink elephant living on this planet which isn't not pink. Bruno, how are flying pink elephants any different from things that I remember but am not experiencing this very moment? I add explanation. Here you describe two 1p events. They are similar, although I guess you don't have precise memory of having actually seen a Flying Pink Elephant in your life, except in cartoon or dreams. For example, I've been to Brussels but I'm not there right now. Brussels is an abstraction in my mind, but I believe it's the capital of Belgium. That's part of the Brussels abstraction, in the same sense that being pink is part of the flying pink elephant abstraction. No? I do not dispute that fact. Pink elephant are pink. But the pink elephant on this planet happens also to be brown rampant worms. And I'm afraid that is only a classical logician's joke. (x = Flying Pink Elephant) - (x = Brown Rampant Worms) is true on this planet because (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, on this planet (I think), But (x = Flying Pink Elephant) is false for all x, is an empirical proposition. I agree. Not one you can prove from arithmetic or logic. But the point was that true propositions, like Flying pink elephants are pink don't imply the existence of anything; just like 17 is prime doesn't imply the existence of 17. But how do you formalize flying pink elephant are pink ? I am simpled minded, so I formalized it in a first order logical formula: if x is an elephant which is pink and which is flying then x is pink. This does not entail Ex( x = an elephant which is pink and which is flying) For the same reason that: if x is a prime number, which is even, and bigger that 3 then x is bigger than 3 does not entail Ex(x = even prime number bigger than 3). Actually it does. Let y=x is a prime number which is even and bigger than three. Then, if y anything; in classical logic everything follows from a contradiction. But we were talking about the metalogical relation of true/false and fictional/real. I don't think two are parallel. It's true that 17 is prime - but it doesn't follow that 17 is real. It's true that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street, but it doesn't follow that he existed. The difference comes from the fact that in arithmetic e can prove Ex(x = 17), but we cannot prove in your theory that Ex(= Sherlock Holmes). But E in those two propositions don't have the same meaning. In the first it means that the axioms of arithmetic imply there is an x=17. In the second it means there was person who had all or most of the characteristics described in Conan Doyle's stories. Of course something described by a contradiction can't exist. But a contradiction is dependent on an axiomatic system. So a pink elephant doesn't exist, but There is a pink elephant. is not a contradiction; it's just a falsehood and it's not the case that everything follows from a falsehood. It is the case that everything follows from a falsehood. (0=1) does implies everything. In classical logic. But logic is just supposed to formalize good reasoning. There is a pink
