Re: The missing perceiver in materialism and artificial intelligence and how to implement it

2013-06-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Jun 2013, at 19:20, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/16/2013 12:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Most are just dualist. They are indeed easily shown inconsistent.  
But the problem is not the absence of mind, it is the believe in a  
primary physical reality, which is not sustained by any evidences.


?? What's the evidence arithmetic is primary?  The only evidence for  
a theory is that it works.


No, it does not work. It fails since a long time on the mind-body  
problem, or it eliminates first person experiences and persons. It  
assumes also what I am trying to understand, the appearance of matter,  
and when I say that there are no evidences, I mean it: there are  
evidences for a physical reality, but *primitive* matter is like  
ether, phlogiston, or N rays: nobody has been able to provide  
evidences. It is just a simplifying assumption, and it is not used in  
any book of physics, even if it is assumed implicitly in some  
fundamental physics. Don't confuse physics and physicalism.


The fact that Arithmetic or Turing-equivalent might be primary are  
overwhelming. First we don't have arithmetic, computer (the math  
object) or anything like that without assuming it. Second it is  
assumed in all pieces of any exact science or human science, then we  
experience it everyday. We teach it without problem in all schools,  
etc. It is the only piece of knowledge on which all humans already  
agree (except a minority of philosophers, but they are easily shown  
inconsistent).




You seem to criticize primary physical reality because it doesn't  
include a more fundamental theory showing that it's primary - but  
that would a contradiction.


Indeed. I criticize primary physical reality for the same reason that  
atheists are right when criticizing the use of God as explanation.  
Primitive matter explains nothing. And then it prevents the search for  
rational explanations.




Whatever the most fundamental model is cannot have a justification  
showing it is fundamental.


That's not correct. Arithmetic or Turing-equivalent theories can  
explain entirely why we cannot get the axioms from less. You can prove  
in arithmetic that without the arithmetical axioms you don't get them.  
You can prove in arithmetic that Pressburger arithmetic (addition, but  
no multiplication) is decidable and complete (in the Gödel 1930  
sense). So you can prove in arithmetic that the fundamental theory is  
arithmetic or a consistent extension of arithmetic. Then with comp you  
can prove that we don't need to extend it for the ontology, and that  
from inside, you need and get *all* consistent exttension, leading to  
a many-world, or many-dreams, account of what we live.


Primitive matter is just a notion extrapolated from quite local  
perceptions. It is like the earth is flat. It works for architects,  
but not for sailors and space explorers.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




Re: In Defense of Penrose. That everybody --including materialists, empiricists and rationalists--is a Platonist

2013-06-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Jun 2013, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/16/2013 12:24 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 15 Jun 2013, at 21:57, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/15/2013 12:40 AM, chris peck wrote:

Hi Rog

As you have described them a materialist could not be a  
combination of both rationalism and empiricism,  because you  
have them as diametrically opposed. If reason alone is the  
source of knowledge, then experience isn't and can't be combined  
to be. Besides, Materialism is an ontological theory and doesn't  
give much of a hoot about how knowledge is aquired.


More to the point neither rationalism nor empiricism are branches  
of intuitionism.


Chris Peck is right here.



The moment of inspiration Penrose attributes to the mind  
connecting with a realm of ideas is neither an act of reason nor  
sensory experience. Moreover, If logic is to be deductive then,  
by definition, conclusions must never follow from unexplainable  
leaps of intuition.


Where does the persuasive power of logic come from?  Why do you  
believe, Either X or not-X is true?  Is it not a matter of  
intuition?


Yes, but not in the sense of the intuitionist.





Isn't logic just an attempt to formalize intuitive reasoning.


Only reasoning, where the intuition is used only in the choice of  
the axiom, and not in the reasoning.


Why not in the rules of inference too?  Rejecting non-constructive  
proofs is a change in reasoning.  I don't think there is such a  
sharp division between axioms and rules of inference as you imply.


I did not imply that. In most system, you can always limit the rules  
of inference by adding axioms. With enough axioms, and the modus  
ponens rule, you can derive all the other rules of inference. In  
particular, quantum logic, intuitionist logic and classical logic can  
be all formalized with only the modus ponens rules, and with the same  
rules for the quantifiers, just by suppressing some axioms in the  
Kleene's presentation of classical logic. You get quantum logic by  
replacing p-(q-p) by (p-q) - (r-t) - (p - q) (limiting the a  
posteriori-axiom for implicative formula); you get intuitionist logic  
by abandoning ~~p - p.


Bruno






Brent



Basically intuitionism reject the idea that there is an independent  
reality such that A v ~A applies to it. They accept only ~ ~(A V ~A).


If we limit reality to sigma_1 truth, like in the comp TOE, there  
is no genuine difference between intuitionism and platonism. But an  
intuitionist should still say no to the doctor, as the FPI is not  
constructive. Washington V Moscow needs a non-intuitionist OR.


Bruno







Brent

If they do they have not been logically deduced, have they? And  
infact that is Penrose's point : leaps of intuition can not be  
modelled computationally. logic, ofcourse, can be. since,  
allegedly, minds can grope for and master facts beyond the scope  
of deduction, they must be qualitatively different from computer  
programs which can only deduce things logically.


You really seem to have things back to front in this post.

Regards


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/





--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




In spacetime (matter) and beyond spacetime (energy)

2013-06-17 Thread Roger Clough
Hi 

Since there has been some question from materialists about my use of the phrase 
beyond spacetime,
I thought I would show that this is a perfectly legitimate concept now being 
investigated
by the likes of Roger Penrose and Lee Smolin.

Here is a 2011 article discussing phase space, which is another name for 
one form of beyond spacetime:

Beyond space-time: Welcome to phase space 
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21128241.700-beyond-spacetime-welcome-to-phase-space.html#.Ub7EqJy0S-U

As I gather, the issue has arisen from:

1) Explorations beyond the spacetime world of Einstein, and

2) The fact if bodies collide inelastically, one has to consider
the conservation not just of energy or of momentum, but
I believe of their sum.

In looking into this, I see that energy, being a scalar, is beyond spacetime,
while momentum, a  vector,  is not. 

Since I have been referring to mind as being beyond spacetime,
perhaps there is a connection between mind and energy.

- Roger Clough



Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/17/2013 
See my Leibniz site at
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




Re: Consciousness in the Materialist, Computationalist and Leibniz models

2013-06-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 16 Jun 2013, at 19:31, Roger Clough wrote:


Consciousness in the Materialist, Computationalist and Leibniz models
This image of a man looking out a window represents the Subject/ 
Object distinction.

public domain 6_.jpg

The man represents the subject, which is subjective or inside.  
Outside of the window is the objective world.
1) In the materialist model of consciousness there is no subject,  
because nothing is subjective-- everything is material or objective.


2) The computationalist or computer model of consciousness is  
essentially the same since everything is numbers,
which are objects, being objective. So there is no subject and hence  
no consciousnress.



This is not correct. Everything is number, in the ontology, but we  
assume not just the numbers, but also addition and multiplication, and  
this is enough to get the dreams and the first person subjectivity,  
even formally in applying the oldest and best theory of knowledge (the  
one of Theaetetus).


You are confusing Bp and Bp  p. It is normal as they are equivalent,  
but with comp, the equivalence can be seen by God, and not by the  
finite terrestrial creature.


Bruno






3) In the Leibniz model, the window is open so that both inside  
subject and outside object are subjective.

In this case we can have consciousness = subject + object,



Dr. Roger Clough NIST (ret.) 6/16/2013
See my Leibniz site at
http://team.academia.edu/RogerClough

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




Re: On Global Warming----The sun is getting a little hotter

2013-06-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Jun 2013, at 01:30, Jason Resch wrote:





On Sun, Jun 16, 2013 at 12:04 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be  
wrote:


snip



That people can initiate law is nice, though.
I would like to initiate the prohibition of prohibition. Oops :)


:-)

What is freedom of speech without freedom of thought?  When we  
upload ourselves it will be all the more clear that making certain  
substances illegal is tantamount to making certain computations  
(thoughts, ways of thinking, and states of consciousness) illegal.



Yes, but we will have to do that. You would certainly not appreciate  
that I copy you, without noticing to you, and reconstitute you in my  
super-mac machine, and torture you, without your consent. You will  
even less appreciate that my lawyer defends me by saying: ---oh but  
that is just running a computation which in any case already exist  
in arithmetic. The problem is that by implementing it, I make it  
relatively normal (in the Gaussian sense) to you, and your suffering  
will be statistically stable from your point of view. So I think you  
will agree that some computations, done without consent (but that's  
part of that computation) will and should be illegal.
Freedom of thought and mind do have some limit. Freedom of speech too,  
like defamation, bullying, all those sort of violence is usually  
illegal, for not bad reasons, I think.


Now, we should not penalize non violent crimes, and as nobody  
complains about the salvia computation, there should be no reason to  
make such computation illegal, but again, we cannot dose people, that  
is,  making them live a computation without their consent (which is  
the main golden rule). For some people salvia is a bit like a  
torture ...


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




Re: How does comp explain interference?

2013-06-17 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Jun 2013, at 04:39, Jason Resch wrote:

One question that comes to my mind is how computationalism might  
lead to the phenomenon of interference.  How is it that infinite  
programs going through a state can interfere?


Might interference be something local to the geography of this  
particular universe, or is it something comp predicts to be global  
for all physics for all observers?


That's the most important question, of all.

To be sure, even just that is still open.

In case interference are not extract from comp, it would mean that the  
quantum is a geographical phenomenon, or that the SWE is non linear.


But the quantum is so deep, and is somehow connected to linearity and  
symmetries which are even deeper, so that I doubt that physics might  
be not quantum, and I estimate that comp, and the whole of physics,  
would lost interest in case that interference feature was not a  
consequence of comp.


But then, eventually, when the math are done, the fact is that we get  
exactly what we need to have interference, and I hope I will be able  
to explain enough of this on the FOAR list, soon or a bit later.


In a nutshell:

Physics = measure on the relative consistent extensions (by UDA), and  
this is given mainly by the three points of view:


Bp  p, Bp  Dt, Bp  Dt  p

Comp will be translated in arithmetic by the restriction of p to the  
sigma_1 sentences,


then the logic associated to the three hypostases get indeed quantum- 
like, by having a quantization formula:


p - []p,

with []p given by the hypostases mentioned just above. You might try  
to search LASE in the archive, as I have call it here (for Little  
Abstract Schroedinger Equation).


This makes the corresponding logic obeying a quantum logic, and it  
suggests both the linearity and the symmetries, and ... the existence  
of interferences. But some work remains to be done to verify this in  
all details, and to conclude that we have a quantum computer in our  
comp neighborhoods.


There is a work by Rawling and Selesnick which suggest we can extract  
a quantum NOR from p - []p, but it uses the necessitation rule,  
and we lost it in comp, so it is not clear how we can use it.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




Re: The missing perceiver in materialism and artificial intelligence and how to implement it

2013-06-17 Thread meekerdb

On 6/17/2013 1:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Jun 2013, at 19:20, meekerdb wrote:


On 6/16/2013 12:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Most are just dualist. They are indeed easily shown inconsistent. But the problem is 
not the absence of mind, it is the believe in a primary physical reality, which is not 
sustained by any evidences.


?? What's the evidence arithmetic is primary?  The only evidence for a theory is that 
it works.


No, it does not work. It fails since a long time on the mind-body problem, or it 
eliminates first person experiences and persons.


That seems to me just a failure of imagination; like those who said chemistry fails to 
explain life because chemicals are alive.  Yes, chemistry failed for a long time - but 
then it succeeded.


It assumes also what I am trying to understand, the appearance of matter, and when I say 
that there are no evidences, I mean it: there are evidences for a physical reality, but 
*primitive* matter is like ether, phlogiston, or N rays: nobody has been able to provide 
evidences. It is just a simplifying assumption, and it is not used in any book of 
physics, even if it is assumed implicitly in some fundamental physics. Don't confuse 
physics and physicalism.


I agree that nobody needs to assume matter is primitive - in fact physicists are 
continually looking for more fundamental stuff which is what led Tegmark to his all 
mathematical objects idea.  But this seems to me just semantics - what do we call the 
stuff that is fundamental matter, computation, mathematical objects...who cares!  
All we care about is whether we can fit them into a coherent theory that explains the world.




The fact that Arithmetic or Turing-equivalent might be primary are overwhelming. First 
we don't have arithmetic, computer (the math object) or anything like that without 
assuming it. Second it is assumed in all pieces of any exact science or human science, 
then we experience it everyday. We teach it without problem in all schools, etc. It is 
the only piece of knowledge on which all humans already agree (except a minority of 
philosophers, but they are easily shown inconsistent).




You seem to criticize primary physical reality because it doesn't include a more 
fundamental theory showing that it's primary - but that would a contradiction.


Indeed. I criticize primary physical reality for the same reason that atheists are right 
when criticizing the use of God as explanation. Primitive matter explains nothing. And 
then it prevents the search for rational explanations.




Whatever the most fundamental model is cannot have a justification showing it is 
fundamental.


That's not correct. Arithmetic or Turing-equivalent theories can explain entirely why we 
cannot get the axioms from less. You can prove in arithmetic that without the 
arithmetical axioms you don't get them.


But that doesn't prove that they are true, nor does it prove than no other axioms might be 
true.  So how does that prove it's fundamental?  Your argument seems circular.


You can prove in arithmetic that Pressburger arithmetic (addition, but no 
multiplication) is decidable and complete (in the Gödel 1930 sense). So you can prove in 
arithmetic that the fundamental theory is arithmetic or a consistent extension of 
arithmetic. Then with comp you can prove that we don't need to extend it for the 
ontology, and that from inside, you need and get *all* consistent exttension, leading to 
a many-world, or many-dreams, account of what we live.


But you don't get all the stuff that physics has explained with the Standard Model and 
General Relativity.  You just *assume* it must be in there somewhere - which doesn't count 
as explanation in my mind.


Brent



Primitive matter is just a notion extrapolated from quite local perceptions. It is like 
the earth is flat. It works for architects, but not for sailors and space explorers.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/



No virus found in this message.
Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com
Version: 2013.0.3345 / Virus Database: 3199/6417 - Release Date: 06/16/13

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything 
List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
Everything List group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit