RE: [foar] Amoeba's Secret now available in paperback
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Thursday, March 27, 2014 5:24 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: [foar] Amoeba's Secret now available in paperback On 28 March 2014 05:28, Chris de Morsella cdemorse...@yahoo.com wrote: In some ways it can be compared to a recipe. the right ingredients AND the right timing sequence is key.. And makes the difference in outcome between some sad lump of something and the brilliant cake. Yes, although I think you get (easier) second chances with programming. LOL that you do. though in many big environments if you break the build once you get to eat raw broccoli; you break it twice you're fired. So then again perhaps not, in some cases. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote: On 3/27/2014 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Why observable? Why not just variable - which it is in current formulations of QM. ? Position, in QM, is represented by an observable (some operator in a Hilbert space). Its eigenvalue are the variable which can be instantiated by a measurement. I am not sure I grasp the remark, nor that it would change anything. If some physical data are actually infinite, a non-computationalist can argue that you can emulate an infinity of mind states in a finite portion of some physical-space-time. But with real valued variables can't there be hypercomputation? Yes. But you can have hypercomputation also when working with only natural numbers, like a machine computing functions from N to N with the help of the Halting Oracle, or with any pi_i or sigma_i oracles. We know this enlarge properly a lot the class of computable functions. I am not convinced by the argument of Kent, but perhaps an improvement can be made. Von Neumann wrote a paper where he estimated that the probability of self-duplication machines apparition on Earth is very low. I am not convinced, but this still suggests that the theory of evolution, when precise enough, might see the trace of the multiverse, in case that probability is so low that the origin of life involves non trivial quantum computations. Gödel also suggested that science might have to admit a God in case the speed of evolution violates the (known) physical laws. Apparently Godel didn't see the Many-world alternative to God, for that function. Godel and Einstein missed the many-thing idea, and I see people resist. Yet, I think that with mechanism, we just cannot avoid that multiplication when we believe statements like Goldbach conjecture is true or false. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 23:33, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 21:26, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 23:26, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 10:30, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. With sufficiently advanced technology (e.g. uploading yourself to a digital brain), the upper limit on your brain size is theoretically unbounded, except perhaps by cosmological considerations. Prepare to join the Overmind... Hmm, I can understand that you put your physicalist hat (because it is a day with a T!), but here you put both the physicalist hat, and the comp hat. Should I infer that every day with a T, you are inconsistent? Well this assumes physical supervenience I think, but so did Stathis, I think, so I was responding in kind. One could posit not uploading as such but adding more and more digital implants and so on that eventually one can throw out the organic core when it dies, and continue to exist in the implants. Whether this is you or not being another question. But anyway, yes, I'm sure you can assume I'm inconsistent some of the time! Same for me! I was just alluding that I have much doubt that the physical supervenience can make sense when we postulate the digital mechanist hypothesis. Note that being immortal by having a growing brain might not be funny, and once immortal, people will love forgetting and resetting their mind. To much souvenirs might be heavy to support. When human will be technologically immortal they might regret it and have a strong nostalgia of death and amnesia. The eternal sunshineindeed. If brain size is finite then resetting, or erasing memories at least, becomes necessary eventually if one is to have (and remember) new experiences. To quote some schoolboy, please sir, can I stop now, my brain is full! The real art is in forgetting, and putting the less relevant information in the trash, and keeping the most relevant one, instead of the contrary. The molting of the spiders is also quite intriguing in question of dying and surviving. It is easy to conceive immortal creature with non growing brain, and yes, they will come back an infinity of times on all their experiences, without noticing it of course. In buddhist term, terrestrial or technological immortality might only be a manner to prevent the nirvana, and to pursue our staying in the samsara forever. Then you can develop an infinite karma making harder and harder to get the nirvana and a pacified soul. Well that's true, in Buddhist terms... is there any correspondence between Buddhism and comp? Plotinus, and most of the neoplatonism, is close to the teaching of some buddhism, and there are books on that subject. Then I propose a lexicon between Plotinus and the machine's talk about herself. I think all mystics are close to what the universal machine discover when looking inward, certainly in some literal or formal sense. It is, very roughly, the difference between Plato and Aristotle, or between the mystics and the naturalists, or even between the mathematicians and the physicists. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 17:59, meekerdb wrote: On 3/27/2014 12:48 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same person after one night, but not after seven years (assuming the whole material body constitution has been changed). That seems to be equivocation on same. OK. That is what I was trying to illustrate, in the case of some non- comp axiom. In a sense I'm the same person as Brent Meeker of 1944, but I'm certainly very different. And not just because I'm made of different atoms (which are indistinguishable anyway). No problem. Bruno Brent The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He died because too much new information was added to his brain. -- Saibal Mitra -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 28 Mar 2014, at 00:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human minds, Because the number is limited by the Beckenstein bound if we assume physical supervenience ? but an infinite number of possible minds if you are running them on the Turing machine in Platonia. (Or an infinite number of Turing machines, according to comp ;-) Does comp suggest that consciousness corresponds to an infinite number of different possible mental states (rather than a very large, but finite, number of them) ? (If so should I assume we're talkng about a countable infinity?) I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object (which seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue of being true independently of my will, or even of the notion of universe, god, etc. You need just to assume, or accept as true, relations like x + 0 = x, for all x, etc. It is a very weak form of realism, and basically, this is assumed by all scientists. *After* UDA, the assumptions are no more than classical logic and , for all x and y: 0 ≠ (x + 1) ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) - x = y x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x * 0 = 0 x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x The boxes and diamond are defined in that theory, the theology and physics is derived in the extensions of that theory (the observers) simulated by that theory. There are many other equivalent theories. There are some metaphysical or theological consequences, clear with comp, but except for the yes doctor, there is no special ontological commitment done, not even on the numbers, that is no more than in Euclid proofs of the infinity of the prime numbers. The computations are implemented in virtue of the consequences of the axioms above. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 15:55, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote: Citeren Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com: On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. -- Stathis Papaioannou Yes, there are only a finite number of quantum states that even the entire visible part of the universe can be in. In which theory? I mean, in which QM? I think that even an electron in an atom of hydrogen can be in infinitely many quantum states, in non GR version of QM. I guess I miss something here. Bruno The different mental states I can find myself in can be regarded as different measurement outcomes. Saibal -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Max and FPI
On 27 Mar 2014, at 17:50, meekerdb wrote: On 3/26/2014 11:38 PM, LizR wrote: OK, I suppose the argument makes sense, sort of (although it seems more likely to me that genes would act as though there is one universe whether that's the case or not, for reasons I already mentioned). Anyway let's assume it does, at least for the sake of argument, and see if it's coherent, if you'll pardon a quantum pun. Interesting that in quantum mechanics coherent mean interferes with itself but in logic it means doesn't contradict itself. Well, the official term is consistent. Actually coherent is used in linear logic, and some quantum logic, and also in topology, with a meaning which somehow generalizes interfere with itself. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coherent_space http://llwiki.ens-lyon.fr/mediawiki/index.php/Coherent_semantics Bruno So the idea is that in a multiverse we - indeed all animals (and plants, etc) should plump for a reproductive strategy that is somehow equivalent to the three descendants on a quantum coin toss one. I'd say it's coherent, but inapplicable because a universe where a species with strategy B occasionally gets wiped out, but those with strategy A don't is a very unlikely universe. But if universes were like that, so getting wiped out was correlated with reproductive strategy, then it's an interesting question whether 'natural selection' under MWI is different than for a single universe. I guess my next question is, what could such a reproductive strategy possibly look like in real life, given that most animals have no access to quantum coin tossing? I suppose you could look at the exigencies of life and mutation and reproduction as providing the quantum coin tosses. But I don't think it's realistic because getting wiped out as a species is more a question of ecological niche and sheer numbers than reproductive strategy. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
On 28 Mar 2014, at 00:23, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 20:12, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 04:44, LizR wrote: I said that the continuity is of exactly the same nature (not that the states were the same - in fact the states are successor states, as I mentioned - which is something assumed to exist but still to be defined). I think that the successor states are well defined, in the 3p view, and i the 1p view too, even if the domain of the 1p indeterlinacy is a complex and highly non constructive notion. How does one define a successor state, or states? (I would guess as a state that has a most recent memory of the preceeding state, perhaps?) In the 3p view, it is the next state of the digital machine you are at some correct level. Applications of this needs to add some precisions, depending of what problems is handled. In the 1p view, you need some God's 3-1 view on yourself, which means the notion is not really definable (and thus the domain of indeterminacy is a fuzzy complex object). But we can progress in the math. In particular we can extract information on the geometry and topology of the states, by studying the logic of the possible instant/ views, like in modal logic, the structure of the kripke multiverse can be extracted from a modal discourse/formula. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 28 Mar 2014, at 1:47 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Mar 2014, at 11:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even if there is no physical communication between its distant parts. Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank Tipler's Physics of Immortality view which basically says that identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one another, and we experience all the states together in an infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic, man!) You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that they will have a similar consciousness. Assuming comp! If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in my liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it is conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp. This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are. Assuming comp. If the exact infinite state of the bile is required, then by definition, the other person is a different person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice. After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor an authentically other person. If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a similar brain you will make a similar consciousness. yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is in the identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is conceivably similar, but not mine. I agree this makes not a lot of sense, but this is because we put the identity (and consciousness) in the relational information, and this uses comp. The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference here. The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same person after a night's sleep. I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here. Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might say that he is the same person after one night, but not after seven years (assuming the whole material body constitution has been changed). That is a difficulty for his theory, but it is logically conceivable if we abandon comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp has not that problem, but then eventually we must explain matter from information handled through number relations/computations. Bruno It doesn't follow that if consciousness is substrate specific it can't be duplicated; OK. But the point is that it might, and that would be the case if my consciousness is attached to both the exact quantum state of my brain and substrate specific (which is a vague thing, yet incompatible with computationalism). it can in fact be duplicated in a straightforward way, by making a biological brain. But we do have evidences that biological copying is at some rather high level, and that it does not copy any piece of matter. It replaces all molecules and atoms with new atoms extracted from food. Here I am just playing the role of devil's advocate and I assume non comp to make a logical point. Even if consciousness is due to an immaterial soul one could say that it could be duplicated if God performs a miracle. Right again, but here too, it might not be the case. God could decide to NOT do a miracle, given that It is so powerful. The claim that the duplicated consciousness isn't really me is a claim about the nature of personal identity, and is independent of any theory of how consciousness is generated. Not if the theory of consciousness is based on personal identity. Your claim makes sense again for a functionalist, but not necessarily to all non-functionalists. A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 27 Mar 2014, at 23:37, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 23:42, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: On 27 March 2014 19:11, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 26 Mar 2014, at 22:30, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On Thursday, March 27, 2014, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Wed, Mar 26, 2014 at 05:06:46PM +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: The engineering tolerance of the brain must be finite (and far higher than the Planck level) if we are to survive from moment to moment, and that implies there are only a finite number of possible brains and hence mental states. Steady on, I don't think it does that at all, unless you constrain the physical world to be bounded somehow in both space and time. I think you were just trying to say that the space of brains (and mental states) is discrete, something I could agree with. Unless you allow brains to grow infinitely big, there are only a finite number of possible brains even in an infinite universe. Assuming comp. If the brain is defined by its material quantum state, and assuming electron position is a continuous observable, then we can have an infinity of brains, even when limiting their size. Is electron position a continuous observable? Even if it is and there are an infinity of brains, why should that result in an infinity of minds? It would seem unlikely that brains would evolve so that an arbitrarily small change in the position of an electron would cause a change in consciousness, and we know that even gross changes in the brain, as occur in stroke or head injury, sometimes have remarkably little effect. I think Bruno must have a materialist hat on here?! Excellent observation! In this context I assume some no-comp, and matter, and real numbers, etc. I can do that too :) It is the context of trying to understand what Stathis is saying, in a proper generalization of comp (still a bit fuzzy to me). In comp the substitution level isn't necessarily at the level of individual electrons, surely... The weak comp I consider is neutral on this, as long as the role of the minimal element is Turing emulable. It could the level of branes or strings, the consequences would still follow. Non-comp needs to give a role to an actual infinities with *all* its decimals. But that raises another question, for me at least - in comp are there only finitely many possible states of mind? They are a priori infinite enumerable. But for some you need *gigantic* brain. Well, they do exist in arithmetic. So one would literally be able to travel full circle through all possible minds - eventually? The UD does that, and although there are many circles, there are also spirales, complex infinite histories which never close on itself. It is hard to conclude, as the 1p and 3p relation is complex, but infinite self-complexifying conscious state cannot be excluded easily neither. A zoom in the mandelbrot set illustrates never-ending self- complification. The more a tiny Mandelbrot set is tiny, the more and more complex will be its filaments. For example: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iL8iZ7lcVnk (3 minutes, + sound). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PD2XgQOyCCk (16 minutes silent zoom). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Max and FPI
On 27 Mar 2014, at 21:49, Richard Ruquist wrote: Brent, If as you say in the multiverse everything happens and infinitely many times then there can be only one multiverse, I think I agree, Richard, but you should perhaps added precisions: like saying everything *consistent* (in some theory) happens, infinitely many times. Computationalism entails that every relative computational states is realized in infinitely many universal number relations, and the physical realities are first person plural sort of projections. which negates a number of cosmology theories like Linde's Chaotic Inflation Cosmology. But then the potential he used provides the best fit to BICEP2 gravitational-wave data. Perhaps it is the multiverse that is falsified? That would falsify computationalism, but who knows. Bruno Richard On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 1:02 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 3/27/2014 12:51 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: 2014-03-27 5:39 GMT+01:00 meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net: On 3/26/2014 9:03 PM, LizR wrote: On 27 March 2014 16:33, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: I don't think you can infer anything about gender preference for triple or bust vs maintain what we've got from evolutionary biology. Well OK, but what I've read (and indeed observed and experienced throughout my life) indicates that people, and most animals who care for their young, employ strategies which could (roughly) be described as male-risky, female-play-it-safe (or at least safer). E.g. it's the male grasshoppers who keep me awake with their racket, the male birds who wake me in the morning with THEIR racket, peacocks with the big showy tails, male bower birds who expend the energy to make the bowers - all males employing (relatively) risky strategies to attract females. (Because, you see, we're just naturally fabulous and you guys have to make the running. Sorry!) Kent's idea would be to look around and see whether people were overwhelmingly type A or type B. If MWI is true they should be type B, if false type A. Yes, I realise what he was saying. I don't think it makes much sense, because it would require people to believe in the existence of a multiverse before they could formulate a reproductive strategy involving that knowledge, and the idea of a multiverse has only existed for about 50 years. Not believe in, just believe MWI is possibly true. But they wouldn't actually have to have any opinion; that's just a way to explain it. Presumably evolution would have already made the choice and we'd all be overwhelmingly either A type or B type, whether we knew it or not. The problem would be finding out which we are if it's just in our genes and not necessarily consciously available. I'd say more of problem for the test is that the aren't really two choices which are passed on genetically. There's really nothing to limit one to just replacement even if there's only one universe. Otherwise, I'd expect people to act as though they are in a single universe, regardless of whether that is so, because that's how things appear to be. I'd expect genes to exhibit a similar strategy - they aren't (can't be) interested in what happens in a parallel world which can't communicate with the one they're in. There shouldn't be any split along gender line. Well there is, at least in my experience (and in various books, articles, nature documentaries and so on that I've come across). Indeed, apart from a few die-hard feminists I don't know of anyone who still adheres to the notion that people are blank slates and that gender roles are purely assigned by culture (humans exhibit sexual dimorphism, and brain scans indicate that it doesn't magically stop at our necks. Plus, why would blank-slatism only be true of us, but not the rest of the animal/fish/insect kingdom where it - often blatantly - isn't the case?) Anyway, that's why I don't think one can sensibly analyse an entire species' reproductive strategy to see if it was A or B (or something else), because reproductive strategies tend to be gender specific. It seems like a daft idea - maybe it's a guy thing? ;-) I don't understand your reasoning. Sure guys are less risk averse. But A vs B is pure win-or-lose depending on whether MWI is true or not. If MWI is true then strategy B is the winner no matter whether you're male or female...and not by a little bit or just probabilistically, but exponentially, overwhelmingly better. If MWI is false and there's just one universe then B is an absolute, zero survivors loser. The thing is even if MWI is true or not... strategy A or B are simply idea with no referent in the reality (even as possibility)... the 0.5 probability of going extinct at the next gen simply refer to nothing real in our reality, same thing for the steady reproduction... so I can't see
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
On 28 Mar 2014, at 02:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: of course you cannot even fathom a 'Q-state' with so much unknow/able/n in everything we KNOW about, or don't even KNOW ABOUT. . Reproduce? No chance. You can work only on whatever is known today. (And that, too, is questionable in your (my?) science) I would say that we can work only from what we believe or assume today, and might indeed be shown wrong tomorrow. Assume and suppose are inadequate. How can I understand that without assuming that by using the word and you assume the same meaning than me, actually that both assume and suppose are inadequate. But then your statement is self-defeating. On the contrary, science works by making assumptions all the times. Why not? Even the best possibility is hollow.. Cloning would use all those infinite details we miss in repro. Everything is an unidentified term, unless you add everything OF WHAT (restricted), which of course makes the term laughable (everything of something not everything).. Your proclaimed fellow agnosticism must agree to that I suppose. You don't seem agnostic on the question if there is really something more that numbers (in company of their laws). I am agnostic, on comp, and thus on its consequences too. I just offer an argument showing that if comp is true, then it makes no sense to say that there is more than arithmetic. No machine can conceived something more complex than arithmetic seen from inside. That's beyond mathematics. Bruno John Mikes On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:37 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, How does cloning differ from asking the doctor. Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- just to indicate that this is an important question. No problem: I love all questions :) The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you have to detsroy the original. But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a quite higher level than the quantum state. You cannot clone this or that exemplary of Alice in Wonderland, but it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is way above the quantum level defining the material book. Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be transmitted All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even if our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does not use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, which is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... as pedagogical steps. But a majority of people believe that the brain, although plausibly a quantum object, works at a much higher level, so I don't insist so much on this, given that we get a non-cloning result directly by comp. OK? Right, and I suspect that consciousness could be duplicated if the consciousness level is at or above the substitution level. Seems we have several levels: the particle and quantum levels, and the consciousness and the substitution level, The conscious level is fixed by nature. The substitution level seems to be fixed by mathematics. They both may be the same: nature and math, that is. Richard Bruno Richard On Mon, Mar 24, 2014 at 2:20 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 24 Mar 2014, at 00:43, Joseph Knight wrote: Bruno, I've seen you say before that COMP (in addition to the first-person indeterminacy) also predicts the no-cloning theorem. Could you explain how? In a purely qualitative way, that should be easy, if you succeed in staying naive-cold with the UDA up to step 7. Imagine that I decide to copy a piece of matter. Unlike information, where things are crisp at some point, it is already not clear what is the relevant level, so an exact copy should be defined by something like a non distinguishability with respect to some set of instruments. Anyway, at some point, in your zooming toward finer and finer description of the piece of matter, you arrive at your own substitution level. At that level, the matter is no more made of subpart, but is undetermined, as you comp state is no more dependent of such details, and *you* diffuse on
Re: [foar] COMP = no cloning?
Bruno wrote 3-28 at 2/32: *I would say that we can work only from what we believe or assume today, and might indeed be shown wrong tomorrow.* Thanks for adding 'belief' to my assume + suppose. *How can I understand that without assuming that by using the word and you assume the same meaning than me, actually that both assume and suppose are inadequate.* *But then your statement is self-defeating. * So be it: I do not go for the TRURH. *On the contrary, science works by making assumptions all the times. Why not? * We are not of the best appriciation of 'science' in general, are we? *You don't seem agnostic on the question if there is really something more that numbers (in company of their laws).* How about being agnostic on NUMBERS (in company of their laws)? I don't feel obliged to *know* things usually filling up the books. *I just offer an argument showing that if comp is true, then it makes no sense to say that there is more than arithmetic. No machine can conceived something more complex than arithmetic seen from inside. That's beyond mathematics.* Huh? Is your(?) opinion how 'complex' a machine can conceive a fundamental truth? And now you call it mathematics? do you know the utter limits of it? (beyond!!). Granted, we start from SOME (belief) system and try to fill in the voids. There is no evidence that we do the right thing (me included - why I do not want to 'persuade' anybody to accept my ideas). I expose my argumentation to trigger some good responses what I can use in my further thinking. Thanks for the reply John M On Fri, Mar 28, 2014 at 2:32 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Mar 2014, at 02:54, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: of course you cannot even fathom a 'Q-state' with so much unknow/able/n in everything we KNOW about, or don't even KNOW ABOUT. . Reproduce? No chance. You can work only on whatever is known today. (And that, too, is questionable in your (my?) science) I would say that we can work only from what we believe or assume today, and might indeed be shown wrong tomorrow. *Assume* and *suppose* are inadequate. How can I understand that without assuming that by using the word and you assume the same meaning than me, actually that both assume and suppose are inadequate. But then your statement is self-defeating. On the contrary, science works by making assumptions all the times. Why not? Even the *best possibility* is hollow.. Cloning would use all those infinite details we miss in repro. Everything is an unidentified term, unless you add everything OF WHAT (restricted), which of course makes the term laughable (everything of something not everything).. Your proclaimed fellow agnosticism must agree to that I suppose. You don't seem agnostic on the question if there is really something more that numbers (in company of their laws). I am agnostic, on comp, and thus on its consequences too. I just offer an argument showing that if comp is true, then it makes no sense to say that there is more than arithmetic. No machine can conceived something more complex than arithmetic seen from inside. That's beyond mathematics. Bruno John Mikes On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 4:37 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.comwrote: On Tue, Mar 25, 2014 at 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 24 Mar 2014, at 20:18, Richard Ruquist wrote: Bruno, How does cloning differ from asking the doctor. Forgive me but it seems that you are being contradictory- just to indicate that this is an important question. No problem: I love all questions :) The non cloning theorem says that you cannot copy exactly a *quantum state*. Note that you can still teleport it quantum mechanically, but you have to detsroy the original. But nobody pretends that your mind needs your exact quantum state. It needs only a substitution level, which is usually estimate to be at a quite higher level than the quantum state. You cannot clone this or that exemplary of Alice in Wonderland, but it is easy to make a copy of its classical information content, which is way above the quantum level defining the material book. Bruno, My concern is at what level is consciousness. I suspect that if it is below the substitution level, then consciousness will not be transmitted All the same with this present post. Once send it will be multiplied, without any information loss, to all participant to this forum. Right, except that I suspect that the post is not conscious. Now, I should add that the consequence of comp remains correct, even if our substitution level is sub quantum, and asks for the total quantum state. WHY? because the consequences depends only on step 7, which does not use any duplication of any states, but only their multi-preparation, which is done automatically by the arithmetical reality, or the Universal Dovetailer. Only the pedagogical step 1-6 are no more available except ... as pedagogical steps. But a
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is too much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a relation with functionalism in the math sense, where an object is defined by its functional relations with other objects, and the identity *is* in the functionality. Then function is always used in two very different sense, especially in computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the body). Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough original atoms to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor, but only if a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a functionalist? Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)? Just to help me to understand. Thanks. A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical substance that comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial brain it may behave like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God could by a miracle grant the artificial brain consciousness, and he could even grant it a similar consciousness to my own, so that it will think it is me. However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we were numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct things numerically identical. I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people have on personal identity, and it is independent of their position on the possibility of computer consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Scott Aaronson vs. Max Tegmark
On 29 March 2014 05:15, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 28 Mar 2014, at 00:00, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: On 28 March 2014 09:51, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 28 March 2014 11:46, Stathis Papaioannou stath...@gmail.com wrote: I would say there is only a finite number of possible biological human minds, Because the number is limited by the Beckenstein bound if we assume physical supervenience ? but an infinite number of possible minds if you are running them on the Turing machine in Platonia. (Or an infinite number of Turing machines, according to comp ;-) Does comp suggest that consciousness corresponds to an infinite number of different possible mental states (rather than a very large, but finite, number of them) ? (If so should I assume we're talkng about a countable infinity?) I think you have to specify whether comp means merely that a computer simulation of a brain can be conscious or go the whole way with Bruno's conclusion that there is no actual physical computer and all possible computations are necessarily implemented by virtue of their status as platonic objects. It is not so much in virtue of their status as platonic object (which seems to imply some metaphysical hypothesis), but in virtue of being true independently of my will, or even of the notion of universe, god, etc. But there is the further notion of implementation. The obvious objection is that computations might be true but they cannot give rise to consciousness unless implemented on a physical computer. Step 8 of the UDA says the physical computer is not necessary; which is a metaphysical position if anything is. You need just to assume, or accept as true, relations like x + 0 = x, for all x, etc. It is a very weak form of realism, and basically, this is assumed by all scientists. *After* UDA, the assumptions are no more than classical logic and , for all x and y: 0 ≠ (x + 1) ((x + 1) = (y + 1)) - x = y x + 0 = x x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1 x * 0 = 0 x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x The boxes and diamond are defined in that theory, the theology and physics is derived in the extensions of that theory (the observers) simulated by that theory. There are many other equivalent theories. There are some metaphysical or theological consequences, clear with comp, but except for the yes doctor, there is no special ontological commitment done, not even on the numbers, that is no more than in Euclid proofs of the infinity of the prime numbers. The computations are implemented in virtue of the consequences of the axioms above. Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
