On 29 March 2014 03:24, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his > consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit or > implicit position on personal identity in functionalism. > > > This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is too > much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a relation > with "functionalism" in the math sense, where an object is defined by its > functional relations with other objects, and the identity *is* in the > functionality. > > Then "function" is always used in two very different sense, especially in > computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the > functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the "body"). > > Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right > computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough "original atoms" > to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor, but only if > a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a functionalist? > > Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)? > Just to help me to understand. Thanks. >
A person could conceivably say the following: it is impossible for a computer to be conscious because consciousness is a magical substance that comes from God. Therefore, if you make an artificial brain it may behave like a real brain, but it will be a zombie. God could by a miracle grant the artificial brain consciousness, and he could even grant it a similar consciousness to my own, so that it will think it is me. However, it won't *really* be me, because it could only be me if we were numerically identical, and not even God can make two distinct things numerically identical. I don't accept this position, but it is the position many people have on personal identity, and it is independent of their position on the possibility of computer consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
