On 27 Mar 2014, at 18:21, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 28 Mar 2014, at 1:47 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 27 Mar 2014, at 11:35, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 27 March 2014 18:48, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 13:47, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Wednesday, March 26, 2014, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 26 Mar 2014, at 01:37, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 26 March 2014 11:29, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 26 March 2014 12:12, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]>
wrote:
An infinite universe (Tegmark type 1) implies that our
consciousness flits about from one copy of us to another and
that as a consequence we are immortal, so it does affect us even
if there is no physical communication between its distant parts.
Only if one assumes comp, I think, or something akin to Frank
Tipler's "Physics of Immortality" view which basically says that
identical quantum states are good enough to be mapped onto one
another, and we experience all the states together in an
infinite BEC type thing until differentiation occurs. (Cosmic,
man!)
You don't have to assume comp. If the theory is that
consciousness is secreted by the brain like bile is secreted by
the liver, so that a simulation can't be conscious, there will
be other brains in the universe similar enough to yours that
they will have a similar consciousness.
Assuming comp!
If y consciousness is really needing the exact material bile in
my liver, the other brain will just not be similar enough, and it
is conceivable that although conscious like me, the copy might be
another person. This makes no sense, if you use some form of comp.
This is a concrete, no nonsense, no consciousness-flitting-about
type of theory - but your consciousness will still effectively
flit about because you can't be sure which copy you are.
Assuming comp. If the exact "infinite state" of the bile is
required, then by definition, the other person is a different
person. I agree this seems absurd, but that is a comp prejudice.
After all, I *can* conceive that the other might be an impostor
an authentically "other person".
If consciousness is secreted by the brain, then if you make a
similar brain you will make a similar consciousness.
yes, but if the brain secrets consciousness, and if my identity is
in the identity of the matter involved, the consciousness is
conceivably similar, but not "mine". I agree this makes not a lot
of sense, but this is because we put the identity (and
consciousness) in the relational information, and this uses comp.
The actual theory of consciousness doesn't make any difference
here.
The claim that the copy isn't really the same person is
equivalent to, and as absurd as, the claim that I'm not the same
person after a night's sleep.
I agree, but I think you are using some functionalism here.
Someone who associates consciousness to its actual matter might
say that he is the same person after one night, but not after
"seven years" (assuming the whole material body constitution has
been changed). That is a difficulty for his theory, but it is
logically conceivable if we abandon comp/functionalism/CTM. Comp
has not that problem, but then eventually we must explain matter
from information handled through number relations/computations.
Bruno
It doesn't follow that if consciousness is substrate specific it
can't be duplicated;
OK. But the point is that it might, and that would be the case if
"my consciousness" is attached to both the exact quantum state of
my brain and substrate specific (which is a vague thing, yet
incompatible with computationalism).
it can in fact be duplicated in a straightforward way, by making a
biological brain.
But we do have evidences that biological copying is at some rather
high level, and that it does not copy any piece of matter. It
replaces all molecules and atoms with "new" atoms extracted from
food.
Here I am just playing the role of devil's advocate and I assume
non comp to make a logical point.
Even if consciousness is due to an immaterial soul one could say
that it could be duplicated if God performs a miracle.
Right again, but here too, it might not be the case. God could
decide to NOT do a miracle, given that It is so powerful.
The claim that the duplicated consciousness "isn't really me" is a
claim about the nature of personal identity, and is independent of
any theory of how consciousness is generated.
Not if the theory of consciousness is based on personal identity.
Your claim makes sense again for a functionalist, but not
necessarily to all non-functionalists.
A functionalist could agree that a computer can replicate his
consciousness but it would not really be him. There is no explicit
or implicit position on personal identity in functionalism.
This is weird. I guess you mean your notion of functionalism, which is
too much general I think, but I was still thinking it could have a
relation with "functionalism" in the math sense, where an object is
defined by its functional relations with other objects, and the
identity *is* in the functionality.
Then "function" is always used in two very different sense, especially
in computer science, as it can be extensional function (defined by the
functionality), or its intension (the code, the description, the
"body").
Could your functionalist say yes to a doctor, which build the right
computer (to replicate his consciousness), and add enough "original
atoms" to preserve the identity? Is someone saying yes to that doctor,
but only if a priest blesses the artificial brain with holy water a
functionalist?
Can you describe an experience refuting functionalism (in your sense)?
Just to help me to understand. Thanks.
Bruno
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