Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Jul 2016, at 22:16, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:42 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:


​> ​I printed the following "Duplicate Questionnaire" and gave  
one to both John-Washington, and John-Moscow. The ​ ​ 
questionnaires each had 8 questions:
​1. What city did you last recall being in? Helsinki2. How many  
cities do you see now? One

3. What is the name of the city you see before you? Washington
4. True/False: You see two cities right now: False
5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was: True
6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was: False
7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow  
was: False
8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow was:  
True​


And every single one of those 8 questions had the personal pronoun  
"you" in it, which in a world with people duplicating machines is an  
ambiguous word, and that means they aren't questions at ​all​  
they're​​ just a sequence of words​ with a question mark at the  
end​​. ​And it isn't a thought experiment​, it's a thought  
muddle.


 So let me help you out by rewriting ​those​ questions so they  
make sense​.​ ​The answers are in bold:


1. What city did ​John Clark​ last recall being in? Helsinki
2. How many cities do​es​ ​John Clark​ see now? ​Two​



Wrong, no John Clark can ever see two cities.  No John Clark has ever  
become two person at once from the 1p view, which was the obvious  
intent. The duplication does not fuse the resulting 1p experience. You  
fake to misunderstand.


Bruno





3. What is the name of ​a​ ​city John Clark sees now ?​   
Moscow
​4. ​What is the ​name of another city​ John Clark sees  
now?​  ​Washington​
​5​. True/False: ​John Clark​ see​s​ two cities right  
now: ​True​
​6​. True/False: The prediction that ​John Clark​ ​will ​ 
see Washington was: ​True​
​7​. True/False: The prediction that ​John Clark​ ​will ​ 
see Moscow was: True
​8​. True/False: The prediction that ​John Clark ​see  
Washington and Moscow was: ​True​
​9​. True/False: The prediction that ​John Clark will​ see  
Washington or Moscow was: ​Dependents on if it's a exclusive  
"or". ​


A person duplicating machine duplicates "you". That needs repeating,  
a person duplicating machine duplicates "you"​.  All of "you" is  
duplicated, there is no essential youness or soul that the machine  
can't duplicate. When "you" is duplicated that means there is more  
than one, so to then ask what one and only one city "you" will see  
is just dumb. Equally dumb is to talk about "THE 1p" as if there  
were only one when that has been duplicated too just like everything  
else about "you".


And neither the John Clark in Washington nor the John Clark in  
Moscow sees the slightest need to apologize for pointing out this  
imbecility.


 John K Clark









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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Holiday Exercise

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016  Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
> ​> ​
> Although I think JKC has a point about pronouns, I don't see what it has
> to do with Bruno's theory.  He just proposes this as an illustration of
> first-person-indetermancy as implicit in Everett's interpretation of QM.
> It has problems with probability, but so does Everett's QM
>

​Everett has problems​
 coming up with probabilities because it's hard to figure out how an
infinite number of worlds and finite probabilities can coexist; maybe the
number of worlds isn't infinite just enormously large, or maybe somebody
will figure out another way to find a answer, but at least Everett's
question is clear.
 But Bruno can't come up with a probability because he doesn't know what he
​even ​
wants a probability of. Not every string of words is a question even if it
has a question mark at the end.

It's as if Bruno demanded to know what is the probability "THE banana" will
be in Washington, not any old banana will do Bruno wants to know about "THE
banana" even though Bruno can't say what "THE banana" is or how it differs
from every other banana and nobody can tell one banana from another, not
even bananas.


> ​> ​
> what does probability refer to when everything happens
>

​
If you were
​a ​
bookie
​ ​
and wanted to make money it refers to the odds you would give
​ ​
that the only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a
Johnkclarkian way will
​say "I have just observed
 X
​"​
 sometime in the next hour.

 John K Clark

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Re: Holiday Exercise (was: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[John Clark]

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 7:42 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

​> ​
>> I printed the following "Duplicate Questionnaire" and gave one to both
>> John-Washington, and John-Moscow. The
>> ​ ​
>> questionnaires each had 8 questions:
>
> ​1. What city did you last recall being in? *Helsinki*2. How many cities
>> do you see now?
>> *One*3. What is the name of the city you see before you?
>> *Washington*4. True/False: You see two cities right now:
>> *False*5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was:
>> *True*6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was:
>> *False*7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow
>> was:
>> *False*8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow
>> was: *True*​
>
>
And every single one of those 8 questions had the personal pronoun "you" in
it, which in a world with people duplicating machines is an ambiguous word,
and that means they aren't questions at
​all​

they're​​
just a sequence of words
​ with a question mark at the end​
​.

​And
 it isn't a thought experiment
​
, it's a thought muddle.

 So let me help you out by rewriting
​those​
 questions so they make sense
​.​

​The
 answers are in *bold*:

1. What city did
​John Clark​
 last recall being in? *Helsinki*
2. How many cities do
​es​

​John Clark​
see now?
​*Two​*
3. What is the name of
​a​

​city John Clark sees now ?​
  *Moscow*
​4. ​
What is the
​name of another city​
 John Clark sees now?​

*​Washington*​
​5​
. True/False:
​John Clark​
 see
​s​
two cities right now:
​*True​*
​6​
. True/False: The prediction that
​John Clark​

​will ​
see Washington was:
* ​True​*
​7​
. True/False: The prediction that
​John Clark​

​will ​
see Moscow was: *True*
​8​
. True/False: The prediction that
​John Clark ​
see Washington and Moscow was:
​*True​*
​9​
. True/False: The prediction that
​John Clark will​
 see Washington or Moscow was:
​*Dependents on if it's a exclusive "or". ​*

A person duplicating machine duplicates "you". That needs repeating, a
 person duplicating machine duplicates "you"
​.  All of "you" is duplicated, there is no essential youness or soul that
the machine can't duplicate. When "you" is duplicated that means there is
more than one, so to then ask what one and only one city "you" will see is
just dumb. Equally dumb is to talk about "THE 1p" as if there were only one
when that has been duplicated too just like everything else about "you".

And neither the John Clark in Washington nor the John Clark in Moscow sees
the slightest need to apologize for pointing out this imbecility.

 John K Clark








>

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Re: Holiday Exercise

[Platonist Guitar Cowboy]

The bickering levels reach a fever pitch and the two teams haven't even
reached consensus concerning their status as teams at all in the first
place. Then there are the heretics that question not only the match but
game theory as well.

But the drug is too hard to resist: to bicker... once more... and preside
over the top of the list, reigning supreme defender of one's own biases
over the biases of all other petty bickerers! Pure power. Pure status for
pure text served straight by valiant knights selflessly dropping knowledge
manna from heavens of surveillance. Sex for people deprived of the same.

In general philosophically naive? Well I guess the fuckin gloves are off
then because now the matter hits the fan. No turning back. Cleanup is for
chumps that are addicted to WHATEVER it was that hit the fan, while we do
require the nuance that Plato didn't have toilet papyrus or a pedophile
fountain handy at all times.

So naive then, huh? What a tangled web those weave calling their children
naive for taking what others post on the internet literally. What? You
believe in posts of the interwebs? And you're calling people naive for
posting them through posting another post in the midst of their posts?
Delicious. We want more!

Therefore bickereth forth brave souls; the savior may actually emerge from
this mess with a point, publish it here as a universal scientific
contribution, and there'll be infinite glory and status for all list
members. And zombie virgins and strawberry ice cream too.

Physicalism, Materialism, Computationalism, Ismismismism... the winner is
who farts and invokes the mythomagical linguistic hallucinatory spell of
freedom from the fundamental law of digital bickering: "I have to go." with
the slick implication that I am too popular for my own shmatter. Too many
friends and too much divine work, better places and stuff, you see? Place
needs more seriousness- no space for weekend nominalists. PGC

On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 3:33 PM, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

> On 15/07/2016 8:31 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Bruce Kellett
>>  wrote:
>>
>>> On 15/07/2016 11:03 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Although I think JKC has a point about pronouns, I don't see what it has
>>> to
>>> do with Bruno's theory.  He just proposes this as an illustration of
>>> first-person-indetermancy as implicit in Everett's interpretation of QM.
>>> It has problems with probability, but so does Everett's QM - what does
>>> probability refer to when everything happens.  The question of which JKC
>>> just gets mapped to which world.
>>>
>>>
>>> Exactly. I have made this point before. The first six or seven steps of
>>> Bruno's argument are not really necessary. It is only when he moves the
>>> Universal Dovetailer into platonia in step 8 that anything new actually
>>> happens.
>>>
>> I don't think the argument would pack the same punch without the
>> previous steps. It's easy to dismiss the move to platonia without
>> them. With them it is not so easy -- unless you resort to linguistic
>> tricks like confusing 1p and 3p on purpose.
>>
>
> It is easy to dismiss the move to platonia at any time. Confusing 1p and
> 3p is not relevant here.
>
> He could have started there and argued for the reversal of physics
>>> and computationalism directly. The duplication of persons is just a
>>> distracting irrelevance to the main argument,
>>>
>> The duplication machines are an excellent device to expose materialist
>> self-contraditions (if you do not assume dualism).
>>
>
> Materialism or physicalism? I don't think I am trying to defend the idea
> that matter excludes the mental. Besides, where is the self-contradiction
> in materialism (or physicalism)?
>
> I don't see how
>> these contradictions would be exposed by outright proposing the move
>> to platonia. This feels like an attempt to "put Bruno in his place" by
>> forcing him to defang his argument.
>>
>
> If you propose the UD in platonia and derive physics from computations
> through conscious persons, the "contradictions of materialism", if there
> are such, become irrelevant.
>
> and depends so heavily on a
>>> particular theory of personal identity as to be essentially useless.
>>>
>> Would you mind restating Bruno's theory of personal identity in your
>> own words (so that we can agree that we are on the same page) and the
>> present a conflicting theory? I think this is the way forward.
>> Otherwise it's just subtle ad hominen: "you are ignorant about the
>> topic of personal identity!"
>>
>
> People on this list seem to be very quick to interpret a lack of
> philosophical insight into anything (theories of personal identity here) as
> an ad hominem, whereas it is often a simple statement of fact. Bruno
> himself is always criticizing his critics for a lack of understanding of
> modal logics and computer science. I find the commenters on this list to
> be, in general, philosophically 

Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruce Kellett]

On 15/07/2016 8:31 pm, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

On 15/07/2016 11:03 am, Brent Meeker wrote:


Although I think JKC has a point about pronouns, I don't see what it has to
do with Bruno's theory.  He just proposes this as an illustration of
first-person-indetermancy as implicit in Everett's interpretation of QM.
It has problems with probability, but so does Everett's QM - what does
probability refer to when everything happens.  The question of which JKC
just gets mapped to which world.


Exactly. I have made this point before. The first six or seven steps of
Bruno's argument are not really necessary. It is only when he moves the
Universal Dovetailer into platonia in step 8 that anything new actually
happens.

I don't think the argument would pack the same punch without the
previous steps. It's easy to dismiss the move to platonia without
them. With them it is not so easy -- unless you resort to linguistic
tricks like confusing 1p and 3p on purpose.


It is easy to dismiss the move to platonia at any time. Confusing 1p and 
3p is not relevant here.



He could have started there and argued for the reversal of physics
and computationalism directly. The duplication of persons is just a
distracting irrelevance to the main argument,

The duplication machines are an excellent device to expose materialist
self-contraditions (if you do not assume dualism).


Materialism or physicalism? I don't think I am trying to defend the idea 
that matter excludes the mental. Besides, where is the 
self-contradiction in materialism (or physicalism)?



I don't see how
these contradictions would be exposed by outright proposing the move
to platonia. This feels like an attempt to "put Bruno in his place" by
forcing him to defang his argument.


If you propose the UD in platonia and derive physics from computations 
through conscious persons, the "contradictions of materialism", if there 
are such, become irrelevant.



and depends so heavily on a
particular theory of personal identity as to be essentially useless.

Would you mind restating Bruno's theory of personal identity in your
own words (so that we can agree that we are on the same page) and the
present a conflicting theory? I think this is the way forward.
Otherwise it's just subtle ad hominen: "you are ignorant about the
topic of personal identity!"


People on this list seem to be very quick to interpret a lack of 
philosophical insight into anything (theories of personal identity here) 
as an ad hominem, whereas it is often a simple statement of fact. Bruno 
himself is always criticizing his critics for a lack of understanding of 
modal logics and computer science. I find the commenters on this list to 
be, in general, philosophically naive.


The theory of personal identity behind the duplication protocols is not 
clearly spelled out, but it is basically a psychological theory, that 
places heavy emphasis on personal memories, though no doubt does give 
some import to things like character, values, beliefs, desires, 
intentions and so forth. There are several alternative theories of 
personal identity, none is without some problems, but I think that the 
closest continuer theory comes closest to surmounting the obstacles.


Bruce

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Re: Holiday Exercise

[Telmo Menezes]

On Fri, Jul 15, 2016 at 3:19 AM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:
> On 15/07/2016 11:03 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> On 7/14/2016 5:07 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 15/07/2016 9:42 am, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> I printed the following "Duplicate Questionnaire" and gave one to both
> John-Washington, and John-Moscow. The questionnaires each had 8 questions:
>
> 1. What city did you last recall being in?
> 2. How many cities do you see now?
> 3. What is the name of the city you see before you?
> 4. True/False: You see two cities right now:
> 5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was:
> 6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was:
> 7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow was:
> 8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow was:
>
> When I gave the questionnaire to John-Washington, he filled out the
> following answers (in bold):
>
> 1. What city did you last recall being in? Helsinki
> 2. How many cities do you see now? One
> 3. What is the name of the city you see before you? Washington
> 4. True/False: You see two cities right now: False
> 5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was: True
> 6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was: False
> 7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow was: False
> 8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow was: True
>
> When I gave the questionnaire to John-Moscow, he filled out the following
> answers (in bold):
>
> 1. What city did you last recall being in? Helsinki
> 2. How many cities do you see now? One
> 3. What is the name of the city you see before you? Moscow
> 4. True/False: You see two cities right now: False
> 5. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington was: False
> 6. True/False: The prediction that you see Moscow was: True
> 7. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington and Moscow was: False
> 8. True/False: The prediction that you see Washington or Moscow was: True
>
> Both Johns expressed deep regret over insulting people on the Everything
> list, most especially Bruno. It turned out neither John-Washington's, nor
> John-Moscow's prediction that they would see both cities was true from their
> own first person points of view.
>
>
> But you have introduced a distinction between John-W and John-M that is not
> present in the original protocol. Remember that the criterion of personal
> identity you are working with is based on person memories (verified by a
> personal diary if necessary). Both copies of John have these memories and
> these diaries, so they both have equal claims to be John. "John", as this
> duplicated person, predicts with certainty that he will see W, and that he
> will see M, so he predicts that he will see both cities.
>
> The fact that this appears odd is that our conventional intuition is
> essentially dualist -- we think that there is a central core that is the
> "real me" that gives me my continuing sense of personal identity. This
> intuition breaks down when you have duplication of persons.
>
>
> Although I think JKC has a point about pronouns, I don't see what it has to
> do with Bruno's theory.  He just proposes this as an illustration of
> first-person-indetermancy as implicit in Everett's interpretation of QM.
> It has problems with probability, but so does Everett's QM - what does
> probability refer to when everything happens.  The question of which JKC
> just gets mapped to which world.
>
>
> Exactly. I have made this point before. The first six or seven steps of
> Bruno's argument are not really necessary. It is only when he moves the
> Universal Dovetailer into platonia in step 8 that anything new actually
> happens.

I don't think the argument would pack the same punch without the
previous steps. It's easy to dismiss the move to platonia without
them. With them it is not so easy -- unless you resort to linguistic
tricks like confusing 1p and 3p on purpose.

> He could have started there and argued for the reversal of physics
> and computationalism directly. The duplication of persons is just a
> distracting irrelevance to the main argument,

The duplication machines are an excellent device to expose materialist
self-contraditions (if you do not assume dualism). I don't see how
these contradictions would be exposed by outright proposing the move
to platonia. This feels like an attempt to "put Bruno in his place" by
forcing him to defang his argument.

> and depends so heavily on a
> particular theory of personal identity as to be essentially useless.

Would you mind restating Bruno's theory of personal identity in your
own words (so that we can agree that we are on the same page) and the
present a conflicting theory? I think this is the way forward.
Otherwise it's just subtle ad hominen: "you are ignorant about the
topic of personal identity!"

Telmo.

> Bruce
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything 

Re: self (was Re: Aristotle the Nitwit

[Telmo Menezes]

On Thu, Jul 14, 2016 at 8:23 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
> On 7/14/2016 4:58 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:25 PM, Brent Meeker 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 7/11/2016 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 09 Jul 2016, at 18:35, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 6:11 PM, John Clark 
> wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Jul 9, 2016 at 4:53 AM, Telmo Menezes 
>> wrote:
>>
>>
>>> Thanks for illustrating what I just said.
>>
>>
>>
>> What you just said was:
>>
>> "
>> Most sane people sooner or later realize that the only way to win this
>> game is not to play it
>> "
>>
>>
>> And then I just said:
>>
>> "If true then the only logical conclusion to make is that
>> Telmo Menezes
>> is not sane."
>
>
> It is also possible that I am an outlier in this regard (most sane
> people...) or that I haven't reached the point where I am sick of
> playing the game (sooner or later).
>
> It is further possible that what I mean by "this game" is the game of
> arguing about the validity of the UDA (and please spare me from your
> usual jokes where you go to wikipedia looking for meaning of the
> acronym. Yes yes it's super funny).
>
> This is your usual modus operandi and I am sick of it. I say modus
> operandi because, judging from certain contributions you made to this
> mailing list it is quite clear that you do not have the limited
> intelligence required to honestly make such mistakes. That would be
> forgivable, but here, and more importantly as you do when discussing
> Bruno's theories, you argue in bad faith.
>
> Finally, yes it could be that I am not sane. Unlike you, I consider
> this possibility. The fact that you do not consider it is precisely
> what makes you a religious fundamentalist. Just because your religion
> has no name, doesn't mean that it does not exist.
>
> I'll spare you the trouble and paste you usual bromide. Here you go:
>
> "Wow, calling a guy known for disliking religion religious, never
> heard that one before, at least I never heard it before I was 12."
>
> This is precisely the sort of manipulative bullshit that religious
> people use. The implicit appeal to common sense. The suggestion that
> your opponent is childish. Anything but directly addressing the ideas
> of your interlocutor.
>
> You argue in bad faith, you destroy honest discussion to score
> internet points and you bully people that were nothing but nice to
> you.
>
 Rather accurate description I'm afraid.

 I think John Clark's religion has a name, though, it is
 Materialismwhich includes Weak Materialism: the belief in some
 primary
 matter and/or its corresponding epistemological version: Physicalism
 (physics is the fundamental science, physics can't be reduced to
 anything
 else simpler).

 I use "weak materialism" for that religion, to oppose it to the use of
 "materialism" in philosophy of mind, which is that not only matter/force
 exists, but only matter/force exists.

 Note that mechanism is what makes materialism working well, as Diderot
 and
 the modern materialist and Naturalist usually think, but only up to some
 point as materialism stumbles down quickly on the mind/body problem. I
 think
 Descartes got the correct (monist) answer, but in his meditation, he
 needs
 to assume that God is good, which, even if true, cannot be assumed in a
 scientific derivation. But I think he got the main point though. Too bad
 he
 never finished his text "À la Recherche de la Vérité". Too bad he
 dismissed
 logic and neoplatonism, but there are historical contingencies which
 might
 explain this.

 Note that it is possible to disbelieve in primary matter and still be
 physicalist. (using a particular or special universal number + some
 oracle).

 When we assume mechanism, it is up to the materialist to explain what is
 primary matter and how it get the focus of consciousness, and it is up
 to
 the physicalist to explain what is the rôle, for consciousness, of the
 fundamental laws of physics, and why they can't be explained in term of
 the
 (infinities of) computations (measure).
>>>
>>>
>>> Explanation is easy.  Prediction is hard.
>>
>> I think it really depends. For example, it is very easy to predict
>> that the sun will rise in the morning, but it took humanity a lot of
>> time to come up with a good explanation of why this is the case.
>
>
> Or they came up with a lot of explanations and we only count as "good" those
> that give good predictions - like the shadow of the Sun on the Moon is a
>