Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 2/06/2017 12:00 pm, smitra wrote: On 02-06-2017 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition. The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in any other interpretation. Bruce In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body will be in different states due to decoherence). I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of non-locality in QM. 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. Bruce Suppose Alice and Bob are robots with classical processors, the states of each register can only be 0 and 1. Whatever Bob is conscious of must then be contained in the bitstring that specifies the state his processor is in. Decoherence has no effect on that bitstring. Until that time that Bob asks Alice about her setting of her polarizer, Bob's consciousness is exactly the same across the different branches in which Alice gives a different answer, False. despite rapid decoherence. Real human beings can be expected to fit well within this model. It is known that there typically is a lot of information present in the unconscious mind that we're not aware of. So, your consciousness could be identical across many branches even if your brain had split and the unconscious mind is already diverging. Take e.g. experiments where you are making a random choice and on the basis on functional MRI scans the experimenters are able to predict your choice before you have even made up your mind. So, this is same good old QM in the MWI where an observer's consciousness is modeled as a finite state machine described by a finite bitstring. We can then work in the basis where the observables for the bits of the bitstrings are all diagonal, this then corresponds to the observer having a definite conscious experience. The definite conscious experience of relevance here is of observing and recording the result of the spin measurement. In practice, what this means is that you can be in a macroscopic superposition long after decoherence has for all practical purposes made the superposition inaccessible to be probed using interference or other experiments. For example, if a spin is polarized in the positive x-direction and the z-component is measured, and I'm not aware of the outcome of the result then my consciousness, as specified by the bitstring that contains all the information that I'm aware of, cannot possibly contain the result of the outcome of the measurement before I'm told what the result is. In a sector where my consciousness is described by bitstring X after the spin has been measured, the state will have to be of the form: 1/sqrt(2) |X> [|up, Universe(up)> + |down, Universe(down> ] where Universe(up) and Universe(down) are different states of the rest of the universe, but my consciousness is described by X and this is not affected by the decoherence caused by measuring the spin. In general there will be a summation of such ter
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 1/06/2017 10:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2017, at 13:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 8:21 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 09:15, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 31/05/2017 4:40 pm, Pierz wrote: >> On 5/30/2017 7:30 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations to be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own understanding. IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when I last conversed with you on this list. I wonder if you'd care to comment on my original argument on this thread - which has of course now been swamped by the usual brawls. Does not a single history + the physical insignificance of the notion of a current moment mean that there is also only a single possible future? >> I don't see how that follows. In the usual model of forking in the future direction every current moment has a single history, but multiple futures. Multiple futures = MWI, surely. Not necessarily. If you insist on Schrödinger determinism, then yes, by reification of the wave function. But if the wave function is only epistemological, then there is only one probabilistic future. How could an epistemological wave interfere all by itself? It seems simpler to say that the wave is real, but that the local, one branch, perception is epistemological. I think you misunderstand this use of the word "epistemological". When it is said that the wave function is merely epistemological, what is meant that it is merely a calculational device: the wave function encapsulates our knowledge of the system of interest, and tells us how to calculate the probabilities of various outcomes. In other words, it is not a 'real' wave in space-time. Yes. That is the problem. How a non real wave in space time can interfere really in space-time? Of course, the answer is simple with the MWI, but asks for real infuence at a distance with the Mono-world assumption. The epistemological understanding does not have a non-real wave in space-time interfering in real space-time. It is merely a calculational device to get the QM probabilities, it doesn't interfere with anything. In MWI there is a real problem -- how can a complex wave existing in N-dimensional configuration space influence anything in 3-dimensional space-time? When I say a single history, I mean that from the Big Bang forward, the universe only followed one branch. And that can lead into the future, only one probabilistic future. >> >>> And if the future is predetermined in this way, isn't this a serious issue for single universe models of QM? How can the outcome of quantum events be both inevitable and random? >> Having a single future isn't the same as being determined. A single future in which situation A is sometimes followed by B and sometimes by C is still random. It depends on perspective. It's true that from 1p, it looks random. But from 3p, it is static and always the same, and in this sense determined. Not true, the 3p view of the future is still just a single probabilistic world line. It is only the bird view, from outside space and time, that gives the appearance that there are multiply existing futures. Neither we from the 1p perspective, or from outside ourselves in the 3p perspective, can we ever see any of the other branches predicted by MWI. Yes, like in WM-duplication. No, that is a serious mistake. Unitary evolution of the wave function is not at all like the person duplication experiments. The main difference is that the duplicates of the Helsinki man are never in a pure quantum state. That was not the point. The comparison is on the reasult measurement, not on the reason of the parallel states. With mechanism, the reason are the same (the first person indeterminacy). With collapse, we need magic. The teleportation to W or M is of separate classical entities, There is no superposition principle for duplicated persons. You can defined for the Helsinki guy. He is in a sort of (non quantum) superposition state in helsinki, which indeed, like in the MWI, is just his ignoance on which computations he belongs. I use Y = II, if that is still needed to say. Your attempt to draw a parallel between person duplication in a laboratory and MWI is simply causing confusion. They are in no way similar. There is no such thing as 'a sort of non quantum superposition'. That is just an abuse of language. Classical probabilities are completely unlike quantum superpositions. The guy in Helsinki can predict that his first person future will be unique, even if he knows that in the "bird" picture, that outside the teleportation/duplication boxes, there will be two versions of him. That is not the "bird" picture, that is merely the objective 3p picture of the ordinary classical world. The bird picture is solely to do with the pure state that is preserved in the unitary
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 02-06-2017 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition. The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in any other interpretation. Bruce In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body will be in different states due to decoherence). I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of non-locality in QM. 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. Bruce Suppose Alice and Bob are robots with classical processors, the states of each register can only be 0 and 1. Whatever Bob is conscious of must then be contained in the bitstring that specifies the state his processor is in. Decoherence has no effect on that bitstring. Until that time that Bob asks Alice about her setting of her polarizer, Bob's consciousness is exactly the same across the different branches in which Alice gives a different answer, despite rapid decoherence. Real human beings can be expected to fit well within this model. It is known that there typically is a lot of information present in the unconscious mind that we're not aware of. So, your consciousness could be identical across many branches even if your brain had split and the unconscious mind is already diverging. Take e.g. experiments where you are making a random choice and on the basis on functional MRI scans the experimenters are able to predict your choice before you have even made up your mind. So, this is same good old QM in the MWI where an observer's consciousness is modeled as a finite state machine described by a finite bitstring. We can then work in the basis where the observables for the bits of the bitstrings are all diagonal, this then corresponds to the observer having a definite conscious experience. In practice, what this means is that you can be in a macroscopic superposition long after decoherence has for all practical purposes made the superposition inaccessible to be probed using interference or other experiments. For example, if a spin is polarized in the positive x-direction and the z-component is measured, and I'm not aware of the outcome of the result then my consciousness, as specified by the bitstring that contains all the information that I'm aware of, cannot possibly contain the result of the outcome of the measurement before I'm told what the result is. In a sector where my consciousness is described by bitstring X after the spin has been measured, the state will have to be of the form: 1/sqrt(2) |X> [|up, Universe(up)> + |down, Universe(down> ] where Universe(up) and Universe(down) are different states of the rest of the universe, but my consciousness is described by X and this is not affected by the decoherence caused by measuring the spin. In general there will be a summation of such terms where X takes different values and Universe(up) and Universe(down) will then depend on X, however, I can only ever find myself in a branch were X takes some de
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 1/06/2017 10:19 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Jun 2017, at 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote: I get your point with decoherence. Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What does mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling with the environment prevents the current observer state to become compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that such certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I cannot disprove, but find problematic). It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP. But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the red-T-rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between the T-rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the particles "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just completely impossible, but to derive from that the unicity of the past, is, it seems to me (and you if I understood well) is invalid. I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in principle. One major problem with recoherence in general is that information leaks from the paths at the speed of light (as well as less slowly for other interactions). Since this vital information goes out along the light cone, it can never be recaptured and returned to the original interaction. In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have agreed to disagree on this if I remember well). Reasoning in QM without SR is not very profitable. Besides, QM + SR does not particularly imply MWI -- it is perfectly possible to have a consistent collapse model of QM+SR. I know you don't agree because of the non-locality implied by EPR, but this non-locality is not removed in MWI, regardless of what you might say. I don't see it, and the mast time we discuss this, we conclude on some vocabulary problem. When there is no collapse, measurement tells to people light separated in which branch theiy belongs, but to exploits that information, they need to come into contact. Last time we discussed this, no resolution was achieved. In QM, with or without collapse, decoherence and the transition from the pure state to a mixture gives a definite measurement result. Without collapse, different branches get different results, but once obtained, these results are fixed, and are not affected by whether Alice and Bob exchange information or not. Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in principle*, so the recoherence is, in general, impossible. OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM) Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is possible in special circumstances, but not in general. From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the word) is by no means invalid -- it is proved. In QM + SR. OK. Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which recoherence is achieved, that still does not invalidate the uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it occurs, simply means that no new branches are formed at that point, so the decoherent history remains unique. OK. That might suggest that we identify our indistinguishible past in arithmetic, if we assume mechanism. I use the Y = II principle, or the "quantum" linearity of the tensor product "@": we have that a @ (b + c) = (a @ b) + (a @ c). That makes sense. Linearity is the heart of QM. It is linearity that allows superpositions, and leads to all the "quantum weirdness". I agree. Both "linearities" (the quantum evolution, and the tensor products). ... But those state difference are accessible to the observers, and indeed, only this makes the analogy with step 3 working. In MWI, the differences are not observable by anyone. Any observer has access to only one branch, so only one copy. They can say nothing about the other branch. The difference are not observable, but are very gross, like seeing a cat dead, or alive. Linearity prevent any direct view of that difference, but it exists, when we assume QM (and non collapse). It is not linearity that prevents macro-superpositions -- it is decoherence and the reduction to a mixed state. The difference between the measurement outcomes exists whatever interpretation of QM you impose. ... Of course, it assures them in all branches, where indeed Aspect like experiences can be made. It seems to me that we did agree on this: that non-locality does not entail any physical influence in the past. That does happen in the unique universe view though; even if
Primordial Black Holes
The January 4 2017 event gives more support to the idea Dark Matter is made of primordial Black Holes born a nanosecond after the Big Bang and were never stars. The spin of one of the Black H oles is not in the same direction as the other and of their orbit, binary stars almost always are. If there were born at different times and at different places the universe is now so spread out it is unlikely there would be enough time for the two to find each other and go into orbit, but very very early in the universe thing s were much more crowded and that would be more likely to happen. If LIGO can eve r find a merger where one of the Black Holes was less than 3 solar masses that would be the smoking gun, that guy would have to be primordial. In addition, some rival theories to Einstein's say gravitational waves don't all travel at the same speed but depends on their frequency, this merger was twice as far away as the previous two so it's the best test yet of that , and Einstein wins again, all the waves move at the same speed (presumably light speed) regardless of frequency. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition. The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in any other interpretation. Bruce In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body will be in different states due to decoherence). I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of non-locality in QM. 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. Bruce The apparent non-locality is then purely an artifact on making such assumptions about localization in branches when that's wrong to do. Saibal -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
LIGO has detected a third Black Hole merger
On January 4 2017 LIGO detected a third Black Hole merger and the most distant one yet, 2.9 billion light years. A 31.2 solar mass Black Hole collided with a 19.4 solar mass Black Hole resulting in a 48.7 solar mass Black Hole with 2 solar masses converted into gravitational wave energy. https://www.sciencenews.org/article/ligo-snags-another-set-gravitational-waves John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote: I get your point with decoherence. Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What does mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling with the environment prevents the current observer state to become compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that such certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I cannot disprove, but find problematic). It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP. But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the red-T-rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between the T-rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the particles "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just completely impossible, but to derive from that the unicity of the past, is, it seems to me (and you if I understood well) is invalid. I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in principle. One major problem with recoherence in general is that information leaks from the paths at the speed of light (as well as less slowly for other interactions). Since this vital information goes out along the light cone, it can never be recaptured and returned to the original interaction. In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have agreed to disagree on this if I remember well). Reasoning in QM without SR is not very profitable. Besides, QM + SR does not particularly imply MWI -- it is perfectly possible to have a consistent collapse model of QM+SR. I know you don't agree because of the non-locality implied by EPR, but this non-locality is not removed in MWI, regardless of what you might say. Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in principle*, so the recoherence is, in general, impossible. OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM) Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is possible in special circumstances, but not in general. From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the word) is by no means invalid -- it is proved. In QM + SR. OK. Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which recoherence is achieved, that still does not invalidate the uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it occurs, simply means that no new branches are formed at that point, so the decoherent history remains unique. OK. That might suggest that we identify our indistinguishible past in arithmetic, if we assume mechanism. I use the Y = II principle, or the "quantum" linearity of the tensor product "@": we have that a @ (b + c) = (a @ b) + (a @ c). That makes sense. Linearity is the heart of QM. It is linearity that allows superpositions, and leads to all the "quantum weirdness". FWIW, you are expressing my own understanding of the situation: there can be no superposition of red and green screens or dinosaurs, or dead and live cats, because there can be no quantum superposition of macroscopic objects. Superpositions of wave functions are only possible for systems isolated from interaction with their environment, which is why quantum computers are so fricking hard to make: keeping aggregates of particles isolated from interactions with the surrounding environment is exponentially more difficult as the system grows in size. The main question for me is this: can two branches hold different observer states, if they differ only by things that are not observable? I would say no, intuitively. I would even say "no" just for the things not observed, even when observable. I previously answered Telmo's question in the affirmative, viz., two fully decohered branches will hold different observer states, even if the differences are not observed or observable. So if some trivial physical event happens to your body, such as the decay of a K 40 nucleus in your foot, this would not be noticeable, or even particularly observable even if you were looking for it. But such an event causes at least two branches to form every instant -- one in which the decay has occurred, and one in which it has not. And since this is a beta decay, a neutrino is lost along the light cone in every case of decay. Perfect recombination of the branches is, then, according to the above argument, not possible. You might object that this decay in my toe did not alter my conscious state -- that is correct, but there are now two copies of the Moscow man as in step 3, My mistake here - I misremembered step 3. Moscow is a targe
Re: substitution level
On Thu, Jun 1, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 31 May 2017, at 12:44, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> Creating a new thread to avoid causing decoherence on the other one :) >> What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level than quantum? E.g. at the level of the neurons and their connections and activations levels? >>> >>> >>> >>> That would enlarge the uncertainty spectrum on the realities we can >>> access >>> without losing anything subjective. It would help the doctor to build the >>> artificial brain. It could also make more difficult to justify the >>> smallness >>> of Planck constant, and to explain why the quantum seems more obviously >>> present in the micro-states, Decoherence would be easier to fight >>> against, >>> and quantum computing would be more easy to be realized. This lakes me >>> think >>> that the quantum level is boundary of the substitution level. >> >> >> This appears to be a testable hypothesis. >> >> I know that Penrose proposed a theory on the quantum effects inside >> neurons that turned ou to be problematic because of decoherence, but >> of course that doesn't mean that quantum mechanics might not play a >> much more holistic role in brain activity. >> >> I remember a presentation perhaps a decade ago by a neuroscientist at >> an artificial life conference, where she showed that neurons can >> operate in a chaotic regime. In fact, she claimed at the time that we >> did not have the computational power to accurately simulate a single >> neuron. To me, this suggests that the activation of neurons might be >> governed by much subtler phenomena than simple threshold effects. >> Perhaps it is conceivable that small scale quantum effects could >> propagate to the macro level of the brain. >> >> On the other hand, it is also true that artificial neural network >> models with just simple threshold neurons are already Turing complete, >> provided that one allows for recurrence. This proves nothing, but >> purely when worrying about neuroscince / artificial intelligence, I am >> a it weary of going for more complicated models when there is still so >> much to explore in the simpler ones... I say this while completely >> disregarding the hard problem. I have perhaps the unusual intuition >> that intelligence and consciousness are quite different issues -- > > > I share that intuition when intelligence is used in the sense of competence. Ok. When I say intelligence I am thinking about systems that can increase, with some degree of success, the future value of an utility function. I came to believe that what people usually call intelligence is something that is fundamentally linked to Darwinian dynamics. > In that case, consciousness, or conscience, might be at the antipode of > intelligence. > That feeling is strengthened when reading the news... I agree. We became the apex predator on this planet, and so competent in your sense of the word that we are effectively cancer. I believe we have the potential to transcend biology, but at the moment it seems that we are taking steps backwards. Society is becoming increasingly insane. Perhaps it's just how it works, some steps back are unavoidable. I share with you the ideia that prohibition is central to the disease, and I think that it is no coincidence that its current incarnation came out of fear of the hippies and their program -- in our sick society, being anti-war and pro-love is the most subversive stance that can be conceived. I take the liberty of sharing a very short video showing a guy that realised the fallacy of utility functions (perhaps with some chemical help :) https://youtu.be/vMhiDCZXU2k?t=7 >> although I doubt that it is possible to build a sophisticated AI that >> is not conscious (or even a simple one, I don't know). > > > We have to distinguish Hameroff from Penrose. Hameroff believes/assumes that > the brain operates at the quantum level,. He assumes that it is a quantum > computer. But a quantum computer does not violate the classical Church's > thesis, and his hypothesis does not change the conclusion of Mechanism > (although it makes more complex the derivation of physics a priori). I have to revisit OR and both Hameroff and Penrose on this. Apparently there is now some evidence for mcrotubules being shielded from decoherence? Regarding the quantum computer, I understand that it is still a classical computer, but with comp it would have consequences regarding our "insertion" in reality, so to say. Correct? > Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I even > suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal quantum > chaotic dovetailing, Can you explain what you mean by chaotic dovetailing? > but even if that is true, that should not be used to > justify physics, because we would get the quanta, and not the qualia (unless > the Riemann hypothesis is shown undecidable in PA (and thus true!). > > Only Penrose asks for an explicit non
Re: Answers to David 4
On 01 Jun 2017, at 16:42, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote: On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal. Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long- winded :( I would say that subjects precedes physical objects, as physics becomes a first person plural notion. Exactly But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports its self-referential modes. Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view. OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set. That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming. It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are "viciously" circular, Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.". I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption). making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.). We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that would be a bit ad hoc, Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the inner God-subject. How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts the truth. The "Bp" is like a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window. Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object. I guess that I meant "natural *number* object. I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject. Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with monopsychism. OK. God's solipism.
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 1 June 2017 at 02:59, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 1/06/2017 6:28 am, David Nyman wrote: > > On 31 May 2017 at 04:55, Bruce Kellett < > bhkell...@optusnet.com.au> wrote: > >> On 31/05/2017 12:30 pm, Pierz wrote: >> >> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations to be >> very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own understanding. >> >> >> Thank you for the kind comments, I try my best to be clear. >> >> IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when I last conversed with you >> on this list. >> >> >> That is indeed the case. I have several reasons to be dubious about MWI. >> Firstly, it amounts to reifying a complex valued function that resides in >> configuration space -- I am not sure that this is a well-defined procedure. >> Secondly, MWI doesn't really do what it claims to do, which is to provide a >> resolution of the measurement problem in QM. MWI doesn't provide any >> explanation of the transition from a pure state to the mixed state that is >> required for experiments to give definite results. At the crucial point, >> MWI simply says "then a miracle happens!" To be more explicit, >> deterministic evolution of the wave function by the Schrödinger equation >> gives a full account of decoherence, and the dissemination of the coherence >> phases into the environment. This reduces the off-diagonal elements of the >> density matrix so that the diagonal elements become *almost* orthogonal, >> but unitary evolution can't go the whole way. The only way one can reduce >> the pure state to a mixture is to trace over the environmental degrees of >> freedom, which is to say that the residual phase information is simply >> thrown away. This trace operation is non-unitary, and there is no warrant >> for it in the SE itself, so it is, in the final analysis, just an appeal to >> magic. >> > > Bruce, is it perhaps finally an appeal to observation per se? IOW what you > say is of course objectively the case, but perhaps in some way the > residual phase information isn't relevant (i.e. can be 'traced over') in > the synthesis of the 'observer-observation' relation. If so, this relation > could perhaps resolve the 'eternalist' pure state (which after all > continues simply to be 'there' in the MWI conception) subjectively into > what would give the 'instrumental' appearance, in effect, of the > probability density characteristic of a mixture? > > > It is often argued that the density matrix is diagonalized FAPP, and FAPP > is all that is required. Unfortunately, I don't think that that really > works. Even though the individual off-diagonal elements might be > arbitrarily small, there are a very large number of them (increasing as > further environmental degrees of freedom are included). The end result is > that the original superposition is still intact and no 'split' has in fact > occurred -- the situation is still completely reversible. The problem I > point to is that there is nothing in the unitary mathematics corresponding > to "ignoring inessential degrees of freedom". That is what the partial > trace does, but that has to be imposed by hand, it is not automatic, and > suffers from all the old difficulties of the Heisenberg cut -- it is > arbitrary. > It's certainly arbitrary in any objective sense, but could that still be said under the observational assumptions I outlined? What I mean is that, in an eternalist framework, transition from pure to mixed state might be considered an emergent phenomenon relativised to some embedded 'point-of-view-of-interest'. So if what you term above "inessential degrees of freedom" did indeed turn out to be inessential to "some fundamental compositional principle of observer-hood" we could perhaps restore from this the operational aspect of an apparently mixed state whilst the pure state continued to be the case in the idealised eternalist frame. In such a case the sense of arbitrariness you mention above might be alleviated. > > Then there wouldn't seem to me to be a necessary idea of 'collapse' > involved, except in a purely epistemological sense. The term 'subjective' > here is more in the sense of some fundamental compositional principle of > observer-hood than a restriction to out-and-out 'waking consciousness'. I'm > not sure if this has any necessary connection to Lockwood's idea of a > 'consciousness basis'. Of course quite clearly any of this would be highly > speculative, but I'm wondering if it could make any sense in principle? I'd > value your opinion. > > > I think that something like this was what Everett had in mind when called > this idea the "relative state model". I think he saw the observer as > complete in every branch, so that > > |psi> = (|1> + \2>)|me>|environment> --> (|1>|me_1> + > |2>|me_2>)|environment> > --> |1>|me_1>|environment_1> + |2>|me_2>|environment_2> > > and he then considered the two parts of the development to be complete in > themselves, so we found ourselves in one or the other branch.
Re: Answers to David 4
On 1 Jun 2017 15:20, "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote: > > On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: >> >> >> >> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to extract" >> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject >> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal. >> >> >> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit, >> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". >> > > Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short. > But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid > ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :( > > >> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects >> , >> as physics becomes a first person plural notion. >> > > Exactly > > >> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to >> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the >> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports >> its self-referential modes. >> > > Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological > component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense, > but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised > (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view. > > > > OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us) > aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a > bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our > sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we > can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to > first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) > the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set. > > That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are > put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA, > but "for RA" PA is already dreaming. > > It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson > believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are > "viciously" circular, > Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.". I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption). > making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we > can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most > mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of > proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, > group theory, etc.). > > >> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that >> would be a bit ad hoc, >> > > Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the > inner God-subject. > > > How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts the truth. The "Bp" is like a > finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god > is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window. > Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object. I guess that I meant "natural *number* object. > I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due > to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of > the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does > not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of > the first person subject. > Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with monopsychism. OK. God's solipism. To b
Re: Answers to David 4
On 01 Jun 2017, at 15:59, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote: On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal. Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long- winded :( I would say that subjects precedes physical objects, as physics becomes a first person plural notion. Exactly But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports its self-referential modes. Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view. OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set. That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming. It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are "viciously" circular, Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.". I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption). making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.). We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that would be a bit ad hoc, Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the inner God-subject. How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts the truth. The "Bp" is like a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window. Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object. I guess that I meant "natural *number* object. I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject. Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with monopsychism. OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is not the biggest "God". Like in Plotinus, and perha
Re: Answers to David 4
On 1 Jun 2017 14:01, "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote: > > On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: >> >> >> >> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to extract" >> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject >> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal. >> >> >> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit, >> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". >> > > Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short. > But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid > ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :( > > >> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects >> , >> as physics becomes a first person plural notion. >> > > Exactly > > >> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to >> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the >> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports >> its self-referential modes. >> > > Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological > component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense, > but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised > (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view. > > > > OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us) > aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a > bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our > sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we > can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to > first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) > the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set. > > That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are > put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA, > but "for RA" PA is already dreaming. > > It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson > believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are > "viciously" circular, > Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.". I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption). > making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we > can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most > mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of > proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, > group theory, etc.). > > >> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that >> would be a bit ad hoc, >> > > Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the > inner God-subject. > > > How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts the truth. The "Bp" is like a > finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god > is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window. > Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object. I guess that I meant "natural *number* object. > I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due > to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of > the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does > not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of > the first person subject. > Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with monopsychism. OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is not the biggest "God". Like in Plotinus, and per
Re: Answers to David 4
On 01 Jun 2017, at 12:44, David Nyman wrote: On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote: On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal. Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :( I would say that subjects precedes physical objects, as physics becomes a first person plural notion. Exactly But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports its self-referential modes. Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view. OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set. That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming. It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are "viciously" circular, Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.". I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption). making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.). We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that would be a bit ad hoc, Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the inner God-subject. How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts the truth. The "Bp" is like a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window. Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object. I guess that I meant "natural *number* object. I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject. Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with monopsychism. OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is not the biggest "God". Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably already in Plato's Parmenides, God is overwhelmed by the "Noùs". Quantified G*, qG*,
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 01 Jun 2017, at 13:02, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 8:21 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 09:15, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 31/05/2017 4:40 pm, Pierz wrote: >> On 5/30/2017 7:30 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations to be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own understanding. IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when I last conversed with you on this list. I wonder if you'd care to comment on my original argument on this thread - which has of course now been swamped by the usual brawls. Does not a single history + the physical insignificance of the notion of a current moment mean that there is also only a single possible future? >> I don't see how that follows. In the usual model of forking in the future direction every current moment has a single history, but multiple futures. Multiple futures = MWI, surely. Not necessarily. If you insist on Schrödinger determinism, then yes, by reification of the wave function. But if the wave function is only epistemological, then there is only one probabilistic future. How could an epistemological wave interfere all by itself? It seems simpler to say that the wave is real, but that the local, one branch, perception is epistemological. I think you misunderstand this use of the word "epistemological". When it is said that the wave function is merely epistemological, what is meant that it is merely a calculational device: the wave function encapsulates our knowledge of the system of interest, and tells us how to calculate the probabilities of various outcomes. In other words, it is not a 'real' wave in space-time. Yes. That is the problem. How a non real wave in space time can interfere really in space-time? Of course, the answer is simple with the MWI, but asks for real infuence at a distance with the Mono-world assumption. When I say a single history, I mean that from the Big Bang forward, the universe only followed one branch. And that can lead into the future, only one probabilistic future. >> >>> And if the future is predetermined in this way, isn't this a serious issue for single universe models of QM? How can the outcome of quantum events be both inevitable and random? >> Having a single future isn't the same as being determined. A single future in which situation A is sometimes followed by B and sometimes by C is still random. It depends on perspective. It's true that from 1p, it looks random. But from 3p, it is static and always the same, and in this sense determined. Not true, the 3p view of the future is still just a single probabilistic world line. It is only the bird view, from outside space and time, that gives the appearance that there are multiply existing futures. Neither we from the 1p perspective, or from outside ourselves in the 3p perspective, can we ever see any of the other branches predicted by MWI. Yes, like in WM-duplication. No, that is a serious mistake. Unitary evolution of the wave function is not at all like the person duplication experiments. The main difference is that the duplicates of the Helsinki man are never in a pure quantum state. That was not the point. The comparison is on the reasult measurement, not on the reason of the parallel states. With mechanism, the reason are the same (the first person indeterminacy). With collapse, we need magic. The teleportation to W or M is of separate classical entities, There is no superposition principle for duplicated persons. You can defined for the Helsinki guy. He is in a sort of (non quantum) superposition state in helsinki, which indeed, like in the MWI, is just his ignoance on which computations he belongs. I use Y = II, if that is still needed to say. The guy in Helsinki can predict that his first person future will be unique, even if he knows that in the "bird" picture, that outside the teleportation/duplication boxes, there will be two versions of him. That is not the "bird" picture, that is merely the objective 3p picture of the ordinary classical world. The bird picture is solely to do with the pure state that is preserved in the unitary evolution pure state of the wave function. I do not assume QM in that context. I was just doing an anlogy, at this stage. This is where the problems with MWI really show up. When you have a quantum event with, say, two possible outcomes with equal probabilities, such as measuring the polarization of an unpolarized photon, the initial probability is 0.5 for each polarization. But after the measurement, the probability for the observed result (horizontal or transverse as observed) is unity -- because the result has been observed, it is now certain. So how did the probability suddenly change from 0.5 to 1.0? Well, with the MWI, it is the same as the dropping from the Helsinki 1/2, to the W(M) "local
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 01 Jun 2017, at 03:59, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 6:28 am, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 at 04:55, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 31/05/2017 12:30 pm, Pierz wrote: Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations to be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own understanding. Thank you for the kind comments, I try my best to be clear. IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when I last conversed with you on this list. That is indeed the case. I have several reasons to be dubious about MWI. Firstly, it amounts to reifying a complex valued function that resides in configuration space -- I am not sure that this is a well- defined procedure. Secondly, MWI doesn't really do what it claims to do, which is to provide a resolution of the measurement problem in QM. MWI doesn't provide any explanation of the transition from a pure state to the mixed state that is required for experiments to give definite results. At the crucial point, MWI simply says "then a miracle happens!" To be more explicit, deterministic evolution of the wave function by the Schrödinger equation gives a full account of decoherence, and the dissemination of the coherence phases into the environment. This reduces the off-diagonal elements of the density matrix so that the diagonal elements become *almost* orthogonal, but unitary evolution can't go the whole way. The only way one can reduce the pure state to a mixture is to trace over the environmental degrees of freedom, which is to say that the residual phase information is simply thrown away. This trace operation is non-unitary, and there is no warrant for it in the SE itself, so it is, in the final analysis, just an appeal to magic. Bruce, is it perhaps finally an appeal to observation per se? IOW what you say is of course objectively the case, but perhaps in some way the residual phase information isn't relevant (i.e. can be 'traced over') in the synthesis of the 'observer-observation' relation. If so, this relation could perhaps resolve the 'eternalist' pure state (which after all continues simply to be 'there' in the MWI conception) subjectively into what would give the 'instrumental' appearance, in effect, of the probability density characteristic of a mixture? It is often argued that the density matrix is diagonalized FAPP, and FAPP is all that is required. Unfortunately, I don't think that that really works. Even though the individual off-diagonal elements might be arbitrarily small, there are a very large number of them (increasing as further environmental degrees of freedom are included). The end result is that the original superposition is still intact and no 'split' has in fact occurred -- the situation is still completely reversible. The problem I point to is that there is nothing in the unitary mathematics corresponding to "ignoring inessential degrees of freedom". That is what the partial trace does, but that has to be imposed by hand, it is not automatic, and suffers from all the old difficulties of the Heisenberg cut -- it is arbitrary. Then there wouldn't seem to me to be a necessary idea of 'collapse' involved, except in a purely epistemological sense. The term 'subjective' here is more in the sense of some fundamental compositional principle of observer-hood than a restriction to out- and-out 'waking consciousness'. I'm not sure if this has any necessary connection to Lockwood's idea of a 'consciousness basis'. Of course quite clearly any of this would be highly speculative, but I'm wondering if it could make any sense in principle? I'd value your opinion. I think that something like this was what Everett had in mind when called this idea the "relative state model". I think he saw the observer as complete in every branch, so that |psi> = (|1> + \2>)|me>|environment> --> (|1>|me_1> + |2>| me_2>)|environment> --> |1>|me_1>|environment_1> + |2>|me_2>|environment_2> and he then considered the two parts of the development to be complete in themselves, so we found ourselves in one or the other branch. Everett had no particular commitment to the existence of the other branches -- Well Everett denied this, and his son, and daughter confirmed this, as I have read in a short biography. Everett told that he had been asked to withdraw any tlak on parallel world, and the term relative states was proposed by the editor of the journal (Review of Modern Physics). This seems also clear from his long text. it was DeWitt who developed the idea of many worlds. The trouble here, as is well known, is that the above is still a pure state, and we require a reduction to a mixed state in order to be able to consider one or other branch on its own. The 'collapse' can be regarded as epistemological, but we will still need the mixed state. OK with this. Thirdly, the non-observed branches in MWI
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 01 Jun 2017, at 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 04:01, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 30/05/2017 9:35 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2017, at 11:28, Telmo Menezes wrote: I get your point with decoherence. Again, I would say that it all depends on theories of mind. What does mind supervene on? Perhaps it is true that every single coupling with the environment prevents the current observer state to become compatible with other branches. But can we be sure? I feel that such certainties come from a strong belief in emergentism (which I cannot disprove, but find problematic). It is impossible to recohere the past, FAPP. But only FAPP. To make the blue T-rex interfereing with the red-T- rex, we must erase the trace of particle interaction between the T-rex in its whole light-cone, and this without forgetting the particles "swallowed" by the black-holes, etc. It is just completely impossible, but to derive from that the unicity of the past, is, it seems to me (and you if I understood well) is invalid. I think the recoherence of paths that have completely decohered is more than just FAPP impossible, I think it is impossible in principle. One major problem with recoherence in general is that information leaks from the paths at the speed of light (as well as less slowly for other interactions). Since this vital information goes out along the light cone, it can never be recaptured and returned to the original interaction. In QM + special relativity OK. (note that to me QM + special relativity => no collapse (and even the Many dreams, but we have agreed to disagree on this if I remember well). Reasoning in QM without SR is not very profitable. Besides, QM + SR does not particularly imply MWI -- it is perfectly possible to have a consistent collapse model of QM+SR. I know you don't agree because of the non-locality implied by EPR, but this non-locality is not removed in MWI, regardless of what you might say. I don't see it, and the mast time we discuss this, we conclude on some vocabulary problem. When there is no collapse, measurement tells to people light separated in which branch theiy belongs, but to exploits that information, they need to come into contact. Consequently, indispensable phase information is lost *in principle*, so the recoherence is, in general, impossible. OK. (I was reasoning in naive classical QM) Of course, with carefully constructed systems, where the loss of information along the light cone is prevented, recoherence is possible in special circumstances, but not in general. From this, the uniqueness of the past of any decoherent history is assured. So deriving the unicity (if I understand this use of the word) is by no means invalid -- it is proved. In QM + SR. OK. Even if one encounters one of those rare situations in which recoherence is achieved, that still does not invalidate the uniqueness of the past history -- recoherence, if it occurs, simply means that no new branches are formed at that point, so the decoherent history remains unique. OK. That might suggest that we identify our indistinguishible past in arithmetic, if we assume mechanism. I use the Y = II principle, or the "quantum" linearity of the tensor product "@": we have that a @ (b + c) = (a @ b) + (a @ c). That makes sense. Linearity is the heart of QM. It is linearity that allows superpositions, and leads to all the "quantum weirdness". I agree. Both "linearities" (the quantum evolution, and the tensor products). FWIW, you are expressing my own understanding of the situation: there can be no superposition of red and green screens or dinosaurs, or dead and live cats, because there can be no quantum superposition of macroscopic objects. Superpositions of wave functions are only possible for systems isolated from interaction with their environment, which is why quantum computers are so fricking hard to make: keeping aggregates of particles isolated from interactions with the surrounding environment is exponentially more difficult as the system grows in size. The main question for me is this: can two branches hold different observer states, if they differ only by things that are not observable? I would say no, intuitively. I would even say "no" just for the things not observed, even when observable. I previously answered Telmo's question in the affirmative, viz., two fully decohered branches will hold different observer states, even if the differences are not observed or observable. So if some trivial physical event happens to your body, such as the decay of a K 40 nucleus in your foot, this would not be noticeable, or even particularly observable even if you were looking for it. But such an event causes at least two branches to form every instant -- one in which the decay has occurred, and one in which it has
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 31 May 2017, at 20:21, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 18:39, "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 30 May 2017, at 17:00, David Nyman wrote: On 30 May 2017 at 14:48, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2017, at 14:10, Telmo Menezes wrote: On Tue, May 30, 2017 at 1:35 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Right, I agree with you and Pierz on this. My point was more on what you address below. What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level than quantum? E.g. at the level of the neurons and their connections and activations levels? That would enlarge the uncertainty spectrum on the realities we can access without losing anything subjective. A point against, I assume. Not sure. Perhaps. It would help the doctor to build the artificial brain. A point in favour. Yes. Modulo it helps also the charlatans, the hackers, etc. But that's part of the price. In the long run, 99% of the treatment of information might consist in cryptography. Some amount of first person privacy is needed to get consistent extensions. It could also make more difficult to justify the smallness of Planck constant, and to explain why the quantum seems more obviously present in the micro-states, Against? Problematical for the Mechanist. I would favor the identification of the substitution level with the lower classical physical state up to the "quantum isolation". I think this could be proved. It is the level of the molecules, and their most probable histories. The quantum fuzziness is how our self-description relatively to the more proable histories appears for the average Löbian number. Decoherence would be easier to fight against, OK and quantum computing would be more easy to be realized. How, if the substitution is above the quantum boundary? Then physics is deflected from the mechanist self-reference. Put it bluntly: computationalism is refuted or we are in a malevolent Bostromian simulation (or other number conspiracies. May be, if the Riemann hypothesis is false, ... Of course, it can depend to what you consider to need to survive. The level of substitution is defined, not for the survival, but for the perfect survival. Above that level, you will continue to survive, but -either you will be aware of a defect, from a permanent headache to anything you can imagine, or not. - Or there will be a defect (observable by a third person, or not). Exemple: the first classical teleported human, who said after the experience : "it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, it is a total success, ... And continue to say so in an asylum. Did he survived? Above the level, you lost things. Obviously, with a digital *electronical* neural net, you would lost the experience of cannabis, alcohol, salvia, tobacco, until you find the apps on the net, emulating the chemical level information. Neurology is fundamentals, including the swarm neural play, but each neuron is a complex chemical factory, and cells communicates mainly by molecules, even when they get the cable (neurons). This makes me think that the quantum level is boundary of the substitution level. I don't follow all of the above. Do you mean a boundary above which, or below which, a plausible substitution might be made? By high level, I mean a vulgar approximation of the brain/body could be made, with few mega on the disk. By low level, I mean an ultra-precise description of a big generalized brain, like the brain + a part of the environment described by the quantum superstring with 10^100 decimals. You will need a big disk. Normally the relative substitution level determine the boundaries between the classical boolean mind and the quantum observable. But with QM without collapse, the level is not a question of micro/ macro, but of independence between computations, in sense which can be described by using the modal logics. In the math part, the level is in the choice of the box, the beweisbar provability predicate. The theology is invariant for all the sound (mechanical, or weakenings) extensions. But no machines can rationally justifies any substitution level, and it is a bit like a private matter. If the brain exploits the quantum weirdness, it means that we can extracts information from the statistical measure on all computations below our substitution. That possibility is independent of the level, and the whole of the apparent matter exploits this, and should entirely emerge from this ... Here I agree with Bohr, if you define the Macroscopic by the Boolean laws of thought level, where th
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 1/06/2017 8:21 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 09:15, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 31/05/2017 4:40 pm, Pierz wrote: >> On 5/30/2017 7:30 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations to be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own understanding. IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when I last conversed with you on this list. I wonder if you'd care to comment on my original argument on this thread - which has of course now been swamped by the usual brawls. Does not a single history + the physical insignificance of the notion of a current moment mean that there is also only a single possible future? >> I don't see how that follows. In the usual model of forking in the future direction every current moment has a single history, but multiple futures. Multiple futures = MWI, surely. Not necessarily. If you insist on Schrödinger determinism, then yes, by reification of the wave function. But if the wave function is only epistemological, then there is only one probabilistic future. How could an epistemological wave interfere all by itself? It seems simpler to say that the wave is real, but that the local, one branch, perception is epistemological. I think you misunderstand this use of the word "epistemological". When it is said that the wave function is merely epistemological, what is meant that it is merely a calculational device: the wave function encapsulates our knowledge of the system of interest, and tells us how to calculate the probabilities of various outcomes. In other words, it is not a 'real' wave in space-time. When I say a single history, I mean that from the Big Bang forward, the universe only followed one branch. And that can lead into the future, only one probabilistic future. >> >>> And if the future is predetermined in this way, isn't this a serious issue for single universe models of QM? How can the outcome of quantum events be both inevitable and random? >> Having a single future isn't the same as being determined. A single future in which situation A is sometimes followed by B and sometimes by C is still random. It depends on perspective. It's true that from 1p, it looks random. But from 3p, it is static and always the same, and in this sense determined. Not true, the 3p view of the future is still just a single probabilistic world line. It is only the bird view, from outside space and time, that gives the appearance that there are multiply existing futures. Neither we from the 1p perspective, or from outside ourselves in the 3p perspective, can we ever see any of the other branches predicted by MWI. Yes, like in WM-duplication. No, that is a serious mistake. Unitary evolution of the wave function is not at all like the person duplication experiments. The main difference is that the duplicates of the Helsinki man are never in a pure quantum state. The teleportation to W or M is of separate classical entities, There is no superposition principle for duplicated persons. The guy in Helsinki can predict that his first person future will be unique, even if he knows that in the "bird" picture, that outside the teleportation/duplication boxes, there will be two versions of him. That is not the "bird" picture, that is merely the objective 3p picture of the ordinary classical world. The bird picture is solely to do with the pure state that is preserved in the unitary evolution pure state of the wave function. This is where the problems with MWI really show up. When you have a quantum event with, say, two possible outcomes with equal probabilities, such as measuring the polarization of an unpolarized photon, the initial probability is 0.5 for each polarization. But after the measurement, the probability for the observed result (horizontal or transverse as observed) is unity -- because the result has been observed, it is now certain. So how did the probability suddenly change from 0.5 to 1.0? In the classical case, such as the duplicates of the H-man going to W or W, there is no problem. The system is already in a mixed state, so the change in probability is simply the result of getting additional information. Just as in the toss of the fair coin, heads and tails are equally likely, but the jump of the probability for 0.5 to 1.0 on observing the result is purely a classical epistemological effect. This is not true for the quantum pure state. In order for the change in probability to be understood epistemologically, the pure state has to be reduced to a mixed state (a process that is not necessary in the classical examples). In quantum mechanics, this change is brought about by the unitary processes of decoherence, and the non-unitary trace over the environmental degrees of freedom. This is an essential difference between classical and quantum physics, and the necessity for this no
Re: Answers to David 4
On 1 Jun 2017 10:02 a.m., "Bruno Marchal" wrote: On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote: > > On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> >> On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: >> >> >> >> On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to extract" >> over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject >> precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal. >> >> >> Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit, >> or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". >> > > Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short. > But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid > ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :( > > >> I would say that subjects precedes physical objects >> , >> as physics becomes a first person plural notion. >> > > Exactly > > >> But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to >> admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the >> subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports >> its self-referential modes. >> > > Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological > component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense, > but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised > (i.e. made true) in terms of a point-of-view. > > > > OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us) > aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a > bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our > sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we > can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to > first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) > the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set. > > That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are > put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA, > but "for RA" PA is already dreaming. > > It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson > believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are > "viciously" circular, > Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.". I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption). > making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we > can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most > mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of > proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, > group theory, etc.). > > >> We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that >> would be a bit ad hoc, >> > > Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the > inner God-subject. > > > How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts the truth. The "Bp" is like a > finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god > is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window. > Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object. I guess that I meant "natural *number* object. > I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due > to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of > the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does > not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of > the first person subject. > Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with monopsychism. OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is not the biggest "God". Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably already in Plato's Parmenides, God is overwhelmed by the "Noùs". Quantified G*, q
Re: substitution level
On 31 May 2017, at 12:44, Telmo Menezes wrote: Creating a new thread to avoid causing decoherence on the other one :) What if the substitution level turns out to be at a higher level than quantum? E.g. at the level of the neurons and their connections and activations levels? That would enlarge the uncertainty spectrum on the realities we can access without losing anything subjective. It would help the doctor to build the artificial brain. It could also make more difficult to justify the smallness of Planck constant, and to explain why the quantum seems more obviously present in the micro-states, Decoherence would be easier to fight against, and quantum computing would be more easy to be realized. This lakes me think that the quantum level is boundary of the substitution level. This appears to be a testable hypothesis. I know that Penrose proposed a theory on the quantum effects inside neurons that turned ou to be problematic because of decoherence, but of course that doesn't mean that quantum mechanics might not play a much more holistic role in brain activity. I remember a presentation perhaps a decade ago by a neuroscientist at an artificial life conference, where she showed that neurons can operate in a chaotic regime. In fact, she claimed at the time that we did not have the computational power to accurately simulate a single neuron. To me, this suggests that the activation of neurons might be governed by much subtler phenomena than simple threshold effects. Perhaps it is conceivable that small scale quantum effects could propagate to the macro level of the brain. On the other hand, it is also true that artificial neural network models with just simple threshold neurons are already Turing complete, provided that one allows for recurrence. This proves nothing, but purely when worrying about neuroscince / artificial intelligence, I am a it weary of going for more complicated models when there is still so much to explore in the simpler ones... I say this while completely disregarding the hard problem. I have perhaps the unusual intuition that intelligence and consciousness are quite different issues -- I share that intuition when intelligence is used in the sense of competence. In that case, consciousness, or conscience, might be at the antipode of intelligence. That feeling is strengthened when reading the news... although I doubt that it is possible to build a sophisticated AI that is not conscious (or even a simple one, I don't know). We have to distinguish Hameroff from Penrose. Hameroff believes/ assumes that the brain operates at the quantum level,. He assumes that it is a quantum computer. But a quantum computer does not violate the classical Church's thesis, and his hypothesis does not change the conclusion of Mechanism (although it makes more complex the derivation of physics a priori). Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I even suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal quantum chaotic dovetailing, but even if that is true, that should not be used to justify physics, because we would get the quanta, and not the qualia (unless the Riemann hypothesis is shown undecidable in PA (and thus true!). Only Penrose asks for an explicit non computable physical reduction of the waves, with some role for gravity, and is authentically non- computationalist. Penrose is coherent with computationalism. He keep physics as fundamental, but accept the price: the abandon of mechanism. But his argument aganist mechanism is not valid, and already defeated by machines like PA, ZF, etc. Bruno Telmo. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 31 May 2017, at 09:15, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 31/05/2017 4:40 pm, Pierz wrote: On Wednesday, May 31, 2017 at 3:28:18 PM UTC+10, Brent wrote: Sorry. Something funny with my verizon account. Brent On 5/30/2017 8:09 PM, Pierz Newton-John wrote: > Brent, are you replying from a mobile? I’m still receiving your replies, as others are, on my private email. That’s what happens to me when I try to reply using my iPhone. The "reply to all" button is missing. I’ll reply to your remarks on the list if you post it there... > > >> On 31 May 2017, at 1:05 pm, Brent Meeker wrote: >> >> >> >> On 5/30/2017 7:30 PM, Pierz wrote: >>> Thanks for these clarifications Bruce. I find your explanations to be very lucid and helpful - they also confirm my own understanding. IIRC, you weren't a particular fan of MWI when I last conversed with you on this list. I wonder if you'd care to comment on my original argument on this thread - which has of course now been swamped by the usual brawls. Does not a single history + the physical insignificance of the notion of a current moment mean that there is also only a single possible future? >> I don't see how that follows. In the usual model of forking in the future direction every current moment has a single history, but multiple futures. Multiple futures = MWI, surely. Not necessarily. If you insist on Schrödinger determinism, then yes, by reification of the wave function. But if the wave function is only epistemological, then there is only one probabilistic future. How could an epistemological wave interfere all by itself? It seems simpler to say that the wave is real, but that the local, one branch, perception is epistemological. When I say a single history, I mean that from the Big Bang forward, the universe only followed one branch. And that can lead into the future, only one probabilistic future. >> >>> And if the future is predetermined in this way, isn't this a serious issue for single universe models of QM? How can the outcome of quantum events be both inevitable and random? >> Having a single future isn't the same as being determined. A single future in which situation A is sometimes followed by B and sometimes by C is still random. It depends on perspective. It's true that from 1p, it looks random. But from 3p, it is static and always the same, and in this sense determined. Not true, the 3p view of the future is still just a single probabilistic world line. It is only the bird view, from outside space and time, that gives the appearance that there are multiply existing futures. Neither we from the 1p perspective, or from outside ourselves in the 3p perspective, can we ever see any of the other branches predicted by MWI. Yes, like in WM-duplication. The guy in Helsinki can predict that his first person future will be unique, even if he knows that in the "bird" picture, that outside the teleportation/duplication boxes, there will be two versions of him. The question is, what determined (from the 3p view) that the universe followed that particular path and not any of the others? Why do you reject out of hand that the universe might be probabilistic? It is possible 'nothing' determined which path from the possibilities was actually followed. All that is known are the probabilities for each path. We do not know that the other paths are followed, either 1p or 3p. In QM, we do have evidences that many path are taken all together. if only the two slits. Bruno My assumption here is that "now" does not exist from the 3p POV and therefore the physical structure (whether it branches or not) of the past and the future is the same. That can certainly be the case, whether there are existing alternative branches or not. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Answers to David 4
On 31 May 2017, at 19:14, David Nyman wrote: On 31 May 2017 at 17:00, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 30 May 2017, at 16:44, David Nyman wrote: On 30 May 2017 at 13:05, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 29 May 2017, at 13:42, David Nyman wrote: On 29 May 2017 at 05:27, Brent Meeker wrote: Yes, so the explanatory priority is now that of "we are to extract" over "the physics of which they are experiences". Or in short, subject precedes object in the explanation. That's the reversal. Maybe it is here that I suspect that we might still differ a little bit, or not in case you mean "physical object" for "object". Yes, That's what I mean. Sometimes perhaps I can be a little too short. But on the other hand at times when I ramble on in an attempt to avoid ambiguities Brent tells me I'm being long-winded :( I would say that subjects precedes physical objects, as physics becomes a first person plural notion. Exactly But with computationalism, to just gives sense to that word, we have to admit that the number objects still precedes (in some logical sense) the subject, which arises from the infinitely many computations which supports its self-referential modes. Well I guess the way I'd put it is that their abstract or ontological component is already 'there' (i.e. assumed) in a certain objective sense, but their 'observable' or epistemological component can only be realised (i.e. made true) in terms of a point- of-view. OK. Yet, having bet on a theory making us (or the correct part of us) aware that the first point of view is local, and so see only a part of a bigger truth, which is the "ultimate" 0p, which mechanism, and our sanity/soundness, which we cannot even express, still less justify, but we can "meta-prove" for the correct machine, that such an 0p can be reduced to first the arithmetical truth, and secondly (blaspheming for two seconds) the sigma arithmetical truth (the UD, The UM, the sigma_1 complete set. That is why we can take RA for the ontology. The PA induction axioms are put in the number epistemology already. RA can prove the existence of PA, but "for RA" PA is already dreaming. It is an open problem (to me at least) if this is mandatory or not. Nelson believes (but seems unique in believing this) that the induction axioms are "viciously" circular, Is this in any way related to Popper's point about induction in fact always being deduction on the basis of some theory (even if only implicitly)? IIRC his rationale was that even the selection of 'data' on which to base the purported inductive generalisation was itself theory-dependent. Hence the claim should really be something more like "on the basis of a certain theory, let us select these features as data, which then might lead us to the following conclusion...etc.". I agree that most (but not all) "induction" (in the sense of inductive inference) requires explicit "induction" axioms, in the Peano sense. But Peano induction axiom will not usually been seen as inductive inference. I agree that inductive inference is theory dependent, and it requires not just PA-like induction, but also the general assumption, usually at the metalevel that there is something to be observed (the <>t meta-assumption). making PA inconsistent. I doubt this a lot, but with mechanism I think we can argue that we can't really prove the consistency of PA, despite most mathematicians believe in the consistency of much more (in the sense of proving abilities) powerful theory than PA, like ZF, Category, theory, group theory, etc.). We can place the natural object in the mind of the God-subject, but that would be a bit ad hoc, Possibly, but in a monopsychic sense they *are* all in the mind of the inner God-subject. How? in Bp & p, the Bp part restricts the truth. The "Bp" is like a finite window through which God/Truth, "p", look at itself. The inner god is the outer God looking at itself through the Bp window. Yes, that's what I meant. Perhaps it's just vocabulary. I assumed (wrongly?) that by natural object you meant physical or perceptual object. I guess that I meant "natural *number* object. I think that what makes you adding the whole truth in the provable is due to the fact that the "Divine Intellect"'s view coincides with the view of the soul-instantiated: that is: the fact that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The soul does not split along G/G*. But that is the "natural", "unavoidable" solipsism of the first person subject. Yes indeed. That's what makes it compatible (at least heuristically) with monopsychism. OK. God's solipism. To be sure, the "(outer) God" of mechanism, V, is not the biggest "God". Like in Plotinus, and perhaps arguably already in Plato's Parmenides, God is overwhelmed by the "Noùs". Quantified G*, qG*, is PI-complete in the V oracle. So, even if you have V at your disposition, you need to complete