Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 03-06-2017 05:42, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/06/2017 11:38 am, smitra wrote: On 03-06-2017 02:10, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/06/2017 9:16 am, smitra wrote: In a single universe theory, this implies non-locality, because of the absence of local hidden variables. If local hidden variable were to exist then you could say that Alice and Bob where to find whatever they found anyway only due to their local interactions with the spins and polarizers. But with that ruled out, whatever Alice will find is information that just popped into existence when Bob made his measurement. What is ruled out by Bell's theorem is that local hidden variables can account for all possible correlations between the observations, Bell's theorem does not rule out the possibility of a local hidden variable explanation in special cases, like that of polarizers set at the same angle. Either there exists a local hidden variable theory from which QM can be derived or such a theory doesn't exist. If we assume that a local hidden variable theory underlies QM, then we find that regardless of the details, it cannot reproduce QM in certain cases. Bell inequalities can be derived for such theories that QM violates. Then, with QM confirmed and in particular the violations of the Bell inequalities conformed, we can then discard any local hidden variables theory. This means that even in cases that do not involve violations of Bell inequalities, we can still say that there are no local hidden variables that can explain the results in those experiments, because we've verified that there is no hidden variable theory that can reproduce QM. Reproduce all QM results. It does not rule out cases where local hidden variable, or common cause, explanations are possible. Then it suffices to consider a simple case of entanglement between two spins where in a single universe interpretation there is non-local behavior, e.g. Alice and Bob measuring the z-components of a system of two spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state. You may consider more complex cases where Alice randomly chooses another direction, but I remember from a previous discussion that this led to a disagreement about how to treat the source of this randomness. Not that I remember. There might have been disagreement about how the orientation of one polarizer became known at the other polarizer, but randmoness was never an issue. Ultimately all randomness has a quantum mechanical origin as pointed out in this article: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953 There simply exists no known way to get to purely classical randomness. In the case where both polarizers have the same setting, the fact that Bob knows what Alice will find poses a problem for locality because local hidden variables have been ruled out. No it doesn't. There is a simple common cause explanation available for this case. Which doesn't eliminate non-local effects, see EPR. So, what Alice will find is random, new information will appear at her place after she measures the spin that didn't previously exist locally. But the fact that Bob could predict her result means that this information did exist at Bob's place. This demonstrates the non-locality aspect of single universe theories. No, it simply demonstrates that when there is a common cause explanation, there is no problem. Remember Bertlmann's socks. No, see EPR argument. Then in the MWI, Alice is identical in the two branches, so her measurement result is not predetermined as she is not yet located in either of Bob's branches. Her measurement result will do that. Not so. When the polarizers are aligned, Bob's measurement has a common cause with Alice's, so the agreement between results is determined from the start. Agreement via common cause does not eliminate non-locality problem in single universe theories, as EPR have shown. If we change the set-up by letting Alice choose different setting of her polarizer to bring in the additional baggage of having to rule out hidden variables within the same experiment so that non-locality arguments have to be re-argued based on that, then that's not going to add anything but confusion. It might confuse you, but until you can do this you have not achieved a local explanation of the general case in which the polarizers are at arbitrary angles to each other. It seems that you are making valiant attempts to avoid the case where the shit hits the fan. Good luck with that, but I am not fooled. Bruce It's totally irrelevant, but I'll write out the GHZ state case with 3 entangled spins and 3 observers that measure the x and y components of the spins to demonstrate step by step that there is no problem in the MWI, while in the CI there is a non-locality problem later when I have time. But in general, the EPR thought experiment proves you wrong, the common cause there does not save you from non-local effects in single universe collapse theories. Then Bell
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 3/06/2017 11:38 am, smitra wrote: On 03-06-2017 02:10, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/06/2017 9:16 am, smitra wrote: In a single universe theory, this implies non-locality, because of the absence of local hidden variables. If local hidden variable were to exist then you could say that Alice and Bob where to find whatever they found anyway only due to their local interactions with the spins and polarizers. But with that ruled out, whatever Alice will find is information that just popped into existence when Bob made his measurement. What is ruled out by Bell's theorem is that local hidden variables can account for all possible correlations between the observations, Bell's theorem does not rule out the possibility of a local hidden variable explanation in special cases, like that of polarizers set at the same angle. Either there exists a local hidden variable theory from which QM can be derived or such a theory doesn't exist. If we assume that a local hidden variable theory underlies QM, then we find that regardless of the details, it cannot reproduce QM in certain cases. Bell inequalities can be derived for such theories that QM violates. Then, with QM confirmed and in particular the violations of the Bell inequalities conformed, we can then discard any local hidden variables theory. This means that even in cases that do not involve violations of Bell inequalities, we can still say that there are no local hidden variables that can explain the results in those experiments, because we've verified that there is no hidden variable theory that can reproduce QM. Reproduce all QM results. It does not rule out cases where local hidden variable, or common cause, explanations are possible. Then it suffices to consider a simple case of entanglement between two spins where in a single universe interpretation there is non-local behavior, e.g. Alice and Bob measuring the z-components of a system of two spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state. You may consider more complex cases where Alice randomly chooses another direction, but I remember from a previous discussion that this led to a disagreement about how to treat the source of this randomness. Not that I remember. There might have been disagreement about how the orientation of one polarizer became known at the other polarizer, but randmoness was never an issue. Ultimately all randomness has a quantum mechanical origin as pointed out in this article: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953 There simply exists no known way to get to purely classical randomness. In the case where both polarizers have the same setting, the fact that Bob knows what Alice will find poses a problem for locality because local hidden variables have been ruled out. No it doesn't. There is a simple common cause explanation available for this case. So, what Alice will find is random, new information will appear at her place after she measures the spin that didn't previously exist locally. But the fact that Bob could predict her result means that this information did exist at Bob's place. This demonstrates the non-locality aspect of single universe theories. No, it simply demonstrates that when there is a common cause explanation, there is no problem. Remember Bertlmann's socks. Then in the MWI, Alice is identical in the two branches, so her measurement result is not predetermined as she is not yet located in either of Bob's branches. Her measurement result will do that. Not so. When the polarizers are aligned, Bob's measurement has a common cause with Alice's, so the agreement between results is determined from the start. If we change the set-up by letting Alice choose different setting of her polarizer to bring in the additional baggage of having to rule out hidden variables within the same experiment so that non-locality arguments have to be re-argued based on that, then that's not going to add anything but confusion. It might confuse you, but until you can do this you have not achieved a local explanation of the general case in which the polarizers are at arbitrary angles to each other. It seems that you are making valiant attempts to avoid the case where the shit hits the fan. Good luck with that, but I am not fooled. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 03-06-2017 02:10, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 3/06/2017 9:16 am, smitra wrote: In a single universe theory, this implies non-locality, because of the absence of local hidden variables. If local hidden variable were to exist then you could say that Alice and Bob where to find whatever they found anyway only due to their local interactions with the spins and polarizers. But with that ruled out, whatever Alice will find is information that just popped into existence when Bob made his measurement. What is ruled out by Bell's theorem is that local hidden variables can account for all possible correlations between the observations, Bell's theorem does not rule out the possibility of a local hidden variable explanation in special cases, like that of polarizers set at the same angle. Either there exists a local hidden variable theory from which QM can be derived or such a theory doesn't exist. If we assume that a local hidden variable theory underlies QM, then we find that regardless of the details, it cannot reproduce QM in certain cases. Bell inequalities can be derived for such theories that QM violates. Then, with QM confirmed and in particular the violations of the Bell inequalities conformed, we can then discard any local hidden variables theory. This means that even in cases that do not involve violations of Bell inequalities, we can still say that there are no local hidden variables that can explain the results in those experiments, because we've verified that there is no hidden variable theory that can reproduce QM. Then it suffices to consider a simple case of entanglement between two spins where in a single universe interpretation there is non-local behavior, e.g. Alice and Bob measuring the z-components of a system of two spin 1/2 particles in the singlet state. You may consider more complex cases where Alice randomly chooses another direction, but I remember from a previous discussion that this led to a disagreement about how to treat the source of this randomness. Ultimately all randomness has a quantum mechanical origin as pointed out in this article: https://arxiv.org/abs/1212.0953 There simply exists no known way to get to purely classical randomness. In the case where both polarizers have the same setting, the fact that Bob knows what Alice will find poses a problem for locality because local hidden variables have been ruled out. So, what Alice will find is random, new information will appear at her place after she measures the spin that didn't previously exist locally. But the fact that Bob could predict her result means that this information did exist at Bob's place. This demonstrates the non-locality aspect of single universe theories. Then in the MWI, Alice is identical in the two branches, so her measurement result is not predetermined as she is not yet located in either of Bob's branches. Her measurement result will do that. If we change the set-up by letting Alice choose different setting of her polarizer to bring in the additional baggage of having to rule out hidden variables within the same experiment so that non-locality arguments have to be re-argued based on that, then that's not going to add anything but confusion. Saibal -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 3/06/2017 9:16 am, smitra wrote: On 02-06-2017 10:05, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 5:31 pm, smitra wrote: On 02-06-2017 04:54, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 12:00 pm, smitra wrote: On 02-06-2017 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition. The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in any other interpretation. Bruce In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body will be in different states due to decoherence). I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of non-locality in QM. 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. Bruce Suppose Alice and Bob are robots with classical processors, the states of each register can only be 0 and 1. Whatever Bob is conscious of must then be contained in the bitstring that specifies the state his processor is in. Decoherence has no effect on that bitstring. Until that time that Bob asks Alice about her setting of her polarizer, Bob's consciousness is exactly the same across the different branches in which Alice gives a different answer, False. It's trivially true. Bob's consciousness reflects the results he got. There are only four branches: '++', '+-', '-+', and '--'. Bob's conscious state is different for the two Alice '+' branches, and also different for the two Alice '-' branches. So it is not invariant across Alice's branches. What matters for the MWI discussion is simply that after Bob has made his measurement and he gets located in a branch corresponding to whatever he has measured, that whatever Alice does is not going to further localize Bob in a narrower set of branches due to decoherence caused by Alice's measurements. Yes, in the case under discussion, there are only two branches for Bob (and two for Alice). Here you then do need to extract Bob's consciousness from Bob's exact physical state. We are doing quantum mechanics here, not a theory of consciousness. So the discussion must be restricted to the formalism of QM. Introducing Bob's conscious state is an obfuscation, because that does not appear in the equations -- only his physical state is relevant to QM. It's only when Alice communicates the details that Bob's consciousness get's located in Alice's branches. How? By magic? despite rapid decoherence. Real human beings can be expected to fit well within this model. It is known that there typically is a lot of information present in the unconscious mind that we're not aware of. So, your consciousness could be identical across many branches even if your brain had split and the unconscious mind is already diverging. Take e.g. experiments where you are making a random choice and on the basis on functional MRI scans the experimenters are able to predict your choice before you have even made up your mind. So, this is same good old QM in the MWI where an observer's consciousness is modeled as a finite state machine describ
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 2 Jun 2017 22:32, "Telmo Menezes" wrote: On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 5:53 PM, David Nyman wrote: > On 2 June 2017 at 14:34, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 3:21 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> > >> > >> > On 2 Jun 2017 14:02, "Telmo Menezes" wrote: >> > >> > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruce Kellett >> > >> > wrote: >> >> On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: >> >>> >> >>> On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. >> >> > For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR >> > "paradox", >> > and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging >> > to >> > macrosuperposition. >> >> >> The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without >> collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were >> unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in >> Bell's >> theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and >> that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in >> any other interpretation. >> >> Bruce >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is >> >>> no >> >>> non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where >> >>> somehow >> >>> there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. >> >>> The >> >>> mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the >> >>> problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even >> >>> when >> >>> Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything >> >>> that's >> >>> necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in >> >>> the >> >>> branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's >> >>> consciousness >> >>> is >> >>> thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in >> >>> his >> >>> body will be in different states due to decoherence). >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that either you or someone else said something like this when >> >> this >> >> was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: >> >> >> >> 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of >> >> QM. >> >> It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question >> >> of >> >> non-locality in QM. >> >> >> >> 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an >> >> undisguised >> >> appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the >> >> decohered >> >> body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in >> >> favour >> >> of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain >> > >> > I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, >> > given that there is no way to measure consciousness. >> > >> >> Hi David, >> >> > I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I >> > recently >> > posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be >> > demonstrated >> > to covary systematically with neurological function, there is surely no >> > lack >> > of experimental evidence. >> >> I've had this discussion with Brent a few times. Even in this case I >> disagree that there is evidence. There is plenty of evidence that what >> one can experience is correlated with brain states, but if you give me >> anestesia and ask me if I was conscious, all I can really say is: "I >> can't remember". >> >> Being conscious but not able to form memories is a well known >> phenomena, because it is possible to detect REM sleep stages and brain >> activity during dreaming, but sometimes people cannot remember >> dreaming. >> >> These discussions are confused by the same word having multiple >> meanings. The overloading of these meanings betrays hidden >> assumptions, and I claim that we must bring these assumptions to the >> light of day if we are going to be rigorous. > > > Sure, but I don't see that anything you've said above is inconsistent with > any particular state of consciousness supervening, in the simple sense of > covariance stated above, with neurological function to any arbitrary level > of detail. Ok, in the simple sense of covariance I agree. Ant viable theory of mind must explain why certain states of consciousness are correlated with certain patterns of neural activity. > Nor for that matter would it be necessary to deny this whatever > one's preferred theory of consciousness might ultimately be (e.g. > computationalism). Agreed. >> >> > In the larger sense, of any finally unambiguous >> > explanatory relation between the two phenomena in general, the question >> > of >> > evidence then depends rather upon what one is willing to count as >> > explanation. The latter consideration is to say the least both less >> > obvious >> > and more controversial. >> >> I would say that it depends m
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 02-06-2017 10:05, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 5:31 pm, smitra wrote: On 02-06-2017 04:54, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 12:00 pm, smitra wrote: On 02-06-2017 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition. The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in any other interpretation. Bruce In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body will be in different states due to decoherence). I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of non-locality in QM. 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. Bruce Suppose Alice and Bob are robots with classical processors, the states of each register can only be 0 and 1. Whatever Bob is conscious of must then be contained in the bitstring that specifies the state his processor is in. Decoherence has no effect on that bitstring. Until that time that Bob asks Alice about her setting of her polarizer, Bob's consciousness is exactly the same across the different branches in which Alice gives a different answer, False. It's trivially true. Bob's consciousness reflects the results he got. There are only four branches: '++', '+-', '-+', and '--'. Bob's conscious state is different for the two Alice '+' branches, and also different for the two Alice '-' branches. So it is not invariant across Alice's branches. What matters for the MWI discussion is simply that after Bob has made his measurement and he gets located in a branch corresponding to whatever he has measured, that whatever Alice does is not going to further localize Bob in a narrower set of branches due to decoherence caused by Alice's measurements. Here you then do need to extract Bob's consciousness from Bob's exact physical state. It's only when Alice communicates the details that Bob's consciousness get's located in Alice's branches. despite rapid decoherence. Real human beings can be expected to fit well within this model. It is known that there typically is a lot of information present in the unconscious mind that we're not aware of. So, your consciousness could be identical across many branches even if your brain had split and the unconscious mind is already diverging. Take e.g. experiments where you are making a random choice and on the basis on functional MRI scans the experimenters are able to predict your choice before you have even made up your mind. So, this is same good old QM in the MWI where an observer's consciousness is modeled as a finite state machine described by a finite bitstring. We can then work in the basis where the observables for the bits of the bitstrings are all diagonal, this then corresponds to the observer having a definite conscious experience. The definite conscious experience of relevance here is of observing and recording the result of the spin measurement. In practice, what this means is that you can be in a macroscopic superposition long after decoheren
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 5:53 PM, David Nyman wrote: > On 2 June 2017 at 14:34, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 3:21 PM, David Nyman wrote: >> > >> > >> > On 2 Jun 2017 14:02, "Telmo Menezes" wrote: >> > >> > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruce Kellett >> > >> > wrote: >> >> On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: >> >>> >> >>> On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: >> >> On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. >> >> > For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR >> > "paradox", >> > and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging >> > to >> > macrosuperposition. >> >> >> The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without >> collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were >> unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in >> Bell's >> theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and >> that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in >> any other interpretation. >> >> Bruce >> >>> >> >>> >> >>> In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is >> >>> no >> >>> non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where >> >>> somehow >> >>> there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. >> >>> The >> >>> mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the >> >>> problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even >> >>> when >> >>> Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything >> >>> that's >> >>> necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in >> >>> the >> >>> branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's >> >>> consciousness >> >>> is >> >>> thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in >> >>> his >> >>> body will be in different states due to decoherence). >> >> >> >> >> >> I think that either you or someone else said something like this when >> >> this >> >> was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: >> >> >> >> 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of >> >> QM. >> >> It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question >> >> of >> >> non-locality in QM. >> >> >> >> 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an >> >> undisguised >> >> appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the >> >> decohered >> >> body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in >> >> favour >> >> of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain >> > >> > I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, >> > given that there is no way to measure consciousness. >> > >> >> Hi David, >> >> > I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I >> > recently >> > posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be >> > demonstrated >> > to covary systematically with neurological function, there is surely no >> > lack >> > of experimental evidence. >> >> I've had this discussion with Brent a few times. Even in this case I >> disagree that there is evidence. There is plenty of evidence that what >> one can experience is correlated with brain states, but if you give me >> anestesia and ask me if I was conscious, all I can really say is: "I >> can't remember". >> >> Being conscious but not able to form memories is a well known >> phenomena, because it is possible to detect REM sleep stages and brain >> activity during dreaming, but sometimes people cannot remember >> dreaming. >> >> These discussions are confused by the same word having multiple >> meanings. The overloading of these meanings betrays hidden >> assumptions, and I claim that we must bring these assumptions to the >> light of day if we are going to be rigorous. > > > Sure, but I don't see that anything you've said above is inconsistent with > any particular state of consciousness supervening, in the simple sense of > covariance stated above, with neurological function to any arbitrary level > of detail. Ok, in the simple sense of covariance I agree. Ant viable theory of mind must explain why certain states of consciousness are correlated with certain patterns of neural activity. > Nor for that matter would it be necessary to deny this whatever > one's preferred theory of consciousness might ultimately be (e.g. > computationalism). Agreed. >> >> > In the larger sense, of any finally unambiguous >> > explanatory relation between the two phenomena in general, the question >> > of >> > evidence then depends rather upon what one is willing to count as >> > explanation. The latter consideration is to say the least both less >> > obvious >> > and more controversial. >> >> I would say that it depends more on what one is willing to count as >> evid
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 2 June 2017 at 20:14, Brent Meeker wrote: > > > On 6/2/2017 12:01 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > On 2 Jun 2017 19:18, "Brent Meeker" wrote: > > > > On 6/2/2017 6:21 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, > given that there is no way to measure consciousness. > > > I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I > recently posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be > demonstrated to covary systematically with neurological function, there is > surely no lack of experimental evidence. In the larger sense, of any > finally unambiguous explanatory relation between the two phenomena in > general, the question of evidence then depends rather upon what one is > willing to count as explanation. The latter consideration is to say the > least both less obvious and more controversial. > > > Right. And a point I've tried to make (apparently unsuccessfully) several > times. > > > Not so. I have always accepted your view as one of the essential > components of any explanation (i. e. the covariance part). > > In the case of physical phenomena, like gravity, we arrive at a > mathematical model and we're all happy - we've explained gravity. When we > do the same thing, providing a useful model of the brain that predicts > conscious thoughts (cf. electrostimulation during brain surgery) we should > be happy that we've explained consciousness. But NO, there are all the > philosophers dedicated to "the hard problem" who demand to know "what > really makes consciousness?". The analogy in physics is John Archibald > Wheeler asking, "But what makes the equations *fly*?" > > In the virtuous circle of explanation, if you're not willing to count > anything as an explanation, then there is no explanation. > > > Again not so. An explanation of consciousness in terms of neurocognition > is both ineliminable and indispensable from a practical perspective. But > left at that, any explanatory relation with first person subjectivity can > never be more than an a posteriori attribution. After all, an explicit > account in terms of neurocognition is already causally sufficient in its > own right. > > IMO the so-called hard problem is an unfortunate artifact of a faulty > formulation of the problem area. Consequently comp doesn't try to 'solve' > it. Instead, it recasts the problem in essentially epistemological terms, > relying on the simplest assumptive ontology adequate to the task. To > succeed, it must also show that this manner of framing the problem is fully > compatible with an observable physics (and its theoretical ontology) such > that all aspects of the physical covariance remarked on above remain > consistent. All that said, what bears most heavily on its role in > explanation is to offer, a priori, an otherwise absent first-personal > account of the characteristic phenomena of subjectivity. > > > I find we are in violent agreement. :-) > Excellent. I think if we can somehow contrive to retain some memory of this mutual accommodation (difficult as I know that can be with our advancing years!) we may in future reach a better understanding of where we may still possibly diverge. As ever, I value your comments and analysis in correcting my own views. David > > > Brent > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Fwd: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
Forwarded on behalf of Brent. -- Forwarded message -- From: David Nyman Date: 2 June 2017 at 20:01 Subject: Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s) To: meekerdb On 2 Jun 2017 19:18, "Brent Meeker" wrote: On 6/2/2017 6:21 AM, David Nyman wrote: I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, given that there is no way to measure consciousness. I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I recently posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be demonstrated to covary systematically with neurological function, there is surely no lack of experimental evidence. In the larger sense, of any finally unambiguous explanatory relation between the two phenomena in general, the question of evidence then depends rather upon what one is willing to count as explanation. The latter consideration is to say the least both less obvious and more controversial. Right. And a point I've tried to make (apparently unsuccessfully) several times. Not so. I have always accepted your view as one of the essential components of any explanation (i. e. the covariance part). In the case of physical phenomena, like gravity, we arrive at a mathematical model and we're all happy - we've explained gravity. When we do the same thing, providing a useful model of the brain that predicts conscious thoughts (cf. electrostimulation during brain surgery) we should be happy that we've explained consciousness. But NO, there are all the philosophers dedicated to "the hard problem" who demand to know "what really makes consciousness?". The analogy in physics is John Archibald Wheeler asking, "But what makes the equations *fly*?" In the virtuous circle of explanation, if you're not willing to count anything as an explanation, then there is no explanation. Again not so. An explanation of consciousness in terms of neurocognition is both ineliminable and indispensable from a practical perspective. But left at that, any explanatory relation with first person subjectivity can never be more than an a posteriori attribution. After all, an explicit account in terms of neurocognition is already causally sufficient in its own right. IMO the so-called hard problem is an unfortunate artifact of a faulty formulation of the problem area. Consequently comp doesn't try to 'solve' it. Instead, it recasts the problem in essentially epistemological terms, relying on the simplest assumptive ontology adequate to the task. To succeed, it must also show that this manner of framing the problem is fully compatible with an observable physics (and its theoretical ontology) such that all aspects of the physical covariance remarked on above remain consistent. All that said, what bears most heavily on its role in explanation is to offer, a priori, an otherwise absent first-personal account of the characteristic phenomena of subjectivity. David Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 2 June 2017 at 14:34, Telmo Menezes wrote: > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 3:21 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > > > > On 2 Jun 2017 14:02, "Telmo Menezes" wrote: > > > > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruce Kellett > > > wrote: > >> On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: > >>> > >>> On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. > > > For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR > > "paradox", > > and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging > to > > macrosuperposition. > > > The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without > collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were > unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's > theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and > that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in > any other interpretation. > > Bruce > >>> > >>> > >>> In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is > no > >>> non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where > >>> somehow > >>> there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. > The > >>> mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the > >>> problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even > when > >>> Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything > that's > >>> necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in > the > >>> branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's > consciousness > >>> is > >>> thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in > >>> his > >>> body will be in different states due to decoherence). > >> > >> > >> I think that either you or someone else said something like this when > this > >> was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: > >> > >> 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of > QM. > >> It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question > of > >> non-locality in QM. > >> > >> 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an > undisguised > >> appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered > >> body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in > favour > >> of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain > > > > I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, > > given that there is no way to measure consciousness. > > > > Hi David, > > > I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I > recently > > posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be > demonstrated > > to covary systematically with neurological function, there is surely no > lack > > of experimental evidence. > > I've had this discussion with Brent a few times. Even in this case I > disagree that there is evidence. There is plenty of evidence that what > one can experience is correlated with brain states, but if you give me > anestesia and ask me if I was conscious, all I can really say is: "I > can't remember". > > Being conscious but not able to form memories is a well known > phenomena, because it is possible to detect REM sleep stages and brain > activity during dreaming, but sometimes people cannot remember > dreaming. > > These discussions are confused by the same word having multiple > meanings. The overloading of these meanings betrays hidden > assumptions, and I claim that we must bring these assumptions to the > light of day if we are going to be rigorous. > Sure, but I don't see that anything you've said above is inconsistent with any particular state of consciousness supervening, in the simple sense of covariance stated above, with neurological function to any arbitrary level of detail. Nor for that matter would it be necessary to deny this whatever one's preferred theory of consciousness might ultimately be (e.g. computationalism). > > In the larger sense, of any finally unambiguous > > explanatory relation between the two phenomena in general, the question > of > > evidence then depends rather upon what one is willing to count as > > explanation. The latter consideration is to say the least both less > obvious > > and more controversial. > > I would say that it depends more on what one is willing to count as > evidence. Well, what would count as evidence is intimately linked to what would count as explanation, since what is selected in the first instance as data is closely dependent on the dictates of theory. Indirect measures of consciousness entail hidden > assumptions, and it becomes easy to beg the question. > Which particular question did you have in mind? David > > Telmo. > > > David > > > > In my opinion this results from equating in
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 3:21 PM, David Nyman wrote: > > > On 2 Jun 2017 14:02, "Telmo Menezes" wrote: > > On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruce Kellett > wrote: >> On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: >>> >>> On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. > For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR > "paradox", > and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to > macrosuperposition. The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in any other interpretation. Bruce >>> >>> >>> In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no >>> non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where >>> somehow >>> there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The >>> mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the >>> problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when >>> Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's >>> necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the >>> branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness >>> is >>> thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in >>> his >>> body will be in different states due to decoherence). >> >> >> I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this >> was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: >> >> 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. >> It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of >> non-locality in QM. >> >> 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised >> appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered >> body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour >> of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain > > I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, > given that there is no way to measure consciousness. > Hi David, > I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I recently > posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be demonstrated > to covary systematically with neurological function, there is surely no lack > of experimental evidence. I've had this discussion with Brent a few times. Even in this case I disagree that there is evidence. There is plenty of evidence that what one can experience is correlated with brain states, but if you give me anestesia and ask me if I was conscious, all I can really say is: "I can't remember". Being conscious but not able to form memories is a well known phenomena, because it is possible to detect REM sleep stages and brain activity during dreaming, but sometimes people cannot remember dreaming. These discussions are confused by the same word having multiple meanings. The overloading of these meanings betrays hidden assumptions, and I claim that we must bring these assumptions to the light of day if we are going to be rigorous. > In the larger sense, of any finally unambiguous > explanatory relation between the two phenomena in general, the question of > evidence then depends rather upon what one is willing to count as > explanation. The latter consideration is to say the least both less obvious > and more controversial. I would say that it depends more on what one is willing to count as evidence. Indirect measures of consciousness entail hidden assumptions, and it becomes easy to beg the question. Telmo. > David > > In my opinion this results from equating intelligence and human > experience with consciousness. Maybe that position is correct, but > nobody can claim to know if this is the case. > > There is overwhelming evidence that the physical brain is a computer, > capable of storing memories, detecting patterns, predicting the future > and so on. It is also the case that human experience depends on these > mechanisms. What there is no evidence for is what is conscious or not. > > For example, panpsychists hold that everything is conscious. I don't > see how such a hypothesis can be falsified at the moment. > > Telmo. > >> -- they move in >> lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular >> measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness >> are >> conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of >> indiscernibles, >> there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI >> tell y
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 2 Jun 2017 14:02, "Telmo Menezes" wrote: On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: >> >> On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>> On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. >>> For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition. >>> >>> >>> The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without >>> collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were >>> unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's >>> theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and >>> that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in >>> any other interpretation. >>> >>> Bruce >> >> >> In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no >> non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where somehow >> there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The >> mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the >> problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when >> Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's >> necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the >> branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is >> thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his >> body will be in different states due to decoherence). > > > I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this > was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: > > 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. > It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of > non-locality in QM. > > 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised > appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered > body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour > of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, given that there is no way to measure consciousness. I think this is confused by an ambiguity about supervenience that I recently posted about. In the sense that one's own consciousness can be demonstrated to covary systematically with neurological function, there is surely no lack of experimental evidence. In the larger sense, of any finally unambiguous explanatory relation between the two phenomena in general, the question of evidence then depends rather upon what one is willing to count as explanation. The latter consideration is to say the least both less obvious and more controversial. David In my opinion this results from equating intelligence and human experience with consciousness. Maybe that position is correct, but nobody can claim to know if this is the case. There is overwhelming evidence that the physical brain is a computer, capable of storing memories, detecting patterns, predicting the future and so on. It is also the case that human experience depends on these mechanisms. What there is no evidence for is what is conscious or not. For example, panpsychists hold that everything is conscious. I don't see how such a hypothesis can be falsified at the moment. Telmo. > -- they move in > lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular > measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness are > conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of indiscernibles, > there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI > tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. > > Bruce > > > >> The apparent non-locality is then purely an artifact on making such >> assumptions about localization in branches when that's wrong to do. >> >> Saibal >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because yo
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On Fri, Jun 2, 2017 at 2:07 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: >> >> On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: >>> >>> On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. >>> For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition. >>> >>> >>> The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without >>> collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were >>> unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's >>> theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and >>> that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in >>> any other interpretation. >>> >>> Bruce >> >> >> In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no >> non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where somehow >> there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The >> mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the >> problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when >> Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's >> necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the >> branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is >> thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his >> body will be in different states due to decoherence). > > > I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this > was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: > > 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. > It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of > non-locality in QM. > > 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised > appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered > body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour > of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain I don't see how such experimental evidence can be claimed to exist, given that there is no way to measure consciousness. In my opinion this results from equating intelligence and human experience with consciousness. Maybe that position is correct, but nobody can claim to know if this is the case. There is overwhelming evidence that the physical brain is a computer, capable of storing memories, detecting patterns, predicting the future and so on. It is also the case that human experience depends on these mechanisms. What there is no evidence for is what is conscious or not. For example, panpsychists hold that everything is conscious. I don't see how such a hypothesis can be falsified at the moment. Telmo. > -- they move in > lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular > measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness are > conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of indiscernibles, > there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI > tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. > > Bruce > > > >> The apparent non-locality is then purely an artifact on making such >> assumptions about localization in branches when that's wrong to do. >> >> Saibal >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 2/06/2017 5:31 pm, smitra wrote: On 02-06-2017 04:54, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 12:00 pm, smitra wrote: On 02-06-2017 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition. The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in any other interpretation. Bruce In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body will be in different states due to decoherence). I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of non-locality in QM. 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. Bruce Suppose Alice and Bob are robots with classical processors, the states of each register can only be 0 and 1. Whatever Bob is conscious of must then be contained in the bitstring that specifies the state his processor is in. Decoherence has no effect on that bitstring. Until that time that Bob asks Alice about her setting of her polarizer, Bob's consciousness is exactly the same across the different branches in which Alice gives a different answer, False. It's trivially true. Bob's consciousness reflects the results he got. There are only four branches: '++', '+-', '-+', and '--'. Bob's conscious state is different for the two Alice '+' branches, and also different for the two Alice '-' branches. So it is not invariant across Alice's branches. despite rapid decoherence. Real human beings can be expected to fit well within this model. It is known that there typically is a lot of information present in the unconscious mind that we're not aware of. So, your consciousness could be identical across many branches even if your brain had split and the unconscious mind is already diverging. Take e.g. experiments where you are making a random choice and on the basis on functional MRI scans the experimenters are able to predict your choice before you have even made up your mind. So, this is same good old QM in the MWI where an observer's consciousness is modeled as a finite state machine described by a finite bitstring. We can then work in the basis where the observables for the bits of the bitstrings are all diagonal, this then corresponds to the observer having a definite conscious experience. The definite conscious experience of relevance here is of observing and recording the result of the spin measurement. In practice, what this means is that you can be in a macroscopic superposition long after decoherence has for all practical purposes made the superposition inaccessible to be probed using interference or other experiments. For example, if a spin is polarized in the positive x-direction and the z-component is measured, and I'm not aware of the outcome of the result then my consciousness, as specified by the bitstring that contains all the information that I'm aware of, cannot possibly contain the result of the outcome of the measurement before I'm told what the result is. In a sector where my consciousness is described by bitstring X after
Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)
On 02-06-2017 04:54, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 12:00 pm, smitra wrote: On 02-06-2017 02:07, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 2/06/2017 7:28 am, smitra wrote: On 01-06-2017 02:26, Bruce Kellett wrote: On 1/06/2017 4:43 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: Non-locality is not removed in MWI as you appear to believe. For me the abandon of the collapse is the solution of the EPR "paradox", and Aspect experience is somehow the confirmation of our belonging to macrosuperposition. The non-local (paradoxical) nature of EPR remains even without collapse. As on the previous occasion we discussed this, you were unable to demonstrate where the notion of 'collapse' is used in Bell's theorem - all Bell requires is that measurements give results, and that is what the whole of physics is based on: in MWI as well as in any other interpretation. Bruce In the MWI there are only trivial common cause like effects. There is no non-locality in some mysterious sense like there is in the CI where somehow there is a non-local effect but you don;t have information transfer. The mistake most people make when arguing that the MWI doesn't resolve the problem is that they can't get their head around the fact that even when Alice and Bob meet and Alice has not yet communicated everything that's necessary to Bob, that the Alice that Bob sees has yet to collapse in the branch corresponding to whatever she is going to say (Bob's consciousness is thus located in many different branches of Alice, even if the atoms in his body will be in different states due to decoherence). I think that either you or someone else said something like this when this was last discussed. I have a couple of points to make: 1. This is not quantum mechanics, or the many worlds interpretation of QM. It is your own idiosyncratic theory that has no bearing on the question of non-locality in QM. 2. Even in its own terms, this theory is nothing more than an undisguised appeal to magic. You want consciousness to be unrelated to the decohered body. That conflicts with the overwhelming experimental evidence in favour of the supervenience on consciousness on the physical brain -- they move in lockstep, so if your body has decohered having obtained a particular measurement result, all copies (if there be such) of this consciousness are conscious of the same measurement result. By the identity of indiscernibles, there is then only one body and one consciousness. That is what QM and MWI tell you, any deviations are simple fantasy. Bruce Suppose Alice and Bob are robots with classical processors, the states of each register can only be 0 and 1. Whatever Bob is conscious of must then be contained in the bitstring that specifies the state his processor is in. Decoherence has no effect on that bitstring. Until that time that Bob asks Alice about her setting of her polarizer, Bob's consciousness is exactly the same across the different branches in which Alice gives a different answer, False. It's trivially true. despite rapid decoherence. Real human beings can be expected to fit well within this model. It is known that there typically is a lot of information present in the unconscious mind that we're not aware of. So, your consciousness could be identical across many branches even if your brain had split and the unconscious mind is already diverging. Take e.g. experiments where you are making a random choice and on the basis on functional MRI scans the experimenters are able to predict your choice before you have even made up your mind. So, this is same good old QM in the MWI where an observer's consciousness is modeled as a finite state machine described by a finite bitstring. We can then work in the basis where the observables for the bits of the bitstrings are all diagonal, this then corresponds to the observer having a definite conscious experience. The definite conscious experience of relevance here is of observing and recording the result of the spin measurement. In practice, what this means is that you can be in a macroscopic superposition long after decoherence has for all practical purposes made the superposition inaccessible to be probed using interference or other experiments. For example, if a spin is polarized in the positive x-direction and the z-component is measured, and I'm not aware of the outcome of the result then my consciousness, as specified by the bitstring that contains all the information that I'm aware of, cannot possibly contain the result of the outcome of the measurement before I'm told what the result is. In a sector where my consciousness is described by bitstring X after the spin has been measured, the state will have to be of the form: 1/sqrt(2) |X> [|up, Universe(up)> + |down, Universe(down> ] where Universe(up) and Universe(down) are different states of the rest of the universe, but my consciousness is described by X and this is not affected by the decoherence ca
