Re: The problem with physics

[John Clark]

On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 7:05 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Mechanism implies that the soul is immaterial,
>

Mechanism implies that information is as close to the traditional concept
of the soul and still remain within the Scientific Method.

*> before materialism became a (christian) dogma* [...]
>

And that is my cue to say goodnight because nothing intelligent ever
follows from that.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv3nQdK8zRiFKGUK1UMkdGaJWoD%2BAEE3JeeefnF_QmO5%2Bg%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[John Clark]

On Thu, Dec 12, 2019 at 6:54 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> A good operational definition of "real" is something that produces
>> results, so you need to explain why some programs, like those inside a
>> computer connected to a power supply, produce results, but other programs,
>> like those printed out in ASCII characters in the pages of a dusty old
>> book, do not.
>
>

*> We agree that a program printed in a book cannot do anything by itself,
> but a program implemented in the arithmetical reality can.*
>

And every time I ask you for an example of a program in nothing but
"arithmetical reality" making a real calculation and producing a real
result you refer me to ASCII characters printed in the pages of a dusty old
book.


> *You need to explain how your matter play any special role in making some
> computation conscious,*
>

Turing already explained how matter can be intelligent, and Darwin's theory
gives good reason to think that consciousness is a byproduct of
intelligence. To put it another way, eventually you will always come to a
brute fact and one of them is consciousness is the way data feels when it
is being processed. Like it or not that's as good an answer as we're ever
going to get.

 John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2Fc%2BcvLKXXTrxJfRt9gHbE5JHAFxqqfSkcJcRG8vjyGw%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: Superdeterminism in comics

[John Clark]

On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 8:59 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>> For the 998th time, given that in Bruno's scenario a first person
>> experience duplicating machine is invoked there is no such thing as *THE
>> *first person experience;
>
>
> *> There is. It is what you can expect to feel when doing the experience.*
>

 Bruno Marchal would be utterly lost without his best friend, good old
Mr.You.


> > *In Helsinki, you believe that you will survive (because* [...]
>

In Helsinki John Clark can make a educated guess about what will happen to
John Clark tomorrow, but no living thing has a clue what Mr.You's fate will
be because thanks to Bruno's "You Duplicating Machine" nobody has a clue
who Mr.You is.

*> you know that it is impossible in Helsinki to write its name in the
> first person* [...]
>

In a world that contains a "THE Duplicating Machine" there is no such thing
as "THE first person"


> *> The first “he” is the guy, when unique, in Helsinki.*
>

If that's what it means then "he" will not survive because tomorrow nobody
will be unique in Helsinki because tomorrow nobody will be in Helsinki.
That doesn't contradict Mechanism it just shows that you've made yet
another goofy definition and I'm sure it won't be your last.


> *> The second “he” refers to each copies’ first person experience
> accessible*
>

And now in addition to goofiness we have ambiguity, the same personal
pronoun referring to two different people.


> *> So now, move to step 4*
>

You must be joking!

>> It's impossible to say if that's true or not because nobody knows what
>> question was asked, certainly Bruno doesn’t.
>
>
> *> The question is simple,*
>

The question is not simple, the question is retarded.

* > and most people get the answer by themselves*
>

Most people, including a certain Mr.Marchal, just assumes that articles
"the" and "a" and common personal pronouns can keep on being used in
exactly the same way as they always have been even in the presence of
something that has never existed before like a "Matter Duplicating
Machine", a "People Duplicating Machine", a "First Person View Duplicating
Machine", a "THE Duplicating Machine". And a few years ago John Clark would
have just assumed that a professional logician would know better than to
make the same sort of silly mistake that most people make, but John Clark's
assumption turned out to be wrong.

>> If the referent is the man that is experiencing H right now on December
>> 9 then obviously even without duplicating machines we can say with absolute
>> certainty "you" will not survive tomorrow because on December 10 nobody
>> will be experiencing H on December 9.
>
>
> *> Nobody has ever considered such useless identity criterion.*
>

 *WHAT?! *You said just a few lines before that "*The first “he” is the
guy, when unique, in Helsinki*."!

 >> But if we take the everyday meaning of the personal pronoun, somebody
>> who remembers being the H man of December 9, then "you" will survive in
>> December 10.
>
>
> *> That’s far better.*
>

Yes, but December 10 is after the duplication so the personal pronoun "he"
is now open to more than one meaning, in other words "he" is ambiguous.
>
>
>> And if a you duplicating machine is thrown into the mix then the "you"
>> as used in the above is ambiguous
>
>
> *> No it is not. We have agreed that both copies have the right identity. *
>

Sometimes John agrees with Bruno for half a sentence but then in the second
half Bruno contradicts the first half. If today both remember being the
Helsinki man yesterday and that is when the question was asked, and if
today, to nobody's surprise, both answer to the name Mr.You, then yesterday
it would be ambiguous to ask about what Mr.You would or would not see on
the next day.  If that's not a example of ambiguity what is?


> > *It is just that the prediction is impossible to make. *
>

If you've found something where the prediction is impossible and the
postdiction is impossible too then what you have found is not profound,
it's just stupid.

>>> *FROM THEIR FIRST PERSON VIEW,  they did get one bit of information.*
>>
>>

>>  And what was that one bit of information that the W Man got?
>>
> That he ended up seeing W.
>
>
> *> Yes,*
>

So the "experiment" provided zero bits of new information because yesterday
before the "experiment" everybody already knew that would happen, even
Mr.You (whoever that is) knew it because everybody knows that tautologies
are always true.

John K Clark

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv2R5RDBZOs4-awU%2B1Pn7bqMjtgaHy8JN0bWhUQn1x%2BBSA%40mail.gmail.com.

Re: How Mathematics Meets the World, by Tim Maudlin

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2019, at 19:20, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wednesday, December 11, 2019 at 11:11:38 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> The empirical evidences supports Mechanism. I don’t see any evidences for 
> physicalism. It fails on the mind, or identify 1p and 3p, or make everything 
> conscious, without any real theory, unlike mechanism, whose theory is 
> computer science, arithmetic, intensional arithmetic, mathematical logic, 
> even Artificial Intelligence, as this domain will be more and more 
> experimental, in all directions.
> 
> The claim that there exist a fundamental-ontological-primary universe only 
> add insuperable complexity to the Mechanist approach and formulation of the 
> mind body problem.
> 
> You are right, the physicalist does not even realise that they use Matter in 
> the same invalid way that some pseudo-religious person invoke God in a 
> metaphysical explanation. The reason is that they take the primitive 
> existence of the physical for granted, and that is not valid when we adopt 
> the scientific attitude in this domain. I am aware that the bad habit lasts 
> for more than 1500 years. A chance I am patient.
> 
> Note for John Clark:  I will (try) to answer your post tomorrow.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> There is a 'test' for the matterless  theory:
> 
> Why panpsychism can’t just go away
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2019/12/03/why-panpsychism-cant-just-go-away/
>  
> 
> 
> Basically: If consciousness can arise in a simulation (of all particles), 
> then panpsychism is false and mechanism is true.

So, basically we agree. 

Materialism will disappear, because it entails pantheism, which explains 
nothing, Imo. I believe in numbers, and I don’ believe that any number can 
think, per se. 

So, I cannot really embrace pantheism, unless using some semantical stretching.

Only Turing universal relation can process thoughts, in the frame of the theory 
that I study.

Bruno



> 
> @philipthrift
>  
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/1ff72fd8-e20a-49fa-9dac-0dd6ff8e0518%40googlegroups.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2303F9B0-A058-40AB-BB78-D8C146BE8D25%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: The problem with physics

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Dec 2019, at 11:08, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Dec 10, 2019 at 8:00 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >>Yesterday before the duplication when there was only ONE, which ONE of the 
> >>ONE ended up seeing what ONE of them is seeing NOW?
> 
> > We are in the semi-duplication context,
> 
> Semi-duplication?

Typo error, sorry. Read “self-duplication”.



> You are assuming there is something non-material that the Matter Duplicating 
> Machine can not duplicate (aka the soul), you're assuming the very thing 
> you're trying to prove.

Mechanism implies that the soul is immaterial, where the soul can be defined by 
the owner of the memory (and it exists provably as something emulated by the 
arithmetical relations). If Mechanism is true, we can change our bodies 
everyday, and that can help to understand that both our 1p and 3p souls are 
immaterial, like numbers are immaterial.
You are the one doing a grand ontological commitment. You are the one assuming 
Matter, instead of trying to prove your case. And you can do this, except if 
you keep the Digital Mechanist hypothesis. In that case we can no more 
interpret any empirical experience as an evidence that there is a primitive 
empirical reality. That was already understood by many people before 
materialism became a (christian) dogma.






>  
> > so your question is badly formulated or ambiguous.
> 
> Yes Captain Obvious, the question is badly formulated and ambiguous. But I'm 
> not the one making the inability to answer the "question" the foundation of 
> his entire philosophy, you are. 
>  
> > But things are very simple.
> 
> Yes indeed things are very simple, but that word has 2 meanings, one is 
> uncomplicated but the other is stupid.
>  
> > Yesterday, a computationalist has put on the annihilation copy button. He 
> > predicted that he will feel to be in only once city, but that he was 
> > incapable of saying with certainty which one in particular.
> 
> He can't give the answer not because he doesn't know it but because badly 
> formulated or ambiguous questions have no answer and are in fact not 
> questions at all, they are gibberish.
> 
> > By definition of the correct first person prediction,
> 
> There is no coherent consistent definition of THE correct first person if 
> First Person Duplication Machines are involved.


But no first person duplication is possible *from* the first person point of 
view. A duplication of first person is only a view from a 3p person. You can 
say, in Helsinki, you can contact me in Washington and in Moscow, tomorrow, but 
that does not mean that if someone contact you in Moscow, he/she automatically 
contact the copy in Washington.


Bruno




>  
> > That describes the protocol
> 
> You have no "protocol", you have a self contradictory clown show.
> 
> > the question of the prediction of the first person experience [...]
> 
> And in your very next sentence you give an example of the clown show. 
> Protocol my ass.
> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0psNrN5ONh0Xy8A2_in7EVGZ7iHckheOjKSqEYEsMXpg%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/A712ED17-B744-4659-ABE6-A2A9A8104A4E%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: Energy conservation in many-worlds

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Dec 2019, at 16:35, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Dec 5, 2019 at 11:23 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > mind is not much what it does, as what it feels,
> 
> I don't think much of the Star Trek/Mr.Spock philosophy. I think something 
> could be conscious and unintelligent but not the other way around. And I 
> don't think it's feelings that distinguishes humans from the other animals, 
> it's intelligence.
> 
> >> I don't think mind (intelligence + consciousness) is a form of matter 
> >> anymore than fast is a form of racing car,
> 
> > Very good point!
> 
> Thank you.
> 
> >>mind is what a form of matter does when it is organized in certain ways. 
> 
> > OK; if you want to implement that mind relatively to you.
>  
> Not OK if you want to assign mind to other people. I know for sure that in my 
> case mind does 2 things, it does intelligence and it does consciousness,  
> perhaps the same 2 things are true for other people's mind too but only one 
> of those attributes can be directly tested by me; so to avoid solipsism I 
> just have to assume that the one implies the other. Actually I can do a bit 
> more than that, although falling short 
> of a proof of Euclidean quality there is good evidence that one implies the 
> other and solipsism is probably untrue:
> 
> I am conscious and Evolution produced me.
> Evolution can NOT directly detect consciousness in others any better than I 
> can.
> SO consciousness can NOT confer a Evolutionary advantage.
> So consciousness can NOT be selected for.
> I am more intelagent than a rock.
> Evolution CAN directly detect intelligence.
> So intelligence CAN confer a Evolutionary advantage. 
> So intelligence  CAN be selected for.
> Therefore consciousness is a byproduct of intelligence.
> 
> > If not, you need to explain more on what is matter, and how it makes some 
> > computations more real than some others. 
> 
> A good operational definition of "real" is something that produces results, 
> so you need to explain why some programs, like those inside a computer 
> connected to a power supply, produce results, but other programs, like those 
> printed out in ASCII characters in the pages of a dusty old book, do not.


We agree that a program printed in a book cannot do anything by itself, but a 
program implemented in the arithmetical reality can. You assume a primitively 
existing physical reality. Not only I do not, but if you proceed in the 
argument I give, at some point you might see that such an assumption is 
incompatible with the digital mechanist assumption. You need to explain how 
your matter play any special role in making some computation conscious, as 
opposed to to explain why matter is indeed needed to make it relatively 
conscious to us, which is indeed the case in the arithmetical reality already.

Bruno



> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
> .
> To view this discussion on the web visit 
> https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAJPayv0o7w2BsJLJUz65AMJq87SyFEO9hoD8KdwLmakHOcge3Q%40mail.gmail.com
>  
> .

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/B80BFE48-5A79-45AE-9D27-44BC0813D350%40ulb.ac.be.

Re: How Mathematics Meets the World, by Tim Maudlin

[Philip Thrift]

On Wednesday, December 11, 2019 at 2:57:09 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 12/10/2019 11:53 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
> What about 'stationary'? Where is that?
>
>
> *it exists where things have space coordinates unchanging relative to time 
> coordinates ?*
>
>
> No problem.  It just shows that things are made of particles that have 
> intrinsic proto-stationarity.
>
> Brent
> P.S. Have you noticed that speed is a fundamental dimension in SI, but 
> position isn't .
>


There is an ontological fad called trope theory - everything is a bindle of 
properties (tropes):

Trope theory is the view that reality is (wholly or partly) made up from 
tropes. Tropes are things like the particular shape, weight, and texture of 
an individual object. Because tropes are particular, for two objects to 
‘share’ a property (for them both to exemplify, say, a particular shade of 
green) is for each to contain (instantiate, exemplify) a greenness-trope, 
where those greenness-tropes, although numerically distinct, nevertheless 
exactly resemble each other.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tropes/

@philipthrift 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/30e35360-129b-495d-a589-1d52f9535e62%40googlegroups.com.