date:20200909

On Thu, 10 Sep 2020 at 00:38, John Clark  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 6:18 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>
>> *> You could say the “you” is at best ambiguous and at worst meaningless
>> in this case.*
>>
>
> Yes, and that means a thought experiment that uses that personal pronoun
> and is supposed to clear up confusion regarding personal identity is an
> utter failure.
>
>
>> * > But if duplication were commonplace, people would use “you”. *
>>
>
> If duplication were commonplace then the English language would need to
> undergo a RADICAL revision, especially in the way it users personal
> pronouns.
>
> > *Most who go through duplication would advise their friends, “don’t bet
>> on a prime number, because going on my experience, you are unlikely to get
>> it”.*
>>
>
> Who is unlikely to get it?
>

That is the point: this is how people will talk. “I went through
duplication, and I woke up in a little room. I was asked to guess if it was
a prime numbered room. Like a fool, I guessed yes. Don’t make the same
mistake if you are duplicated! Guess no!” Someone will say that the
pronouns do not have the same meaning any more, but so what, you can’t
argue with thousands of people, even previous pronoun sceptics, telling the
same story.

John K Clark
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> > The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never
 existed in the first place.
>>>
>>>
>>> I agree with that but I don't think "you" refers to anything or anyone.
>>> Of course all this confusion could be avoided if people would simply stop
>>> using personal pronouns in thought experiments that are supposed to make 
>>> Abstract
>>> ideas about personal identity clearer.
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>>
>>>



>>>
>>>
>>>
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>>> 
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>>>
>>>
>>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:09 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>> None of the identical copies becomes separate people until one of them
>> sees something the others do not, because after that they are no longer
>> identical
>
>
> * > That's an exaggeration.  There are many things that will differentiate
> the copies other than what they see. *
>

Many things other than the external environment? Many things? Random
quantum variations is the only thing I can think of.


> > *The interesting question is whether things that are subconscious
> count...something he felt but only remembered feeling much later?*
>

If it was felt by one and not the other then they are no longer identical.


> > *a flea bite he didn't notice?*
>

If it was not noticed then they remain identical

*> but only remembered feeling much later?*


If it is remembered by one but not the other then they can no longer be
identical.


> >
> * I don't think consciousness is the unitary thing that is implicitly
> assumed on this forum. *
>

I don't' think survival is a all or nothing matter either.

 John K Clark






>
>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List




On 9/9/2020 3:32 AM, John Clark wrote:
None of the identical copies becomes separate people until one of them 
sees something the others do not, because after that they are no 
longer identical 


That's an exaggeration.  There are many things that will differentiate 
the copies other than what they see.  The interesting question is 
whether things that are subconscious count...something he felt but only 
remembered feeling much later? ...a flea bite he didn't notice? ...ex 
hypothesi there are a lot of physical differences at the molecular 
level.  I don't think consciousness is the unitary thing that is 
implicitly assumed on this forum.


Brent

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/9/2020 12:29 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett > a écrit :

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:

On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer
theory is a convention designed to resolve questions of
personal identity in cases of personal
duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections
are not as satisfactory.

I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for
continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct.

Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will
be millions of errors in each copy. There would be no point in
trying to make them any more accurate. That would certainly
be good enough to fool his closest friends and family. So at
the molecular level there will certainly be a unique closest
continuer. But I can't see that it makes any difference.
That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
his door the REAL Bruce.

The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to
assess closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication
becomes possible, we can worry about the fine details of this. But
if you think in terms of AI, duplication might involve no more
than running the same program on multiple computers. Duplication
errors are then eliminated.

I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under
anaesthesia, or otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person
when unconscious? The same person? Does your family recognize you
then or not? Since we do not doubt continuity of personal
existence even though our bodies change continuously at the
molecular level, copying errors at that level are not relevant for
bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit as
much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to
determine continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is
the sort of thing that can be sorted out if and when we can
actually duplicate persons and their bodies.

The only thing for a person to take into account if she is the same
person as yesterday, one second ago, one year ago.. is feeling she is
and is the only true thing,

But she can be mistaken about that. Suppose she feels she's the Queen
of England, but she doesn't know where the Queen was yesterday or who
the Queen spoke to a minute ago or the name of the Queen's assistant.
And suppose there's another person, who is and has been physically
distinct from her and is the Queen of England and does know all those
things. Are we to suppose her feeling trumps all that. And what
exactly is this "feeling" if it does not depend on memories?

Brent

what you're talking about could have meaning in a law court but
nowhere else... it has nothing to do with personal identity.

Quentin

Bruce
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/9/2020 12:14 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
> wrote:

On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory
is a convention designed to resolve questions of personal
identity in cases of personal duplication, absent a "soul".
Arbitrary random selections are not as satisfactory.

I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for
continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct.

Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
millions of errors in each copy. There would be no point in
trying to make them any more accurate. That would certainly be
good enough to fool his closest friends and family. So at the
molecular level there will certainly be a unique closest
continuer. But I can't see that it makes any difference. That's
just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open his door
the REAL Bruce.

The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes
possible, we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you
think in terms of AI, duplication might involve no more than running
the same program on multiple computers. Duplication errors are then
eliminated.

I don't think those are determinative. When you awake you have the same
memories and personality as when you went to sleep. So you might say
the anesthetized Bruce is a different person, but the continuity is
still between awake Bruce before and awake Bruce after. In common
parlance someone suffering a brain injury, a stroke or tumor or trauma,
is often described a "being a different person". But that's not usually
said of a person who becomes a paraplegic or loses a limb.

Brent

Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The same person? Does
your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not doubt
continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are
not relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change
every bit as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to
determine continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the
sort of thing that can be sorted out if and when we can actually
duplicate persons and their bodies.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 6:18 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:


> *> You could say the “you” is at best ambiguous and at worst meaningless
> in this case.*
>

Yes, and that means a thought experiment that uses that personal pronoun
and is supposed to clear up confusion regarding personal identity is an
utter failure.


> * > But if duplication were commonplace, people would use “you”. *
>

If duplication were commonplace then the English language would need to
undergo a RADICAL revision, especially in the way it users personal
pronouns.

> *Most who go through duplication would advise their friends, “don’t bet
> on a prime number, because going on my experience, you are unlikely to get
> it”.*
>

Who is unlikely to get it?

John K Clark





>
> > The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never
>>> existed in the first place.
>>
>>
>> I agree with that but I don't think "you" refers to anything or anyone.
>> Of course all this confusion could be avoided if people would simply stop
>> using personal pronouns in thought experiments that are supposed to make 
>> Abstract
>> ideas about personal identity clearer.
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>>
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>> 
>> .
>>
>>
>> --
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread PGC



On Wednesday, September 9, 2020 at 11:38:32 AM UTC+2, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Sep 2020, at 07:51, Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou > > wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou >>> > wrote:

> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>>
>>> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
>>> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit 
>>> dualist
>>> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked 
>>> the
>>> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow 
>>> morning,
>>> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to 
>>> exist and
>>> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is 
>>> because
>>> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
>>> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are 
>>> separate
>>> >> persons."
>>> >>
>>> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent 
>>> and
>>> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
>>> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
>>> >>
>>> >> Bruce
>>> >>
>>> >
>>> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the 
>>> physical 
>>> > states of the copies.
>>>
>>> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your 
>>> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce 
>>> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember 
>>> the 
>>> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either 
>>> get 
>>> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet 
>>> certainly 
>>> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are 
>>> invented 
>>> to deal with reality, not define it.
>>>
>>
>>
>> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question 
>> of the person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you 
>> assume dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... 
>> and 
>> so on. These are different persons who share some memories with the BK 
>> of 
>> the night before. Closest continuer theory works well in these 
>> duplication 
>> scenarios, despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that 
>> theory for some undefined reason.
>>
>
> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a 
> continuation of the original, even when there is only one BK extant at 
> any 
> time, implies dualism.
>


 Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no 
 unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is 
 necessarily 
 the closest. Dualism is not required.

>>>
>>> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person 
>>> rather than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference 
>>> for it?
>>>
>>
>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a 
>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of 
>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not 
>> as satisfactory.
>>
>
> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity 
> of identity, it is just a psychological construct. 
>
>
>
> That is a bit dangerous, and on the verge of reductionism. I understand 
> why you say this in this context, but the psychological constructs must be 
> taken seriously. The physical reality itself will become a first person 
> plural psychological construct too.
>
> I am not sure if you have understood that we need some arithmetical 
> realism just to define precisely what is a digital machine, and o enunciate 
> the Church-Turing thesis, but then we need to take into account the fact 
> that all computations are emulated by that minimal amount of arithmetic 
> that we have supposed.
>
> I know that Parfit called “mechanism” “reductionism”, but Mechanism is in 
> reality a powerful vaccine against reductionism, beginning by the 
> reductionist conception of machine and number.
>
> With Mechanism, we do have an ontological reductionism: only numbers 
> exist, with only two simple laws: addition and multiplication. Then the 
> physical reality emerges as a first person plural persistent sharable 
> interfering web of histories, which is confirmed by quantum mechanics 
> without collapse, up to now.
>
> It is the believ

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On 9 Sep 2020, 20:41 +1000, John Clark , wrote:
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:05 PM Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
>
> > > so the person who wakes up in your bed tomorrow is not you, but just 
> > >someone who thinks he is you.
>
> How would things be different if that were not true and the person who wakes 
> up in your bed tomorrow who thinks he's you really is you? Things wouldn't be 
> different at all as far as I can tell. If it makes no difference if X is true 
> or not then X can't be very important.

Things could only be different if there were some non-apparent property such as 
a magical soul that was missing.

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:40 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> *It has a perfectly clear referent,*
>

If it were perfectly clear then why doesn't Bruno Marchal use the referent
in Bruno Marchal's thought experiments rather than a personal pronoun? John
Clark has been asking Bruno Marchal to do that for years but Bruno
Marchal absolutely
refuses.

> *if you make precise if you talk about he first person “you” or about
> some third person view.*
>

And as John Clark has been saying for years, if "you" is duplicated then
there is no longer such a thing as "*THE* first person" there is only "*A*
first person".

John K Clark

>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 10:35 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*>Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no
> unique closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily
> the closest.*


Closest continuer theory Is a remarkably silly theory even for
philosophers, and that's saying something!

John K Clark






>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 9:05 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> *so the person who wakes up in your bed tomorrow is not you, but just
> someone who thinks he is you.*

How would things be different if that were not true and the person who
wakes up in your bed tomorrow who thinks he's you really is you? Things
wouldn't be different at all as far as I can tell. If it makes no
difference if X is true or not then X can't be very important.

John K Clark

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:16 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> *A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the night before
> duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning, because when I am
> duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist *

Suppose There were no duplication would you also cease to exist?  I think
the Bruce Kellett of yesterday still exists because somebody today
remembers being him, if there is more than 1 all the better.

> *and each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person.*

None of the identical copies becomes separate people until one of them sees
something the others do not, because after that they are no longer identical

> This is because there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest
> continuer. In that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are
> separate persons."

Nobody remembers every little thing they did, said or saw the day before, I
hate to tell you this but I secretly made a copy of the Bruce Kellett of
yesterday that has a little bit better memory than you do so he is the
"closest continuer" not you, so I guess that means you don't exist. So
Bruce, how does it feel not to exist? Has nonexistence caused you any
problems?

*> Now you might not like this answer, *

I don't.

> but it is perfectly coherent and rational.

I don't think so.

John K Clark

>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 19:33, John Clark  wrote:

>
>
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 6:14 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
> > If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived,
>
>
> Yes.
>
>  > because all it takes is one
>
>
> Yes, so there is a 100% chance John Clark will see a prime number on his
> room number and a 100% chance John Clark will not see a prime number on his
> room number.
>
> > *and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly chosen John Clark
>> will see a prime number.*
>
>
> OK.
>
>  > *This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is
>> the probability that you will see a prime number?”. *
>
>
> Then the referent to the personal pronoun "you" is not John Clark It is a
> subset of randomly selected John Clarks made after 100 duplications that
> were shown numbers between one and 100. But the question  "what will *you*
> see?" was asked before the duplications and so there was nobody in that
> subset at the time, So who was the question directed at and who was
> expected to answer?
>

You could say the “you” is at best ambiguous and at worst meaningless in
this case. But if duplication were commonplace, people would use “you”.
Most who go through duplication would advise their friends, “don’t bet on a
prime number, because going on my experience, you are unlikely to get it”.

> The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never
>> existed in the first place.
>
>
> I agree with that but I don't think "you" refers to anything or anyone.
> Of course all this confusion could be avoided if people would simply stop
> using personal pronouns in thought experiments that are supposed to make 
> Abstract
> ideas about personal identity clearer.
>
> John K Clark
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

> On 9 Sep 2020, at 07:51, Stathis Papaioannou  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
> >> persons."
> >>
> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
> >>
> >> Bruce
> >>
> >
> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical 
> > states of the copies.
> 
> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your 
> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce 
> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the 
> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get 
> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly 
> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented 
> to deal with reality, not define it.
> 
> 
> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of the 
> person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume 
> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on. 
> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the night 
> before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication scenarios, 
> despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that theory for some 
> undefined reason.
> 
> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation of 
> the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies 
> dualism.
> 
> 
> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique 
> closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the 
> closest. Dualism is not required.
> 
> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person rather 
> than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference for it?
> 
> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a convention 
> designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of personal 
> duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not as 
> satisfactory.
> 
> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity of 
> identity, it is just a psychological construct. 

That is a bit dangerous, and on the verge of reductionism. I understand why you 
say this in this context, but the psychological constructs must be taken 
seriously. The physical reality itself will become a first person plural 
psychological construct too.

I am not sure if you have understood that we need some arithmetical realism 
just to define precisely what is a digital machine, and o enunciate the 
Church-Turing thesis, but then we need to take into account the fact that all 
computations are emulated by that minimal amount of arithmetic that we have 
supposed.

I know that Parfit called “mechanism” “reductionism”, but Mechanism is in 
reality a powerful vaccine against reductionism, beginning by the reductionist 
conception of machine and number.

With Mechanism, we do have an ontological reductionism: only numbers exist, 
with only two simple laws: addition and multiplication. Then the physical 
reality emerges as a first person plural persistent sharable interfering web of 
histories, which is confirmed by quantum mechanics without collapse, up to now.

It is the believer in a “physical reality out there” to explain how it manage 
to make some computations more real than other. It is up to them to show some 
evidence for that belief. This requires to abandon digital mechanism eventually.

If you or anyone have still a problem with this, I can explain more. This is 
known since the 1930s, but ignored by many.

Bruno

PS I will certainly say more on this, but now I have hundred of exam copies to 
note...

> 
> -- 
>

Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 6:14 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> If there are 100 John Clarks tomorrow then John Clark has survived,

Yes.

 > because all it takes is one

Yes, so there is a 100% chance John Clark will see a prime number on his
room number and a 100% chance John Clark will not see a prime number on his
room number.

> *and there is a 25/100 probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will
> see a prime number.*

OK.

 > *This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is the
> probability that you will see a prime number?”. *

Then the referent to the personal pronoun "you" is not John Clark It is a
subset of randomly selected John Clarks made after 100 duplications that
were shown numbers between one and 100. But the question  "what will *you*
see?" was asked before the duplications and so there was nobody in that
subset at the time, So who was the question directed at and who was
expected to answer?

> The “you” cannot refer to a magical soul, because such a thing never
> existed in the first place.

I agree with that but I don't think "you" refers to anything or anyone. Of
course all this confusion could be avoided if people would simply stop
using personal pronouns in thought experiments that are supposed to
make Abstract
ideas about personal identity clearer.

John K Clark

>

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 9 Sep 2020, at 06:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 2:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 12:35, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 12:32 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 11:53, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 11:39 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> On 9/8/2020 6:14 PM, smitra wrote:
> > On 09-09-2020 02:16, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> 
> >> I don't find that answer convincing, because of the implicit dualist
> >> assumption. A perfectly reasonable answer to the question asked the
> >> night before duplication is: "I won't be in a room tomorrow morning,
> >> because when I am duplicated with 100 continuers, I cease to exist and
> >> each of the continuers becomes a new, separate person. This is because
> >> there is a tie among the continuers, with no closest continuer. In
> >> that situation, the original ceases, and the continuers are separate
> >> persons."
> >>
> >> Now you might not like this answer, but it is perfectly coherent and
> >> rational. It has the great advantage that it avoids the stench of
> >> dualism that hangs over your theory.
> >>
> >> Bruce
> >>
> >
> > The tie will be broken by small random fluctuations in the physical 
> > states of the copies.
> 
> Dualism would imply that one and only one of the duplicates has your 
> soul and is "you".  I see no problem is just saying they are Bruce 
> Kellet-1, Bruce Kellet-2,... Bruce Kellet-100.  They all remember the 
> bet, and assuming their stake is duplicated too, they each either get 
> $100 or lose $25.  The existence of more than one Bruce Kellet certainly 
> creates problems in law and language.  But law and language are invented 
> to deal with reality, not define it.
> 
> 
> You are right about what dualism implies. So if you ask the question of the 
> person the night before duplication, it has no answer unless you assume 
> dualism. I think you are right about multiple BKs: BK1, BK2,... and so on. 
> These are different persons who share some memories with the BK of the night 
> before. Closest continuer theory works well in these duplication scenarios, 
> despite the fact that people on this list seem averse to that theory for some 
> undefined reason.
> 
> You could say that any suggestion that one of the BK's is a continuation of 
> the original, even when there is only one BK extant at any time, implies 
> dualism.
> 
> 
> Not on the closest continuer theory. If there is a tie, there is no unique 
> closest continuer. If there is only one continuer, he is necessarily the 
> closest. Dualism is not required.
> 
> But why should the closest continuer be a continuation of the person rather 
> than the next-closest continuer, unless the soul has a preference for it?
> 
> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a convention 
> designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of personal 
> duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not as 
> satisfactory.

To negate the soul is the same as to negate consciousness. That is the 
materialist eliminativism. I see it as the nth attempt by materialist to negate 
the existence of the subjective experience. 

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 9 Sep 2020, at 02:16, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 10:06 AM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 09:00, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 8:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Tue, 8 Sep 2020 at 22:10, John Clark  > wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 6:49 PM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> 
> > The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a 
> > prime number, not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler 
> > who buys a lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one 
> > particular gambler will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that 
> > some gambler will buy the winning ticket
>  
> BEFORE the duplication "one particular John Clark" and "some John Clark" are 
> exactly the same person, that is Bruno's Mr.You, that is the person Bruno 
> makes his bet with. Thus AFTER the duplication the identity of Mr.You becomes 
> completely ambiguous, there is now no way to tell who he made the bet with, 
> or how to determine the outcome and figure out who won and who lost. And 
> that's why Bruno loves personal pronouns so much and refuses to stop using 
> them, they can be used to sweep logical contradictions and absurdities under 
> the rug, and that can be very useful if the towering logical edifice of your 
> theory is built on a foundation of sand. The only way Bruno can stop using 
> personal pronouns is by means of Bruno's patented peepee terminology and 
> start talking about THE First Person Perspective, when of course after the 
> duplication there is no such thing as THE First Person Perspective, there is 
> only A First Person Perspective.
> 
> > Nothing singles him out, one is picked at random out of the 100,
> 
> But this entire thought experiment Is about what "you" can predict BEFORE the 
> duplication, Back then nobody can single anybody out because there is only 
> one John Clark. And this thought experiment is about what "you" can expect to 
> see, so the gambler must be Mr.You, so the gambler is also duplicated 100 
> times. 
> 
> > and the question is asked, what is the probability that this particular one 
> > will see a prime number? 
> 
> I can predict today with 100% certainty that tomorrow AFTER the duplication 
> when the John Clark in room #11 walks out turns around and looks at the 
> number on his door he will see a prime number, but that is a very VERY long 
> way from the original ambiguous question that was asked BEFORE the 
> duplication, namely "AFTER the duplication what is the probability "you" will 
> see a prime number?".  And that has no answer because it is not a question, 
> it's gibberish.
> 
> I think what you and Bruce Kellett are perhaps objecting to is the dualist 
> idea that there is a unique John Clark soul, with the question of probability 
> with duplicates implicitly asking which one of the duplicates this soul will 
> fly into. We know that souls are delusional, and this applies to a single 
> world situation also. If you survive the night, it means that an entity 
> identifying as John Clark wakes up in your bed tomorrow morning, not that 
> your soul has persisted in the one body. If there are 100 John Clarks 
> tomorrow then John Clark has survived, because all it takes is one, and there 
> is a 25/100 probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime 
> number. This is the non-delusional interpretation of the question “what is 
> the probability that you will see a prime number?”. The “you” cannot refer to 
> a magical soul, because such a thing never existed in the first place.
> 
> 
> I am certainly objecting to the perceived dualist assumption in your response 
> to the question (asked before duplication): "What is the probability that you 
> will see a prime number on your door when you wake tomorrow?". As JC points 
> out, by tomorrow there will be 100 individuals in the frame. Who is the "You" 
> to whom you posed the question yesterday? If the question in that form has an 
> answer, then you must assume that just one of the 100 individuals next 
> morning has inherited the soul of JC, and is the person to whom you 
> originally referred. By subtly changing the question so that you refer only 
> to asking the question of some random individual the next morning, you avoid 
> this dualist implication by essentially saying that the initial "You" 
> referred to, is the random individual you selected in the morning. If the two 
> questions are to be related at all, then you must make the dualist assumption.
> 
> I have given you the non-dualist interpretation of the question: "what is the 
> probability that you will see a prime number tomorrow" is "what is the 
> probability that a randomly chosen John Clark will see a prime number". 
> Perhaps some people assume that a magical soul will f

Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 8 Sep 2020, at 01:05, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Sep 8, 2020 at 8:49 AM Stathis Papaioannou  > wrote:
> On Mon, 7 Sep 2020 at 04:41, John Clark  > wrote:
> On Sun, Sep 6, 2020 at 9:34 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> I don't know what the hell to make of a "objective probability of a 
> >> possible subjectivity”.
> 
> > I give you an example. A person is multiplied by 100 and put in 100 
> > different, but identical from inside rooms. Just the number of the room 
> > differs, like in some hostel. You seem to agree that, as long as they stay 
> > in the room, there is only one person. But the copies are asked to open the 
> > room, and the person was asked, before the experience what is the 
> > probability that when going out of the room, its number is prime.
> 
> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John 
> Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there is 
> only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk out, 
> look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100% chance he 
> will not see a prime number. And the question "What is the probability I will 
> see a prime number?" has no answer because in this hypothetical the personal 
> pronoun "I" is ambiguous. 
> 
> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of those 
> rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a prime 
> number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a legitimate 
> unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there are 25 prime 
> numbers less than 100. But that probability would just be a subjective 
> probability because he is either in a prime numbered room or he is not, So 
> that probability figure must just be a measure of that John Clark's ignorance.
> 
> The probability of interest is that one particular John Clark will see a 
> prime number,
> 
> 
> How do you avoid the clear dualist implications of this? What is it that 
> singles out the particular John Clark in whom you are interested?


We are interested in all copies, and what is common for the majority of them 
(to get the prediction right). Nothing pick up one of them, except each does 
that itself from the first person perspective.

There is no ontological dualism, only a phenomenological dualism, the same we 
need to understand the difference between seeing someone tortured and being 
tortured. To negate that phenomenological dualism is like eliminating person or 
consciousness, which will indeed be mandatory to keep Materialism + Mechanism 
coherent. But as this negates consciousness, eventually the monism will have to 
be idealistic or neutral.

Your position either negate Mechanism (and we are then out of the scope of the 
thread), or to eliminate the first person experience, which is obviously random 
from the points of view of the majority of duplicated people when we iterate 
the duplication.

Bruno



> 
> Bruce
> 
> not that some John Clark will see a prime number. A gambler who buys a 
> lottery ticket is interested in the probability that one particular gambler 
> will buy the winning ticket, not the probability that some gambler will buy 
> the winning ticket, which he knows is 1 if all the tickets are sold.
> 
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM


> On 7 Sep 2020, at 16:33, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Sep 7, 2020 at 9:29 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> >> In that thought experiment there is no objective probability because John 
> >> Clark is always in a prime numbered room or John Clark is not. So there is 
> >> only subjective probability. There is a 100% chance John Clark will walk 
> >> out, look at the number on the door and see a prime number, and a 100% 
> >> chance he will not see a prime number.
> 
> > You make the same error than Bruce (curiously enough). Because all the 
> > alternative are realised, you take as 1 the probability that you feel them.
> 
> And you make the exact same error over and over and over and over again!  If 
> I made a mistake in the above it certainly wasn't that one because I said 
> absolutely nothing about what Mr.You would or would not do or say or think, 
> and could not even if I wanted to because due to the circumstances of the 
> thought experiment the personal pronoun "you" has no referent,


It has a perfectly clear referent, if you make precise if you talk about he 
first person “you” or about some third person view.

You mock the 1p/3p distinction (the “peepee”), but the absence of reference 
comes from not taking that difference into account. It is an informal confusion 
similar to Penrose and Lucas, who confused the []p (3p), and the []p & p (1p).

The confusion is natural as G* proves them equivalent, but the whole point 
comes from the fact hat the machine cannot prove that equivalence. 

The machine cannot even define “[]p & p”, which explains the difficulty here, 
but it is both resolved intuitively and formally with the mechanist assumption 
made precise, and the understanding of the 1p/3p difference (that you have, as 
you told us many times).

Bruno



> so any "question" using that word has no answer because it is not a question, 
> it's just some words and a question mark.
> 
> >> However if you were to ask one of the individual John Clarks in one of 
> >> those rooms AFTER the duplication "What is the probability you will see a 
> >> prime number on the door when you walk out?" then that would be a 
> >> legitimate unambiguous question, and the answer would be 25% because there 
> >> are 25 prime numbers less than 100.
> 
> > In this case, there were no explicit duplication,
> 
> Exactly, and therefore the personal pronoun "you" would not be ambiguous.so a 
> question that started as "what would you" would not automatically be an 
> ambiguous question.
> 
> > Let me ask you this: do you agree that if I can predict with certainty that 
> > I will be [...]
> 
> I don't need to read another word. No I do not agree, and I don't disagree 
> either because gibberish is not the sort of thing one can agree or disagree 
> with, it's just gibberish. 
> 
> John K Clark
> 
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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 17:14, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
>>> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
>>> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
>>> as satisfactory.
>>>
>>
>> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity
>> of identity, it is just a psychological construct.
>>
>>
>> Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
>> millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make
>> them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his
>> closest friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly
>> be a unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any
>> difference.  That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
>> his door the REAL Bruce.
>>
>
>
> The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
> closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
> we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
> AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
> multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.
>
> I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
> identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
> continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or
> otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The
> same person? Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not
> doubt continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
> continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not
> relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit
> as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine
> continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing
> that can be sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and
> their bodies.
>

The only reason you are considered to still be a person when unconscious is
that you are expected to eventually wake up. Cryonics enthusiasts sometimes
propose using alternative words for what everyone else would call a corpse,
such as a body in an "ametabolic coma", on the grounds that eventually it
might be revived.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread Quentin Anciaux

Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:46, Bruce Kellett  a
écrit :

> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:
>
>> Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
>> écrit :
>>
>>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>
 On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

>
> Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
> convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
> personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
> as satisfactory.
>

 I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for
 continuity of identity, it is just a psychological construct.


 Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
 millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make
 them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his
 closest friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly
 be a unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any
 difference.  That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
 his door the REAL Bruce.

>>>
>>>
>>> The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
>>> closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
>>> we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
>>> AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
>>> multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.
>>>
>>> I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
>>> identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
>>> continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or
>>> otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The
>>> same person? Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not
>>> doubt continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
>>> continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not
>>> relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit
>>> as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine
>>> continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing
>>> that can be sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and
>>> their bodies.
>>>
>>
>> The only thing for a person to take into account if she is the same
>> person as yesterday, one second ago, one year ago.. is feeling she is and
>> is the only true thing, what you're talking about could have meaning in a
>> law court but nowhere else... it has nothing to do with personal identity.
>>
>
>
> Tell that to the parents grieving over their son who is in a coma
> following an accident.
>

This has nothing to do with *personal* identity... personal identity is a
first person concept... if you're not conscious (coma, dead, whatever) if
there is no 'I' talking into your head, it has no meaning... now for law,
inheritance and other persons acting towards you, it can have meaning, but
it's not "personal identity" and for knowing if you're alive or not, you're
the only source of truth about that... no one can tell you you're not what
you think you are.

Quentin

>
> Bruce
>
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> 
> .
>


-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM

2020-09-09 Thread Bruce Kellett

On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 5:29 PM Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

> Le mer. 9 sept. 2020 à 09:14, Bruce Kellett  a
> écrit :
>
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2020 at 4:50 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 9/8/2020 10:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>>
>>> On Wed, 9 Sep 2020 at 14:56, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 Be a dualist if you want to. But the closest continuer theory is a
 convention designed to resolve questions of personal identity in cases of
 personal duplication, absent a "soul". Arbitrary random selections are not
 as satisfactory.

>>>
>>> I'm not a dualist. I think there is no metaphysical basis for continuity
>>> of identity, it is just a psychological construct.
>>>
>>>
>>> Realistically (sort of) in the duplication of Bruce there will be
>>> millions of errors in each copy.  There would be no point in trying to make
>>> them any more accurate.  That would certainly be good enough to fool his
>>> closest friends and family.  So at the molecular level there will certainly
>>> be a unique closest continuer.  But I can't see that it makes any
>>> difference.  That's just as arbitrary as denominating the first one to open
>>> his door the REAL Bruce.
>>>
>>
>>
>> The importance of copying errors depends on the metric used to assess
>> closeness of continuation. If and when actual duplication becomes possible,
>> we can worry about the fine details of this. But if you think in terms of
>> AI, duplication might involve no more than running the same program on
>> multiple computers. Duplication errors are then eliminated.
>>
>> I think the point of taking more into account in terms of personal
>> identity than just psychological continuity is that psychological
>> continuity makes little sense when you are asleep, under anaesthesia, or
>> otherwise unconscious. Do you cease to be a person when unconscious? The
>> same person? Does your family recognize you then or not? Since we do not
>> doubt continuity of personal existence even though our bodies change
>> continuously at the molecular level, copying errors at that level are not
>> relevant for bodily continuity. Our memories and emotions change every bit
>> as much, if not more, on these time scales. So the metric to determine
>> continuity of personal identity is not clear cut. It is the sort of thing
>> that can be sorted out if and when we can actually duplicate persons and
>> their bodies.
>>
>
> The only thing for a person to take into account if she is the same person
> as yesterday, one second ago, one year ago.. is feeling she is and is the
> only true thing, what you're talking about could have meaning in a law
> court but nowhere else... it has nothing to do with personal identity.
>


Tell that to the parents grieving over their son who is in a coma following
an accident.

Bruce

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Re: Probability in Everettian QM