Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 2:53 PM smitra  wrote:

>
> imposing the Born rule by fiat is not incompatible with each outcome
> being realized.


It is, actually. The Born rule gives probabilities that are incompatible
with every outcoming occurring on every trial. If every outcome always
occurs you are led to statements such as "This low probability outcome is
certain to occur", which is nonsense. If something is certain to occur, it
has probability one, but the Born rule never gives unit probability to a
single outcome from the set.


Your identity at any time is specified by all the
> information that specifies your physical state. After each observation,
> your identity changes. But this is only by a few bits of information,
> allowing us to ignore that change. However in the sort of discussion
> like this one about the MWI this change of identity due to different
> outcomes of the measurements in the different sectors is of crucial
> importance. The Born rule then specifies a measure on the space of all
> possible observers, where we also distinguish two observers who split
> off from the same observer after a measurement.
>

But the Born probabilities are inconsistent with unit probability for every
possible outcome.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[smitra]

On 23-12-2020 03:29, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 12:45 PM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:


On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 10:58, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 10:45 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
privileged.

What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way
if there is to be a probability different from zero.


Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it
isn't dualist?

It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are
zombies -- you are still making a dualist assumption.


The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular
outcome. I am one randomly sampled copy.


And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in all
self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this
when he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but
your soul only goes with one."

I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the
probability that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the
carrots are duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a
particular randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it;
you do, and there seems to be no way around it.

Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand
one card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one
of the people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that
'You' will get the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The
difference is that you have identified yourself in advance. The
dualist assumption is equivalent.

Let's say you are copied 10^100 times. One copy will end up in a place
where they use euros and the rest will end up in a place where they
use dollars. Do you put euros or dollars in your wallet before
duplication?

Let's say I wait and see! and go to the money exchange if necessary.
You are posing a different problem, one in which the number of copies
on a particular branch is increased. That is incompatible with MWI and
Everett with non-degenerate eigenvalues.

You don't avoid the dualist implications of self-selection by
increasing the number of copies: the example with 52 cards says
everything that is necessary.

From what I understand of your position, you would claim that the 1 in
10^100 copy will screw up the very concept of probability. If that
extra copy did not exist, you would take dollars, because you will
certainly need dollars; but with the extra copy you would just throw
up your hands and say you don't know what to do, because it is certain
you will need dollars and euros.

My complaint about your example is that you are changing the problem
-- you are changing the probabilities in a way that is incompatible
with both the Schrodinger equation and the Born rule. But there could
be more moderate examples of branch duplication that would be more in
line with what is proposed by some people. For example, both Sean
Carroll and Zurek propose a procedure whereby they expand the number
of branches so that all branches have equal amplitudes (weights, or
Born probabilities). This is incompatible with the Schrodinger
equation, but if we leave that aside for the moment, it gives a
branch-counting solution to the probability question. The idea then is
that you self-select from a uniform random distribution over this
expanded set of branches.  However, the expansion of the number of
branches in this approach is, in fact, unnecessary, since random
self-selection from a distribution would give the same result if the
distribution were determined directly by the Born rule.

But this is still inconsistent with the Schrodinger equation because
there is nothing in the SE that tells you that you have a probability
distribution given by the Born weights. You can impose the Born rule
by fiat, but that is then incompatible with the fact that every
outcome in the Schrodinger equation occurs with probability equal to
one. (Which is where we started).

The self-selection idea, whether from an expanded set of branches with
equal weights, or from the original number of branches weighted by the
Born rule, still involves the idea of a random selection from a
distribution. This is not part of the Schrodinger equation, and it is
still essentially dualist since it requires the selection of one
unique individual who is not specified by the equations -- it assumes
that just one of the individuals involved is uniquely specified to be
YOU -- by virtue of an immortal soul or some 

Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 12:45 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 10:58, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 10:45 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou <
>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
 stath...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none
> are privileged.
>

 What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some
 way if there is to be a probability different from zero.

>>>
>>> Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that
>>> it isn't dualist?
>>>
>>
>> It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are
>> zombies -- you are still making a dualist assumption.
>>
>> The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
>>> probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular 
>>> outcome. I
>>> am one randomly sampled copy.
>>>
>>
>>
>> And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in
>> all self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood 
>> this
>> when he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but 
>> your
>> soul only goes with one."
>>
>
> I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the
> probability that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the
> carrots are duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a
> particular randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you 
> do,
> and there seems to be no way around it.
>


 Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand
 one card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of
 the people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will
 get the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you
 have identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent.

>>>
>>> Let's say you are copied 10^100 times. One copy will end up in a place
>>> where they use euros and the rest will end up in a place where they use
>>> dollars. Do you put euros or dollars in your wallet before duplication?
>>>
>>
>>
>> Let's say I wait and see! and go to the money exchange if necessary. You
>> are posing a different problem, one in which the number of copies on a
>> particular branch is increased. That is incompatible with MWI and Everett
>> with non-degenerate eigenvalues.
>>
>> You don't avoid the dualist implications of self-selection by increasing
>> the number of copies: the example with 52 cards says everything that is
>> necessary.
>>
>
> From what I understand of your position, you would claim that the 1 in
> 10^100 copy will screw up the very concept of probability. If that extra
> copy did not exist, you would take dollars, because you will certainly need
> dollars; but with the extra copy you would just throw up your hands and say
> you don't know what to do, because it is certain you will need dollars and
> euros.
>


My complaint about your example is that you are changing the problem -- you
are changing the probabilities in a way that is incompatible with both the
Schrodinger equation and the Born rule. But there could be more moderate
examples of branch duplication that would be more in line with what is
proposed by some people. For example, both Sean Carroll and Zurek propose a
procedure whereby they expand the number of branches so that all branches
have equal amplitudes (weights, or Born probabilities). This is
incompatible with the Schrodinger equation, but if we leave that aside for
the moment, it gives a branch-counting solution to the probability
question. The idea then is that you self-select from a uniform random
distribution over this expanded set of branches.  However, the expansion of
the number of branches in this approach is, in fact, unnecessary, since
random self-selection from a distribution would give the same result if the
distribution were determined directly by the Born rule.

But this is still inconsistent with the Schrodinger equation because there
is nothing in the SE that tells you that you have a probability
distribution given by the Born weights. You can impose the Born rule by
fiat, but that is then incompatible with the fact that every outcome in the
Schrodinger equation occurs with probability equal to one. (Which is where
we started).

The self-selection idea, 

Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 10:58, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 10:45 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>

 All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
 privileged.

>>>
>>> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way
>>> if there is to be a probability different from zero.
>>>
>>
>> Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that
>> it isn't dualist?
>>
>
> It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are
> zombies -- you are still making a dualist assumption.
>
> The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
>> probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular 
>> outcome. I
>> am one randomly sampled copy.
>>
>
>
> And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in all
> self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this 
> when
> he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but your soul
> only goes with one."
>

 I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the
 probability that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the
 carrots are duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a
 particular randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you do,
 and there seems to be no way around it.

>>>
>>>
>>> Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand
>>> one card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of
>>> the people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will
>>> get the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you
>>> have identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent.
>>>
>>
>> Let's say you are copied 10^100 times. One copy will end up in a place
>> where they use euros and the rest will end up in a place where they use
>> dollars. Do you put euros or dollars in your wallet before duplication?
>>
>
>
> Let's say I wait and see! and go to the money exchange if necessary. You
> are posing a different problem, one in which the number of copies on a
> particular branch is increased. That is incompatible with MWI and Everett
> with non-degenerate eigenvalues.
>
> You don't avoid the dualist implications of self-selection by increasing
> the number of copies: the example with 52 cards says everything that is
> necessary.
>

>From what I understand of your position, you would claim that the 1 in
10^100 copy will screw up the very concept of probability. If that extra
copy did not exist, you would take dollars, because you will certainly need
dollars; but with the extra copy you would just throw up your hands and say
you don't know what to do, because it is certain you will need dollars and
euros.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 10:45 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
>>> privileged.
>>>
>>
>> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way
>> if there is to be a probability different from zero.
>>
>
> Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it
> isn't dualist?
>

 It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are
 zombies -- you are still making a dualist assumption.

 The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
> probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular outcome. 
> I
> am one randomly sampled copy.
>


 And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in all
 self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this when
 he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but your soul
 only goes with one."

>>>
>>> I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the
>>> probability that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the
>>> carrots are duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a
>>> particular randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you do,
>>> and there seems to be no way around it.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand
>> one card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of
>> the people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will
>> get the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you
>> have identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent.
>>
>
> Let's say you are copied 10^100 times. One copy will end up in a place
> where they use euros and the rest will end up in a place where they use
> dollars. Do you put euros or dollars in your wallet before duplication?
>


Let's say I wait and see! and go to the money exchange if necessary. You
are posing a different problem, one in which the number of copies on a
particular branch is increased. That is incompatible with MWI and Everett
with non-degenerate eigenvalues.

You don't avoid the dualist implications of self-selection by increasing
the number of copies: the example with 52 cards says everything that is
necessary.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
>> privileged.
>>
>
> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way
> if there is to be a probability different from zero.
>

 Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it
 isn't dualist?

>>>
>>> It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are
>>> zombies -- you are still making a dualist assumption.
>>>
>>> The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
 probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular outcome. I
 am one randomly sampled copy.

>>>
>>>
>>> And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in all
>>> self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this when
>>> he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but your soul
>>> only goes with one."
>>>
>>
>> I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the probability
>> that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the carrots are
>> duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a particular
>> randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you do, and there
>> seems to be no way around it.
>>
>
>
> Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand one
> card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of the
> people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will get
> the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you have
> identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent.
>

Let's say you are copied 10^100 times. One copy will end up in a place
where they use euros and the rest will end up in a place where they use
dollars. Do you put euros or dollars in your wallet before duplication?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 10:35 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
>>> privileged.
>>>
>>
>> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way
>> if there is to be a probability different from zero.
>>
>
> Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it
> isn't dualist?
>

 It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are
 zombies -- you are still making a dualist assumption.

 The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
> probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular outcome. 
> I
> am one randomly sampled copy.
>


 And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in all
 self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this when
 he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but your soul
 only goes with one."

>>>
>>> I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the
>>> probability that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the
>>> carrots are duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a
>>> particular randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you do,
>>> and there seems to be no way around it.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand
>> one card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of
>> the people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will
>> get the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you
>> have identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent.
>>
>
> The probability that one particular randomly sampled person will get the 3
> of spades is 1/52.
>


As I said. But who or what does the random sampling so that you are the
selected person? You cannot escape the dualist implications that easily.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:15, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>
>> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
>> privileged.
>>
>
> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way
> if there is to be a probability different from zero.
>

 Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it
 isn't dualist?

>>>
>>> It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are
>>> zombies -- you are still making a dualist assumption.
>>>
>>> The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
 probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular outcome. I
 am one randomly sampled copy.

>>>
>>>
>>> And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in all
>>> self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this when
>>> he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but your soul
>>> only goes with one."
>>>
>>
>> I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the probability
>> that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the carrots are
>> duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a particular
>> randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you do, and there
>> seems to be no way around it.
>>
>
>
> Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand one
> card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of the
> people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will get
> the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you have
> identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent.
>

The probability that one particular randomly sampled person will get the 3
of spades is 1/52.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 9:07 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

>
> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
> privileged.
>

 What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way if
 there is to be a probability different from zero.

>>>
>>> Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it
>>> isn't dualist?
>>>
>>
>> It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are zombies
>> -- you are still making a dualist assumption.
>>
>> The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
>>> probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular outcome. I
>>> am one randomly sampled copy.
>>>
>>
>>
>> And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in all
>> self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this when
>> he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but your soul
>> only goes with one."
>>
>
> I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the probability
> that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the carrots are
> duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a particular
> randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you do, and there
> seems to be no way around it.
>


Think of it like this: take a randomly shuffled deck of cards and hand one
card from the deck to each of 52 people. The probability that one of the
people will get the 3-of-Spades is one. The probability that 'You' will get
the 3-of-Spades in a fair shuffle is 1/52. The difference is that you have
identified yourself in advance. The dualist assumption is equivalent.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, 23 Dec 2020 at 09:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
 privileged.

>>>
>>> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way if
>>> there is to be a probability different from zero.
>>>
>>
>> Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it
>> isn't dualist?
>>
>
> It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are zombies
> -- you are still making a dualist assumption.
>
> The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
>> probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular outcome. I
>> am one randomly sampled copy.
>>
>
>
> And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in all
> self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this when
> he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but your soul
> only goes with one."
>

I could say that my soul is duplicated and I want to know the probability
that I am one randomly sampled soul. I could say that the carrots are
duplicated and I want to know the probability that I get a particular
randomly sampled carrot. I don't have a problem with it; you do, and there
seems to be no way around it.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 8:32 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
>>> privileged.
>>>
>>
>> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way if
>> there is to be a probability different from zero.
>>
>
> Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it
> isn't dualist?
>

It makes no difference if all copies are conscious, or if all are zombies
-- you are still making a dualist assumption.

The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
> probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular outcome. I
> am one randomly sampled copy.
>


And that is precisely the dualist assumption that  is intrinsic in all
self-location (indexical) arguments. I think Brent has understood this when
he says "That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but your soul
only goes with one."

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Wed, Dec 23, 2020 at 2:37 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Am Mo, 21. Dez 2020, um 21:35, schrieb Bruce Kellett:
>
> On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark  wrote:
>
>
> On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule*
>
>
> How do you figure that?
>
>
>
> It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every
> outcome happens, with probability one.
>
>
> That is an exemple of confusion between the third person pictured where
> indeed MWI keep all superposition “intacte”, and that all possible quantum
> outcome are realised, and the first person account where that does not
> happen, as each brain is correlated to the terms of the superposition.
>

The 1p/3p distinction does not help you here. There are many 1p views, and
for each the probability of that particular observation is one,
contradicting the Born rule calculation of the probability in every case.
This follows from the linearity of the Schrodinger equation. The Born rule
cannot be deduced from the Schrodinger equation -- they are incompatible.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 10:50 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 4:51 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
> *> There is an observer for every outcome.*
>>
>
> No, sometimes an outcome has many observers, even many with the same
> name, and sometimes an outcome has no observers at all. Many Worlds
> doesn't care if an outcome is observed or not and that is its one
> enormous strength, unlike Copenhagen it doesn't have to explain what
> exactly an "observation" is because consciousness has nothing to do with it.
>


I think you have overlooked the implications of linearity.

> *do you really believe in a dualist model?*
>>
>
> I have no opinion on that, I know little about pistols or sword fighting.
>


And you can't even spell!

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 21:31, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 19:47, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 7:35 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 18:21, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 5:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:51, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 8:47 AM Stathis Papaioannou <
>>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:35, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett <
>> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> *> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule*
>>
>>
>> How do you figure that?
>>
>
>
> It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that
> every outcome happens, with probability one. The Born rule says that
> different outcomes have different probabilities. So MWI + Born gives 
> two
> incompatible results for outcome probabilities. Hence Everett is 
> incoherent
> -- incompatible with the Born rule.
>

 The probability that an outcome happens and the probability that an
 observer will see a particular outcome are two different things.

>>>
>>> Only if you say so -- Nature doesn't care what you say! There is an
>>> observer for every outcome. Or do you really believe in a dualist model?
>>>
>>
>> Nature agrees that different observers will see different outcomes,
>> since they are not in telepathic communication.
>>
>
> Which observer are you? What outcome do you see?
>

 I am potentially any of them, but only one, which is why it is
 probabilistic. This is independent of consciousness and quantum mechanics.
 A rational character in a computer game that branches would reason the same
 way.

>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, it is a problem inherent in all indexical reasoning. Either you are
>>> all of the copies, and hence the probability for you to see any particular
>>> outcome is unity, or you are only one of the copies, and the rest are
>>> zombies. That is the dualist position, and it is necessary if you want to
>>> get probabilities other than unity for outcomes.
>>>
>>> The reasoning is like that in the many minds model of QM of Albert and
>>> Loewer, and they now explicitly acknowledge that the reasoning underlying
>>> that model is manifestly dualist.
>>>
>>
>> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
>> privileged.
>>
>
> What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way if
> there is to be a probability different from zero.
>

Why did you say it was dualist if it doesn't make a difference that it
isn't dualist?
The probability calculated where there are multiple copies is the
probability that one randomly sampled copy will see a particular outcome. I
am one randomly sampled copy.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

['scerir' via Everything List]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are privileged.

"In truth there is only one mind. Oneness it is the doctrine of the 
Upanishads." As far as I remember Schroedinger wrote something like that. Does 
that "Oneness" could resolve our problem? :-)


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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[smitra]

On 22-12-2020 08:20, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 5:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:


On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:51, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 8:47 AM Stathis Papaioannou
 wrote:

On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:35, Bruce Kellett 
wrote:

On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark 
wrote:

On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett
 wrote:

_> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule_

How do you figure that?


It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every
outcome happens, with probability one. The Born rule says that
different outcomes have different probabilities. So MWI + Born gives
two incompatible results for outcome probabilities. Hence Everett is
incoherent -- incompatible with the Born rule.

The probability that an outcome happens and the probability that an
observer will see a particular outcome are two different things.

Only if you say so -- Nature doesn't care what you say! There is an
observer for every outcome. Or do you really believe in a dualist
model?

Nature agrees that different observers will see different outcomes,
since they are not in telepathic communication.

Which observer are you? What outcome do you see?

Bruce


If the MWI were false and only one outcome would be realized in a given 
region of space containing one observer, you can still end up with an 
ensemble of all possible outcomes in an infinitely large universe. 
Verifying the Born rule obviously doesn't falsify theories that predict 
an infinite universe, like eternal inflation theory. Therefore, we can 
conclude that Bruce's arguments here holds no water.


Saibal


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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 12/22/2020 12:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 18:21, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 5:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:51, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 8:47 AM Stathis Papaioannou
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:35, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>>
wrote:

On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark
mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:


On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkellet...@gmail.com>> wrote:

/> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule/


How do you figure that?



It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger
equation says that every outcome happens, with
probability one. The Born rule says that different
outcomes have different probabilities. So MWI +
Born gives two incompatible results for outcome
probabilities. Hence Everett is incoherent --
incompatible with the Born rule.


The probability that an outcome happens and the
probability that an observer will see a particular
outcome are two different things.


Only if you say so -- Nature doesn't care what you say!
There is an observer for every outcome. Or do you really
believe in a dualist model?


Nature agrees that different observers will see different
outcomes, since they are not in telepathic communication.


Which observer are you? What outcome do you see?


I am potentially any of them, but only one, which is why it is 
probabilistic.


That seems to imply dualism.  All the bodies exist, but your soul only 
goes with one.


Brent

This is independent of consciousness and quantum mechanics. A rational 
character in a computer game that branches would reason the same way.

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Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Trump is on drugs

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 12 Oct 2020, at 12:15, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> I would say in general with a machine you can see the seems, bolts and rivets 
> while a biological system you don’t.

In both case we see particles and fields obeying computable laws, when we look 
at a digital machine implemented in some subset of the physical laws.

The first person associated with the machine cannot do. She does not know which 
computations run it, among the infinities of differentiating computations which 
run her in Arithmetic (with a big “A”, Arithmetic refers to the Model, that is 
the truth or semantic, not a theory of Arithmetic, like RA or PA).



> You can turn off a machine, but a biological system does not turn back on.

OK. But that is contingent. In principle, perhaps through cryongenisation, if 
your body remains stable enough, we might turn you back on. 



> Biological systems are spontaneous and will act accordingly.


That is what the Universal machine do. They are only partially computable. I am 
not sure what you mean by “spontaneous” to be sure.



> A computer with no input just sits there.

There are many programs with no inputs which can do quite varied things, like 
executing a dreaming program. It looks it just sit there, but like a patient in 
a coma, he might be conscious (or might be associated to a conscious 
individual) without us able to notice it.




> While there are clearly Turning machine or Church-Turing aspects of how 
> brains or neural systems work, there are also huge departures. 

Perhaps, but without any evidence for this, let us continue to search it. What 
you are doing here, is to be that there is a difference between the physics 
inferred from observation and the physics mathematical subbranch of machine 
self-rerference.

Doing theology rationally and empirically consists in doing those experience, 
and although Newton physics contradicts Mechanism, up to now the quantum facts 
confirms it, even strikingly if we forget about the wave collapse reduction.

Fundamental science is just philosophy/theology done with the scientific 
attitude and method.

Bruno





> 
> LC
> 
> On Sunday, October 11, 2020 at 9:42:03 AM UTC-5 telmo wrote:
> Hi Lawrence,
> 
> Am So, 11. Okt 2020, um 14:21, schrieb Lawrence Crowell:
>> On Sunday, October 11, 2020 at 8:06:10 AM UTC-5 johnk...@gmail.com 
>>  wrote:
>> On Sat, Oct 10, 2020 Lawrence Crowell > via 
>> Everything List wrote:
>> 
>> >> [Me] Nations? People? You're showing a remarkable lack of imagination and 
>> >> making a lot of unwarranted assumptions. A 100 years from now (maybe less 
>> >> than 50) nation states will certainly no longer exist and even something 
>> >> that you are I would recognize as a biological human being probably 
>> >> won't. 
>> 
>> > The only way I see that is if we snuff ourselves out, which is possible.
>> 
>> 
>> I'm not talking about humans snuffing themselves out although I admit that's 
>> possible, I'm talking about humans replacing parts of themselves until there 
>> is no longer anything very human about them. Some signals in the brain move 
>> as slowly as .01 meters per second, the slow diffusion of hormones for 
>> example, but even the very fastest signals in the brain move at only 100 
>> meters per second and light moves at 300,000,000 meters per second; and in a 
>> computer made with Nanotechnology the distances the signal must travel will 
>> be far shorter because the components will be much smaller. And that's 
>> without even considering Quantum Computers. There is just no way biology can 
>> compete with that.
>> 
>> 
>> > Nation states will otherwise  probably exist,
>> 
>> Their life expectancy depends on the evolution of Memes not the evolution of 
>> genes as in Darwinian evolution, but Memes evolve astronomically faster than 
>> genes.
>>  
>> > Human also will exist,
>> 
>> Information processing Turing Machines that remember once being human will 
>> still exist a century from now, but if you or I were to see one we wouldn't 
>> say they looked or acted like a human.
>> 
>>  John K Clark
>> 
>> I have serious doubts about a lot of these hyper-tech ideas that border on 
>> science fiction. I really question ideas of minds being downloaded into 
>> cybers, or the matryoshka ideas and so forth. These ideas sort of give me a 
>> sense of why there were so many of those 1950 science fiction and horror 
>> films about mad doctors or scientists hell bent on bizarre quests. I think 
>> for the average person these sorts of ideas probably sound little different. 
>> One has to remember that while we can pursue a better understanding of the 
>> universe, few people want their humanity taken away or to become robots.
> 
> In your understanding of reality, what is the difference between a human and 
> a robot*?
> 
> Cheers,
> Telmo
> 
> * Let us assume sci-fi level stuff here
> 
> 
>> For some practical reasons I also think there are limits on these things.
>> 
>> LC  
>> 
>> 
> 
>> --
>> You 

Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Telmo,

I comment Bruce, and add some more. Feel free to try to explain what the 
machine’s theory of consciousness is missing, if you think something is missed 
(besides the infinity of theorem in this open branch of mathematical logic or 
machine theology).

> On 22 Dec 2020, at 10:35, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Am Mo, 21. Dez 2020, um 21:35, schrieb Bruce Kellett:
>> On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> 
>> > MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule
>> 
>> How do you figure that?  
>> 
>> 
>> It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every outcome 
>> happens, with probability one.

That is an exemple of confusion between the third person pictured where indeed 
MWI keep all superposition “intacte”, and that all possible quantum outcome are 
realised, and the first person account where that does not happen, as each 
brain is correlated to the terms of the superposition.

The MWI predicts that John will see a cat alive + John will see a cat dead, but 
still makes impossible the prediction “John will see the cat alive and dead”. 
Once John looks at the cat, the schroedinger equation predict that both the 
superposed John will agree on seeing the cat being definitely dead XOR alive.

In the mathematical theory of self-reference, this confusion mix []p and ([]p & 
p). Despite []p & ([]p & p) are provided equivalent by G*, they cannot be 
proved equivalent by G, and they obey different mathematics, and the p get 
different probabilities.credibilities, ...



>> The Born rule says that different outcomes have different probabilities. So 
>> MWI + Born gives two incompatible results for outcome probabilities. Hence 
>> Everett is incoherent -- incompatible with the Born rule.
> 
> Nice sophism you got there Bruce.


It could be called the Lucas-Penrose sophism, in this context, or perhaps the 
Clark-Kellet sophism.

To be sure, the []p and []p & p difference is fundamental, notably to 
understand that “consciousness” is partially explained, as we (the universal 
machines) can define “[]p” in arithmetic, but we (the universal machines)  
cannot define []p & p. That is used to show that consciousness and first person 
experience are not definable (which is stronger than just “non-provable”) 
without invoking a self-encompacing notion of of truth (commonly “called" God).

With Mechanism, all the terms, or concepts, like consciousness, can be defined 
in ZF, except one “natural number”, which would need a standard model of ZF, 
which today are just defined by using the notion of standard natural number.

The consciousness of the universal machine is *dissociated*. To associate it to 
“us”, we have to link the induction axiom to the “physical time”, and make the 
machine handling well a model of itself through short term memories and long 
term memories. It could be that we need a “circular neural nets” learning this 
through experience, to get it right, but the machines, like us, will always 
improved and develop this (using wall, paper, magnetic band, computer, etc.)

Bruno



> 
> Telmo.
> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> 
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>>  
>> .
> 
> 
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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[smitra]

On 20-12-2020 11:41, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 9:33 PM smitra  wrote:


On 20-12-2020 07:57, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:

On 12/19/2020 10:38 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 6:48 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything

List

 wrote:


As far as I know, it was Born who came up with the

interpretation

of the equations as expressing probabilities.  But there was

(and

maybe still is) controversy over whether this was irreducibly
random or whether there were hidden variables and it was just

the

randomness of ignorance.  For most physicists this was resolved

by

the experimental confirmation of the violation of Bell
inequalities.  At that point the choice was irreducible

randomness

or nonlocal effects


That is not quite right. The choice is not between randomnesss

and

non-locality. Non-local hidden variables (Bohm) do reduce the
apparent randomness to ignorance of the detailed quantum state,

but

at the price of non-locality. Bell's result implies that
non-locality is unavoidable, and this has nothing to do with the
presence or absence of intrinsic randomness.


If there were not intrinsic randomness then the extra correlation

of

that violates Bell's inequality could be used to signal faster

than

light.


That can indeed be done in Bohm theory. There the Born rule requires
the
assumption of so-called "quantum-equilibrium", and that condition
can be
violated:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ [1]Quantum_non-equilibrium [1]


First find your violation of this "Quantum equilibrium" -- a stupid
construct if ever if heard of one!

Bruce


The point is that it exists if Bohm theory is correct. It's worthwhile 
to look into this sorts of things, regardless of experimental evidence 
to see what sort of experiments would be worthwhile to do in the first 
place.


Saibal

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[John Clark]

On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 4:51 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

*>>> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule*
>>
>>

>> How do you figure that?
>>
>

*> It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every
> outcome happens, with probability one.*
>

The Schrodinger equation is unitary, if it wasn't then it wouldn't be able
to give probabilities because to be meaningful probabilities must be
unitary, that is to say the sum of all the probabilities must always add up
to 1. So Schrodinger's Equation says when an electron encounters a photon
there are an infinite number of things the electron could end up doing, but
when you add up all the probabilities it will always equal to exactly 1.
Many Worlds says the same thing, when an electron encounters a photon
everything that could happen, everything that does not violate the laws of
physics, does happen. In other words the probability that an observer will
see **something* *happen when the electron encounters a photon is exactly
one.


> *> The Born rule says that different outcomes have different
> probabilities.*
>

Yes, and in Many Worlds the probability Bruce Kellett will see the electron
go left rather than right depends entirely on how many Bruce Kelletts there
are; and there are certainly more than one, a great many more than one.

> Which observer are you? What outcome do you see?


It's amazing how much confusion that simple personal pronoun causes. In
Many Worlds there are a great many observers who would have a legitimate
claim to the same name, John K Clark for example, even if some of them have
one atom of Carbon-13 in a particular fat cell in their left big toe and
others have Carbon-12 instead.

*> There is an observer for every outcome.*
>

No, sometimes an outcome has many observers, even many with the same name, and
sometimes an outcome has no observers at all. Many Worlds doesn't care if
an outcome is observed or not and that is its one enormous strength, unlike
Copenhagen it doesn't have to explain what exactly an "observation" is
because consciousness has nothing to do with it.


> > *do you really believe in a dualist model?*
>

I have no opinion on that, I know little about pistols or sword fighting.

John K Clark

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 9:19 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 19:47, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 7:35 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 18:21, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 5:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:51, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 8:47 AM Stathis Papaioannou <
>> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:35, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark 
 wrote:

>
> On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett <
> bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> *> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule*
>
>
> How do you figure that?
>


 It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every
 outcome happens, with probability one. The Born rule says that 
 different
 outcomes have different probabilities. So MWI + Born gives two 
 incompatible
 results for outcome probabilities. Hence Everett is incoherent --
 incompatible with the Born rule.

>>>
>>> The probability that an outcome happens and the probability that an
>>> observer will see a particular outcome are two different things.
>>>
>>
>> Only if you say so -- Nature doesn't care what you say! There is an
>> observer for every outcome. Or do you really believe in a dualist model?
>>
>
> Nature agrees that different observers will see different outcomes,
> since they are not in telepathic communication.
>

 Which observer are you? What outcome do you see?

>>>
>>> I am potentially any of them, but only one, which is why it is
>>> probabilistic. This is independent of consciousness and quantum mechanics.
>>> A rational character in a computer game that branches would reason the same
>>> way.
>>>
>>
>>
>> Yes, it is a problem inherent in all indexical reasoning. Either you are
>> all of the copies, and hence the probability for you to see any particular
>> outcome is unity, or you are only one of the copies, and the rest are
>> zombies. That is the dualist position, and it is necessary if you want to
>> get probabilities other than unity for outcomes.
>>
>> The reasoning is like that in the many minds model of QM of Albert and
>> Loewer, and they now explicitly acknowledge that the reasoning underlying
>> that model is manifestly dualist.
>>
>
> All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
> privileged.
>

What difference does that make? One has to be privileged in some way if
there is to be a probability different from zero.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 19:47, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 7:35 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 18:21, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 5:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:51, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 8:47 AM Stathis Papaioannou <
> stath...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:35, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark 
>>> wrote:
>>>

 On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett <
 bhkellet...@gmail.com> wrote:

 *> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule*


 How do you figure that?

>>>
>>>
>>> It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every
>>> outcome happens, with probability one. The Born rule says that different
>>> outcomes have different probabilities. So MWI + Born gives two 
>>> incompatible
>>> results for outcome probabilities. Hence Everett is incoherent --
>>> incompatible with the Born rule.
>>>
>>
>> The probability that an outcome happens and the probability that an
>> observer will see a particular outcome are two different things.
>>
>
> Only if you say so -- Nature doesn't care what you say! There is an
> observer for every outcome. Or do you really believe in a dualist model?
>

 Nature agrees that different observers will see different outcomes,
 since they are not in telepathic communication.

>>>
>>> Which observer are you? What outcome do you see?
>>>
>>
>> I am potentially any of them, but only one, which is why it is
>> probabilistic. This is independent of consciousness and quantum mechanics.
>> A rational character in a computer game that branches would reason the same
>> way.
>>
>
>
> Yes, it is a problem inherent in all indexical reasoning. Either you are
> all of the copies, and hence the probability for you to see any particular
> outcome is unity, or you are only one of the copies, and the rest are
> zombies. That is the dualist position, and it is necessary if you want to
> get probabilities other than unity for outcomes.
>
> The reasoning is like that in the many minds model of QM of Albert and
> Loewer, and they now explicitly acknowledge that the reasoning underlying
> that model is manifestly dualist.
>

All the copies could be conscious or all could be zombies; none are
privileged.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Telmo Menezes]

Am Mo, 21. Dez 2020, um 21:35, schrieb Bruce Kellett:
> On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark  wrote:
>> 
>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>> 
>>> *> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule*
>> 
>> How do you figure that?  
> 
> 
> It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every outcome 
> happens, with probability one. The Born rule says that different outcomes 
> have different probabilities. So MWI + Born gives two incompatible results 
> for outcome probabilities. Hence Everett is incoherent -- incompatible with 
> the Born rule.

Nice sophism you got there Bruce.

Telmo.

> Bruce
> 

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>  
> .

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Bruce Kellett]

On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 7:35 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
wrote:

> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 18:21, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 5:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:51, Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 8:47 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
 wrote:

> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:35, Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark 
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> *> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule*
>>>
>>>
>>> How do you figure that?
>>>
>>
>>
>> It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every
>> outcome happens, with probability one. The Born rule says that different
>> outcomes have different probabilities. So MWI + Born gives two 
>> incompatible
>> results for outcome probabilities. Hence Everett is incoherent --
>> incompatible with the Born rule.
>>
>
> The probability that an outcome happens and the probability that an
> observer will see a particular outcome are two different things.
>

 Only if you say so -- Nature doesn't care what you say! There is an
 observer for every outcome. Or do you really believe in a dualist model?

>>>
>>> Nature agrees that different observers will see different outcomes,
>>> since they are not in telepathic communication.
>>>
>>
>> Which observer are you? What outcome do you see?
>>
>
> I am potentially any of them, but only one, which is why it is
> probabilistic. This is independent of consciousness and quantum mechanics.
> A rational character in a computer game that branches would reason the same
> way.
>


Yes, it is a problem inherent in all indexical reasoning. Either you are
all of the copies, and hence the probability for you to see any particular
outcome is unity, or you are only one of the copies, and the rest are
zombies. That is the dualist position, and it is necessary if you want to
get probabilities other than unity for outcomes.

The reasoning is like that in the many minds model of QM of Albert and
Loewer, and they now explicitly acknowledge that the reasoning underlying
that model is manifestly dualist.

Bruce

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Re: Irreducible randomness in QM

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 18:21, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 5:58 PM Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:51, Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Dec 22, 2020 at 8:47 AM Stathis Papaioannou 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 On Tue, 22 Dec 2020 at 08:35, Bruce Kellett 
 wrote:

> On Mon, Dec 21, 2020 at 10:56 PM John Clark 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2020 at 1:38 AM Bruce Kellett 
>> wrote:
>>
>> *> MWI is incompatible with the Born Rule*
>>
>>
>> How do you figure that?
>>
>
>
> It's easy enough. MWI from the Schrodinger equation says that every
> outcome happens, with probability one. The Born rule says that different
> outcomes have different probabilities. So MWI + Born gives two 
> incompatible
> results for outcome probabilities. Hence Everett is incoherent --
> incompatible with the Born rule.
>

 The probability that an outcome happens and the probability that an
 observer will see a particular outcome are two different things.

>>>
>>> Only if you say so -- Nature doesn't care what you say! There is an
>>> observer for every outcome. Or do you really believe in a dualist model?
>>>
>>
>> Nature agrees that different observers will see different outcomes, since
>> they are not in telepathic communication.
>>
>
> Which observer are you? What outcome do you see?
>

I am potentially any of them, but only one, which is why it is
probabilistic. This is independent of consciousness and quantum mechanics.
A rational character in a computer game that branches would reason the same
way.

> --
Stathis Papaioannou

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