Re: Experiential Realism

2019-11-19 Thread Bruno Marchal

> On 14 Nov 2019, at 19:35, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take Phenomenological Reality 
> on its own Terms in the Study of the Mind
> Stan B. Klein
> Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
> University of California at Santa Barbara
> https://philpapers.org/archive/KLEADO-3.pdf
> 
> 
> Abstract
> 
> In this paper I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on its 
> own terms. In defense of “experiential realism” I offer a critique of modern 
> psychology’s all-too-frequent attempts to effect an objectification and 
> quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is “What can we learn 
> about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of scientific 
> objectification, transform the qualitative properties of experience into 
> quantitative indices?” I conclude that such treatment is neither necessary 
> for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, subjectively given states (such 
> as perception, pain, imagery, fear, thought, memory) – that is, for 
> understanding many of the principle objects of psychological inquiry. A 
> “science of mind” that approaches its subject matter from a third-person 
> perspective should, I contend, be treated with a healthy amount of informed 
> skepticism.

Nice!



> 
> In my view, science needs to adopt a new, more inclusive, metaphysics,  one 
> in which reality is not reduced to only that which can be captured by current 
> scientific methods.

In other terms: … one in which reality is not defined by what we see, observe, 
measure. 
In other terms: we need to come back on Plato’s skepticism on the idea that 
matter is primary, perhaps, as enforced by taking Descartes and Turing 
seriously into account.

No need of a new metaphysics: the preceding one was working very well, and the 
Theaeteus’ nuance of belief versus knowledge leads to an arithmetical 
interpretation of the five main hypostases of Parmenides and Plotinus. And the 
Observable one is testable, and indeed gives rise two a triple of quantum 
logics, with justifiable and non justifiable parts, knowable and not knowable 
parts, as well as believable and non believable, with all the math to get 
quanta and qualia.

Bruno



> 
> I thank Galen Strawson for suggesting the quote at the beginning of this 
> article, as well as for insightful comments on the text.
> 
> 
> @philipthrift
> 
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Experiential Realism

2019-11-14 Thread Philip Thrift

*A Defense of Experiential Realism: The Need to take Phenomenological 
Reality on its own Terms in the Study of the Mind*
Stan B. Klein
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences
University of California at Santa Barbara
https://philpapers.org/archive/KLEADO-3.pdf


Abstract

In this paper I argue for the importance of treating mental experience on 
its own terms. In defense of “experiential realism” I offer a critique of 
modern psychology’s all-too-frequent attempts to effect an objectification 
and quantification of personal subjectivity. The question is “What can we 
learn about experiential reality from indices that, in the service of 
scientific objectification, transform the qualitative properties of 
experience into quantitative indices?” I conclude that such treatment is 
neither necessary for realizing, nor sufficient for capturing, subjectively 
given states (such as perception, pain, imagery, fear, thought, memory) – 
that is, for understanding many of the principle objects of psychological 
inquiry. A “science of mind” that approaches its subject matter from a 
third-person perspective should, I contend, be treated with a healthy 
amount of informed skepticism.

In my view, science needs to adopt a new, more inclusive, metaphysics,  one 
in which reality is not reduced to only that which can be captured by 
current scientific methods.

I thank Galen Strawson for suggesting the quote at the beginning of this 
article, as well as for insightful comments on the text.


@philipthrift

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