R: Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
Following the above reasoning MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory) should violate the locality condition. I doubt this, but if you find a proof, in the literature (or not), I am interested. As I explained, and also give references, it seems to me that the MWI restores both 3p determinacy and 3p locality, making both the indeterminacy and non-locality only first person plural phenomenological happening. That is also Everett's position, and I would say the position of most Everettian (I still don't find any Everettian claiming that the MWI remains non-local, except the beginners who often think at first that the entire universe split instantaneously, but this does not deserve to be commented as nobody believes in this anymore). Bruno Jarrett, but also Shimony, and also Ghirardi, gave the proof that a *deterministic* QM (I should say a *deterministic and single-valued* QM) must violate the Locality Condition. I do not have references at hand, right now. I'll write down something as soon as possible. I did not re-read it, but a paper (about differences between non-separability, non-locality, determinism, etc.) could be this one http://dropcanvas.com/#n9m72p90WEc54O (I hope the link works) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
R: Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
Bruce: I came across the following brief statement by Goldstein et al: Many-worlds and relational interpretations of quantum theory [etc.] # Adrian Kent writes: "Making scientific sense of Everett’s idea is difficult, as evidenced by the many and generally incompatible attempts to show how unitary quantum theory explains the appearance of a quasiclassical world and the apparent validity of the Born rule and Copenhagen quantum theory, and evidenced also by the problems with all of these attempts. There is still nothing close to a consensus on the most promising way forward, even among many-worlds enthusiasts. This adds motivation for developing alternative ways of formulating quantum theory that have the purported advantages of many-worlds ideas — realism, and Lorentz invariance — but describe a single real world, so avoiding both the conceptual problems and the fantastic nature of many-worlds ideas. Still, for many, the appeal of many-worlds ideas evidently persists." in http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.1944 "Does it Make Sense to Speak of Self-Locating Uncertainty in the Universal Wave Function?" see also http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.0624 and http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/9703089 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
On 11/05/2016 2:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 May 2016, at 15:37, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote: Following the above reasoning MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory) should violate the locality condition. I doubt this, but if you find a proof, in the literature (or not), I am interested. As I explained, and also give references, it seems to me that the MWI restores both 3p determinacy and 3p locality, making both the indeterminacy and non-locality only first person plural phenomenological happening. That is also Everett's position, and I would say the position of most Everettian (I still don't find any Everettian claiming that the MWI remains non-local, except the beginners who often think at first that the entire universe split instantaneously, but this does not deserve to be commented as nobody believes in this anymore). I came across the following brief statement by Goldstein et al: *Many-worlds and relational interpretations of quantum theory** * Strictly speaking, there is yet another assumption, besides locality and the "no conspiracy" condition that is necessary for the proof of Bell's theorem: one has to assume that, after the experiment on one given side is performed, its ±1-valued outcome is a well-defined element of physical reality. (Recall that in Section 6, in order to apply Bell's definition of locality to the type of experiment considered in Section 5, we assumed that the outcomes A1 and A2 were functions of the local beables in regions 1 and 2, respectively.) Now one might wonder how anyone could deny that assumption. After all, the outcome of the experiment is recorded by the configuration of a macroscopic object (say, a pointer position, ink on a piece of paper, etc.) that can be directly inspected by a human experimenter. However, there exists one fairly popular interpretation of quantum theory that does deny that one has (after the experiments are concluded) a well-defined physically real ±1-valued outcome on each side: the many-worlds interpretation90. More precisely, according to the many-worlds interpretation, both outcomes are equally real on each side, so that it doesn't make sense to talk about "the one ±1-valued outcome that actually occurs". Certain "relational" interpretations of quantum theory91 also deny that a completed experiment has a well-defined physically real outcome. It is possible that this type of strategy could succeed in evading the consequences of Bell's theorem, allowing for the possibility of a universe governed by a local theory such that conscious observers living in that universe attest to the validity of the quantum predictions. However, it is not clear how to actually do the trick. There are many difficulties and the subject is rather subtle. To begin with, there are controversies around the problem of finding an appropriate formulation of a many-worlds (or relational) interpretation. Moreover, it is not clear whether such an appropriate formulation can be made local, given that the wave function — which seems to be all there is in standard formulations of many-worlds theories — is not a localized object; in the terminology of Bell, it is not a local beable. (Indeed, if a theory has no local beables, it is certainly not meaningful to ask whether it is local or not in the relevant sense.) A formulation of a version of the many-worlds interpretation which includes, in addition to the wave function, some local beables, was presented in a recent paper92, but it was found by the authors to be non-local. The question of whether a many-worlds (or relational) approach can be taken advantage of to create a local (and empirically viable) theory thus remains open — as does the question of how seriously one should take a theory of this type, should it be successfully constructed. http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Bell%27s_theorem#Manyworlds_and_relational_interpretations_of_quantum_theory This Scholarpedia article (*6*, 8378) is available on-line and has many additional references. Bruce -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
On 11/05/2016 2:31 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: The question is: are the probabilities, or the indeterminacies, and the non locality, phenomenological (1p) or factual (ontological, real, 3p)? QM+collapse admit factual indeterminacies (God plays dice, and there are action at a distance, even if they cannot be used to transmit signal quicker than light). QM-without-collapse is purely deterministic at the 3p level, and admits indeterminacies at the phenomenological level. I think everyone agree on this. I think that your confidence here is a bit premature. The Schrödinger equation was devised for the quantum behaviour of a single non-relativistic particle. It is local and deterministic in the many worlds interpretation for that case. However, the Schrödinger equation does not relate easily to relativity or spin degrees of freedom (spin is an intrinsically relativistic notion). These can be tacked on, but not always with great felicity. The main problem, however, is that once you move beyond a single particle system, you have to move from physical space into configuration space, where there are three independent 'spatial' coordinates for each particle. This caused consternation for the early practitioners of QM, and still causes problems today for the overly naïve. So while the Schrödinger equation for a multi-particle system might be local and deterministic in configuration space, there is no guarantee that this will remain true when one moves back into physical space to confront experiment. This is precisely the problem that one encounters with the current example of entangled pairs of spinning particles. Single particle non-relativistic intuitions can mislead, and do so here. Your confidence in determinism and locality for this system is seriously misplaced. The debate is on the following question: does QM-without-collapse admit factual non-locality (real physical action at a distance, like QM-with-collapse), or do the non-locality becomes, like the indeterminacy, phenomenological? (I think yes, as Jesse, Saibal and others, but it seems Bruce and John C. differ on this). Given that one cannot simply assume locality or determinism for the multi-particle system, one is led back to the Bell and CHSH inequalities. These apply to the two particle case, and the experimental confirmation of the violation of these inequalities for entangled particles leads to the conclusion that quantum mechanics is intrinsically non-local. Since Everettian QM is claimed to reproduce all the standard quantum results, it must also violate these inequalities. So either Everettian QM is as non-local as standard QM, or the Bell and CHSH theorems do not apply to the no-collapse theory. This latter has been claimed, and people have sought for assumptions that these theorems make that are not true in MWI. For example, Price claims: "Bell and Eberhard had implicity assumed that every possible measurement - even if not performed - would have yielded a /single/ definite result. This assumption is called contra-factual definiteness or CFD [S]. What Bell and Eberhard really proved was that every quantum theory must either violate locality /or/ CFD." The trouble here is that CFD is either trivially violated in ordinary quantum mechanics, or it is without content. CFD, if it is to mean anything at all, would be the claim that an unperformed experiment would produce a definite result *that could be predicted in advance*. That is, of course false in any version of quantum mechanics. An unperformed experiment would necessarily produce a result, not necessarily predictable, in a collapse model; and all possible results in a many worlds model. But in neither case is there any lack of a result. So the notion of CFD remains murky, and its relevance to the Bell and CHSH derivations is even less clear -- in exactly which line of the proofs is that assumption made? and what happens if that assumption is not made? I think the claim of counterfactual indefiniteness, if it means anything, reduces to the claim that Bell assumes a collapse model. This is the other argument that is raised against the Bell and CHSH proofs -- they assume that experiments have single outcomes. In other words, they assume a collapse model. But this is not true either, or, if it is true, it is not fatal to the applicability of these theorems to MWI. I will post a full derivation of the CHSH inequality shortly, and I claim that this does not make any assumption about single results. In fact, the whole proof is cast in terms of expectation values over results, so this works for both single and multiple outcomes for any particular experiment. The proof is not invalidated by moving to a many worlds scenario because, for any particular set of outcomes from the measurements on each of the entangled particles, there is only a finite number of possible joint worlds that can be produced. Each of these
R: Re: R: Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
. I think we all agree that QM-with-collapse entails a violation of Locality. The debate was for the case of the non-single value QM, that is QM-without-collapse, where all branches of the wave are kept "alive". Bruno As somebody wrote "Algebraic nonseparability entails geometric nonlocality; emphasis on its time aspect can be worded atemporality." (Olivier Costa de Beauregard). And yes, in QM without collapse (without reduction of probability packet), all branches are kept alive (with some probability or weight attached to each world; with a conservation of energy not well defined in each world or, better, during each split; and with a strange concept of locality - because there are "many" decohering "worlds"). s. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: R: Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
On 10 May 2016, at 19:06, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote: Messaggio originale Da: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> Data: 10/05/2016 18.31 A: <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Ogg: Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature) On 10 May 2016, at 15:37, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote: Thanks Scerir, but yet again, this paper get the same conclusion as mine (and most people here). With the MWI, non-locality does not imply action-at-a distance. (d'Espagnat would call it non- separability). What I look for would be a paper which would show that in the MWI there are action-at-a-distance, like Bruce and John C claim. I might comment later, as I am late in my scheduling, but will just notice that Gisin's paper (mentionned by Brent) use the non- compatibilist theory of free-will, which makes no-sense to a mechanist. I think Brent concluded similarly. Bruno If A and B are two wings of a typical Bell apparatus, i the observable to be measured in A and x its possible value, j is the observable to be measured in B and y its possible value, and if Lambda are hidden variables, we could write Locality Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) = p_A,Lambda (x|i) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j) = p_B,Lambda (y|j) Separability Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j,y) = p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j,x) = P_B,Lambda (y|i,j) There is (was) some agreement that a (phantomatic) deterministic theory (i.e. one in which the range of any probability distribution of outcomes is the set: 0 or 1) ? The question is: are the probabilities, or the indeterminacies, and the non locality, phenomenological (1p) or factual (ontological, real, 3p)? QM+collapse admit factual indeterminacies (God plays dice, and there are action at a distance, even if they cannot be used to transmit signal quicker than light). QM-without-collapse is purely deterministic at the 3p level, and admits indeterminacies at the phenomenological level. I think everyone agree on this. The debate is on the following question: does QM-without-collapse admit factual non-locality (real physical action at a distance, like QM-with-collapse), or do the non-locality becomes, like the indeterminacy, phenomenological? (I think yes, as Jesse, Saibal and others, but it seems Bruce and John C. differ on this). Frankly it is not easy for me to say anything about that, at least something consistent. Mainly because "Many-worlds with its multiplicity of results in different worlds violates CFD, of course, and thus can be local. Thus many-worlds is the only local quantum theory in accord with the standard predictions of QM and, so far, with experiment.". reproducing all the predictions of QM, can not violate the Separability Condition, (the specification of Lambda, i, j, in principle determines completely the outcomes x, y, then any additional conditioning on x or y is superfluous, having x and y just one value allowed, so they cannot affect the probability, which - in a deterministic theory - can just take the values 0 or 1) and must violate the Locality Condition. Following the above reasoning MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory) should violate the locality condition. I doubt this, but if you find a proof, in the literature (or not), I am interested. As I explained, and also give references, it seems to me that the MWI restores both 3p determinacy and 3p locality, making both the indeterminacy and non-locality only first person plural phenomenological happening. That is also Everett's position, and I would say the position of most Everettian (I still don't find any Everettian claiming that the MWI remains non-local, except the beginners who often think at first that the entire universe split instantaneously, but this does not deserve to be commented as nobody believes in this anymore). Bruno Jarrett, but also Shimony, and also Ghirardi, gave the proof that a *deterministic* QM (I should say a *deterministic and single- valued* QM) Yes, that is important to add. It was notoriously implicit in EPR and Bell 1964, even after. must violate the Locality Condition. EPR and Bell shows this, and the usual papers (Clauser and Horne, Clauser Horne Shimony, Holt, Aspect, ...). I do not have references at hand, right now. I'll write down something as soon as possible. I think we all agree that QM-with-collapse entails a violation of Locality. The debate was for the case of the non-single value QM, that is QM-without-collapse, where all branches of the wave are kept "alive". Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@go
Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
On 10 May 2016, at 18:36, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote: scerir wrote: If A and B are two wings of a typical Bell apparatus, i the observable to be measured in A and x its possible value, j is the observable to be measured in B and y its possible value, and if Lambda are hidden variables, we could write Locality Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) = p_A,Lambda (x|i) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j) = p_B,Lambda (y|j) Separability Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j,y) = p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j,x) = p_B,Lambda (y|i,j) There is (or was) some agreement that a (phantomatic) deterministic theory (i.e. one in which the range of any probability distribution of outcomes is the set: 0 or 1) reproducing all the predictions of QM, can not violate the Separability Condition, (the specification of Lambda, i, j, in principle determines completely the outcomes x, y, then any additional conditioning on x or y is superfluous, having x and y just one value allowed, so they cannot affect the probability, which - in a deterministic theory - can just take the values 0 or 1) and must violate the Locality Condition. Following the above reasoning, MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory) should violate the Locality Condition. --- ### Since the Everett faq gives the following . "To recap. Many-worlds is local and deterministic. Local measurements split local systems (including observers) in a subjectively random fashion; distant systems are only split when the causally transmitted effects of the local interactions reach them. We have not assumed any non-local FTL effects, yet we have reproduced the standard predictions of QM. So where did Bell and Eberhard go wrong? They thought that all theories that reproduced the standard predictions must be non-local. It has been pointed out by both Albert [A] and Cramer [C] (who both support different interpretations of QM) that Bell and Eberhard had implicity assumed that every possible measurement - even if not performed - would have yielded a single definite result. This assumption is called contra- factual definiteness or CFD [S]. What Bell and Eberhard really proved was that every quantum theory must either violate locality or CFD. Many-worlds with its multiplicity of results in different worlds violates CFD, of course, and thus can be local." So, I should say that . MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory, reproducing all the predictions of QM) should violate the Locality Condition but, in fact, it violates CFD only :-). Exactly. I think we are on the same length wave (as we say in french for assessment). And that is why QM-without collapse needs only the computationalist First Person Indeterminacy (FPI), making QM facts confirming mechanism instead of threatening it (which is what would happen if we allow collapse, or worst, direct action of consciousness on the physical). Like with Gödels theorem, QM seems to threat mechanism, but eventually appears to be an ally, and perhaps a confirmation, (which of course is not a proof, but we can't prove anything on reality, nor even that it exists. We can only bet on it.). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
R: Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
Messaggio originale Da: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> Data: 10/05/2016 18.31 A: <everything-list@googlegroups.com> Ogg: Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature) On 10 May 2016, at 15:37, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote: Thanks Scerir, but yet again, this paper get the same conclusion as mine (and most people here). With the MWI, non-locality does not imply action-at-a distance. (d'Espagnat would call it non-separability). What I look for would be a paper which would show that in the MWI there are action-at-a-distance, like Bruce and John C claim. I might comment later, as I am late in my scheduling, but will just notice that Gisin's paper (mentionned by Brent) use the non-compatibilist theory of free-will, which makes no-sense to a mechanist. I think Brent concluded similarly. Bruno If A and B are two wings of a typical Bell apparatus, i the observable to be measured in A and x its possible value, j is the observable to be measured in B and y its possible value, and if Lambda are hidden variables, we could write Locality Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) = p_A,Lambda (x|i) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j) = p_B,Lambda (y|j) Separability Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j,y) = p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j,x) = P_B,Lambda (y|i,j) There is (was) some agreement that a (phantomatic) deterministic theory (i.e. one in which the range of any probability distribution of outcomes is the set: 0 or 1) ? The question is: are the probabilities, or the indeterminacies, and the non locality, phenomenological (1p) or factual (ontological, real, 3p)? QM+collapse admit factual indeterminacies (God plays dice, and there are action at a distance, even if they cannot be used to transmit signal quicker than light). QM-without-collapse is purely deterministic at the 3p level, and admits indeterminacies at the phenomenological level. I think everyone agree on this. The debate is on the following question: does QM-without-collapse admit factual non-locality (real physical action at a distance, like QM-with-collapse), or do the non-locality becomes, like the indeterminacy, phenomenological? (I think yes, as Jesse, Saibal and others, but it seems Bruce and John C. differ on this). Frankly it is not easy for me to say anything about that, at least something consistent. Mainly because "Many-worlds with its multiplicity of results in different worlds violates CFD, of course, and thus can be local. Thus many-worlds is the only local quantum theory in accord with the standard predictions of QM and, so far, with experiment.". reproducing all the predictions of QM, can not violate the Separability Condition, (the specification of Lambda, i, j, in principle determines completely the outcomes x, y, then any additional conditioning on x or y is superfluous, having x and y just one value allowed, so they cannot affect the probability, which - in a deterministic theory - can just take the values 0 or 1) and must violate the Locality Condition. Following the above reasoning MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory) should violate the locality condition. I doubt this, but if you find a proof, in the literature (or not), I am interested. As I explained, and also give references, it seems to me that the MWI restores both 3p determinacy and 3p locality, making both the indeterminacy and non-locality only first person plural phenomenological happening. That is also Everett's position, and I would say the position of most Everettian (I still don't find any Everettian claiming that the MWI remains non-local, except the beginners who often think at first that the entire universe split instantaneously, but this does not deserve to be commented as nobody believes in this anymore). Bruno Jarrett, but also Shimony, and also Ghirardi, gave the proof that a *deterministic* QM (I should say a *deterministic and single-valued* QM) must violate the Locality Condition. I do not have references at hand, right now. I'll write down something as soon as possible. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https:
R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
scerir wrote: If A and B are two wings of a typical Bell apparatus, i the observable to be measured in A and x its possible value, j is the observable to be measured in B and y its possible value, and if Lambda are hidden variables, we could write Locality Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) = p_A,Lambda (x|i) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j) = p_B,Lambda (y|j) Separability Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j,y) = p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j,x) = p_B,Lambda (y|i,j) There is (or was) some agreement that a (phantomatic) deterministic theory (i.e. one in which the range of any probability distribution of outcomes is the set: 0 or 1) reproducing all the predictions of QM, can not violate the Separability Condition, (the specification of Lambda, i, j, in principle determines completely the outcomes x, y, then any additional conditioning on x or y is superfluous, having x and y just one value allowed, so they cannot affect the probability, which - in a deterministic theory - can just take the values 0 or 1) and must violate the Locality Condition. Following the above reasoning, MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory) should violate the Locality Condition. --- ### Since the Everett faq gives the following . "To recap. Many-worlds is local and deterministic. Local measurements split local systems (including observers) in a subjectively random fashion; distant systems are only split when the causally transmitted effects of the local interactions reach them. We have not assumed any non-local FTL effects, yet we have reproduced the standard predictions of QM. So where did Bell and Eberhard go wrong? They thought that all theories that reproduced the standard predictions must be non-local. It has been pointed out by both Albert [A] and Cramer [C] (who both support different interpretations of QM) that Bell and Eberhard had implicity assumed that every possible measurement - even if not performed - would have yielded a single definite result. This assumption is called contra-factual definiteness or CFD [S]. What Bell and Eberhard really proved was that every quantum theory must either violate locality or CFD. Many-worlds with its multiplicity of results in different worlds violates CFD, of course, and thus can be local." So, I should say that . MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory, reproducing all thepredictions of QM) should violate the Locality Condition but, in fact, it violates CFD only :-). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
On 10 May 2016, at 15:37, 'scerir' via Everything List wrote: Thanks Scerir, but yet again, this paper get the same conclusion as mine (and most people here). With the MWI, non-locality does not imply action-at-a distance. (d'Espagnat would call it non- separability). What I look for would be a paper which would show that in the MWI there are action-at-a-distance, like Bruce and John C claim. I might comment later, as I am late in my scheduling, but will just notice that Gisin's paper (mentionned by Brent) use the non- compatibilist theory of free-will, which makes no-sense to a mechanist. I think Brent concluded similarly. Bruno If A and B are two wings of a typical Bell apparatus, i the observable to be measured in A and x its possible value, j is the observable to be measured in B and y its possible value, and if Lambda are hidden variables, we could write Locality Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) = p_A,Lambda (x|i) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j) = p_B,Lambda (y|j) Separability Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j,y) = p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j,x) = P_B,Lambda (y|i,j) There is (was) some agreement that a (phantomatic) deterministic theory (i.e. one in which the range of any probability distribution of outcomes is the set: 0 or 1) ? The question is: are the probabilities, or the indeterminacies, and the non locality, phenomenological (1p) or factual (ontological, real, 3p)? QM+collapse admit factual indeterminacies (God plays dice, and there are action at a distance, even if they cannot be used to transmit signal quicker than light). QM-without-collapse is purely deterministic at the 3p level, and admits indeterminacies at the phenomenological level. I think everyone agree on this. The debate is on the following question: does QM-without-collapse admit factual non-locality (real physical action at a distance, like QM-with-collapse), or do the non-locality becomes, like the indeterminacy, phenomenological? (I think yes, as Jesse, Saibal and others, but it seems Bruce and John C. differ on this). reproducing all the predictions of QM, can not violate the Separability Condition, (the specification of Lambda, i, j, in principle determines completely the outcomes x, y, then any additional conditioning on x or y is superfluous, having x and y just one value allowed, so they cannot affect the probability, which - in a deterministic theory - can just take the values 0 or 1) and must violate the Locality Condition. Following the above reasoning MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory) should violate the locality condition. I doubt this, but if you find a proof, in the literature (or not), I am interested. As I explained, and also give references, it seems to me that the MWI restores both 3p determinacy and 3p locality, making both the indeterminacy and non-locality only first person plural phenomenological happening. That is also Everett's position, and I would say the position of most Everettian (I still don't find any Everettian claiming that the MWI remains non-local, except the beginners who often think at first that the entire universe split instantaneously, but this does not deserve to be commented as nobody believes in this anymore). Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
Thanks Scerir, but yet again, this paper get the same conclusion as mine (and most people here). With the MWI, non-locality does not imply action-at-a distance. (d'Espagnat would call it non-separability). What I look for would be a paper which would show that in the MWI there are action-at-a-distance, like Bruce and John C claim. I might comment later, as I am late in my scheduling, but will just notice that Gisin's paper (mentionned by Brent) use the non-compatibilist theory of free-will, which makes no-sense to a mechanist. I think Brent concluded similarly. Bruno If A and B are two wings of a typical Bell apparatus, i the observable to be measured in A and x its possible value, j is the observable to be measured in B and y its possible value, and if Lambda are hidden variables, we could write Locality Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) = p_A,Lambda (x|i) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j) = p_B,Lambda (y|j) Separability Condition p_A,Lambda (x|i,j,y) = p_A,Lambda (x|i,j) p_B,Lambda (y|i,j,x) = P_B,Lambda (y|i,j) There is (was) some agreement that a (phantomatic) deterministic theory (i.e. one in which the range of any probability distribution of outcomes is the set: 0 or 1) reproducing all the predictions of QM, can not violate the Separability Condition, (the specification of Lambda, i, j, in principle determines completely the outcomes x, y, then any additional conditioning on x or y is superfluous, having x and y just one value allowed, so they cannot affect the probability, which - in a deterministic theory - can just take the values 0 or 1) and must violate the Locality Condition. Following the above reasoning MWI (if it is a truly deterministic theory) should violate the locality condition. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
R: Re: R: Re: Non-locality and MWI (literature)
### W. Myrvold wrote something here http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/11654/ (see ch. 0.8) It seems that he is saying that 'action-at-a-distance' is something that would violate the 'no-signalling theorem' of quantum mechanics. So he sees experimental violation of the Bell inequalities as evidence for non-locality, but not necessarily evidence for action-at-a-distance in the above sense. I would agree with his conclusion that both collapse and Everettian theories are like this -- non-local, but also non-signalling at spacelike separations. Bruce ### Yes, It seems so. There is - in general - some confusion between 'nonlocality' and 'nonseparability'. Not to mention also 'action-at-a-distance' and 'locality of measurement' and "local causality" and so on. Myrvold et al. wrote something else here http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/4222/1/everett_and_evidence_21aug08.pdf (general objections to Everettism). "Now it is precisely in cleaning up intuitive ideas for mathematics that one is likely to throw out the baby with the bathwater." J.S. Bell (quoted here https://arxiv.org/pdf/1007.3724.pdf ) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.