Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ?
On 16 Jan 2013, at 17:50, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal 1) My awareness is nonphysical (because internal) yet exists in time. I agree that the most common conscious state (awareness) exists in relation with subjective time, but subjective time itself does not exist in physical time. Of course I assume comp throughout, I will not repeat this. 2) I suppose you're right about epistemological existence, as long as nobody is thinking about those states. I suppose that 1p would apply there, if we consider thinking as internal perception of an idea. Thinking is a fuzzy term. It can be associated with the whole handling of the information (deduction, inductive inference, imagination, and you might add or not perception, as long as you say so and remain coherent). Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/16/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-16, 10:57:41 Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ? On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal That is only true in heaven, where time does not exist. Nothing could exist (on earth) if there were no time because things (physical or nonphysical) exist in time. I don't grasp that the non physical exist in time. That is what to exist means. To be there, dasein. That's epistemological existence. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/16/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-15, 10:07:27 Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ? On 14 Jan 2013, at 12:31, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's my best answer at present. Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's universe. They are all substances of one part. --- Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3 Every proposition has a subject and a predicate. A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.) Sorry but I don't know what time is. Please read Plotinus, and forget everything written after, because it is just footnotes on Aristotle, and this can't work with my favorite working hypothesis. Of course you can also assume that comp is false, and develop a non- comp theory, but that is more difficult, and for this I will ask you much more precision. Bruno - The phrase predicates which are qualities existing at various times gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both quanta and numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all monads, whatever they be, must have a fixed identity. Subject predicate(s) (of fixed identity) ordinary matter always both 1. physcal matter 2. mental matter wavicle either 1. physical matter or 2. mental (quantum) matter numbers always 2. mental matter. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/14/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48 Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote: Hi Roger, How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal dimensions? I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound waves. A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its neighborhood. Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of arbitrary functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural restrictions here). The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an electron, for an example. I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the non physical relations between numbers). Bruno On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi everything-list, I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI. Here's why: I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM
Re: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ?
Hi Bruno Marchal That is only true in heaven, where time does not exist. Nothing could exist (on earth) if there were no time because things (physical or nonphysical) exist in time. That is what to exist means. To be there, dasein. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/16/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-15, 10:07:27 Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ? On 14 Jan 2013, at 12:31, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's my best answer at present. Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's universe. They are all substances of one part. --- Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3 Every proposition has a subject and a predicate. A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.) Sorry but I don't know what time is. Please read Plotinus, and forget everything written after, because it is just footnotes on Aristotle, and this can't work with my favorite working hypothesis. Of course you can also assume that comp is false, and develop a non-comp theory, but that is more difficult, and for this I will ask you much more precision. Bruno - The phrase predicates which are qualities existing at various times gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both quanta and numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all monads, whatever they be, must have a fixed identity. Subjectpredicate(s) (of fixed identity) ordinary matteralways both 1. physcal matter 2. mental matter wavicle either 1. physical matteror 2. mental (quantum) matter numbers always 2. mental matter. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/14/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48 Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote: Hi Roger, How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal dimensions? I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound waves. A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its neighborhood. Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of arbitrary functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural restrictions here). The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an electron, for an example. I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the non physical relations between numbers). Bruno On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi everything-list, I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI. Here's why: I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect, due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic. This seems to deny quantum weirdness observed in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird happening. My own view is that the weirdness arises because the waves and the photons are residents of two completely different but interpenetrating worlds, where: 1) the photon is a resident of the physical world, where by physical I mean (along with Descartes) extended in space, 2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no extension in space. Under these conditions, there is no need to create an additional physical world, since each can exist as aspects of the the same world, one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world beyond spacetime. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/12/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ?
On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal That is only true in heaven, where time does not exist. Nothing could exist (on earth) if there were no time because things (physical or nonphysical) exist in time. I don't grasp that the non physical exist in time. That is what to exist means. To be there, dasein. That's epistemological existence. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/16/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-15, 10:07:27 Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ? On 14 Jan 2013, at 12:31, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's my best answer at present. Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's universe. They are all substances of one part. --- Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3 Every proposition has a subject and a predicate. A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.) Sorry but I don't know what time is. Please read Plotinus, and forget everything written after, because it is just footnotes on Aristotle, and this can't work with my favorite working hypothesis. Of course you can also assume that comp is false, and develop a non- comp theory, but that is more difficult, and for this I will ask you much more precision. Bruno - The phrase predicates which are qualities existing at various times gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both quanta and numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all monads, whatever they be, must have a fixed identity. Subjectpredicate(s) (of fixed identity) ordinary matteralways both 1. physcal matter 2. mental matter wavicle either 1. physical matteror 2. mental (quantum) matter numbers always 2. mental matter. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/14/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48 Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote: Hi Roger, How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal dimensions? I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound waves. A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its neighborhood. Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of arbitrary functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural restrictions here). The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an electron, for an example. I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the non physical relations between numbers). Bruno On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi everything-list, I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI. Here's why: I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect, due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic. This seems to deny quantum weirdness observed in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird happening. My own view is that the weirdness arises because the waves and the photons are residents of two completely different but interpenetrating worlds, where: 1) the photon is a resident of the physical world, where by physical I mean (along with Descartes) extended in space, 2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no extension in space. Under these conditions, there is no need to create an additional physical world, since each can exist as aspects of the the same world, one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world beyond spacetime. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/12/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near
Re: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ?
Hi Bruno Marchal 1) My awareness is nonphysical (because internal) yet exists in time. 2) I suppose you're right about epistemological existence, as long as nobody is thinking about those states. I suppose that 1p would apply there, if we consider thinking as internal perception of an idea. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/16/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-16, 10:57:41 Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ? On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:03, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal That is only true in heaven, where time does not exist. Nothing could exist (on earth) if there were no time because things (physical or nonphysical) exist in time. I don't grasp that the non physical exist in time. That is what to exist means. To be there, dasein. That's epistemological existence. Bruno [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/16/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-15, 10:07:27 Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ? On 14 Jan 2013, at 12:31, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's my best answer at present. Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's universe. They are all substances of one part. --- Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3 Every proposition has a subject and a predicate. A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.) Sorry but I don't know what time is. Please read Plotinus, and forget everything written after, because it is just footnotes on Aristotle, and this can't work with my favorite working hypothesis. Of course you can also assume that comp is false, and develop a non- comp theory, but that is more difficult, and for this I will ask you much more precision. Bruno - The phrase predicates which are qualities existing at various times gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both quanta and numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all monads, whatever they be, must have a fixed identity. Subject predicate(s) (of fixed identity) ordinary matter always both 1. physcal matter 2. mental matter wavicle either 1. physical matter or 2. mental (quantum) matter numbers always 2. mental matter. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/14/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48 Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote: Hi Roger, How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal dimensions? I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound waves. A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its neighborhood. Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of arbitrary functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural restrictions here). The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an electron, for an example. I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the non physical relations between numbers). Bruno On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi everything-list, I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI. Here's why: I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect, due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic. This seems to deny quantum weirdness observed in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird happening. My own view is that the weirdness arises because the waves and the photons are residents of two completely different but interpenetrating worlds, where: 1) the photon is a resident
Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ?
On 14 Jan 2013, at 12:31, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's my best answer at present. Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's universe. They are all substances of one part. --- Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3 Every proposition has a subject and a predicate. A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.) Sorry but I don't know what time is. Please read Plotinus, and forget everything written after, because it is just footnotes on Aristotle, and this can't work with my favorite working hypothesis. Of course you can also assume that comp is false, and develop a non-comp theory, but that is more difficult, and for this I will ask you much more precision. Bruno - The phrase predicates which are qualities existing at various times gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both quanta and numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all monads, whatever they be, must have a fixed identity. Subjectpredicate(s) (of fixed identity) ordinary matteralways both 1. physcal matter 2. mental matter wavicle either 1. physical matteror 2. mental (quantum) matter numbers always 2. mental matter. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/14/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48 Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote: Hi Roger, How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal dimensions? I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound waves. A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its neighborhood. Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of arbitrary functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural restrictions here). The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an electron, for an example. I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the non physical relations between numbers). Bruno On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi everything-list, I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI. Here's why: I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect, due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic. This seems to deny quantum weirdness observed in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird happening. My own view is that the weirdness arises because the waves and the photons are residents of two completely different but interpenetrating worlds, where: 1) the photon is a resident of the physical world, where by physical I mean (along with Descartes) extended in space, 2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no extension in space. Under these conditions, there is no need to create an additional physical world, since each can exist as aspects of the the same world, one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world beyond spacetime. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/12/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit
Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ?
On 14 Jan 2013, at 16:17, Richard Ruquist wrote: I say discrete digital fermionic particles of any kind are substances. whereas continuous analog quantum bosonic loops, and waves and fields are not. Richard Hmm... perhaps. It looks a bit like magic to me, though. Bruno On Mon, Jan 14, 2013 at 6:31 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's my best answer at present. Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's universe. They are all substances of one part. --- Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3 Every proposition has a subject and a predicate. A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.) - The phrase predicates which are qualities existing at various times gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both quanta and numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all monads, whatever they be, must have a fixed identity. Subjectpredicate(s) (of fixed identity) ordinary matteralways both 1. physcal matter 2. mental matter wavicle either 1. physical matteror 2. mental (quantum) matter numbers always 2. mental matter. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/14/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48 Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote: Hi Roger, How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal dimensions? I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound waves. A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its neighborhood. Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of arbitrary functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural restrictions here). The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an electron, for an example. I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the non physical relations between numbers). Bruno On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi everything-list, I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI. Here's why: I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect, due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic. This seems to deny quantum weirdness observed in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird happening. My own view is that the weirdness arises because the waves and the photons are residents of two completely different but interpenetrating worlds, where: 1) the photon is a resident of the physical world, where by physical I mean (along with Descartes) extended in space, 2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no extension in space. Under these conditions, there is no need to create an additional physical world, since each can exist as aspects of the the same world, one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world beyond spacetime. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/12/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ?
I say discrete digital fermionic particles of any kind are substances. whereas continuous analog quantum bosonic loops, and waves and fields are not. Richard On Mon, Jan 14, 2013 at 6:31 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's my best answer at present. Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's universe. They are all substances of one part. --- Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3 Every proposition has a subject and a predicate. A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.) - The phrase predicates which are qualities existing at various times gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both quanta and numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all monads, whatever they be, must have a fixed identity. Subjectpredicate(s) (of fixed identity) ordinary matteralways both 1. physcal matter 2. mental matter wavicle either 1. physical matteror 2. mental (quantum) matter numbers always 2. mental matter. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/14/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48 Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote: Hi Roger, How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal dimensions? I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound waves. A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its neighborhood. Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of arbitrary functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural restrictions here). The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an electron, for an example. I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the non physical relations between numbers). Bruno On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi everything-list, I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI. Here's why: I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect, due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic. This seems to deny quantum weirdness observed in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird happening. My own view is that the weirdness arises because the waves and the photons are residents of two completely different but interpenetrating worlds, where: 1) the photon is a resident of the physical world, where by physical I mean (along with Descartes) extended in space, 2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no extension in space. Under these conditions, there is no need to create an additional physical world, since each can exist as aspects of the the same world, one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world beyond spacetime. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 1/12/2013 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. - Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed
