[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/16/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-16, 10:57:41
Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ?
On 16 Jan 2013, at 13:03, Roger Clough wrote:
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> That is only true in heaven, where time does not exist.
>
> Nothing could exist (on earth) if there were no time
> because things (physical or nonphysical) exist in time.
I don't grasp that the non physical exist in time.
> That is what "to exist" means. To be there, dasein.
That's epistemological existence.
Bruno
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 1/16/2013
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2013-01-15, 10:07:27
> Subject: Re: Are numbers substances ? Are quanta substances ?
>
>
>
>
> On 14 Jan 2013, at 12:31, Roger Clough wrote:
>
>
> Hi Bruno Marchal
>
> Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's
> my best answer at present.
>
> Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's
> universe.
> They are all substances of one part.
>
>
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
> Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance
>
> http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3
>
>
> "Every proposition has a subject and a predicate.
> A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at
> various times. (Such a subject is called a substance.) "
>
>
>
> Sorry but I don't know what time is. Please read Plotinus, and
> forget everything written after, because it is just footnotes on
> Aristotle, and this can't work with my favorite working hypothesis.
> Of course you can also assume that comp is false, and develop a non-
> comp theory, but that is more difficult, and for this I will ask you
> much more precision.
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> The phrase " predicates which are qualities existing at various
times"
> gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both
> quanta and
> numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all
> monads, whatever they be,
> must have a fixed identity.
>
> Subject predicate(s)
> (of fixed identity)
>
> ordinary matter always both 1. physcal matter 2. mental matter
> wavicle either 1. physical matter or 2.
> mental (quantum) matter
> numbers always 2. mental matter.
>
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 1/14/2013
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> From: Bruno Marchal
> Receiver: everything-list
> Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48
> Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects
> Theory
>
>
>
>
> On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>
> Hi Roger,
>
>
> How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal
> dimensions?
>
>
>
>
> I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily
> related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave
> or tsunami, or sound waves.
> A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its
> neighborhood.
>
>
> Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces),
> so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of "arbitrary"
> functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural
> restrictions here).
>
>
> The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical
> interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make
> them interfere as if they were physical. But in MWI, the quantum
> waves are just the map of the relative accessible physical
> realities. An electronic orbital is a map of where you can find an
> electron, for an example.
> I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the
> non physical relations between numbers).
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough wrote:
>
> Hi everything-list,
>
> I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI.
> Here's why:
>
> I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect,
> due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves
> are physical waves, so that everything is physical and
materialistic.
>
> This seems to deny "quantum weirdness" observed
> in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave
> and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird
> happening.
>
> My own view is that the weirdness arises because the
> waves and the photons are residents of two completely
> different but interpenetrating worlds, where:
>
> 1) the photon is a resident of the physical world,
> where by physical I mean (along with Descartes)
> "extended in space",
>
> 2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of
> the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no
> extension in space.
>
> Under these conditions, there is no need
> to create an additional physical world, since each
> can exist as aspects of the the same world,
> one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like
> mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world
> beyond spacetime.
>
> [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
> 1/12/2013
> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
>
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