On 14 Jan 2013, at 16:17, Richard Ruquist wrote:

I say discrete digital fermionic particles of any kind are substances.
whereas continuous analog quantum bosonic loops, and waves and fields
are not. Richard

Hmm... perhaps. It looks a bit like magic to me, though.

Bruno





On Mon, Jan 14, 2013 at 6:31 AM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal

Good question. It's a difficult question to answer, but here's
my best answer at present.

Monads or substances are the fundamental entites of Leibniz's universe.
They are all substances of one part.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Here's Bertrand Russell's view of Leibniz's definition of substance

http://www.ditext.com/russell/leib1.html#3


"Every proposition has a subject and a predicate.
A subject may have predicates which are qualities existing at various times.
(Such a subject is called a substance.) "

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The phrase " predicates which are qualities existing at various times" gets me off the hook with regard to wavicles and numbers. Both quanta and
numbers are substances of one part and so are monads. And all monads,
whatever they be,
must have a fixed identity.

Subject                predicate(s)
(of fixed identity)

ordinary matter    always both 1. physcal matter     2. mental matter
wavicle               either      1. physical matter    or  2. mental
(quantum) matter
numbers              always     2. mental matter.


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/14/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-13, 11:57:48
Subject: Re: MWI as an ontological error, it should be TwoAspects Theory


On 12 Jan 2013, at 13:01, Telmo Menezes wrote:

Hi Roger,

How can you have a wave without some notion of spatial/temporal dimensions?



I don't see why we cannot have purely mathematical waves (easily related to lines and circles), and physical waves, like water wave or tsunami, or sound
waves.
A propagating wave is a sort of oscillation contagious to its neighborhood.

Summing waves gives arbitrary functions (in some functional spaces), so simple wave can be see as the base in the space of "arbitrary" functions (for reasonable functional spaces, there are any natural restrictions here).

The whole problem with QM, is that the wave's physical interpretation is an amplitude of probability, and that we can make them interfere as if they
were physical. But in MWI, the quantum waves are just the map of the
relative accessible physical realities. An electronic orbital is a map of
where you can find an electron, for an example.
I would say it is something physical (even if it emerges from the non
physical relations between numbers).

Bruno






On Sat, Jan 12, 2013 at 12:52 PM, Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net> wrote:

Hi everything-list,

I don't believe that Descartes would accept the MWI.
Here's why:

I think that the ManyWorldsInterpretation of QM is incorrect,
due to the mistaken notion (IMHO) that quantum waves
are physical waves, so that everything is physical and materialistic.

This seems to deny "quantum weirdness" observed
in the two-slit experiment. Seemingly if both the wave
and the photon are physical, there should be nothing weird
happening.

My own view is that the weirdness arises because the
waves and the photons are residents of two completely
different but interpenetrating worlds, where:

1) the photon is a resident of the physical world,
where by physical I mean (along with Descartes)
"extended in space",

2) the quantum wave in nonphysical, being a resident of
the nonphysical world (the world of mind), which has no
extension in space.

Under these conditions, there is no need
to create an additional physical world, since each
can exist as aspects of the the same world,
one moving in spactime and being physical, the other, like
mind, moving simulataneously in the nonphysical world
beyond spacetime.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
1/12/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen

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