Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On 09 Aug 2016, at 19:32, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > a nine years old child get the point And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year old child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek. Feeling superior? That might be the root of your difficulties here. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > a nine years old child get the point And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year old child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On 06 Aug 2016, at 20:35, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication. Question 2: if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain about the outcome of that experience at time t. As I explained in my previous post that is not universally true, it depends on if you have forgotten something or not. When i was in the fourth grade I had to learn the state capitals and knew with certainty what the capital of Wyoming was, and I was not only certain I was undoubtedly correct too. Today I could look it up but right now, although much time has passed, I am uncertain what the capital of Wyoming is. > You have answered both questions positively in your posts of the 02 August and 03 August respectively. Yes that's true I did, and both questions involved either no duplication or identical environments after duplication so, as I also explained in my previous post, personal pronouns and the identity of the mysterious Mr. You is not important. And I might add if the environments are identical then although there are 2 brains there is only one individual because thinking is what brains do and the structure of the 2 brains are identical and the 2 environmental inputs to the 2 brains are identical so what the 2 brains are doing is also identical. > Then I have shown that the step 3 FPI is a direct consequence of answering "yes" to the questions 1 and 2. Not if YOU walk into a YOU duplicating machine and one YOU goes to Moscow and the other YOU goes to Washington! Then talking about THE FPI and the probabilities of what YOU will see after duplication is just ridiculous. On the contrary. Once you have a bit of empathy with yourself you listen to whatever the copies can say, and a nine years old child get the point when doing that. The rest is playing with words and ad hominem boring distractions. Bruno And don't start the bit about the duplicating machine being equivalent to one of Everett's branching worlds because it's not. With Everett the identity of the personal pronoun "YOU" is crystal clear and can always be uniquely and unambiguously defined: YOU is the one and only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Brunomarchalian way. But if duplicating machines are around then "YOU" has no definition and talking about THE FPI as if there were only one is just silly. > do you see why it entails the FPI? What I don't see is how THE FPI can exist at all in a world with person duplicating machines because the "P" in FPI stands for "person" and the person has been duplicated, YOU have been duplicated, all of YOU has been duplicated. All. I think your confusion stems entirely from something you said a few posts ago, something you've used as a unnamed hidden axiom from day one at the very start of your "proof": "Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of view" If that's true then computationalism is false, but you can't use an assumption that computationalism is false to prove that computationalism is false. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On Sat, Aug 6, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication. > *Question 2*: if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be > uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain about > the outcome of that experience at time t. > As I explained in my previous post that is not universally true, it depends on if you have forgotten something or not. When i was in the fourth grade I had to learn the state capitals and knew with certainty what the capital of Wyoming was, and I was not only certain I was undoubtedly correct too. Today I could look it up but right now, although much time has passed, I am uncertain what the capital of Wyoming is. > > You have answered both questions positively in your posts of the 02 August > and 03 August respectively. > Yes that's true I did, and both questions involved either no duplication or identical environments after duplication so, as I also explained in my previous post, personal pronouns and the identity of the mysterious Mr. You is not important. And I might add if the environments are identical then although there are 2 brains there is only one individual because thinking is what brains do and the structure of the 2 brains are identical and the 2 environmental inputs to the 2 brains are identical so what the 2 brains are doing is also identical. > > Then I have shown that the step 3 FPI is a direct consequence of answering > "yes" to the questions 1 and 2. > Not if YOU walk into a YOU duplicating machine and one YOU goes to Moscow and the other YOU goes to Washington! Then talking about *THE* FPI and the probabilities of what YOU will see after duplication is just ridiculous. And don't start the bit about the duplicating machine being equivalent to one of Everett's branching worlds because it's not. With Everett the identity of the personal pronoun "YOU" is crystal clear and can always be uniquely and unambiguously defined: YOU is the one and only chunk of matter in the observable universe that behaves in a Brunomarchalian way. But if duplicating machines are around then "YOU" has no definition and talking about *THE *FPI as if there were only one is just silly. > > > do you see why it entails the FPI? > What I don't see is how *THE* FPI can exist at all in a world with person duplicating machines because the "P" in FPI stands for "person" and the person has been duplicated, *YOU* have been duplicated, all of YOU has been duplicated. All. I think your confusion stems entirely from something you said a few posts ago, something you've used as a unnamed hidden axiom from day one at the very start of your "proof": " *Nothing can duplicate a first person view from its first person point of view"* If that's true then computationalism is false, but you can't use an assumption that computationalism is false to prove that computationalism is false. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On 06 Aug 2016, at 03:43, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>>>Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. >>> So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1. >> The guy in Helsinki? NO!!! Bruno Marchal said "The question is not about duplication" > The question 2 was not about duplication, If duplication was not involved then why on god's green earth were you talking about the goddamn HELSINKI MAN?! Do you read the posts? Question 1: in the duplication protocol, if event X is presented to both copies (like getting coffee), P(X) = 1. You have agreed on this last week. I quote your post (of 02 augustus): << > both copies will have a cup of coffee after the reconstitution. Are you OK that P("experience of drinking coffee") = 1? Yes, and in this case it doesn't matter if Bruno Marchal says P is the probability John Clark will drink the coffee or says P is the probability "you" will drink the coffee, there is no ambiguity either way. However if the Moscow man got the coffee but the Washington man did not then there would be a 100% probability that John Clark will get the coffee and also a 100% probability that John Clark will not get the coffee, just as I would assign a 100% probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be red and I would also assign a 100% probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be green. >> It was the question 2 which does not involve duplication. Question 2: if I am sure at time t that at time q, q > t, I will be uncertain of the outcome of some experience x, then I am uncertain about the outcome of that experience at time t. You have answered both questions positively in your posts of the 02 August and 03 August respectively. Then I have shown that the step 3 FPI is a direct consequence of answering "yes" to the questions 1 and 2. But your reply to that was not referring to the question correctly. So, do you still agree with yourself on those two questions, and if yes, do you see why it entails the FPI? Bruno > but the question 1 was, and you said that P("drinking coffee") was equal to one. P can always be equal to 1, it depends on what P means, and if P has no meaning, if for example too many unspecified personal pronouns are used, then P has no value at all, not even zero. In the first case BOTH the Moscow man and the Washington man got the coffee so the identity of the mysterious Mr. You does not need to be specified and so P had both a meaning and a value. If one gets the coffee and one does not what is the probability (P) that "YOU" will get the coffee? Is it 1? No. Is it 1/2? No. Is it 0? No, P has no value at all because P is gibberish. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On Fri, Aug 5, 2016 at 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>>> >>> Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous >>> as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. >> >> >> > >>> >> >>> >>> So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1. >>> >> >> >> >> >> The >> guy in Helsinki >> ? >> NO!!! Bruno Marchal said "The question is not about duplication" >> > > > > The question 2 was not about duplication, > If duplication was not involved then why on god's green earth were you talking about the goddamn* HELSINKI MAN*?! > > > but the question 1 was, and you said that P("drinking coffee") was equal > to one. > P can always be equal to 1, it depends on what P means, and if P has no meaning, if for example too many unspecified personal pronouns are used, then P has no value at all, not even zero. In the first case BOTH the Moscow man and the Washington man got the coffee so the identity of the mysterious Mr. You does not need to be specified and so P had both a meaning and a value. If one gets the coffee and one does not what is the probability (P) that " *YOU*" will get the coffee? Is it 1? No. Is it 1/2? No. Is it 0? No, P has no value at all because P is gibberish. John K Clark > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal wrote: > The question is not about duplication. OK. And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. > So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1. The guy in Helsinki? NO!!! Bruno Marchal said "The question is not about duplication" but the guy in Helsinki is just about to walk into a YOU duplicating machine, so John Clark will not assign any probability of any sort about the one and only one thing that will happen to "YOU". It's just plain dumb. Nope, question one was about duplication. Only question 2 was not. You ndid say that P("drinking coffee") = 1 for the helsinki guy. Just to be sure, I quote your answer to question one: On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 12:55 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > both copies will have a cup of coffee after the reconstitution. Are you OK that P("experience of drinking coffee") = 1? Yes, and in this case it doesn't matter if Bruno Marchal says P is the probability John Clark will drink the coffee or says P is the probability "you" will drink the coffee, there is no ambiguity either way. However if the Moscow man got the coffee but the Washington man did not then there would be a 100% probability that John Clark will get the coffee and also a 100% probability that John Clark will not get the coffee, just as I would assign a 100% probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be red and I would also assign a 100% probability that tomorrow tomatoes will be green. Like I just said: QED, unless you explicitly change your mind on question 1. But then say it, and we come back to question 1. Bruno > Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting by Van Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by Monet in the other reconstitution box. Let's see if John Clark can guess what's coming. After "YOU" have been duplicated by a YOU duplicating machine what is the probability that "YOU" will blah blah blah. What on earth made Bruno Marchal think that substituting a painting for a cup of coffee would make things less ambiguous? > The key point here, is that we don't tell you which reconstitution box contains which painting. [...] Why is that the key point? Suppose we change the experiment and this time before the experiment we tell "YOU" which box contains which painting, we tell "YOU" that the red box on the left contains the Van Gogh and the blue box on the right contains the Monet , and we tell "YOU" that after "YOU" are duplicated by the YOU duplicating machine "YOU" will be in both boxes. Does that information help in the slightest way in determining what one and only one painting "YOU" will see after "YOU" are duplicated? It's just plain dumb. > P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door") P is equal to who's uncertainty? After the experiment is over how do we determine what the true value of P turned out to be? To find out that value we need to ask "YOU" what "YOU" saw after "YOU" walked into the YOU duplicating machine and opened one and only one door. But who exactly do we ask? We can't ask the Helsinki man as he's no longer around, oh I know, we ask "YOU". > OK? No it's not OK, it's about as far from OK as things get. > Can we move to step 4? Just as soon as Bruno Marchal explains what one and only one thing "YOU" refers to in a world with "YOU" duplicating machines. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On 04 Aug 2016, at 19:53, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal wrote: > The question is not about duplication. OK. And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. > So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1. The guy in Helsinki? NO!!! Bruno Marchal said "The question is not about duplication" The question 2 was not about duplication, but the question 1 was, and you said that P("drinking coffee") was equal to one. You already contradict your recent post where you said that question 1, which was clearly about duplication, admit a positive answer. QED. Bruno but the guy in Helsinki is just about to walk into a YOU duplicating machine, so John Clark will not assign any probability of any sort about the one and only one thing that will happen to "YOU". It's just plain dumb. > Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting by Van Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by Monet in the other reconstitution box. Let's see if John Clark can guess what's coming. After "YOU" have been duplicated by a YOU duplicating machine what is the probability that "YOU" will blah blah blah. What on earth made Bruno Marchal think that substituting a painting for a cup of coffee would make things less ambiguous? > The key point here, is that we don't tell you which reconstitution box contains which painting. [...] Why is that the key point? Suppose we change the experiment and this time before the experiment we tell "YOU" which box contains which painting, we tell "YOU" that the red box on the left contains the Van Gogh and the blue box on the right contains the Monet , and we tell "YOU" that after "YOU" are duplicated by the YOU duplicating machine "YOU" will be in both boxes. Does that information help in the slightest way in determining what one and only one painting "YOU" will see after "YOU" are duplicated? It's just plain dumb. > P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door") P is equal to who's uncertainty? After the experiment is over how do we determine what the true value of P turned out to be? To find out that value we need to ask "YOU" what "YOU" saw after "YOU" walked into the YOU duplicating machine and opened one and only one door. But who exactly do we ask? We can't ask the Helsinki man as he's no longer around, oh I know, we ask "YOU". > OK? No it's not OK, it's about as far from OK as things get. > Can we move to step 4? Just as soon as Bruno Marchal explains what one and only one thing "YOU" refers to in a world with "YOU" duplicating machines. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On Thu, Aug 4, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Marchal wrote: > > > >> The question is not about duplication. > > > OK. > > > And that part is still OK. Assigning probabilities about what "YOU" will see next is not ambiguous as long as "YOU" duplicating machine are not around. > > So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1. > The guy in Helsinki ? NO!!! Bruno Marchal said "The question is not about duplication" but the guy in Helsinki is just about to walk into a *YOU* duplicating machine , so John Clark will not assign any probability of any sort about the one and only one thing that will happen to " *YOU* " . It's just plain dumb. > > Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting by Van Gogh > in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by Monet in the other > reconstitution box. > > > Let's see if John Clark can guess what's coming. After "*YOU*" have been duplicated by a *YOU* duplicating machine what is the probability that " *YOU*" will blah blah blah. What on earth made Bruno Marchal think that substituting a painting for a cup of coffee would make things less ambiguous? > > The key point here, is that we don't tell you which reconstitution box > contains which painting. > [...] > Why is that the key point? Suppose we change the experiment and this time before the experiment we tell "Y*OU*" which box contains which painting, we tell "*YOU*" that the red box on the left contains the Van Gogh and the blue box on the right contains the Monet , and we tell "*YOU*" that after "*YOU*" are duplicated by the *YOU* duplicating machine "*YOU*" will be in both boxes. Does that information help in the slightest way in determining what one and only one painting "*YOU*" will see after "*YOU*" are duplicated? It's just plain dumb. > > P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door") P is equal to who's uncertainty? After the experiment is over how do we determine what the true value of P turned out to be? To find out that value we need to ask "*YOU*" what "*YOU*" saw after "*YOU*" walked into the *YOU *duplicating machine and opened one and only one door. But who exactly do we ask? We can't ask the Helsinki man as he's no longer around, oh I know, we ask "*YOU*". > > OK? > No it's not OK, it's about as far from OK as things get. > > Can we move to step 4? > Just as soon as Bruno Marchal explains what one and only one thing "*YOU*" refers to in a world with "*YOU*" duplicating machines. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise
On 03 Aug 2016, at 19:20, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 2:56 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > The question is not about duplication. OK. > Do you agree that if today, someone is "sure" that tomorrow (or any precise time later) he will be uncertain of an outcome of a certain experience, then he can say, today, that he is uncertain about that future outcome. Sure, he can say whatever he wants because being sure and being correct are two entirely different things. > For example, if I promise myself to buy a lottery ticket next week. I am pretty sure now that next week I will be unsure winning something I've been known to break promises to myself before. If I didn't buy the ticket I'd absolutely certain I won't win the lottery next week, if I do buy the ticket I'd be almost certain I won't win next week. I'll have to wait till next week to find out if in addition to being certain I was also correct. And because you said right at the start that people duplicating machines are not involved this time personal pronouns can be used without ambiguity. > or not with that ticket, so I consider myself to be uncertain right now about winning or not the lottery next week. So I repeat, the principle questioned here says that if at t_0 P("I will be uncertain of the outcome of some experience at t_1") = 1 then The outcome of the experience at t_1 is uncertain at t_0. You can be certain and wrong, and uncertain and correct. I will say that if I don't know fact X tomorow but I do know fact X now then sometime between today and tomorrow part of my memory must have been be erased. It's called "forgetting". But I haven't forgotten you said " The question is not about duplication" and that means "I" duplicating Machines are not involved, and that is the only reason it wasn't gibberish when you said "I will be uncertain of the...". OK. So, you are OK that the guy in Helsinki write P("drinking coffee") = 1. (Question 1). I notice also that you did not mention that the coffee should taste exactly the same, and I could have just propose a hot drink, we would still have P("drinking hot drink") = 1. All right? And you agree (question 2) that if am pretty sure that tomorrow I will make an experience with a random/uncertain result (lottery, quantum lottery, whatever), I can say that I am already uncertain today about the result of that experience, assuming I keep my promise to myself to do the experience of course (buying the lottery ticket, measuring that spin, etc.). Good! Now, I will prove, assuming computationalism (alias digital mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science), that there is a first person indeterminacy in some still modified step 3 protocol. Then I will explain that the modification does not change the uncertainty, and thus proved step 3. Now, the guy in Helsinki is told that we have put a painting by Van Gogh in one of the reconstitution box, and a painting by Monet in the other reconstitution box. The key point here, is that we don't tell you which reconstitution box contains which painting. After the reconstitutions, the doors will remain close for some short time, which I call delta-t_1, so that t_0 is when the guy is in Helsinki, and delta-t_2 is the interval of time when the reconstitutions are done, simultaneously (say) in Washington and in Moscow. The guy in Helsinki reasons like this: by the question 1 principle, P("seeing a painting") = 1, given that there will be a painting in both reconstitution boxes. Now, by Digital Mechanism, both copies will see different paintings, given that they have been reconstituted in different boxes containing different paintings. But the difference between the paintings differentiates the first persn experience of each copies, and they know that. Both will see a specific painting, like a Monet, or a Van Gogh, and both will conclude that by seiing the painting, they have already differentiate, so that the city behind the door is already determined. But as we have not told the guy in Helsinki where the paintings have been placed, the differentiation is not enough for them to deduce with certainty what city is behind the door. The guy in Helsinki I just prove that P("being uncertain about which city is behind the door") = 1, in the same sense of the question one principle (if X occurs at both places then P(X) = 1). The guy in Helsinki expect (with P=1, modulo assumption and default hyp) to get a cup of coffee, to see a painting, and to live an interval of time where he will be aware that the differentiation has occurred, despite not knowing which city is behind the doors. By the principle of the question 2, he is already uncertain about the outcome of the opening of the door tomorrow. The delta-t_2 interval of uncertainty is lifted to the day before. Now, obviously, telling the guy in Hels