Re: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all..
Hi Stephen P. King I can't disagree with your comments, which are about reality. Leibniz's metaphysics (monads have no windows) is not a carbon copy of reality, but I intend to stick with him as long as I can. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/10/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-08, 14:05:29 Subject: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. On 12/8/2012 7:24 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. Stephen doesn't see such a need. Dear Roger, What I am claiming is that the action of consciousness *is* the local 'coming to be mutually consistent' of the percepts for each and every monad. Percepts are strictly first person, they are not objects, like a stone, that we can hold in our hand and look at from several differing angles. We can conceptualize this action as a separate action itself in the sense that it is what all monads have as their internal act of cogitation, but to think of such as being determined from the outside by some separate entity demands a sufficient reason for such a thought. Why have an entity whose only function is to coordinate the internal activity of monads when 1) this is disallowed by the definition of a monad as windowless and 2) such a coordinating action requires the equivalent of a computation that can be proven mathematically to be impossible? Why do we even need the hypothesis of the existence of an external entity when everything that it is presupposed to do is already done by the monads themselves? What is amazing to me is that I am in fact making a claim that is identical to Bruno's claim that the appearance of a physical world is nothing more than the shareability of 'dreams of numbers'. The fact that percepts of a pair of monads happen to synchronize does not require that they be set up to be synchronous in some special event. The mere possibility of the existence of Monads, as defined in the Monadology, might give us the idea that they somehow have distinct properties from each other, but this is a mistake as it is assuming that monads are object that we can somehow think of as objects! Monads do not have an outside! The example of a CPU of a physical computer is an object like the stone discussed earlier, it has an 'outside'. It is not a monad, but it is something that exists as a pattern of mutuality in the percepts of many monads. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all..
Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. Stephen doesn't see such a need. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:32:51 Subject: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Roger. How can L's monads be blind if they all have perception as clearly expressed in L's Monadology? Richard On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: WHOOPS! My equivalence or as if princple accepting materialism/atheism is wrong for the following reason. The Supreme monad (God) is absolutely needed, because without a supreme monad, the monads are blind and don't work properly. The Supreme Monad has a necessary, irreplaceable function, that of reflecting the perceptions of all of the other monads in the universe back to a given monad that guides his changes. So I have to take back my acceptance of materialism/atheism. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: Roger Clough Time: 2012-12-06, 09:12:38 Subject: Puppets and strings Perhaps a simple analogy might make my thinking plainer. L sees the world and its beings as acting like puppets with strings. Atheism/materialism sees the world as if there are no strings. A similar analogy applies to religion. It all depends on how you look at the world. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 09:00:01 Subject: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's metaphysics. Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email
Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all..
On 12/8/2012 7:24 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. Stephen doesn't see such a need. Dear Roger, What I am claiming is that the action of consciousness *is* the local 'coming to be mutually consistent' of the percepts for each and every monad. Percepts are strictly first person, they are not objects, like a stone, that we can hold in our hand and look at from several differing angles. We can conceptualize this action as a separate action itself in the sense that it is what all monads have as their internal act of cogitation, but to think of such as being determined from the outside by some separate entity demands a sufficient reason for such a thought. Why have an entity whose only function is to coordinate the internal activity of monads when 1) this is disallowed by the definition of a monad as windowless and 2) such a coordinating action requires the equivalent of a computation that can be proven mathematically to be impossible? Why do we even need the hypothesis of the existence of an external entity when everything that it is presupposed to do is already done by the monads themselves? What is amazing to me is that I am in fact making a claim that is identical to Bruno's claim that the appearance of a physical world is nothing more than the shareability of 'dreams of numbers'. The fact that percepts of a pair of monads happen to synchronize does not require that they be set up to be synchronous in some special event. The mere possibility of the existence of Monads, as defined in the Monadology, might give us the idea that they somehow have distinct properties from each other, but this is a mistake as it is assuming that monads are object that we can somehow think of as objects! Monads do not have an outside! The example of a CPU of a physical computer is an object like the stone discussed earlier, it has an 'outside'. It is not a monad, but it is something that exists as a pattern of mutuality in the percepts of many monads. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all..
On 08 Dec 2012, at 13:24, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual perceptions are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the perceptions of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. For having a computation, you need a computer. But there are many, they are very variate, and they reflect each other. Some does not synchronize anything, some have no data, some have all data, some exploits parallelism, some don't, some exploit the physical (appearances, which still obeys laws), some don't, etc. The universal numbers can be said supreme monads (note the plural), but it is not the supreme monad, which is more like the whole arithmetical truth (in the CTM setting). Bruno Stephen doesn't see such a need. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/8/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 12:32:51 Subject: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all.. Roger. How can L's monads be blind if they all have perception as clearly expressed in L's Monadology? Richard On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 at 11:26 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: WHOOPS! My equivalence or as if princple accepting materialism/atheism is wrong for the following reason. The Supreme monad (God) is absolutely needed, because without a supreme monad, the monads are blind and don't work properly. The Supreme Monad has a necessary, irreplaceable function, that of reflecting the perceptions of all of the other monads in the universe back to a given monad that guides his changes. So I have to take back my acceptance of materialism/atheism. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: Roger Clough Time: 2012-12-06, 09:12:38 Subject: Puppets and strings Perhaps a simple analogy might make my thinking plainer. L sees the world and its beings as acting like puppets with strings. Atheism/materialism sees the world as if there are no strings. A similar analogy applies to religion. It all depends on how you look at the world. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 09:00:01 Subject: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's metaphysics. Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit
WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all..
WHOOPS! My equivalence or as if princple accepting materialism/atheism is wrong for the following reason. The Supreme monad (God) is absolutely needed, because without a supreme monad, the monads are blind and don't work properly. The Supreme Monad has a necessary, irreplaceable function, that of reflecting the perceptions of all of the other monads in the universe back to a given monad that guides his changes. So I have to take back my acceptance of materialism/atheism. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: Roger Clough Time: 2012-12-06, 09:12:38 Subject: Puppets and strings Perhaps a simple analogy might make my thinking plainer. L sees the world and its beings as acting like puppets with strings. Atheism/materialism sees the world as if there are no strings. A similar analogy applies to religion. It all depends on how you look at the world. [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-06, 09:00:01 Subject: A truce: if atheism/materialism is an as if universe Hi Stephen P. King OK, after thinking it over, it seems there's two ways of thinking about L's metaphysics. 1) (My way) The Idealist way, that being L's metaphysics as is. 2) (Your way) The atheist/materialist way, that being the usual atheist/materialistc view of the universe --- as long as you realize that strictly speaking this is not correct, but the universe acts as if there's no God. I have trouble with this view in speaking of mental space, but I suppose you can consider mental states to exist as if they are real. L's metaphysics has no conflicts with the phenomenol world (the physical world you see and that of science), but L would say that strictly speaking, the phenomenol world is not real, only its monadic representation is real. I have not yet worked Bruno's view into this scheme, but a first guess is that Bruno's world is 2). [Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net] 12/6/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-12-05, 19:51:28 Subject: Re: a paper on Leibnizian mathematical ideas On 12/5/2012 1:01 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: L's monads have perception. They sense the entire universe. On Wed, Dec 5, 2012 at 12:45 PM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King God isn't artificially inserted into L's metaphysics, it's a necessary part, because everything else (the monads) afre blind and passive. Just as necessary as the One is to Plato's metaphysics. Hi Richard, Yes, the monads have an entire universe as its perception. What distinguishes monads from each other is their 'point of view' of a universe. One has to consider the idea of closure for a monad, my conjecture is that the content of perception of a monad must be representable as an complete atomic Boolean algebra. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
