On 12/8/2012 7:24 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Richard Ruquist That's understandable because of L's terminology. The individual "perceptions" are continually updated by the supreme monad, which is necessary so that all the "perceptions" of all of the monads are properly synchronized. The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize all of the operations and data of the subprograms. Stephen doesn't see such a need.
What I am claiming is that the action of consciousness *is* the local 'coming to be mutually consistent' of the percepts for each and every monad. Percepts are strictly first person, they are not "objects", like a stone, that we can hold in our hand and look at from several differing angles. We can conceptualize this action as a separate action itself in the sense that it is what all monads have as their internal act of cogitation, but to think of such as being determined from the outside by some separate entity demands a sufficient reason for such a thought. Why have an entity whose only function is to coordinate the internal activity of monads when 1) this is disallowed by the definition of a monad as windowless and 2) such a coordinating action requires the equivalent of a computation that can be proven mathematically to be impossible? Why do we even need the hypothesis of the existence of an external entity when everything that it is presupposed to do is already done by the monads themselves? What is amazing to me is that I am in fact making a claim that is identical to Bruno's claim that the appearance of a physical world is nothing more than the shareability of 'dreams of numbers'. The fact that percepts of a pair of monads happen to synchronize does not require that they be set up to be synchronous in some special event. The mere possibility of the existence of Monads, as defined in the Monadology, might give us the idea that they somehow have distinct properties from each other, but this is a mistake as it is assuming that monads are object that we can somehow think of as objects! Monads do not have an "outside"! The example of a CPU of a physical computer is an object like the stone discussed earlier, it has an 'outside'. It is not a monad, but it is something that exists as a pattern of mutuality in the percepts of many monads.
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