Hi Stephen P. King 

I can't disagree with your comments, which are about reality.
Leibniz's metaphysics (monads have no windows) is not a carbon 
copy of reality, but I intend to stick with him as long as I can.

[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen

----- Receiving the following content ----- 
From: Stephen P. King 
Receiver: everything-list 
Time: 2012-12-08, 14:05:29
Subject: Re: WHOOPS! The Supreme Monad (God) is necessary after all..

On 12/8/2012 7:24 AM, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Richard Ruquist 

That's understandable because of L's terminology.

The individual "perceptions" are continually updated by the supreme monad,
which is necessary so that all the "perceptions" of all
of the monads are properly synchronized.

The anology would be that a CPU is needed to synchronize
all of the operations and data of the subprograms.

Stephen doesn't see such a need.

Dear Roger,

    What I am claiming is that the action of consciousness *is* the local 
'coming to be mutually consistent' of the percepts for each and every monad. 
Percepts are strictly first person, they are not "objects", like a stone, that 
we can hold in our hand and look at from several differing angles. 
    We can conceptualize this action as a separate action itself in the sense 
that it is what all monads have as their internal act of cogitation, but to 
think of such as being determined from the outside by some separate entity 
demands a sufficient reason for such a thought. Why have an entity whose only 
function is to coordinate the internal activity of monads when 1) this is 
disallowed by the definition of a monad as windowless and 2) such a 
coordinating action requires the equivalent of a computation that can be proven 
mathematically to be impossible?
    Why do we even need the hypothesis of the existence of an external entity 
when everything that it is presupposed to do is already done by the monads 
themselves? What is amazing to me is that I am in fact making a claim that is 
identical to Bruno's claim that the appearance of a physical world is nothing 
more than the shareability of 'dreams of numbers'. The fact that percepts of a 
pair of monads happen to synchronize does not require that they be set up to be 
synchronous in some special event. 
    The mere possibility of the existence of Monads, as defined in the 
Monadology, might give us the idea that they somehow have distinct properties 
from each other, but this is a mistake as it is assuming that monads are object 
that we can somehow think of as objects! Monads do not have an "outside"! The 
example of a CPU of a physical computer is an object like the stone discussed 
earlier, it has an 'outside'. It is not a monad, but it is something that 
exists as a pattern of mutuality in the percepts of many monads.



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