Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED] Brent Meeker writes: On 31-Jul-05, you wrote: [-Original Message-Tom Caylor wrote:] May I offer the following quote as a potential catalyst for Bruno and Colin: ... Our scientific evidentiary process is based on the fallacy of the assumed existence of an 'objective view'. To push the so-called 'objective view' of corroborative science aside and allocate primacy to the subjective is not going to be an easy adjustment. To do that and retain the validity of all science to date (because it works) is ultimately what is required. Reality vs perception of reality? I vote we work really hard on the latter and drop all ascription in relation to the former. A significant dose of humility indeed. Cheers Colin hales Science is not based on a fallacious assumption of objectivity. It is based on a model which explains various agreements between our subjective experiences by the existence of a reality that is independent of us. This is not an assumption. Philosophically it is a hypothesis; one that is extremly well supported. In fact it is also supported by having been hardwired into our brains by evolution; so that it comes to us so intuitively that we have to learn philosophy before we can see that it is a model. Brent Meeker I said: Our scientific evidentiary process is based on the fallacy of the assumed existence of an 'objective view'. You said: Science is not based on a fallacious assumption of objectivity. Objectivity and an objective view are not the same thing. The former is a procedural norm relating to the use of the latter objective view. The latter is a construct of appearances. We are not talking about the same thing. 'Evidence' derived from the apparent objective view says NOTHING about the existence or character of the objective view. 5000 different brains could be proposed that provide 5000 different 'objective views' of the same natural phenomenon. Procedural objectivity means all 5000 could result in the same scientific outcome (say some description involving a generalisation X). Which of the 5000 is the 'real' objective view. All? None? Now take away phenomenal consciousness completely. How many views do you have then? NONE. Can you do science then? NO. No amount of 'objectivity' will make up for it. You wont even be able to perceive another scientist, let alone do anything scientific! The logical holes in the assumptions we make are fairly loud and obvious. Colin Hales
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
I thought this article might be useful! Stephen http://www.skepticalinvestigations.org/objectivity/bogusskepticism.htm The Objectivity of Science Seven Warning Signs of Bogus Skepticism by Rochus Boerner The progress of science depends on a finely tuned balance between open-mindedness and skepticism. Be too open minded, and you'll accept wrong claims. Be too skeptical, and you'll reject genuine new discoveries. Proper skepticism must be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Unfortunately, much of what comes out of the skeptical community these days is not proper skepticism, but all-out, fundamentalist disbelief. Such skepticism can be called pseudo-skepticism, pathological skepticism or bogus skepticism. Here are the warning signs of bogus skepticism. 1. The Skeptic has reached her skeptical opinion not after careful research and examination of the claim, but simply based on media reports and other forms of second-hand knowledge. Example: Pathological cold fusion skeptic Robert L. Park revealed in his March 1st 2002 What's New column that Science was going to publish an article on Sonofusion, and that even though he had not seen the paper, talked to the researchers or conducted any personal research in the area, he already knew that the Sonofusion discovery would turn out to be a repeat of the cold fusion fiasco. Park used every bit of influence he had in a behind-the-scenes attempt to kill the paper. Luckily, the Science editor didn't cave and decided to publish. 2. Making uncontrolled criticisms. A criticism is uncontrolled if the same criticism could equally be applied to accepted science. For example, Park makes such a criticism in his book Voodoo Science (p.199). In the context of a discussion of an obviously pseudoscientific Good Morning America report on anomalous phenomena (debunkery by association: as if TV shows were the principal outlet for reporting the results of psi research!), Park writes Why, you may wonder, all this business of random machines? Jahn has studied random number generators, water fountains in which the subject tries to urge drops to greater heights, all sorts of machines. But it is not clear that any of these machines are truly random. Indeed, it is generally believed that there are no truly random machines. It may be, therefore, that the lack of randomness only begins to show up after many trials. Besides, if the mind can influence inanimate objects, why not simply measure the static force the mind can exert? Modern ultramicrobalances can routinely measure a force of much less than a billionth of an ounce. Why not just use your psychokinetic powers to deflect a microbalance? It's sensitive, simple, even quantitative, with no need for any dubious statistical analysis. Where does Park's assessment that effects that are only indirectly detected, by statistical analysis, are suspect, leave conventional science? Deprived of one of its most powerful tools of analysis. The cherished 1992 COBE discovery of minute fluctuations in the cosmic microwave background radiation would have to be thrown out, since it was entirely statistical in nature, and therefore by Park's argument, 'dubious'. The most celebrated discoveries of particle physics, such as the 1995 discovery of the top quark, or the results of neutrino detection experiments, or the synthesis of superheavy, extremely short-lived elements, would have to be thrown out, since they, too, are indirect and statistical in nature. Modern medicine would have to be invalidated as well because it relies on statistical analysis (of double- blind trials) to prove the efficacy of drugs. For comparison: the American Institute of Physics's Bulletin of Physics News, #216, March 3, 1995 gives the odds against chance for the top quark discovery as a million to one. A 1987 meta-analysis performed by Dean Radin and Roger Nelson of RNG (random number generator) experiments between 1959 and 1987 , on the other hand, shows the existence of an anomalous deviation from chance with odds against chance exceeding one trillion to one (see Radin, The Conscious Universe, p. 140). Park's argument is the quintessential uncontrolled criticism: accepted scientific methods that constitute the backbone of modern science suddenly become questionable when they are used on phenomena that don't fit his ideological predilections. 3. The Pseudoskeptical Catch-22: unconventional claims have to be proved before they can be investigated! This way, of course, they will never be investigated or proved. Parapsychology has been significantly hampered by this pseudoskeptical attitude. Pseudoskeptics complain that effect sizes are not bigger; but at the same time, they scream bloody murder if any grant-making agency even so much considers doing something about it. Radin writes in The Conscious Universe: The tactics of the extreme skeptics have been more than merely
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
To the quote of Lee's remark: I would try Vernumft (which may as well be similarly inaccurate for 'consciousness'). There were some German speaking souls(!) who used it quite effectively G. I try for'mind':the mentality aspect of the living complexity which says not much more if 'mentality' is not properly identified. However referring to the complexity of the 'living creatures' it points to a function which is inseparable from the substrate it goes together with (brain and the rest of the world). So I would not agree with Baum as to the 'brain' running the program for thinking, which is a tool in the complexity 'running' in concert with the rest of it. Also simulating menatlity from computer expressions seems reversing the fact that in comp (AI etc.) the computer science attempts to simulate certain and very limited items we already discovered from our mind. Living I use instead of human, of course. But that comes from my generalization trend of terms beyond our human only pretension. To Searle's book-title: it implies that we already HAVE discovered what the 'mind' is. Well, we did not. At least not to the satisfaction of the advanced thinking community. John M --- [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: [Lee wrote:] Interesting note about mind: there is no German language equivalent for it. Another reason to be *very* careful when employing it. Sarcastic comment about the possibility of Teutonic zombies elided. In a very deep (but non-mathematical) book, What is Thought? by Eric Baum, the author decides to use mind as the name of the program the brain runs, and it seems to work out well. Lee What is going on? Another book is quoted and it too is right in front of me. I conclude there is a hidden web cam somewhere in my office I love causality. :) As regards the book contents. I have to go through it in moiré detail but at first run through he makes precisely the same mistakes as all the other functionalists outlined so well in Searle J. R. 1992. The rediscovery of the mind. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. xv, 270 p. Once again: A metaphor based on a lack of imagination. The fallacy: that because our mind is so adept at constructing ontologies that therefore there is such things as 'things' in the universe. There are ways of constructing 'thought' that have no need for prescription of an ontology of any sort yet appears to be so. Including Germans! Baum cannot make any empirical predictions of brain matter. Nice read...but no progress has been made except to shoehorn the received view into the limelight. Are we ever going to get past this? Cheers Colin
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Aditya writes [LC]: Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of event and observer moment can't really be said to be at all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have been using the term OM for years and years, and event has a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer moments have to do with something conscious (and, evidently, pretty complex). And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness exists on a gray scale. Then dare I say that any Theory based on this restricted definition of OMs (happening to observers with consciousness/intelligence comparable to ours) can never be as complete as a theory based on the much simpler (and encompassing) notion of events. I am hugely sympathetic to the point of view you are proposing, namely that theories based on OMs do have inherent weaknesses, and are quite out of line with the progress sciences has shown historically. Most of the proponents of OM-based theories will succumb to the temptation to resort to introspection as an investigation tool. Yes, some will at all times keep flexibly in mind the realization that any OM explanation must be totally consistent with its dual event-based explanation. However, it's the eternal search for ever simpler more unifying explanation that fuels the search for a way to avoid another dualism (so it seems to me), the idea that mathematics and physics are separate. That is, they want to derive everything about physics from the platonic existence of mathematical patterns. Ok, the above sounds a bit arrogant on my part, but its just that when I think of Big things like ToEs, I am much more comfortable without the burden of assuming that I am special in some way. If it were so, It would either be too much of a coincidence, or some act of a God that I can never hope to explain to myself. Yes, some of Wheeler's theories (e.g. an observer created universe) have this very characteristic: the observer (to me an immensely complicated machine, a johnny-come-lately in evolution) is placed at the center and deemed fundamental. But to be fair, the time-deniers (the math Platonists who seek everything explained by patterns) allow that all conscious, complex entities have non-trivial OMs. I can only agree to disagree by saying that any theory that explains consciousness in terms of something more than just interference of events on a HUGE scale, is pretty much the same as explaining away [coincidence] as acts of a God: that unreachable, unfathomable entity. Yeah, well said. Lee
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
--- Lee Corbin [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Russell writes John M. wrote To Russell's 4 coordinates of (any?) event: how come the occurrence (event!) of a 'good idea' in my mind - (mind: not a thing, not a place, not time-restricted) should have t,x,y,z coordinates? [Russell?] I would say that the event occurs in your brain (the neural correlate of whatever is going on in your mind). Whatever is going on in your mind is something else - an observation perhaps. [JM]: I guess whatever is observable in your brainfunctions is not the event but its reflection. The event itself is the 'occurrence' what you deem 'observation', while you observe it only as it happenned. It is quite clear as you call the brain a neural correlate, which makes it clear that it is not the originating, neither executing factor, just a correlate of such. Exactly the 'hard problem' since Kohler's Gestalt. I like the correlate, it is pointing to the inseparability of the functions as we try to decipher them. To the translations in Russell's other post: I take translation = transfiguration, I read in 5 languages and saw 'good' translations with different meanings. Nothing beats the 'original' written in a mother-tongue John M
Re: MODERATOR'S NOTE: Theology Discussion
Hi Alan, Thank you very much for making my point even more clear(*). You know my theory (which is just the classical machine's theory) has been named machine biology, and then machine theology. It is my thesis director in France who asked me to use the term machine psychology instead of theology. I really don't care of the wording but it seems to me, for empirical reasons, that people are more shocked by an expression like physics is derivable from machine psychology than by physics is derivable from machine theology. This is related to the fact that most theologies admit cosmogonies unlike psychology. None of those words are well chosen, but if you think theology is necessarily mystical I can go back to the word psychology instead. Or you could help me to find a less shocking wording (and less flattening than just computer science which is defensible assuming comp). Sometimes the moderation posts are very interesting by themselves. It is a little sad that this one is authoritative and does not admit replies (in the FOR-list). (Given that my point was really that theology could be amenable to scientific discourse, once we make some assumptions). Assuming the computationalist hypothesis, it is natural to define machine theology by all what is *true about* the consistent machines. By incompleteness this is much less than what consistent machines can prove about themselves. Now the gap between provability and truth is amenable to mathematical analysis (by Godel, Lob, Boolos, Solovay, etc.). Precisely: G' minus G. (The Solovay provability logics(**)). Alan, how could I communicate? If I explain in plain english I will look mystical and moderated out. If I explain the mystical out, then I will look technical, and moderate out again. It is a pity because it seems to me all this is relevant with the Church-Turing thesis and principle discussed in FOR. Of course on this point I disagree with David Deutsch, but then I disagree with all physicists except J. A. Wheeler (if I may borrow this sort of expression to DD :). Ah! I just remember a wording I have used for the machine's theology a long time ago, it is the collection of propositions belonging to the difference between computer science and computer's computer science (which is non empty by incompleteness again). But that is long and could look both mystical and technical. Sometimes I add the restriction that the machine should be able to correctly bet on those propositions. Anyway, I will search for better words ... I didn't expect to be moderated out so quickly this time ;) Regards, Bruno Le 01-août-05, à 03:02, Alan Forrester a écrit : Hallo Peeps :-) I have decided that the theology discussion is far too prone to wander into mysticism and religion, if, indeed, it has not done so already and mysticism and religion are off-topic. All theology posts sent to the list will be deleted without a mod message from now on. Alan Forrester Fabric of Reality List Moderating Team NOTES: (*) cf: ->BM: Most theological questions are still buried under the carpet, Bill Taylor: Where they belong. BM: The problem is that if the scientist dismiss some fundamental questions, they will be tackled by those who will use some urgency feeling related to them to to do total unrigorous manipulative pseudo-theology, so that the scientist will say you see, let us keep those things under the carpet. Your negative attitude is unfounded and self-fulfilling, I'm afraid. ->or dismiss as non scientific. As I have just done. No sincere questions are non scientific. Prejudice against some possible sense in those questions will not help making them more clear and, who can know in advance, susceptible to scientific progress on them. (**) Solovay, R. M. (1976). Provability Interpretation of Modal Logic. Israel Journal of Mathematics, 25:287-304. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
Hi John, Le 01-août-05, à 16:57, John M a écrit : Also simulating menatlity from computer expressions seems reversing the fact that in comp (AI etc.) the computer science attempts to simulate certain and very limited items we already discovered from our mind. Except that since Turing, Church, Godel ... we know that we don't know what is a computer. There are no theory capable of completely describing what they can or cannot do. Remember I insist that comp entails we cannot even know which machine we are, although we can bet on some substitution level in front of the doctor (for the worst or for the best). The discovery of computers makes us much more ignorant. Computers will make our lives much less easy. Hopefully more funny too but it depends in part from us (the human, here). Kind Regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: OMs are events
Hi Hal, thank you for your answer, but I've little more to ask : Le Lundi 01 Août 2005 05:32, Hal Finney a écrit : Quentin Anciaux writes: In all of these discussion, it is really this point that annoy me... What is the calculation ? Is it a physical process ? Obviously a calculation need time... what is the difference between an abstract calculation (ie: one which is done on a sheet of paper or just in your head) with an effective calculation ? What is the meaning of instantiating in a block universe view ? I am generally of the school that considers that calculations can be treated as abstract or formal objects, that they can exist without a physical computer existing to run them. I completely agree with that... but I have problem with the word instantiating in front of an abstract calculation, because if the calculation is abtract that means the calculation just is, no need of instantiation. On the other hand I have still problem with abstract calculation... take for example a mathematic demonstration written on a sheet of paper, it doesn't mean anything if there is no observer to read it and understand it (thereby instantiating the calculus in his own mind), what do you think of that ? Quentin
Re: Reality vs. Perception of Reality
[Col replies---] Tom, in your very eloquent fashion you have touched upon the essence of my approach to the issue of a theory of everything. I need to make sure that everyone knows that the very eloquent words are not mine, but those of H.W.B. Joseph in the reference at the end of the quote. Tom
Re: OMs are events
Quentin Anciaux writes: Le Lundi 01 Août 2005 05:32, Hal Finney a écrit : I am generally of the school that considers that calculations can be treated as abstract or formal objects, that they can exist without a physical computer existing to run them. I completely agree with that... but I have problem with the word instantiating in front of an abstract calculation, because if the calculation is abtract that means the calculation just is, no need of instantiation. I agree, and if I used that terminology then it was probably a mistake. Looking back at the message you replied to, I did not talk of instantiating an abstract calculation. I did mention the question of whether a given calculation instantiated a given OM. Maybe instantiate is not the right word there. I meant to consider the question of whether the first calculation added to the measure of the information structure corresponding to the OM. If you can find any other place where I used the word confusingly, let me know. On the other hand I have still problem with abstract calculation... take for example a mathematic demonstration written on a sheet of paper, it doesn't mean anything if there is no observer to read it and understand it (thereby instantiating the calculus in his own mind), what do you think of that ? I can interpret your question in two ways. One is, does a mathematical proof written on paper has an intrinsic meaning, or is the meaning in the mind of the reader? And the other is, do mathematical proofs have abstract, logical/mathematical existence, in the same way that, say, numbers or geometric figures might be said to abstractly exist? As far as the first question, I would analyze it by asking whether someone who did not know the language it was written in, not even recognizing the symbols, would be able to deduce what the proof was. I believe the answer is yes, for reasonably long proofs. There would be no ambiguity. As a concrete way to understand this, suppose we want to ask the question, does this string of symbols represent proof X, where X is some valid mathematical proof. We could write a translation program which, given the symbols, would output proof X. If the string of symbols is reasonably long and actually does match proof X, the translation program will be short, much shorter than the proof itself. However if the string of symbols is not a proof of X, then the translation program will have to be long. By the same type of argument I have used repeatedly, this gives us a tool for evaluating whether a string has a given meaning. If the translation program is short, then the meaning is in the string. If the translation program is long, then the meaning is in the translation. I believe that this shows that it is in fact reasonably to suppose that a complex proof written on paper does in fact have intrinsic meaning and it is not just a matter of how it is interpreted in the mind of the reader. In terms of the other question, whether proofs have abstract mathematical existence just as (we suppose) integers and triangles do, again I think that the answer is yes. Proofs are merely more complex. They have relationships amongs their parts. They depend on an axiom system. The implicit causality and time ordering among steps of the proof could be represented graphically, by colored arrows leading from one step to another. I could imagine a representation where valid proof steps would be as apparent and obvious as the question of whether a set of lines in a geometric figure all meet at a common point. In short, I do think that proofs, and for that matter computations, can be sensibly thought of as having abstract existence just like other complex mathematical objects. Some of the constructions of set theory are far more complex than any humanly understandable proof, yet it is reasonable to say that sets exist in the abstract. The fact that a proof has many parts and has complex relationships between the parts is no obstacle to its having abstract mathematical existence. Hal Finney
RE: OMs are events
Hal writes I did mention the question of whether a given calculation instantiated a given OM. Maybe instantiate is not the right word there. I meant to consider the question of whether the first calculation added to the measure of the information structure corresponding to the OM. I think that both the word and the meaning are clear. Consider the following gentle seduction approach. One day instead of artificial hearts, people get---piece by ---piece, artificial brains; and let us, just for the purpose of clarifying the above, suppose that this happens without much protest (say in the year 2100). Of course, *many* here do protest, but let's just imagine that it becomes accepted anyway. Then a lot of people are walking around with very complicated programs for minds. Since they act and talk just as we do, let's inquire as to how they would report on the above discussion. While someone's body is undergoing repair, it may happen that he or she can rent a replacement body. It may even happen that for the duration of the operation, their program (i.e. what we think of as their mind) is temporarily halted. This too would seem unobjectionable given the original premise above that in 2100 people have artificial brains made of silicon. Finally, instead of just being unconscious, that is, absent, during the operation, it might be that they could download their program into some small device that furnished only virtual reality. This too would be equally unobjectionable, given the aforesaid premise. So while some very small machine somewhere was hosting them, we could very well say that that particular machine was *instantiating* them, could we not? This is how I would use the terms. One could even go further and say that a person could be instantiated in more than one place at a time. After all, today we speak of your computer being able to instantiate a program (give runtime to), while my computer can do the same thing with a different instance of the same program. So the big Everything claim, or Schmidhuber conjecture, (or I don't know what to call it) is that you and I are *already* being instantiated by abstract mathematical patterns (the UDist, for Universal Distribution). This conjecture, of course, is hotly debated, but I think that what is being claimed is clear. Does anyone disagree with the *clarity* of what I have written, or can anyone have a problem with any of the *words* I used? (We must before anything else make sure that we are communicating.) Lee
Re: MODERATOR'S NOTE: Theology Discussion
I commiserate with you. I finally left FOR because of the moderation policy - that, and the endless waffle that would have been prevented had more technical language been possible in the first place. Anything of substance seems to get ported to the everything list eventually anyway! Cheers On Mon, Aug 01, 2005 at 05:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Alan, ... Sometimes the moderation posts are very interesting by themselves. It is a little sad that this one is authoritative and does not admit replies (in the FOR-list). (Given that my point was really that theology could be amenable to scientific discourse, once we make some assumptions). ... Alan, how could I communicate? If I explain in plain english I will look mystical and moderated out. If I explain the mystical out, then I will look technical, and moderate out again. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpkL4nmRuUsl.pgp Description: PGP signature
RE: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
John M: snip:) To Searle's book-title: it implies that we already HAVE discovered what the 'mind' is. Well, we did not. At least not to the satisfaction of the advanced thinking community. John M I think the name was a play the name of another book The discovery of the mind by Bruno Snell Searle's too smart to allude to literality like that. Indeed the whole book is about our lack of success in the quest. Vernumft ly yours :-) Colin
Re: MODERATOR'S NOTE: Theology Discussion
I'm sure Alan is just doing his best to keep everyone on point with the scientific concepts raised in FOR, but it is a little strange. For instance, the dramatic culmination of the FOR is the OP theory, which of course is a speculation, based in science, for a possible explanation of of the multiverse based on intelligent design. Now regardless of anyones thoughts on that theory the manner in which it is openly discussed in the book, and is in fact endorsed by DD as the best current concept of how an integration of the fundamental branches of reality may explain reality, would certainly seem to open the door to certain theologically orientated discussions, as long as you avoid dogmatic "Jesus is the way to truth" or whatever type discussion. I always had trouble getting my posts put on the FOR. Even my posts several months ago about time being the higher dimensial space the multiverse exists in were initially kept off the FOR board. When I challenged Alan about it, he relented and conceded there was no problem with the posts. Don't want to judge, but perhaps there is a little heavy-handedness with the post censorship there. Everything list is much better for discussion. Unfortunately it takes me a long time to decipher some of these posts, so I have to pick and choose what to read. I need to give up the practice of law to read all of the great posts made to the everything list! Danny Mayes Russell Standish wrote: I commiserate with you. I finally left FOR because of the moderation policy - that, and the endless waffle that would have been prevented had more technical language been possible in the first place. Anything of substance seems to get ported to the everything list eventually anyway! Cheers On Mon, Aug 01, 2005 at 05:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Alan, ... Sometimes the "moderation posts" are very interesting by themselves. It is a little sad that this one is authoritative and does not admit replies (in the FOR-list). (Given that my point was really that "theology" could be amenable to scientific discourse, once we make some assumptions). ... Alan, how could I communicate? If I explain in plain english I will look mystical and moderated out. If I explain the "mystical" out, then I will look technical, and moderate out again.
Re: OMs are events
Lee Corbin wrote: Hal writes I did mention the question of whether a given calculation instantiated a given OM. Maybe instantiate is not the right word there. I meant to consider the question of whether the first calculation added to the measure of the information structure corresponding to the OM. I think that both the word and the meaning are clear. Consider the following gentle seduction approach. One day instead of artificial hearts, people get---piece by ---piece, artificial brains; and let us, just for the purpose of clarifying the above, suppose that this happens without much protest (say in the year 2100). Of course, *many* here do protest, but let's just imagine that it becomes accepted anyway. Then a lot of people are walking around with very complicated programs for minds. Since they act and talk just as we do, let's inquire as to how they would report on the above discussion. While someone's body is undergoing repair, it may happen that he or she can rent a replacement body. It may even happen that for the duration of the operation, their program (i.e. what we think of as their mind) is temporarily halted. This too would seem unobjectionable given the original premise above that in 2100 people have artificial brains made of silicon. Finally, instead of just being unconscious, that is, absent, during the operation, it might be that they could download their program into some small device that furnished only virtual reality. This too would be equally unobjectionable, given the aforesaid premise. So while some very small machine somewhere was hosting them, we could very well say that that particular machine was *instantiating* them, could we not? This is how I would use the terms. One could even go further and say that a person could be instantiated in more than one place at a time. After all, today we speak of your computer being able to instantiate a program (give runtime to), while my computer can do the same thing with a different instance of the same program. So the big Everything claim, or Schmidhuber conjecture, (or I don't know what to call it) is that you and I are *already* being instantiated by abstract mathematical patterns (the UDist, for Universal Distribution). I'm uncertain whether instantiated by abstract mathematical patterns means that the patterns are being physically realized by a process in time (as in the sci-fi above) or by the physical existence of the patterns in some static form (e.g. written pieces of paper) or just by the Platonic existence of the patterns within some mathematic/logic system. Brent Meeker
