Brain-computer interface and quantum robots
arXiv.org/abs/0909.1508 I saw the title and thought of what Bruno would make of it. Any thoughts? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Brain-computer interface and quantum robots
Ronald. I pursue (vaguely) such development and - though have no intention to outguess Bruno's opinion - find it a VERY PRACTICAL (may I call it: e-bio) line. (lineS - plural). Quite amazing results have been so far achieved in this IMO totally initial phase. I can't wait how the ultra-theoreticians on this list will include such results into 'machine-consciousness' etc. ideas. John M On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 8:06 AM, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote: arXiv.org/abs/0909.1508 I saw the title and thought of what Bruno would make of it. Any thoughts? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation. It is strictly an argument against the claim that computation causes consciousness , as opposed to the claim that mental states are identical to computational states. I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised computation could be identical to any mental state. This is what follows if one accepts the argument from MGA or Olympia that consciousness does not attach to physical states qua computatio. But CTM is not engaged on such a project; in fact it entails the opposite conclusion: i.e. by stipulating its type-token identities purely functionally it requires that a homogeneous phenomenal state must somehow be associated with a teeming plurality of heterogeneous physical states. It doesn't suggest that any mental state can be associated with any phsycial state. It doesn't need to say that to be obscure as a physical theory. The point is that it can ex hypothesi say nothing remotely physically illuminating about what causes a mental state. To say that it results whenever a physical system implements a specific computation is to say nothing physical about that system other than to insist that it is 'physical'. It has been accused of overdoing Multiple Realisability, but MR can be underdone as well. I agree. Nonetheless, when two states are functionally equivalent one can still say what it is about them that is physically relevant. For example, in driving from A to B it is functionally irrelevant to my experience whether my car is fuelled by petrol or diesel. But there is no ambiguity about the physical details of my car trip or precisely how either fuel contributes to this effect. Various arguments - Olympia, MGA, the Chinese Room etc. - seek to expose the myriad physical implausibilities consequential on such implementation independence. But the root of all this is that CTM makes impossible at the outset any possibility of linking a phenomenal state to any unique, fully-explicated physical reduction. That's probably a good thing. We want to be able to say that two people with fine-grained differences in their brain structure can both be (for instance) apprehensiveness. Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why the fine-grained differences make no difference at the level of experience. If nothing physical can in principle be ruled out as an explanation for experience, That isn't an implication of CTM. CTM can regard computers as a small subset of physical systems, and conscious computers as a small subset of computers. Yes, but we needn't push nothing physical to the extent of random association to make the point at issue. The relevant point is that, in picking out the subset of physical systems solely qua computatio, no kind of physical realisation is capable of being ruled out in principle. That is unproblematic in the usual case because our interest is restricted to the computational output of such systems, and we are unconcerned by the physical details that occasion this. But if we are seeking a physical explanation of consciousness, then it is precisely the coupling of the physical process and the mental process which requires explication in a physical theory, and this is now obscured from any general resolution by the computational posit. no uniquely-justified physical explanation need - or in practice could - be explicated. I don't think unique justification is a requirement The detailed implausibilities variously invoked all fall out of this. So if a physical theory of mind is what is needed, CTM would seem to fail even as a candidate because its arbitrariness with respect to physical realisation renders it incapable of grounding consciousness in any specific fundamental physical reduction. MR is not complete arbitrariness. I can only suppose that complete arbitrariness would be a random association between physical states and mental states. This is not what is meant by arbitrary realisation. What is meant is that the requirement that a physical system be deemed conscious purely in virtue of its implementing a computation rules out no particular kind of physical realisation. Consequently a theory of this type is incapable of explicating general principles of physical-mental association independent of its functional posit. If CTM had the implication that one material system could realise more than one computation, then there would be a conflict with the phsyical supervenience principle. I agree. But CTM only has the implication that one computation system
Re: Brain-computer interface and quantum robots
I have to agree that I am curious what responses I will get from the frequent posters. I see this as someday being able to say,yes, Doctor. Ronald On Sep 10, 9:17 am, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Ronald. I pursue (vaguely) such development and - though have no intention to outguess Bruno's opinion - find it a VERY PRACTICAL (may I call it: e-bio) line. (lineS - plural). Quite amazing results have been so far achieved in this IMO totally initial phase. I can't wait how the ultra-theoreticians on this list will include such results into 'machine-consciousness' etc. ideas. John M On Thu, Sep 10, 2009 at 8:06 AM, ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com wrote: arXiv.org/abs/0909.1508 I saw the title and thought of what Bruno would make of it. Any thoughts?- Hide quoted text - - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Brain-computer interface and quantum robots
ronaldheld wrote: arXiv.org/abs/0909.1508 I saw the title and thought of what Bruno would make of it. Any thoughts? The authors write, However, recent studies lead to the conclusion that the human mind is not a classical computer, and, in general, not completely reducible to any kind of computer (not even classical) because of the non-algorithmic nature of some mental processes. But they give to no reference to these recent studies. The paper seems to be about well known problems in training artificial neural networks and other artificial learning algorithms. Sure EEG is inadequate to define intention, there's just not much information there. I don't see that as having any foundational implications. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/9 Flammarion peterdjo...@yahoo.com: What you say above seems pretty much in sympathy with the reductio arguments based on arbitrariness of implementation. It is strictly an argument against the claim that computation causes consciousness , as opposed to the claim that mental states are identical to computational states. I'm not sure I see what distinction you're making. If as you say the realisation of computation in a physical system doesn't cause consciousness, that would entail that no physically-realised computation could be identical to any mental state. This is what follows if one accepts the argument from MGA or Olympia that consciousness does not attach to physical states qua computatio. But CTM is not engaged on such a project; in fact it entails the opposite conclusion: i.e. by stipulating its type-token identities purely functionally it requires that a homogeneous phenomenal state must somehow be associated with a teeming plurality of heterogeneous physical states. It doesn't suggest that any mental state can be associated with any phsycial state. It doesn't need to say that to be obscure as a physical theory. The point is that it can ex hypothesi say nothing remotely physically illuminating about what causes a mental state. To say that it results whenever a physical system implements a specific computation is to say nothing physical about that system other than to insist that it is 'physical'. It has been accused of overdoing Multiple Realisability, but MR can be underdone as well. I agree. Nonetheless, when two states are functionally equivalent one can still say what it is about them that is physically relevant. For example, in driving from A to B it is functionally irrelevant to my experience whether my car is fuelled by petrol or diesel. But there is no ambiguity about the physical details of my car trip or precisely how either fuel contributes to this effect. Various arguments - Olympia, MGA, the Chinese Room etc. - seek to expose the myriad physical implausibilities consequential on such implementation independence. But the root of all this is that CTM makes impossible at the outset any possibility of linking a phenomenal state to any unique, fully-explicated physical reduction. That's probably a good thing. We want to be able to say that two people with fine-grained differences in their brain structure can both be (for instance) apprehensiveness. Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why the fine-grained differences make no difference at the level of experience. Consider what a clear physical account of apprehensiveness might be: There's an increased level of brain activity which is similar to that caused by a strange sound when along in the dark, a slight rise in adrenaline, a tensing of muscles that would be used to flee, brain patterns formed as memories while watching slasher movies become more excited. Fine-grained differences below these levels, as might differ in others, are irrelevant to the experience. For comparison consider a Mars rover experiencing apprehension: Sensor signals indicate lack of traction which implies likely inability to reach it's next sampling point. Extra battery power is put on line and various changes in paths and backtracking are calculated. Mission control is apprised. The soil appearance related to poor traction is entered into a database with a warning note. Notice how the meaning, the content of 'apprehension' comes from the context of action and purpose and interaction with an external world. We summarize these things as a single word 'apprehension' which we then take to describe a strictly internal state. But that is because we have abstracted away the circumstances that give the meaning. There are difference cirmcustances that would give the same hightened states. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Brain-computer interface and quantum robots
On 10 Sep 2009, at 19:38, Brent Meeker wrote: ronaldheld wrote: arXiv.org/abs/0909.1508 I saw the title and thought of what Bruno would make of it. Any thoughts? The authors write, However, recent studies lead to the conclusion that the human mind is not a classical computer, and, in general, not completely reducible to any kind of computer (not even classical) because of the non-algorithmic nature of some mental processes. But they give to no reference to these recent studies. The paper seems to be about well known problems in training artificial neural networks and other artificial learning algorithms. Sure EEG is inadequate to define intention, there's just not much information there. I don't see that as having any foundational implications. I think so. Yet the authors postulate a wave collapse, and conclude The previous arguments showed that the quantum approach predicts the possibility of a direct action of mind on matter. Just an old idea, it seems to me. See Deutsch and Albert for quantum intospection in Everett and Bohm respectively. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why the fine-grained differences make no difference at the level of experience. Consider what a clear physical account of apprehensiveness might be: There's an increased level of brain activity which is similar to that caused by a strange sound when along in the dark, a slight rise in adrenaline, a tensing of muscles that would be used to flee, brain patterns formed as memories while watching slasher movies become more excited. Fine-grained differences below these levels, as might differ in others, are irrelevant to the experience. For comparison consider a Mars rover experiencing apprehension: Sensor signals indicate lack of traction which implies likely inability to reach it's next sampling point. Extra battery power is put on line and various changes in paths and backtracking are calculated. Mission control is apprised. The soil appearance related to poor traction is entered into a database with a warning note. Notice how the meaning, the content of 'apprehension' comes from the context of action and purpose and interaction with an external world. We summarize these things as a single word 'apprehension' which we then take to describe a strictly internal state. But that is because we have abstracted away the circumstances that give the meaning. There are difference cirmcustances that would give the same hightened states. Whilst I am of course in sympathy with the larger import of you're saying, Brent, I'm not sure how it's relevant to the intentionally more restricted focus of the current discussion. It is by definition true that fine-grained differences below these levels, as might differ in others, are irrelevant to the experience. My point still is that a complete physical theory of consciousness would be capable of explicating - both in general physical principles and in detail - the relation between coarse and fine-grained physical accounts of an experiential state, whatever the wider context in which it might be embedded. Or IOW, of explaining what physical principles and processes are responsible for the fineness of fine graining and the coarseness of coarse graining. CTM doesn't appear to offer any physically explicit route to this goal. David But isn't that because the computational in CTM is abstracted away from a context in which there is action and purpose. It's the same problem that leads to the question, Does a rock compute every function? When looking at a physical process as a computation one has to ask, Computing what? and the answer is in terms of some interaction with the rest of the world in which the computation is embedded, e.g. the answer will mean something to the programmer who started it and it means something to him because he's a human animal that evolved to have goals and values and can take actions. The level of experience, the finess or coarsenss of physical process, is determined by the level at which there are actions. Brent Bretn --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
books on logic/computing
I thought that I would start a thread to consolidate some of the books useful in following current and old threads. if people alos want to post key papers here, I do not see a problem with that. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: But isn't that because the computational in CTM is abstracted away from a context in which there is action and purpose. It's the same problem that leads to the question, Does a rock compute every function? When looking at a physical process as a computation one has to ask, Computing what? and the answer is in terms of some interaction with the rest of the world in which the computation is embedded, e.g. the answer will mean something to the programmer who started it and it means something to him because he's a human animal that evolved to have goals and values and can take actions. The level of experience, the finess or coarsenss of physical process, is determined by the level at which there are actions. Yes, I agree with your analysis completely when evaluating any externally observed situation. The trouble is that I think if this approach is followed with mentality then the experiential aspect just gets lost in the processual account. For example your saying the level of experience, the finess or coarsenss of physical process, is determined by the level at which there are actions immediately focuses attention at the interface with the environment, where inputs and outputs can be equivalent for many internally heterogeneous internal processes. This makes perfect sense in the evaluation of a person's, a computer's, or a rock's computational status, if any, because this becomes relevant only at the point where something emerges from the interior to engage with the environment. It's a big leap from that to showing how heterogeneous physical processes are internally experientially equivalent *for clearly explicable physical reasons*. The reason for my emphasis of *physical* is that my problem with CTM, at least in this discussion, is not that it is computational, but that it isn't a physical theory in any standard sense, since it can't justify the attachment of experience to any particular events for other than *functional* reasons. Re-reading the foregoing reminds me of my basic problem with any purely third person approach to mentality, whether physical or functional. Considered from the third person perspective, 'mental' processes have no need to be experiential homogeneous because everything functionally relevant is assumed to be exhausted in the processual account, and hence experience could be nothing but epiphenomenal to this. So what difference could it make? But that is another discussion. David David Nyman wrote: 2009/9/10 Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com: Yes, I agree. But if we're after a physical theory, we also want to be able to give in either case a clear physical account of their apprehensiveness, which would include a physical justification of why the fine-grained differences make no difference at the level of experience. Consider what a clear physical account of apprehensiveness might be: There's an increased level of brain activity which is similar to that caused by a strange sound when along in the dark, a slight rise in adrenaline, a tensing of muscles that would be used to flee, brain patterns formed as memories while watching slasher movies become more excited. Fine-grained differences below these levels, as might differ in others, are irrelevant to the experience. For comparison consider a Mars rover experiencing apprehension: Sensor signals indicate lack of traction which implies likely inability to reach it's next sampling point. Extra battery power is put on line and various changes in paths and backtracking are calculated. Mission control is apprised. The soil appearance related to poor traction is entered into a database with a warning note. Notice how the meaning, the content of 'apprehension' comes from the context of action and purpose and interaction with an external world. We summarize these things as a single word 'apprehension' which we then take to describe a strictly internal state. But that is because we have abstracted away the circumstances that give the meaning. There are difference cirmcustances that would give the same hightened states. Whilst I am of course in sympathy with the larger import of you're saying, Brent, I'm not sure how it's relevant to the intentionally more restricted focus of the current discussion. It is by definition true that fine-grained differences below these levels, as might differ in others, are irrelevant to the experience. My point still is that a complete physical theory of consciousness would be capable of explicating - both in general physical principles and in detail - the relation between coarse and fine-grained physical accounts of an experiential state, whatever the wider context in which it might be embedded. Or IOW, of explaining what physical principles and processes are responsible for the fineness of fine graining and the coarseness of coarse graining. CTM doesn't appear to offer any
