Re: [Fis] FW: Fw: Definition of Knowledge?
Dear Stan. Loet, List ... It is simply incorrect to assume that language distinguishes our species. Many species make use of language and, within the limits of physiology, construct marks to communicate persistently with other members of their species. It is the opposable thumb and other aspects of our physical structure that enable us to write books, print, construct libraries, etc... The notion of person-independent knowledge makes little sense to me. If there is a consistency between the knowledge that I embody and the knowledge that Loet embodies it is due entirely to a regularity in our personal behaviors derived from a commonality of relevant physical structure and common habit. Common habit is still person dependent. I have never understood the idea of biosemiotics. This, or any other qualified semeiotic, seems to introduce a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of semeiotic theory. With respect, Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info http://senses.info On Oct 7, 2009, at 1:44 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote: S: The difference between us and animals is basically language. S: Why not 'check out' 'Biosemiotics'? STAN Dear Stan, I don't understand the bio in this. If we distinguish between two systems of reference for knowledge -- discursive knowledge to be attributed to interhuman communication, and personal knowledge to be attributed to human psychologies -- the latter one is biologically embedded by the body, but the former is only embedded by human minds (which are of course embodied). Knowledge can then also be globalized and become person-independent. In other words: discursive knowledge is generated bottom-up, but control can be top-down. Shouldn't it therefore be psycho-semiotics? Bio-semiotics is only valid for personalized knowledge. (For the good order, let me hasten to add that the two systems of knowledge -- the interpersonal and the personal ones -- are reflexive to each other.) Best wishes, Loet Loet Leydesdorff Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] FW: Fw: Definition of Knowledge?Chrysippus's dog
Stanley, Christophe
simpler forms of knowledge management as existing in animals?
I agree natural language probably separates hominids from other primates etc. But what about 'information'?
And inferencing? Remember 'Chrysippus's dog' who infers to the best explanation (abduction) when on reaching ajunction of threepathssniffstwo for the scent of his prey thenrushes off down the third without sniffing further.
I once tried a number of similarexperiments with my intelligent curly-coated retriever and a tennis ball. Smart dog! She understood the idea of variation (hiding the ball in different spots) within theconstraint of my back yard.
And what's to say thatcellular entities such as astrocytes,chaperone cells and telomeresare not also 'inferencing' ininformational situations like calcium signalling,protein foldingand cell ageing? Let alone my GPS's cybernetic navigational ability.Maybe our existing concepts of information are 'human all too human'.Chrysippus of Soli attributed 'psyche' to animals (from 'animus') and 'pneuma' (soul) to human beings. Reportedly he died laughing while watching a donkey trying to eat figs (after the animal was plied with alcohol - inferencing to the best drink ?)
bridge knowledge with meaning generation, information/knowledge
I agree that semantic networks are a more fruitful approach to the information/meaning problem than DIK. I have yet to find any convincing study which verifies an intrinsic relationship between Data Information and Knowledge (let alone Wisdom). The 'DIK triangle' (the basis of informatics) is IMO a contrived infertile notion. Neither am I convinced (like Rafael) by the Dretske/Floridi attempts to understand the phenomenon of information from the POV of traditional (and Shannon-driven) semantics ('grammatically meaningful statements'). IMO we need to develop a comprehensive Grammar of Information which embraces not only semantics and syntax but also modality, case, aspect , tense etc and looks at the language of informational states, objects, events, experiences and processes throughout thebiosphere, physiosphere, sociosphere etc. A number of recent developments in dynamic andevidential linguistics, media communication studies and Social Information(like Scott Lash's 'information critique' and Dave Weinberger's 'third order of order' ) are pointing to a new,more non-linear approach to the information/communication interplay which FIS should map into its current ICT agenda for discussion and research.
Best
John H
On Wed Oct 7 3:39 , sent:
Christophe --
Dear FIS colleagues,
Knowledge is a wide and interesting subject as applied to us humans. But what
about knowledge in the world of animals ?
What about an evolutionary approach to knowledge that takes into account
simpler forms of knowledge management as existing in animals ?
S: Any property we must have, necessarily had to evolve from precursor
systems in our ancestors. This is the 'logic' here. These systems need not have
had exactly the same function as with us, but they still would count as 'proto-
knowledge'.
We Humans can consciously manageknowledge. But the performance of human
consciousness does not imply that knowledge is absent in animals. We also
manage knowledge unconsciously.
And knowledge is a personal and social construction. It is a tool we use all the
time in our everyday life to satisfy various constraints. For finding our way in a
city as well as for doing math. We acquire and use knowledge automatically as
well as consciously by introspection. But the difference is more about
complexity than about nature. In both cases we manage meaningful information
for some purpose.
S: The difference between us and animals is basically language.
Animals also have constraints to satisfy, the key one being to stay alive.
S: Darwinians would say 'to reproduce'.
Most animals miss a conscious self to be in a position of conscious
introspection (perhaps some of our cousins like chimpanzee or bonobo have a
minimum sense of conscious self that allow them a minimum of introspection).
S; As a bird watcher, I am convinced that some of the larger birds (jays and
crows, parrots) are able to think as individuals different from other individuals
("This is mine -- go away!"). I have watched jays handle peanuts, comparing
their weights, presumably to see which one is heaviest. And so 'heaviness' has a
meaning to the jay not directly related to eating, because it buries most of them
for the future. Thus, it has knowledge of locations as well as anticipation..
So I feel that the concept of knowledge deserves being addressed in an
evolutionary background in order to allow a bottom-up approach highlighting
simpler cases than human one (just to work as long as possible without the
“hard problem”, and bring it back in explicitly later). Animals are submitted to
constraint satisfaction processes as we humans are(with different constraints
coming in
Re: [Fis] FW: Fw: Definition of Knowledge?
Loet, Karl, Steven -- S: The difference between us and animals is basically language. S: Why not 'check out' 'Biosemiotics'? STAN Dear Stan, I don't understand the bio in this. If we distinguish between two systems of reference for knowledge -- discursive knowledge to be attributed to interhuman communication, and personal knowledge to be attributed to human psychologies -- the latter one is biologically embedded by the body, but the former is only embedded by human minds (which are of course embodied). Knowledge can then also be globalized and become person-independent. In other words: discursive knowledge is generated bottom-up, but control can be top-down. S: You raise a ramifying issue here. Your focus here is on discursive knowledge, which is mediated by language (and its attendant developments). Inasmuch as it learned by individuals, it is top down. It is society's way of inhabiting minds. It is our main means of getting outside ourselves; language is our major externalizing medium. Internally we have intimations, intuitions, etc. These may come to be harnessed by linguistic forms, top-down. Internal excursions unharnessed by language are the basis of creativity and criminality. Note that in language we do make a functional distinction here: the internal is carried by the First Person, present progressive tense, the external in Third Person, universal present tense reports. These cannot be mixed, although one can be bracketed within the other. In our culture the external is privileged (except in, e.g., modern poetry). Shouldn't it therefore be psycho-semiotics? Bio-semiotics is only valid for personalized knowledge. Here I must inform you that biosemiotics has two prongs. Originally (von Uexküll) it was about ethology, more latterly it is based in the 'language' of genetics and DNA. All of this was/is external, discursive. I think I can say that there is as yet no 'psychosemiotics', in the sense I think you mean it, as such. Semiotics is taken to be about communication and interpretation. (For the good order, let me hasten to add that the two systems of knowledge -- the interpersonal and the personal ones -- are reflexive to each other.) Yes. Internally one might -- in the discursive, Third Person mode -- try to interpret one's feelings and intuitions. But this the external reaching in, controlling from outside. - Karl -- replying in part: -snip- The difference between us and animals is that we can exchange foreground and background and discuss how the world changes - in our perception, not really. We can step back from the artefacts of our perceptional apparatus and try to see white on black and not only black on white. Then we could discuss how the world presents itself if we use TWO ways of reading the mixture of black/white patterns. von Uexküll showed that each species lives in its own 'innenwelt'. So each kind of animal has a different mind than any other. If we could put all the minds together, we still would not have a complete view of existence (all those species now extinct!). That what is the collection of what we know and can know is delineated by the rules by which we contrast the foreground to the background. These rules could be quite different in different species. - Steven -- answering in part -- Dear Stan. Loet, List ... I have never understood the idea of biosemiotics. This, or any other qualified semeiotic, seems to introduce a fundamental misunderstanding about the nature of semeiotic theory. These terms have come about because of the natural tendency of discourses to fragment into specialities. Thus, for some, biosemiotics centers around intracell communication based in the DNA 'language'. Several specializations are becoming distinguished -- 'physiosemiotics', 'biosemiotics', 'anthroposemiotics'. This makes sense from an evolutionary, and materialist, point of view. If humans have a property, then our ancestral systems must have had precursor systems from which these evolved. STAN ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] FW: Fw: Definition of Knowledge?Chrysippus's dog
Why not situation theory, or Barwise and Seligman's channel theory? Jacob john.holg...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Stanley, Christophe IMO we need to develop a comprehensive Grammar of Information which embraces not only semantics and syntax but also modality, case, aspect , tense etc and looks at the language of informational states, objects, events, experiences and processes throughout the biosphere, physiosphere, sociosphere etc. ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
Re: [Fis] FW: Fw: Definition of Knowledge?Chrysippus's dog
I would second that. There are some relevant papers on my home page: http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/InformationCausationComputation.pdf http://logica.ugent.be/philosophica/fulltexts/75-4.pdf http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/papers/Information%20in%20Biological%20Systems.pdf John At 07:46 PM 2009/10/07, Jacob Lee wrote: Why not situation theory, or Barwise and Seligman's channel theory? Jacob john.holg...@ozemail.com.au wrote: Stanley, Christophe IMO we need to develop a comprehensive Grammar of Information which embraces not only semantics and syntax but also modality, case, aspect , tense etc and looks at the language of informational states, objects, events, experiences and processes throughout the biosphere, physiosphere, sociosphere etc. ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis -- Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292 F: +27 (31) 260 3031 http://www.ukzn.ac.za/undphil/collier/index.html ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
[Fis] FW: Fw: Definition of Knowledge?
Dear FIS colleagues, Knowledge is a wide and interesting subject as applied to us humans. But what about knowledge in the world of animals ? What about an evolutionary approach to knowledge that takes into account simpler forms of knowledge management as existing in animals ? We Humans can consciously manage knowledge. But the performance of human consciousness does not imply that knowledge is absent in animals. We also manage knowledge unconsciously. And knowledge is a personal and social construction. It is a tool we use all the time in our everyday life to satisfy various constraints. For finding our way in a city as well as for doing math. We acquire and use knowledge automatically as well as consciously by introspection. But the difference is more about complexity than about nature. In both cases we manage meaningful information for some purpose. Animals also have constraints to satisfy, the key one being to stay alive. Most animals miss a conscious self to be in a position of conscious introspection (perhaps some of our cousins like chimpanzee or bonobo have a minimum sense of conscious self that allow them a minimum of introspection). So I feel that the concept of knowledge deserves being addressed in an evolutionary background in order to allow a bottom-up approach highlighting simpler cases than human one (just to work as long as possible without the “hard problem”, and bring it back in explicitly later). Animals are submitted to constraint satisfaction processes as we humans are (with different constraints coming in addition). So the foundations of knowledge look to me as constraint satisfaction driven. Such a bottom-up approach allows to bridge knowledge with meaning generation, and perhaps what is available for the latter can be used for the former (http://cogprints.org/6279/2/MGS.pdf). Following the same thread, let me tell you also about an extension of the notion of meaningful information to the one of meaningful representation. It is proposed that a meaningful representation of an entity for an agent submitted to constraints is the network of meanings relative to that entity. These networks of meanings contain the dynamic aspect of meaning generation with the consequences of implemented actions, as well the action scenarios with past experiences or simulations making available anticipation performances. We are far from the GOFAI types of representations. Such meaningful representations are interactive and imbed the agent in its environment (more on this at http://www.idt.mdh.se/ECAP-2005/INFOCOMPBOOK/CHAPTERS/MenantChristophe.pdf). To echo Jose Maria, we could consider that meaningful information and representations are somehow ‘nourishing’ knowledge. All the best Christophe Date: Tue, 6 Oct 2009 12:32:46 +0200 From: jnaf...@uax.es To: fis@listas.unizar.es Subject: [Fis] Fw: Definition of Knowledge? (FIS Digest, Vol 530, Issue 1) -- Mensaje reenviado -- De: Rafael Capurro raf...@capurro.de Fecha: 6 de octubre de 2009 02:28 Asunto: Re: [Fis] Definition of Knowledge? (FIS Digest, Vol 530, Issue 1) Para: José María Díaz Nafría jnaf...@uax.es dear jose maria and fis colleagues, greetings from japan I very much agree with pedro's suggestions about naturalizing the concept of knowledge i.e. of not reducing it to the propositional traditional (platonic and partly arisotelian) concept (as suggested also by floridi building a hierarchy where the top is propositional scientific knowledge). the concept of implicit knowldge or fore-knowledge in hermeneutic terms is a key issue that links in some way the 'typical' human propositional knowledge with knowledged in non-human agents. we should diversify our concepts and avoid hierarchical and dogmatic human-centered views also through a classic connection of data becoming information becoming knowledge, where 'becoming' is some kind of black box that explains nothing. kind regards rafael Zitat von José María Díaz Nafría jnaf...@uax.es: Dear FIS colleagues: I apologize for being so quiet, considering the interesting topics arisen with the occasion of our proposal to the COST open call of past March, which we thank once again. This proposal as revisited by FIS came to coincide in time with a call for themes proposal by the European Science Foundation (Eurocores Theme Proposal), which we also presented with a short timing. We may not succeed in the first attempt, but anyhow it aims at opening a new scientific topic in the ESF. If the proposed theme were selected, new projects in the delimited field (well fitted to FIS interests) from any European state could be presented to joint the research network. I say that, to justify our silence in the FIS arena, while we were actually working on it, although in the background. Afterwards, it was too late to answer, when already other issues were under discussion… To keep on the argument
Re: [Fis] FW: Fw: Definition of Knowledge?
S: The difference between us and animals is basically language. S: Why not 'check out' 'Biosemiotics'? STAN Dear Stan, I don't understand the bio in this. If we distinguish between two systems of reference for knowledge -- discursive knowledge to be attributed to interhuman communication, and personal knowledge to be attributed to human psychologies -- the latter one is biologically embedded by the body, but the former is only embedded by human minds (which are of course embodied). Knowledge can then also be globalized and become person-independent. In other words: discursive knowledge is generated bottom-up, but control can be top-down. Shouldn't it therefore be psycho-semiotics? Bio-semiotics is only valid for personalized knowledge. (For the good order, let me hasten to add that the two systems of knowledge -- the interpersonal and the personal ones -- are reflexive to each other.) Best wishes, Loet Loet Leydesdorff Amsterdam School of Communications Research (ASCoR), Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam. Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-20- 525 3681 l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ ___ fis mailing list fis@listas.unizar.es https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
