Re: [Fis] there is no need to number every word

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Alex,


> On 16 Feb 2018, at 06:18, Alex Hankey  wrote:
> 
> But Bruno, to harp on an old point, 
> "mathematicians (and their “dreams”)" 
> implies the world of 'ideas’,

Yes. You can identify the ideas with the program, and thus with the numbers 
once you fix some base (any Turing universal system) to provide the universal 
enumeration of all programs.



> and 
> as I have said, those are not in 
> the world of 'arithmetic’,

They are. The notion of program, execution of programs, … are all purely 
arithmetical notion at the start. Gödel did not saw this because in 1931 he 
missed the thesis of Church-Turing (but got it in 1936 after reading Turing’s 
paper). 



> in the sense 
> that they are not described by 
> digital information, 
> but by catastrophes.  


What are you basic assumptions in metaphysics?
Is it the notion of catastrophe of René Thom? That does not exist in 
arithmetic, but that do exist in the phenomenology of the numbers (trivially). 
To make it non trivial, and keep Mechanism, we would need to prove that the 
histories where such catastrophe plays a role have a measure near one. That is 
possible, but premature in the study of the physics apparent for the numbers.

Of course, you can also reject Mechanism, but then you need a theory of mind 
for some non mechanical entities, which you need to assume, and that seems to 
me premature, and doubly so given that Mechanism explains a very startling 
aspect of nature (the quantum aspect);

Bruno


>  
> 
> On 15 February 2018 at 15:14, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > On 13 Feb 2018, at 04:46, mihir chakraborty  > > wrote:
> >
> > Dear Friends,
> >
> > i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done
> > by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?
> 
> Yes, good point. And that made possible the arithmetization of 
> metamathematics, which is a sort of embedding of the mathematician in 
> arithmetic, a bit like Everett Quantum Mechanics (like the Newtonian physics 
> by default) embeds the physicists in the physical reality (but if we claim 
> that the wave packet reduction is physical and not psychological, this is no 
> more true, and the early QM was rather dualist).
> 
> If we postulate Mechanism, the embedding of the mathematicians (and his 
> “dreams”) in the arithmetical realm eventually makes physics into a branch of 
> the (classical and general) information science (including computer science). 
> The universal numbers are responsible for associating a variety of meanings 
> to finite pieces of codes.
> 
> The whole work of Gödel is very important, and I think that it changes 
> everything. Ultimately, it makes physics into a derivable science, indeed 
> derivable from "machine psychology or theology” itself derivable 
> constructively from elementary arithmetic. You can search may many papers on 
> this. Physics becomes a first person statistics on some first person 
> experiences. That makes Mechanism into a testable hypothesis, and Quantum 
> Mechanics confirms it, up to now.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >
> > mihir
> >
> > On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov > 
> > wrote:
> >> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
> >> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
> >> But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
> >> Because ... All words are already numbered
> >> We have published large monograph named
> >> “Natural Language Addressing”
> >> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and
> >> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
> >> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm 
> >> .
> >> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer
> >> we enter not letters but their codes.
> >> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
> >> It really works!!!
> >> Friendly greetings
> >> Krassimir
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Karl Javorszky
> >> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
> >> To: Stanley N Salthe
> >> Cc: fis
> >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
> >> the cateogry theory
> >>
> >> Using the logical language to understand Nature
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms 
> >> “symbol”,
> >> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, 
> >> because
> >> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great
> >> works.
> >>
> >> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
> >> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
> >> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
> >> 

Re: [Fis] there is no need to number every word

[Louis Kauffman]

Dear Alex,
To add my 2 cents: Please note that it is your theory that the world of ideas 
is described by “catastrophes” and it is Bruno’s theory that the world of ideas 
is
described by the full Goedelian encoding of formal systems. In Bruno’s theory 
the world of ideas are in ‘arithmetic’ in this extended sense of an arithmetic 
that can refer to itself 
via the Goedelian encoding. Nobody is wrong yet!
Best,
Lou Kauffman

> On Feb 16, 2018, at 6:18 AM, Alex Hankey  wrote:
> 
> But Bruno, to harp on an old point, 
> "mathematicians (and their “dreams”)" 
> implies the world of 'ideas', and 
> as I have said, those are not in 
> the world of 'arithmetic', in the sense 
> that they are not described by 
> digital information, 
> but by catastrophes.  
>  
> 
> On 15 February 2018 at 15:14, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > On 13 Feb 2018, at 04:46, mihir chakraborty  > > wrote:
> >
> > Dear Friends,
> >
> > i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done
> > by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?
> 
> Yes, good point. And that made possible the arithmetization of 
> metamathematics, which is a sort of embedding of the mathematician in 
> arithmetic, a bit like Everett Quantum Mechanics (like the Newtonian physics 
> by default) embeds the physicists in the physical reality (but if we claim 
> that the wave packet reduction is physical and not psychological, this is no 
> more true, and the early QM was rather dualist).
> 
> If we postulate Mechanism, the embedding of the mathematicians (and his 
> “dreams”) in the arithmetical realm eventually makes physics into a branch of 
> the (classical and general) information science (including computer science). 
> The universal numbers are responsible for associating a variety of meanings 
> to finite pieces of codes.
> 
> The whole work of Gödel is very important, and I think that it changes 
> everything. Ultimately, it makes physics into a derivable science, indeed 
> derivable from "machine psychology or theology” itself derivable 
> constructively from elementary arithmetic. You can search may many papers on 
> this. Physics becomes a first person statistics on some first person 
> experiences. That makes Mechanism into a testable hypothesis, and Quantum 
> Mechanics confirms it, up to now.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> >
> > mihir
> >
> > On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov > 
> > wrote:
> >> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
> >> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
> >> But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
> >> Because ... All words are already numbered
> >> We have published large monograph named
> >> “Natural Language Addressing”
> >> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and
> >> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
> >> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm 
> >> .
> >> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer
> >> we enter not letters but their codes.
> >> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
> >> It really works!!!
> >> Friendly greetings
> >> Krassimir
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Karl Javorszky
> >> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
> >> To: Stanley N Salthe
> >> Cc: fis
> >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
> >> the cateogry theory
> >>
> >> Using the logical language to understand Nature
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms 
> >> “symbol”,
> >> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, 
> >> because
> >> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great
> >> works.
> >>
> >> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
> >> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
> >> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
> >> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
> >> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
> >> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
> >> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
> >> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
> >> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
> >>
> >> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
> >> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
> >> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It 
> >> is
> >> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can 

Re: [Fis] there is no need to number every word

[Alex Hankey]

But Bruno, to harp on an old point,
"mathematicians (and their “dreams”)"
implies the world of 'ideas', and
as I have said, those are not in
the world of 'arithmetic', in the sense
that they are *not* described by
digital information,
but by catastrophes.


On 15 February 2018 at 15:14, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> > On 13 Feb 2018, at 04:46, mihir chakraborty  wrote:
> >
> > Dear Friends,
> >
> > i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done
> > by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?
>
> Yes, good point. And that made possible the arithmetization of
> metamathematics, which is a sort of embedding of the mathematician in
> arithmetic, a bit like Everett Quantum Mechanics (like the Newtonian
> physics by default) embeds the physicists in the physical reality (but if
> we claim that the wave packet reduction is physical and not psychological,
> this is no more true, and the early QM was rather dualist).
>
> If we postulate Mechanism, the embedding of the mathematicians (and his
> “dreams”) in the arithmetical realm eventually makes physics into a branch
> of the (classical and general) information science (including computer
> science). The universal numbers are responsible for associating a variety
> of meanings to finite pieces of codes.
>
> The whole work of Gödel is very important, and I think that it changes
> everything. Ultimately, it makes physics into a derivable science, indeed
> derivable from "machine psychology or theology” itself derivable
> constructively from elementary arithmetic. You can search may many papers
> on this. Physics becomes a first person statistics on some first person
> experiences. That makes Mechanism into a testable hypothesis, and Quantum
> Mechanics confirms it, up to now.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> >
> > mihir
> >
> > On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
> >> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
> >> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
> >> But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
> >> Because ... All words are already numbered
> >> We have published large monograph named
> >> “Natural Language Addressing”
> >> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and
> >> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
> >> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm.
> >> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the
> computer
> >> we enter not letters but their codes.
> >> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
> >> It really works!!!
> >> Friendly greetings
> >> Krassimir
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> From: Karl Javorszky
> >> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
> >> To: Stanley N Salthe
> >> Cc: fis
> >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on
> >> the cateogry theory
> >>
> >> Using the logical language to understand Nature
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms
> “symbol”,
> >> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development,
> because
> >> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great
> >> works.
> >>
> >> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
> >> languages and the development of philosophy into specific
> sub-philosophies.
> >> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
> >> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this,
> he
> >> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
> >> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away
> on
> >> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
> >> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are
> anyway
> >> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
> >>
> >> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation
> of
> >> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
> >> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing.
> It is
> >> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
> >> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
> >> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been
> true.
> >> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
> >> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
> >> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be
> surprised
> >> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the
> finding
> >> so long.
> >>
> >> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
> >> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
> >> results show, that if one uses 

Re: [Fis] there is no need to number every word

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 13 Feb 2018, at 04:46, mihir chakraborty  wrote:
> 
> Dear Friends,
> 
> i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done
> by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?

Yes, good point. And that made possible the arithmetization of metamathematics, 
which is a sort of embedding of the mathematician in arithmetic, a bit like 
Everett Quantum Mechanics (like the Newtonian physics by default) embeds the 
physicists in the physical reality (but if we claim that the wave packet 
reduction is physical and not psychological, this is no more true, and the 
early QM was rather dualist).

If we postulate Mechanism, the embedding of the mathematicians (and his 
“dreams”) in the arithmetical realm eventually makes physics into a branch of 
the (classical and general) information science (including computer science). 
The universal numbers are responsible for associating a variety of meanings to 
finite pieces of codes. 

The whole work of Gödel is very important, and I think that it changes 
everything. Ultimately, it makes physics into a derivable science, indeed 
derivable from "machine psychology or theology” itself derivable constructively 
from elementary arithmetic. You can search may many papers on this. Physics 
becomes a first person statistics on some first person experiences. That makes 
Mechanism into a testable hypothesis, and Quantum Mechanics confirms it, up to 
now.

Bruno




> 
> mihir
> 
> On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
>> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
>> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
>> But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
>> Because ... All words are already numbered
>> We have published large monograph named
>> “Natural Language Addressing”
>> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and
>> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
>> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm.
>> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer
>> we enter not letters but their codes.
>> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
>> It really works!!!
>> Friendly greetings
>> Krassimir
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> From: Karl Javorszky
>> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
>> To: Stanley N Salthe
>> Cc: fis
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
>> the cateogry theory
>> 
>> Using the logical language to understand Nature
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms “symbol”,
>> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, because
>> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great
>> works.
>> 
>> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
>> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
>> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
>> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
>> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
>> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
>> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
>> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
>> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
>> 
>> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
>> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
>> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is
>> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
>> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
>> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
>> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
>> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
>> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised
>> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding
>> so long.
>> 
>> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
>> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
>> results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical
>> words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial
>> problem. This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a
>> tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in
>> a semantic fashion.
>> 
>> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that Wittgenstein
>> suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real philosophy
>> has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical 

Re: [Fis] there is no need to number every word

[mihir chakraborty]

Dear Friends,

i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done
by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?

mihir

On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov  wrote:
> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
> But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
> Because ... All words are already numbered
> We have published large monograph named
> “Natural Language Addressing”
> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and
> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm.
> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer
> we enter not letters but their codes.
> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
> It really works!!!
> Friendly greetings
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Karl Javorszky
> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
> To: Stanley N Salthe
> Cc: fis
> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
> the cateogry theory
>
> Using the logical language to understand Nature
>
>
>
> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms “symbol”,
> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, because
> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great
> works.
>
> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
>
>
>
> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
>
> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is
> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised
> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding
> so long.
>
> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
> results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical
> words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial
> problem. This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a
> tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in
> a semantic fashion.
>
> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that Wittgenstein
> suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real philosophy
> has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical sentences or
> otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside philosophy, namely
> number theory. If every concept can be represented by a number, and valid
> sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers are satisfied,
> then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out later for what
> they stand.
>
> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The only
> noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that old
> dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering
> layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too
> high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that
> one executes by routine.
>
> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible
> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to
> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could
> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority
> readiness One into priority readiness Two.
>
> There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the
> field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of
> reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the
> concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a
> reorder. Cycles that