Dear Alex, To add my 2 cents: Please note that it is your theory that the world of ideas is described by “catastrophes” and it is Bruno’s theory that the world of ideas is described by the full Goedelian encoding of formal systems. In Bruno’s theory the world of ideas are in ‘arithmetic’ in this extended sense of an arithmetic that can refer to itself via the Goedelian encoding. Nobody is wrong yet! Best, Lou Kauffman
> On Feb 16, 2018, at 6:18 AM, Alex Hankey <alexhan...@gmail.com> wrote: > > But Bruno, to harp on an old point, > "mathematicians (and their “dreams”)" > implies the world of 'ideas', and > as I have said, those are not in > the world of 'arithmetic', in the sense > that they are not described by > digital information, > but by catastrophes. > > > On 15 February 2018 at 15:14, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be > <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote: > > > On 13 Feb 2018, at 04:46, mihir chakraborty <mihi...@gmail.com > > <mailto:mihi...@gmail.com>> wrote: > > > > Dear Friends, > > > > i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done > > by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ? > > Yes, good point. And that made possible the arithmetization of > metamathematics, which is a sort of embedding of the mathematician in > arithmetic, a bit like Everett Quantum Mechanics (like the Newtonian physics > by default) embeds the physicists in the physical reality (but if we claim > that the wave packet reduction is physical and not psychological, this is no > more true, and the early QM was rather dualist). > > If we postulate Mechanism, the embedding of the mathematicians (and his > “dreams”) in the arithmetical realm eventually makes physics into a branch of > the (classical and general) information science (including computer science). > The universal numbers are responsible for associating a variety of meanings > to finite pieces of codes. > > The whole work of Gödel is very important, and I think that it changes > everything. Ultimately, it makes physics into a derivable science, indeed > derivable from "machine psychology or theology” itself derivable > constructively from elementary arithmetic. You can search may many papers on > this. Physics becomes a first person statistics on some first person > experiences. That makes Mechanism into a testable hypothesis, and Quantum > Mechanics confirms it, up to now. > > Bruno > > > > > > > > mihir > > > > On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov <mar...@foibg.com <mailto:mar...@foibg.com>> > > wrote: > >> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues, > >> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis! > >> But, I think, there is no need to number every word. > >> Because ... All words are already numbered > >> We have published large monograph named > >> “Natural Language Addressing” > >> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and > >> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData). > >> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm > >> <http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm>. > >> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer > >> we enter not letters but their codes. > >> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system. > >> It really works!!! > >> Friendly greetings > >> Krassimir > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> From: Karl Javorszky > >> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM > >> To: Stanley N Salthe > >> Cc: fis > >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on > >> the cateogry theory > >> > >> Using the logical language to understand Nature > >> > >> > >> > >> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms > >> “symbol”, > >> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, > >> because > >> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great > >> works. > >> > >> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical > >> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies. > >> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps. > >> > >> > >> > >> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by > >> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he > >> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that > >> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on > >> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is > >> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway > >> self-evident and cannot be otherwise. > >> > >> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of > >> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate > >> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It > >> is > >> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a > >> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only > >> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true. > >> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an > >> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an > >> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be > >> surprised > >> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the > >> finding > >> so long. > >> > >> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are > >> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his > >> results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical > >> words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a > >> combinatorial > >> problem. This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a > >> tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in > >> a semantic fashion. > >> > >> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that > >> Wittgenstein > >> suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real > >> philosophy > >> has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical sentences or > >> otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside philosophy, namely > >> number theory. If every concept can be represented by a number, and valid > >> sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers are satisfied, > >> then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out later for what > >> they stand. > >> > >> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The only > >> noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that old > >> dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering > >> layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too > >> high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that > >> one executes by routine. > >> > >> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible > >> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to > >> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could > >> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority > >> readiness One into priority readiness Two. > >> > >> There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the > >> field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of > >> reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the > >> concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a > >> reorder. Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each other. > >> Learning is based on the concept of associations. Being an element in the > >> corpus of a cycle may well be the formal explanation for a property of > >> being > >> associated with. > >> > >> Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place, > >> relation to potential successors, …} {symbol, signal, mass, impact, > >> chemical > >> valence, predictability, energy level, information content,…} is of > >> secondary importance. As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to > >> make sure that we all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one. > >> The next task is to make sure that we all perceive the same picture. As the > >> kaleidoscope produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge that one > >> can be expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we all observe > >> the same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to name the > >> facts > >> of perception. > >> > >> The present problem is not with the inability of the logical language to > >> process that what we wish to discuss. The present task is to realise that > >> one needs a clear idea before one enters the struggle to express it > >> clearly. > >> The unveiling has been done. Now the interested public is invited to look > >> at > >> the picture. > >> > >> Once one has answered the dilemma: “On Tuesdays, this here cup is to the > >> left of the screen, because Tuesdays I order things on their colour; on > >> Wednesdays the same cup is to the right of the screen for its size, because > >> on Wednesdays I order things on their size: so, which is the correct place > >> of this cup, actually?”; once on has figured this out – that namely the cup > >> would be oscillating between its two places, or take up a position on a > >> plane with axes: colour, size -, then one has done great strides towards > >> understanding that “symbol”, “sign”, “signal” etc. are surface concepts, > >> while the underlying deep concepts have to do with sequencing and the > >> mechanics of re-sequencing, which means cycles, rhythms and periodicities. > >> > >> > >> > >> We all know that the DNA is a sequence. Then, if one wants to understand > >> how > >> the DNA functions, one had better resign to the fact that one has to deal > >> with sequences, whether one likes the topic or not. As there can be nothing > >> philosophically new in the explanation of how the DNA works, the only > >> subject that needs investigation is, why one has such a reticence to deal > >> with places, priorities, rankings, order, first and last becoming last and > >> first, etc. Maybe the door to the edifice of insights on how the interplay > >> between mixtures and sequences actually works and what this interplay > >> produces; maybe this door opens from a well-barricaded corridor within the > >> cellar of the sub-conscious, hidden among some skeletons of {to have sunken > >> low, defeats of self-esteem, to have been downgraded, to be among the last, > >> to be a low-ranking individual, etc.}. One of the techniques of influencing > >> people with low self-esteem is to encourage them to find the discipline in > >> which they are really good. In how many ways can a person be classified and > >> how many of these ranking results are contradictory? Is the concept of > >> cognitive dissonance linked to the similarity of two orders? Number theory > >> should jump onto the subject of intermediate states between two differing > >> permutations, as it is intimately connected with the subject of how DNA > >> functions. Which names fit best the patterns we observe while doing > >> manifold > >> re-orderings is presently of a secondary importance. Of primary importance > >> is presently to observe, what happens if a sequence is turned into a > >> different sequence. After all, we deal with sequences, don’t we. > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> 2018-02-10 16:24 GMT+01:00 Stanley N Salthe <ssal...@binghamton.edu > >> <mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu>>: > >> > >> Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically, > >> as: > >> > >> In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in > >> other ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus > >> (using > >> the compositional hierarchy): > >> > >> > >> [information [language [signal]]] > >> > >> > >> Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be > >> understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs. > >> > >> > >> (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’, > >> where: > >> > >> > >> [sign [information [...]]] ) > >> > >> > >> Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy): > >> > >> > >> {language {signal {information}}} > >> > >> > >> Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations, > >> so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information > >> (informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations. > >> > >> > >> STAN > >> > >> > >> > >> On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn > >> <mailto:y...@pku.edu.cn>> wrote: > >> > >> Dear Colleagues, > >> > >> I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana > >> recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination > >> with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human > >> language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone: > >> > >> In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved > >> multiple languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and > >> interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various > >> biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such > >> as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera > >> signaling. > >> > >> I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the > >> concept information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or signaling) 55 > >> times, so we have to review the history and application of “information” > >> and > >> “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to understand > >> the > >> relationship between language, signal, and information. > >> > >> The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can > >> be traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and > >> endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of > >> Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in > >> Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since > >> then, the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and > >> biochemistry. > >> > >> As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to > >> its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used > >> to > >> employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From the > >> tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal transduction > >> study of cells is only equivalent to the level of telecommunications before > >> 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's information theory, the > >> central issue of telecommunications is "signal" rather than "information". > >> After that, the central issue of telecommunications is "information" rather > >> than "signal". > >> > >> According to the application history of information concept, nearly all > >> the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger, > >> signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem > >> what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the > >> information. > >> > >> > >> > >> For the same reason, I recommend another two papers: > >> > >> 1. Do Plants Think? (June 5, 2012, Scientific American) > >> > >> > >> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b > >> > >> <http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b>） > >> > >> 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn (December 3, 2014, New Scientist) > >> > >> > >> (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn > >> > >> <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn>) > >> > >> From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists. > >> > >> > >> > >> Best wishes, > >> > >> Xueshan > >> > >> > >> > >> From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es > >> <mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es> [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es > >> <mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es>] > >> On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji > >> Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM > >> To: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com > >> <mailto:13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>>; Terrence W. DEACON > >> <dea...@berkeley.edu <mailto:dea...@berkeley.edu>> > >> Cc: Fis, <fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>> > >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based > >> on the cateogry theory > >> > >> > >> > >> Hi Terry, and FISers, > >> > >> > >> > >> Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife > >> that, in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can > >> kill? > >> > >> > >> > >> All the best. > >> > >> > >> > >> Sung > >> > >> > >> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> > >> From: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com > >> <mailto:13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>> > >> Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM > >> To: Terrence W. DEACON > >> Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji > >> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based > >> on the cateogry theory > >> > >> > >> > >> Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, > >> > >> è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of > >> information è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e > >> seguita da un sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si > >> ha un processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non > >> significa necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un > >> Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra > >> macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal > >> caso non si ha significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di > >> informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario > >> che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo > >> di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica > >> autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che > >> l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o > >> tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che > >> biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o > >> specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della > >> significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è > >> impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una > >> semiotica della significazione. > >> > >> Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. > >> Umberto Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della > >> scienza economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza > >> dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). > >> Nello mio stesso libro si trovano: > >> > >> - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si > >> colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di > >> significazione e i processi di comunicazione; > >> > >> - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la > >> neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova > >> epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130). > >> > >> Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio > >> scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che > >> mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto più grande > >> del > >> (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie. > >> > >> Un saluto affettuoso. > >> > >> Francecso > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> 2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu > >> <mailto:dea...@berkeley.edu>>: > >> > >> Dear FISers, > >> > >> > >> > >> In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model > >> for building a general theory of information. > >> > >> Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a > >> claim that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it > >> can be causally misleading. > >> > >> I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and > >> evolution of the human language capacity. > >> > >> And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic > >> Species. > >> > >> Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary > >> biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary > >> thinking. > >> > >> Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing > >> tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic > >> thinking as well. > >> > >> So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I > >> append the following excerpt from the book. > >> > >> > >> > >> "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for > >> analyzing other > >> > >> species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other > >> form of communication as > >> > >> exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent > >> case. No analytic method > >> > >> could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as > >> long as animals have > >> > >> interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been > >> around at least as long as frogs > >> > >> have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic > >> communication was an afterthought, > >> > >> so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an > >> ancient and well-established > >> > >> mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model > >> against which to assess > >> > >> other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, > >> and a quite anomalous > >> > >> exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with > >> respect to the extent they possess or > >> > >> lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the > >> types of hair on different mammals > >> > >> with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is > >> an understandable > >> > >> anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we > >> might see more typical wings > >> > >> and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced > >> adaptations—but it does more to > >> > >> obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so > >> should be analyzed as an > >> > >> exception to a more general rule, not vice versa." > >> > >> > >> > >> Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms. > >> > >> This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a > >> vast nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure. > >> > >> So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more > >> fundamental precursors. > >> > >> And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw > >> insight from this more familiar realm. > >> > >> I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that > >> assumes what it endeavors to explain. > >> > >> > >> > >> Regards to all, Terry > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero > >> <javierwe...@gmail.com <mailto:javierwe...@gmail.com>> wrote: > >> > >> In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, > >> though I am still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I > >> am afraid that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of > >> it I will lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here > >> it > >> comes: > >> > >> I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts > >> in which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many > >> contexts on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of > >> the > >> distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. Baecker > >> and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group that > >> what > >> information is depends on the system we are talking about. But the concept > >> of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has many sources > >> and types of information. > >> So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a > >> set of loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a > >> temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements. > >> Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by > >> RNA > >> to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate > >> cell. > >> We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a specific kind > >> of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or a set of > >> linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or discourse. > >> > >> The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as > >> information. Or even better, each type of medium produces information of > >> its > >> own kind. > >> According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. > >> It can only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference > >> that a medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. > >> A > >> medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can > >> couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic > >> manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions. > >> And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into information. > >> For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to > >> print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let us > >> say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking > >> cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social > >> practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the introduction > >> of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message > >> orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not the > >> same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to > >> face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if the > >> other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and > >> what > >> that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is being > >> sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special place, so > >> he > >> planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable > >> configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You > >> shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone in > >> her > >> room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And imagination > >> makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral > >> communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and > >> send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by > >> adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what > >> he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social > >> sciences because that is my research field, although I have the intuition > >> that it could also work for natural sciences. > >> > >> Best, > >> > >> JJ > >> > >> El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu > >> <mailto:s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu>> > >> escribió: > >> > >> Hi FISers, > >> > >> > >> > >> On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote: > >> > >> > >> > >> " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our > >> discussions and recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways > >> to many different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate > >> the framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological, > >> linguistic, etc. > >> > >> . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction > >> introduced by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though > >> it > >> too is in my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be > >> misleading when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less > >> linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the > >> division: i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and normative > >> analyses/properties of information." > >> > >> > >> > >> I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic > >> metaphor in defining "information". Although the linguistic metaphor has > >> its limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique > >> advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of > >> functions > >> (see the last column in Table 1.) > >> > >> > >> > >> The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied > >> theories of information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging > >> to > >> the same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically > >> represented as the 3-node closed network in the first column of Table 1. > >> > >> > >> > >> Table 1. The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible > >> Triadic Relation) as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell > >> language theory, and linguistics. > >> > >> Category Theory > >> > >> > >> f g > >> A -----> B ------> C > >> | ^ > >> | | > >> |______________| > >> h > >> > >> > >> > >> ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) > >> Deacon’s theory of information > >> Shannon’s > >> > >> Theory of > >> > >> information > >> Peirce’s theory of signs > >> Cell language theory > >> Human language > >> (Function) > >> > >> A > >> Intrinsic information > >> Source > >> Object > >> Nucleotides*/ > >> Amion acids > >> Letters > >> (Building blocks) > >> > >> B > >> Referential information > >> Message > >> Sign > >> Proteins > >> Words > >> (Denotation) > >> > >> C > >> Normative information > >> Receiver > >> Interpretant > >> Metabolomes > >> (Totality of cell metabolism) > >> Systems of words > >> (Decision making & Reasoning) > >> > >> f > >> ? > >> Encoding > >> Sign production > >> Physical laws > >> Second articulation > >> > >> g > >> ? > >> Decoding > >> Sign interpretation > >> Evoutionary selection > >> First and Third articulation > >> > >> h > >> ? > >> Information flow > >> Information flow > >> Inheritance > >> Grounding/ > >> > >> Habit > >> > >> Scale > >> Micro-Macro? > >> Macro > >> Macro > >> Micro > >> Macro > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides. > >> According to the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n > >> genetic > >> alphabets, each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn consisting > >> of n nucleotides. In this view, the classical genetic alphabet is just one > >> example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1. When n = 3, for > >> example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet with 4^3 = 64 > >> letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the familiar codon > >> table. Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not words as widely thought > >> (including myself until recently) but letters! It then follows that > >> proteins are words and metabolic pathways are sentences. Finally, the > >> transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as "hyperstructures" by > >> V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by me more recently) > >> correspond to texts essential to represent arguement/reasoning/computing. > >> What is most exciting is the recent discovery in my lab at Rutgers that the > >> so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of mRNA levels in living cells can > >> identify > >> function-dependent "hypermetabolic pathways" underlying breast cancer > >> before > >> and after drug treatment (manuscript under review). > >> > >> > >> > >> Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome. > >> > >> > >> > >> Sung > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> > >> Professor Terrence W. Deacon > >> University of California, Berkeley > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > >> -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >> _______________________________________________ > >> Fis mailing list > >> Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > >> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > >> <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis> > >> > > > > _______________________________________________ > > Fis mailing list > > Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis> > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es <mailto:Fis@listas.unizar.es> > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > <http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis> > > > > -- > Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.) > Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science, > SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle > Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India > Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195 > Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789 > ____________________________________________________________ > > 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics > and Phenomenological Philosophy > <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>_______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
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