Dear Friends, i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?
mihir On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov <mar...@foibg.com> wrote: > Dear Karl and FIS colleagues, > Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis! > But, I think, there is no need to number every word. > Because ... All words are already numbered > We have published large monograph named > “Natural Language Addressing” > where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and > computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData). > One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm. > The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer > we enter not letters but their codes. > This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system. > It really works!!! > Friendly greetings > Krassimir > > > > > > > > From: Karl Javorszky > Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM > To: Stanley N Salthe > Cc: fis > Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on > the cateogry theory > > Using the logical language to understand Nature > > > > The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms “symbol”, > “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, because > understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great > works. > > There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical > languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies. > The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps. > > > > Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by > investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he > has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that > Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on > the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is > opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway > self-evident and cannot be otherwise. > > The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of > the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate > about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is > true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a > logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only > point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true. > There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an > unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an > archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised > about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding > so long. > > As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are > well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his > results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical > words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial > problem. This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a > tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in > a semantic fashion. > > One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that Wittgenstein > suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real philosophy > has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical sentences or > otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside philosophy, namely > number theory. If every concept can be represented by a number, and valid > sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers are satisfied, > then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out later for what > they stand. > > This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The only > noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that old > dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering > layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too > high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that > one executes by routine. > > We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible > enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to > order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could > memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority > readiness One into priority readiness Two. > > There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the > field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of > reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the > concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a > reorder. Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each other. > Learning is based on the concept of associations. Being an element in the > corpus of a cycle may well be the formal explanation for a property of being > associated with. > > Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place, > relation to potential successors, …} {symbol, signal, mass, impact, chemical > valence, predictability, energy level, information content,…} is of > secondary importance. As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to > make sure that we all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one. > The next task is to make sure that we all perceive the same picture. As the > kaleidoscope produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge that one > can be expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we all observe > the same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to name the facts > of perception. > > The present problem is not with the inability of the logical language to > process that what we wish to discuss. The present task is to realise that > one needs a clear idea before one enters the struggle to express it clearly. > The unveiling has been done. Now the interested public is invited to look at > the picture. > > Once one has answered the dilemma: “On Tuesdays, this here cup is to the > left of the screen, because Tuesdays I order things on their colour; on > Wednesdays the same cup is to the right of the screen for its size, because > on Wednesdays I order things on their size: so, which is the correct place > of this cup, actually?”; once on has figured this out – that namely the cup > would be oscillating between its two places, or take up a position on a > plane with axes: colour, size -, then one has done great strides towards > understanding that “symbol”, “sign”, “signal” etc. are surface concepts, > while the underlying deep concepts have to do with sequencing and the > mechanics of re-sequencing, which means cycles, rhythms and periodicities. > > > > We all know that the DNA is a sequence. Then, if one wants to understand how > the DNA functions, one had better resign to the fact that one has to deal > with sequences, whether one likes the topic or not. As there can be nothing > philosophically new in the explanation of how the DNA works, the only > subject that needs investigation is, why one has such a reticence to deal > with places, priorities, rankings, order, first and last becoming last and > first, etc. Maybe the door to the edifice of insights on how the interplay > between mixtures and sequences actually works and what this interplay > produces; maybe this door opens from a well-barricaded corridor within the > cellar of the sub-conscious, hidden among some skeletons of {to have sunken > low, defeats of self-esteem, to have been downgraded, to be among the last, > to be a low-ranking individual, etc.}. One of the techniques of influencing > people with low self-esteem is to encourage them to find the discipline in > which they are really good. In how many ways can a person be classified and > how many of these ranking results are contradictory? Is the concept of > cognitive dissonance linked to the similarity of two orders? Number theory > should jump onto the subject of intermediate states between two differing > permutations, as it is intimately connected with the subject of how DNA > functions. Which names fit best the patterns we observe while doing manifold > re-orderings is presently of a secondary importance. Of primary importance > is presently to observe, what happens if a sequence is turned into a > different sequence. After all, we deal with sequences, don’t we. > > > > > 2018-02-10 16:24 GMT+01:00 Stanley N Salthe <ssal...@binghamton.edu>: > > Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically, > as: > > In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in > other ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus (using > the compositional hierarchy): > > > [information [language [signal]]] > > > Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be > understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs. > > > (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’, > where: > > > [sign [information [...]]] ) > > > Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy): > > > {language {signal {information}}} > > > Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations, > so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information > (informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations. > > > STAN > > > > On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn> wrote: > > Dear Colleagues, > > I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana > recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination > with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human > language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone: > > In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved > multiple languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and > interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various > biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such > as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera > signaling. > > I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the > concept information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or signaling) 55 > times, so we have to review the history and application of “information” and > “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to understand the > relationship between language, signal, and information. > > The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can > be traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and > endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of > Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in > Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since > then, the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and > biochemistry. > > As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to > its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used to > employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From the > tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal transduction > study of cells is only equivalent to the level of telecommunications before > 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's information theory, the > central issue of telecommunications is "signal" rather than "information". > After that, the central issue of telecommunications is "information" rather > than "signal". > > According to the application history of information concept, nearly all > the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger, > signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem > what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the > information. > > > > For the same reason, I recommend another two papers: > > 1. Do Plants Think? (June 5, 2012, Scientific American) > > > (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b） > > 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn (December 3, 2014, New Scientist) > > > (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn) > > From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists. > > > > Best wishes, > > Xueshan > > > > From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] > On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji > Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM > To: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON > <dea...@berkeley.edu> > Cc: Fis, <fis@listas.unizar.es> > Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based > on the cateogry theory > > > > Hi Terry, and FISers, > > > > Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife > that, in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can > kill? > > > > All the best. > > > > Sung > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- > > From: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com> > Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM > To: Terrence W. DEACON > Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji > Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based > on the cateogry theory > > > > Caro Terry estensibile a tutti, > > è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La general theory of > information è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e > seguita da un sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si > ha un processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non > significa necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un > Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra > macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal > caso non si ha significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di > informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario > che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo > di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica > autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che > l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o > tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che > biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o > specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della > significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è > impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una > semiotica della significazione. > > Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10. > Umberto Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della > scienza economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza > dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997). > Nello mio stesso libro si trovano: > > - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si > colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di > significazione e i processi di comunicazione; > > - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la > neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova > epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130). > > Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio > scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che > mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA', molto più grande del > (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie. > > Un saluto affettuoso. > > Francecso > > > > > > > > 2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>: > > Dear FISers, > > > > In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model > for building a general theory of information. > > Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a > claim that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it > can be causally misleading. > > I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and > evolution of the human language capacity. > > And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic > Species. > > Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary > biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary > thinking. > > Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing > tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic > thinking as well. > > So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I > append the following excerpt from the book. > > > > "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for > analyzing other > > species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other > form of communication as > > exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent > case. No analytic method > > could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as > long as animals have > > interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been > around at least as long as frogs > > have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic > communication was an afterthought, > > so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an > ancient and well-established > > mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model > against which to assess > > other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule, > and a quite anomalous > > exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with > respect to the extent they possess or > > lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the > types of hair on different mammals > > with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is > an understandable > > anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we > might see more typical wings > > and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced > adaptations—but it does more to > > obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so > should be analyzed as an > > exception to a more general rule, not vice versa." > > > > Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms. > > This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a > vast nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure. > > So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more > fundamental precursors. > > And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw > insight from this more familiar realm. > > I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that > assumes what it endeavors to explain. > > > > Regards to all, Terry > > > > > > > > On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero > <javierwe...@gmail.com> wrote: > > In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this, > though I am still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I > am afraid that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of > it I will lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it > comes: > > I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts > in which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many > contexts on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of the > distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. Baecker > and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group that what > information is depends on the system we are talking about. But the concept > of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has many sources > and types of information. > So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a > set of loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a > temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements. > Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by RNA > to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate cell. > We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a specific kind > of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or a set of > linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or discourse. > > The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as > information. Or even better, each type of medium produces information of its > own kind. > According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted. > It can only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference > that a medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A > medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can > couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic > manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions. > And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into information. > For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to > print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let us > say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking > cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social > practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the introduction > of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message > orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not the > same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to > face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if the > other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and what > that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is being > sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special place, so he > planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable > configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You > shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone in her > room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And imagination > makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral > communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and > send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by > adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what > he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social > sciences because that is my research field, although I have the intuition > that it could also work for natural sciences. > > Best, > > JJ > > El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu> > escribió: > > Hi FISers, > > > > On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote: > > > > " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our > discussions and recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways > to many different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate > the framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological, > linguistic, etc. > > . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction > introduced by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though it > too is in my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be > misleading when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less > linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the > division: i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and normative > analyses/properties of information." > > > > I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic > metaphor in defining "information". Although the linguistic metaphor has > its limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique > advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of functions > (see the last column in Table 1.) > > > > The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied > theories of information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging to > the same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically > represented as the 3-node closed network in the first column of Table 1. > > > > Table 1. The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible > Triadic Relation) as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell > language theory, and linguistics. > > Category Theory > > > f g > A -----> B ------> C > | ^ > | | > |______________| > h > > > > ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) > Deacon’s theory of information > Shannon’s > > Theory of > > information > Peirce’s theory of signs > Cell language theory > Human language > (Function) > > A > Intrinsic information > Source > Object > Nucleotides*/ > Amion acids > Letters > (Building blocks) > > B > Referential information > Message > Sign > Proteins > Words > (Denotation) > > C > Normative information > Receiver > Interpretant > Metabolomes > (Totality of cell metabolism) > Systems of words > (Decision making & Reasoning) > > f > ? > Encoding > Sign production > Physical laws > Second articulation > > g > ? > Decoding > Sign interpretation > Evoutionary selection > First and Third articulation > > h > ? > Information flow > Information flow > Inheritance > Grounding/ > > Habit > > Scale > Micro-Macro? > Macro > Macro > Micro > Macro > > > > > *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides. > According to the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n genetic > alphabets, each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn consisting > of n nucleotides. In this view, the classical genetic alphabet is just one > example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1. When n = 3, for > example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet with 4^3 = 64 > letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the familiar codon > table. Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not words as widely thought > (including myself until recently) but letters! It then follows that > proteins are words and metabolic pathways are sentences. Finally, the > transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as "hyperstructures" by > V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by me more recently) > correspond to texts essential to represent arguement/reasoning/computing. > What is most exciting is the recent discovery in my lab at Rutgers that the > so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of mRNA levels in living cells can identify > function-dependent "hypermetabolic pathways" underlying breast cancer before > and after drug treatment (manuscript under review). > > > > Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome. > > > > Sung > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > > > > -- > > Professor Terrence W. Deacon > University of California, Berkeley > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > > > > > > -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- > _______________________________________________ > Fis mailing list > Fis@listas.unizar.es > http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis > _______________________________________________ Fis mailing list Fis@listas.unizar.es http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
