Dear Friends,

i did not enter the site --- but was not such numbering already done
by great Goedel ? The so called Goedel numbering ?

mihir

On 2/11/18, Krassimir Markov <mar...@foibg.com> wrote:
> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
> Yes, the Number Theory is very important basis!
> But, I think, there is no need to number every word.
> Because ... All words are already numbered
> We have published large monograph named
> “Natural Language Addressing”
> where we outlined this idea and presented the mathematical model and
> computer implementation for very large volumes of data (BigData).
> One can read it at http://foibg.com/ibs_isc/ibs-33/ibs-33.htm.
> The idea is very simple – every letter has its own code and in the computer
> we enter not letters but their codes.
> This way every word is a number in any positional numbering system.
> It really works!!!
> Friendly greetings
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> From: Karl Javorszky
> Sent: Saturday, February 10, 2018 8:36 PM
> To: Stanley N Salthe
> Cc: fis
> Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on
> the cateogry theory
>
> Using the logical language to understand Nature
>
>
>
> The discussion in this group refocuses on the meaning of the terms “symbol”,
> “signal”, “marker” and so forth. This is a very welcome development, because
> understanding the tools one uses is usually helpful when creating great
> works.
>
> There is sufficient professional literature on epistemology, logical
> languages and the development of philosophy into specific sub-philosophies.
> The following is just an unofficial opinion, maybe it helps.
>
>
>
> Wittgenstein has created a separate branch within philosophy by
> investigating the structure and the realm of true sentences. For this, he
> has been mocked and ridiculed by his colleagues. Adorno, e.g. said that
> Wittgenstein had misunderstood the job of a philosopher: to chisel away on
> the border that separates that what can be explained and that what is
> opaque; not to elaborate about how one can express truths that are anyway
> self-evident and cannot be otherwise.
>
> The Wittgenstein set of logical sentences are the rational explanation of
> the world. That, which we can communicate about, we only can communicate
> about, because both the words and what they mean are self-referencing. It is
> true that nothing ever new, hair-raising or surprising can come out of a
> logical discussion modi Wittgenstein, because every participant can only
> point out truths that are factually true, and these have always been true.
> There is no opportunity for discovery in rational thinking, only for an
> unveiling of that what could have been previously known: like an
> archaeologist can not be surprised about a finding, he can only be surprised
> about himself, how he had been able to ignore the possibility of the finding
> so long.
>
> As the Wittgenstein collection uses only such concepts that are
> well-defined, these concepts can be easily enumerated. In effect, his
> results show, that if one uses well-formulated, clearly defined logical
> words, the collection of all explanations is the solution of a combinatorial
> problem. This is also the reason why he says that his philosophy is just a
> tool of sharpening the brain, and contains nothing whatsoever noteworthy in
> a semantic fashion.
>
> One may summarise that the pariah state among philosophers that Wittgenstein
> suffered on this his insight, is owed to the conclusion that real philosophy
> has either nothing to do with the grammar of true logical sentences or
> otherwise it is degenerating into a technique outside philosophy, namely
> number theory. If every concept can be represented by a number, and valid
> sentence are those for which the rules that govern numbers are satisfied,
> then one can work with the numbers as such and figure out later for what
> they stand.
>
> This is the situation as per today. There is no change whatsoever. The only
> noteworthy development is, that one can indeed teach new tricks to that old
> dog, number theory. The sand that has to be swiped away is the covering
> layer of attitudes that are too clever by half. By keeping the nose not too
> high, one may look before one’s feet and reconsider simple operations that
> one executes by routine.
>
> We know how to sort and how to order, and we are intelligent and flexible
> enough to change priorities if circumstances dictate such. We know how to
> order and how to reorder. If we only had a brain like a computer, we could
> memorise all the patterns that appear as we transform from priority
> readiness One into priority readiness Two.
>
> There are many opportunities for number theory to jump into action in the
> field of organising and reorganising. As one intensifies one’s hobby of
> reordering the contents of one’s office, one will now have arrived at the
> concept of sequenced groups of elements that change place together during a
> reorder. Cycles that constitute a reorder connect elements with each other.
> Learning is based on the concept of associations. Being an element in the
> corpus of a cycle may well be the formal explanation for a property of being
> associated with.
>
> Whether one calls the elements’ {position, amount, sequential place,
> relation to potential successors, …} {symbol, signal, mass, impact, chemical
> valence, predictability, energy level, information content,…} is of
> secondary importance. As we look into a kaleidoscope, the first step is to
> make sure that we all look at a kaleidoscope, and preferably the same one.
> The next task is to make sure that we all perceive the same picture. As the
> kaleidoscope produces natural numbers, this should be a challenge that one
> can be expected to match. Only after it has been agreed that we all observe
> the same patterns is it reasonable to start discussing how to name the facts
> of perception.
>
> The present problem is not with the inability of the logical language to
> process that what we wish to discuss.  The present task is to realise that
> one needs a clear idea before one enters the struggle to express it clearly.
> The unveiling has been done. Now the interested public is invited to look at
> the picture.
>
> Once one has answered the dilemma: “On Tuesdays, this here cup is to the
> left of the screen, because Tuesdays I order things on their colour; on
> Wednesdays the same cup is to the right of the screen for its size, because
> on Wednesdays I order things on their size: so, which is the correct place
> of this cup, actually?”; once on has figured this out – that namely the cup
> would be oscillating between its two places, or take up a position on a
> plane with axes: colour, size -, then one has done great strides towards
> understanding that “symbol”, “sign”, “signal” etc. are surface concepts,
> while the underlying deep concepts have to do with sequencing and the
> mechanics of re-sequencing, which means cycles, rhythms and periodicities.
>
>
>
> We all know that the DNA is a sequence. Then, if one wants to understand how
> the DNA functions, one had better resign to the fact that one has to deal
> with sequences, whether one likes the topic or not. As there can be nothing
> philosophically new in the explanation of how the DNA works, the only
> subject that needs investigation is, why one has such a reticence to deal
> with places, priorities, rankings, order, first and last becoming last and
> first, etc. Maybe the door to the edifice of insights on how the interplay
> between mixtures and sequences actually works and what this interplay
> produces; maybe this door opens from a well-barricaded corridor within the
> cellar of the sub-conscious, hidden among some skeletons of {to have sunken
> low, defeats of self-esteem, to have been downgraded, to be among the last,
> to be a low-ranking individual, etc.}. One of the techniques of influencing
> people with low self-esteem is to encourage them to find the discipline in
> which they are really good. In how many ways can a person be classified and
> how many of these ranking results are contradictory? Is the concept of
> cognitive dissonance linked to the similarity of two orders? Number theory
> should jump onto the subject of intermediate states between two differing
> permutations, as it is intimately connected with the subject of how DNA
> functions. Which names fit best the patterns we observe while doing manifold
> re-orderings is presently of a secondary importance. Of primary importance
> is presently to observe, what happens if a sequence is turned into a
> different sequence. After all, we deal with sequences, don’t we.
>
>
>
>
> 2018-02-10 16:24 GMT+01:00 Stanley N Salthe <ssal...@binghamton.edu>:
>
>   Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically,
> as:
>
>   In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in
> other ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus (using
> the compositional hierarchy):
>
>
>           [information [language [signal]]]
>
>
>   Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be
> understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs.
>
>
>   (Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’,
> where:
>
>
>           [sign [information [...]]] )
>
>
>   Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):
>
>
>           {language {signal {information}}}
>
>
>   Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations,
> so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information
> (informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations.
>
>
>   STAN
>
>
>
>   On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan <y...@pku.edu.cn> wrote:
>
>     Dear Colleagues,
>
>     I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana
> recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination
> with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human
> language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:
>
>     In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved
> multiple languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and
> interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various
> biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such
> as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera
> signaling.
>
>     I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the
> concept information 3 times but the concept signal (signal or signaling) 55
> times, so we have to review the history and application of “information” and
> “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for us to understand the
> relationship between language, signal, and information.
>
>     The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can
> be traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and
> endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of
> Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in
> Nature, in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since
> then, the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and
> biochemistry.
>
>     As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to
> its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used to
> employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From the
> tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal transduction
> study of cells is only equivalent to the level of telecommunications before
> 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's information theory, the
> central issue of telecommunications is "signal" rather than "information".
> After that, the central issue of telecommunications is "information" rather
> than "signal".
>
>     According to the application history of information concept, nearly all
> the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger,
> signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem
> what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the
> information.
>
>
>
>     For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:
>
>     1. Do Plants Think?  (June 5, 2012, Scientific American)
>
>
> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b)
>
>     2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn  (December 3, 2014, New Scientist)
>
>
> (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn)
>
>     From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.
>
>
>
>     Best wishes,
>
>     Xueshan
>
>
>
>     From: fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> On Behalf Of Sungchul Ji
>     Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
>     To: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON
> <dea...@berkeley.edu>
>     Cc: Fis, <fis@listas.unizar.es>
>     Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
>     Hi Terry,  and FISers,
>
>
>
>     Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife
> that, in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can
> kill?
>
>
>
>     All the best.
>
>
>
>     Sung
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>     From: Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
>     Sent: Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
>     To: Terrence W. DEACON
>     Cc: Fis,; Sungchul Ji
>     Subject: Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
>     Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
>
>     è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general theory of
> information è preceduta da un sistema (o semiotica) di significazione e
> seguita da un sistema (o semiotica ) di comunicazione. Tranne che quando si
> ha un processo comunicativo come il passaggio di un Segnale (che non
> significa necessariamente 'un segno') da una Fonte, attraverso un
> Trasmettitore, lungo un Canale, a un Destinatario. In un processo tra
> macchina e macchina il segnale non ha alcun potere 'significante'. In tal
> caso non si ha significazione anche se si può dire che si ha passaggio di
> informazione. Quando il destinatario è un essere umano (e non è necessario
> che la fonte sia anch'essa un essere umano) si è in presenza di un processo
> di significazione. Un sistema di significazione è una costruzione semiotica
> autonoma, indipendente da ogni possibile atto di comunicazione che
> l'attualizzi. Invece ogni processo di comunicazione tra esseri umani -- o
> tra ogni tipo di apparato o struttura 'intelligente, sia meccanico che
> biologico, -- presuppone un sistema di significazione come propria o
> specifica condizione. In conclusione, è possibile avere una semiotica della
> significazione indipendente da una semiotica della comunicazione; ma è
> impossibile stabilire una semiotica della comunicazione indipendente da una
> semiotica della significazione.
>
>     Ho appreso molto da Umberto Eco a cui ho dedicato il capitolo 10.
> Umberto Eco e il processo di re-interpretazione e re-incantamento della
> scienza economica (pp. 175-217) di "Valore e valutazioni. La scienza
> dell'economia o l'economia della scienza" (FrancoAngeli, Milano, 1997).
> Nello mio stesso libro si trovano:
>
>     - il capitolo 15. Semiotica economico-estimativa (pp. 327-361) che si
> colloca nel quadro di una teoria globale di tutti i sistemi di
> significazione e i processi di comunicazione;
>
>     - il sottoparagrafo 5.3.3 La psicologia genetica di Jean Piaget e la
> neurobiologia di Humberto Maturana e Francesco Varela. una nuova
> epistemologia sperimentale della qualità e dell'unicità (pp. 120-130).
>
>     Chiedo scusa a Tutti se Vi ho stancati o se ancora una volta il mio
> scrivere in lingua italiana Vi crea qualche problema. Penso che il dono che
> mi fate è, a proposito della QUALITA' e dell'UNICITA',  molto più grande del
> (per)dono che Vi chiedo. Grazie.
>
>     Un saluto affettuoso.
>
>     Francecso
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>     2018-02-07 23:02 GMT+01:00 Terrence W. DEACON <dea...@berkeley.edu>:
>
>       Dear FISers,
>
>
>
>       In previous posts I have disparaged using language as the base model
> for building a general theory of information.
>
>       Though I realize that this may seem almost heretical, it is not a
> claim that all those who use linguistic analogies are wrong, only that it
> can be causally misleading.
>
>       I came to this view decades back in my research into the neurology and
> evolution of the human language capacity.
>
>       And it became an orgnizing theme in my 1997 book The Symbolic
> Species.
>
>       Early in the book I describe what I (and now other evolutionary
> biologists) have come to refer to as a "porcupine fallacy" in evolutionary
> thinking.
>
>       Though I use it to critique a misleading evolutionary taxonomizing
> tendency, I think it also applies to biosemiotic and information theoretic
> thinking as well.
>
>       So to exemplify my reasoning (with apologies for quoting myself) I
> append the following excerpt from the book.
>
>
>
>       "But there is a serious problem with using language as the model for
> analyzing other
>
>       species’ communication in hindsight. It leads us to treat every other
> form of communication as
>
>       exceptions to a rule based on the one most exceptional and divergent
> case. No analytic method
>
>       could be more perverse. Social communication has been around for as
> long as animals have
>
>       interacted and reproduced sexually. Vocal communication has been
> around at least as long as frogs
>
>       have croaked out their mating calls in the night air. Linguistic
> communication was an afterthought,
>
>       so to speak, a very recent and very idiosyncratic deviation from an
> ancient and well-established
>
>       mode of communicating. It cannot possibly provide an appropriate model
> against which to assess
>
>       other forms of communication. It is the rare exception, not the rule,
> and a quite anomalous
>
>       exception at that. It is a bit like categorizing birds’ wings with
> respect to the extent they possess or
>
>       lack the characteristics of penguins’ wings, or like analyzing the
> types of hair on different mammals
>
>       with respect to their degree of resemblance to porcupine quills. It is
> an understandable
>
>       anthropocentric bias—perhaps if we were penguins or porcupines we
> might see more typical wings
>
>       and hair as primitive stages compared to our own more advanced
> adaptations—but it does more to
>
>       obfuscate than clarify. Language is a derived characteristic and so
> should be analyzed as an
>
>       exception to a more general rule, not vice versa."
>
>
>
>       Of course there will be analogies to linguistic forms.
>
>       This is inevitable, since language emerged from and is supported by a
> vast nonlinguistic semiotic infrastructure.
>
>       So of course it will inherit much from less elaborated more
> fundamental precursors.
>
>       And our familiarity with language will naturally lead us to draw
> insight from this more familiar realm.
>
>       I just worry that it provides an elaborate procrustean model that
> assumes what it endeavors to explain.
>
>
>
>       Regards to all, Terry
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>       On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 11:04 AM, Jose Javier Blanco Rivero
> <javierwe...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>         In principle I agree with Terry. I have been thinking of this,
> though I am still not able to make a sound formulation of the idea. Still I
> am afraid that if I miss the chance to make at least a brief formulation of
> it I will lose the opportunity to make a brainstorming with you. So, here it
> comes:
>
>         I have been thinking that a proper way to distinguish the contexts
> in which the concept of information acquires a fixed meaning or the many
> contexts on which information can be somehow observed, is to make use of the
> distinction between medium and form as developed by N. Luhmann, D. Baecker
> and E. Esposito. I have already expressed my opinion in this group that what
> information is depends on the system we are talking about. But  the concept
> of medium is more especific since a complex system ussualy has many sources
> and types of information.
>         So the authors just mentioned, a medium can be broadly defined as a
> set of loosely coupled elements. No matter what they are. While a Form is a
> temporary fixed coupling of a limited configuration of those elements.
> Accordingly, we can be talking about DNA sequences which are selected by RNA
> to form proteins or to codify a especific instruction to a determinate cell.
> We can think of atoms forming a specific kind of matter and a specific kind
> of molecular structure. We can also think of a vocabulary or a set of
> linguistic conventions making possible a meaningful utterance or discourse.
>
>         The idea is that the medium conditions what can be treated as
> information. Or even better, each type of medium produces information of its
> own kind.
>         According to this point of view, information cannot be transmitted.
> It can only be produced and "interpreted" out of the specific difference
> that a medium begets between itself and the forms that take shape from it. A
> medium can only be a source of noise to other mediums. Still, media can
> couple among them. This means that media can selforganize in a synergetic
> manner, where they depend on each others outputs or complexity reductions.
> And this also mean that they do this by translating noise into information.
> For instance, language is coupled to writing, and language and writing to
> print. Still oral communication is noisy to written communication. Let us
> say that the gestures, emotions, entonations, that we make when talking
> cannot be copied as such into writing. In a similar way, all the social
> practices and habits made by handwriting were distorted by the introduction
> of print. From a technical point of view you can codify the same message
> orally, by writing and by print. Still information and meaning are not the
> same. You can tell your girlfriend you love her. That interaction face to
> face where the lovers look into each others eye, where they can see if the
> other is nervous, is trembling or whatever. Meaning (declaring love and what
> that implies: marriage, children, and so on) and information (he is being
> sincere, she can see it in his eye; he brought her to a special place, so he
> planned it, and so on) take a very singular and untranslatable
> configuration. If you write a letter you just can say "I love you". You
> shall write a poem or a love letter. Your beloved would read it alone in her
> room and she would have to imagine everything you say. And  imagination
> makes information and meaning to articulate quite differently as in oral
> communication. It is not the same if you buy a love card in the kiosk and
> send it to her. Maybe you compensate the simplicity of your message by
> adding some chocolates and flowers. Again, information (jumm, lets see what
> he bought her) and meaning are not the same. I use examples of social
> sciences because that is my research field, although I have the intuition
> that it could also work for natural sciences.
>
>         Best,
>
>         JJ
>
>         El feb 7, 2018 10:47 AM, "Sungchul Ji" <s...@pharmacy.rutgers.edu>
> escribió:
>
>           Hi  FISers,
>
>
>
>           On 10/8/2017, Terry wrote:
>
>
>
>           " So basically, I am advocating an effort to broaden our
> discussions and recognize that the term information applies in diverse ways
> to many different contexts. And because of this it is important to indicate
> the framing, whether physical, formal, biological, phenomenological,
> linguistic, etc.
>
>           . . . . . . The classic syntax-semantics-pragmatics distinction
> introduced by Charles Morris has often been cited in this respect, though it
> too is in my opinion too limited to the linguistic paradigm, and may be
> misleading when applied more broadly. I have suggested a parallel, less
> linguistic (and nested in Stan's subsumption sense) way of making the
> division: i.e. into intrinsic, referential, and normative
> analyses/properties of information."
>
>
>
>           I agree with Terry's concern about the often overused linguistic
> metaphor in defining "information".  Although the linguistic metaphor has
> its limitations (as all metaphors do), it nevertheless offers a unique
> advantage as well, for example, its well-established categories of functions
> (see the last column in Table 1.)
>
>
>
>           The main purpose of this post is to suggest that all the varied
> theories of information discussed on this list may be viewed as belonging to
> the same category of ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation) diagrammatically
> represented as the 3-node closed network in the first column of Table 1.
>
>
>
>                 Table 1.  The postulated universality of ITR (Irreducible
> Triadic Relation) as manifested in information theory, semiotics, cell
> language theory, and linguistics.
>
>                 Category Theory
>
>
>                    f            g
>                    A -----> B ------> C
>                     |                           ^
>                     |                            |
>                     |______________|
>                    h
>
>
>
>                 ITR (Irreducible Triadic Relation)
>                Deacon’s theory of information
>                Shannon’s
>
>                 Theory of
>
>                 information
>                Peirce’s theory of signs
>                Cell language theory
>                Human language
>                 (Function)
>
>                 A
>                Intrinsic information
>                Source
>                Object
>                Nucleotides*/
>                 Amion acids
>                Letters
>                 (Building blocks)
>
>                 B
>                Referential information
>                Message
>                Sign
>                Proteins
>                Words
>                 (Denotation)
>
>                 C
>                Normative information
>                Receiver
>                Interpretant
>                Metabolomes
>                 (Totality of cell metabolism)
>                Systems of words
>                 (Decision making & Reasoning)
>
>                 f
>                ?
>                Encoding
>                Sign production
>                Physical laws
>                Second articulation
>
>                 g
>                ?
>                Decoding
>                Sign interpretation
>                Evoutionary selection
>                First and Third articulation
>
>                 h
>                ?
>                Information flow
>                Information flow
>                Inheritance
>                Grounding/
>
>                 Habit
>
>                 Scale
>                Micro-Macro?
>                Macro
>                Macro
>                Micro
>                Macro
>
>
>
>
>           *There may be more than one genetic alphabet of 4 nucleotides.
> According to the "multiple genetic alphabet hypothesis', there are n genetic
> alphabets, each consisting of 4^n letters, each of which in turn consisting
> of n nucleotides.  In this view, the classical genetic alphabet is just one
> example of the n alphabets, i.e., the one with n = 1.  When n = 3, for
> example, we have the so-called 3rd-order genetic alphabet with 4^3 = 64
> letters each consisting of 3 nucleotides, resulting in the familiar codon
> table.  Thus, the 64 genetic codons are not words as widely thought
> (including myself until recently) but letters!  It then follows that
> proteins are words and  metabolic pathways are sentences.  Finally, the
> transient network of metbolic pathways (referred to as "hyperstructures" by
> V. Norris in 1999 and as "hypermetabolic pathways" by me more recently)
> correspond to texts essential to represent arguement/reasoning/computing.
> What is most exciting is the recent discovery in my lab at Rutgers that the
> so-called "Planck-Shannon plots" of mRNA levels in living cells can identify
> function-dependent "hypermetabolic pathways" underlying breast cancer before
> and after drug treatment (manuscript under review).
>
>
>
>           Any comments, questions, or suggestions would be welcome.
>
>
>
>           Sung
>
>
>
>
>           _______________________________________________
>           Fis mailing list
>           Fis@listas.unizar.es
>           http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
>         _______________________________________________
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>       Professor Terrence W. Deacon
>       University of California, Berkeley
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