Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst (response to arrowlessness)
At 12:00 PM 7/5/2005 +0200, Oudeyis wrote: Steve, I really do not have enough time to devote to answering this message as it deserves. So please excuse the briefness of my responses. No problem at all. I am happy to let that response be the last major word on this discussion for now, which we can certainly return to when time permits. As for the final question asked, What say you comrade? I say, thank you for the stimulating discussion, we'll get back to these important and stimulating topics as time goes on. Below are some passages that stand out for me as excellent thinking and research points for me to work with. Victor suggests, asks, points out: * that I am ... arguing that all reflective thought is ideal ... * So what do you call reality? Ilyenkov is quite clear as to what he calls reality ... * What is virgin materiality? If by virgin materiality you mean that part of nature men have yet to have contacted ... * Sorry, but I'm afraid your argument that thought as a function of practice and thought as received social wisdom are both ideal are not acceptable to me or to Ilyenkov. * Your views that all reflective thought is ideal is much more consistent with the views of Lukacs, Adorno, Marcuse and Horkheimer and more recently of Habermas than with Ilyenkov ... * ... you've determined that all human consciousness is ideal ... * Wow! I wrote the previous paragraph before reading this one ... * ... you are confirming my description of your argument as more consistent with Critical Theory than with EVI's Marxist-Leninism. * The identification of scientific theory as an integral part of the ideal is an invention of Lukacs that was expanded by his Critical Theorist epigones. * At no point does Ilyenkov describe scientific work as ideal. * What say you comrade? Oudeyis I say: thanks again, - Steve end ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Re: [marxistphilosophy] demystifying Marx in mainstream reference works (Myths Legends)
One of my frequent scourings of SF used bookstores in the 1970's produced this set of volumes, still sitting on my bookshelves. I am glad to see it available on line. I hadn't looked at the Lichtheim article before, or at least, don't remember it making any impression on me. It covers a number of ideological trends generated by Karl Marx, describing two in the passage that Jim quotes below, but does not seem to give credit to the one that I subscribe to - that Marx, Engels and Lenin were following the same essential philosophy and methodology, that there is a core continuity between these revolutionaries and others (I would include, for example, Trotsky and Guevara) that can be continued in our time. - Steve At 02:47 PM 7/2/2005 -0400, Jim Farmelant wrote: On Sat, 02 Jul 2005 11:41:51 -0400 Ralph Dumain [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: What do you think of this encyclopedia entry by George Lichtheim: HISTORICAL AND DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM Dictionary of the History of Ideas http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/cgi-local/DHI/ot2www-dhi?specfile=/texts/english/dhi/dhi.o2wact=textoffset=8277756query=holismtag=HISTORICAL+AND+DIALECTICAL+MATERIALISM I think it's pretty good, though I think a number of additions and qualifications are needed. In the last part of the article, Lichtheim wrote: In purely philosophical terms, the difference be- tween Engels' ontological, or metaphysical, materi- alism, and the doctrine of Plekhanov and Lenin is not without interest. Plekhanov, and following him Lenin, eliminated from the concept of dialectical materi- alism the ontological notion of matter as an absolute substance or constituent element of the universe. In its place they introduced the rather more common sensible use of matter as a logical concept signifying little more than the externality of the world for the reflective consciousness. In other words, they substi- tuted for Engels' metaphysical monism an ordinary epistemological realism which at least had the advan- tage of being compatible with the procedure of the natural sciences. The locus classicus of this trans- formation (which was never described as such) is Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909), a work which after 1917 obtained canonical status in the USSR and for the Marxist-Leninist school generally. Unfortunately, the philosophers of this school have simultaneously had to cope with Engels' own quite different (because fundamentally metaphysical) under- standing of the term materialism, as well as with Lenin's quasi-Hegelian logical speculations in his Notebooks of 1915-16. The resulting conflicts and con- tradictions have furnished material for exhaustive logi- cal tournaments among philosophers in Eastern Europe, without for that reason bringing any nearer that fusion of dialectical logic with positive science which remains the stated aim of the Marxist-Leninist school. Insofar as the gradual change in the intellectual atmosphere since the late 1950's has encouraged greater independence of thought in the Soviet sphere, there has been a tendency for two revisionist trends to crystallize outside the official orthodoxy: existential- ist humanism, oriented on the writings of the young Marx, on the one hand, positivist scientism and em- piricism on the other. In countering these trends, the official dogmatism of the Leninist school, while retain- ing its function as an integrative ideology or Weltan- schauung for the benefit of the Communist party, appears to have been placed on the defensive; a posi- tion from which it is unlikely to emerge. That's pretty much my understanding as to how things evolved in eastern European Marxist philosophy, where Marxism tended to evolve either in the direction of a humanism influenced by phenomenology (which was already very popular in eastern Europe) and existentialism, or it evolved in the direction of positivism. You might recall that back in May when we were discussing the logical empiricists and the Vienna Circle, I noted that Philipp Frank in his *Modern Science and Its Philosophy* made observations, not unlike the ones that Litcheim made here in his article. Frank thought that Lenin had, in his *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, overstated his differences with the Machists. And Frank noted the existence of different tendencies within Soviet Marxism, some which he observed tended strongly towards positivism, while other tendencies tended towards Hegelian idealism. Frank, himself, called for an alliance between logical empiricism and dialectical materialism, a kind of Popular Front in the realm of philosophy. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to:
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst
I am responding to a 6/22/2005 post from Victor, which I quote from. The quote below is a good example of where I think Victor gets Ilyenkov wrong 180 degrees. In the general section of Ilyenkov's 1977 essay The Concept of the Ideal that Victor quotes from, I believe Ilyenkov is making just the opposite point that Victor attributes to him. Victor quotes Ilyenkov: Paragraph 53: It is this fact, incidentally, that explains the persistent survival of such semantic substitutions; indeed, when we are talking about nature, we are obliged to make use of the available language of natural science, the language of science with its established and generally understood meanings. It is this, specifically, which forms the basis of the arguments of logical positivism, which quite consciously identifies nature with the language in which people talk and write about nature. Paragraph 54: It will be appreciated that the main difficulty and, therefore, the main problem of philosophy is not to distinguish and counterpose everything that is in the consciousness of the individual to everything that is outside this individual consciousness (this is hardly ever difficult to do), but to delimit the world of collectively acknowledged notions, that is, the whole socially organised world of intellectual culture with all its stable and materially established universal patterns, and the real world as it exists outside and apart from its expression in these socially legitimised forms of experience. (Ilyenkov The Concept of the Ideal 1977) Victor comments: The delimitation of what Ilyenkov calls the whole socially organised world of intellectual culture and the real world as it exists outside and apart from its expression in these socially legitimised forms of experience. can only be based on the distinction between the socially learned and confirmed concepts or ideas of the tribe and the concepts formulated by reflecting on practical material activity, i.e. labour activity: the operations carried out, the physical and material response of the instruments and material of production to these activities and finally the effectivity of the operations relative to their purposes. Victor says the delimitation that Ilyenkov makes (I am adding ...'s to make Victor's complex sentence a little more readable) can only be based on the distinction between the socially learned and confirmed concepts or ideas of the tribe ... and ... the concepts formulated by reflecting on practical material activity, i.e. labour activity: the operations carried out, the physical and material response of the instruments and material of production to these activities and finally the effectivity of the operations relative to their purposes. But this is decidedly *not* the distinction Ilyenkov makes. The essential discussion we are having here is over this question: where, precisely, is the boundary between ideality and materiality? Victor draws the boundary between socially learned concepts, on one hand, and conceptualizing practical activity/carrying out practical activity/the consequences of practical activity - on the other. Ilyenkov draws a very different distinction. Ilyenkov is investigating the distinction - and he refers to this as the main problem of philosophy - between the whole socially organised world of intellectual culture and the real world as it exists outside and apart from this. I believe I can draw on Ilyenkov, and: a) show where Ilyenkov makes his distinction between the ideal and the real and b) demonstrate that Victor is committing the very idealist error that Ilyenkov criticizes Hegel and Bogdanov for making. In the essay The Concept of the Ideal, my annotations offer the subtitles Hegel's Concept of the Ideal to paragraphs 45-49, The Secret Twist of Idealism to paragraphs 50-53, and The Distinction Between the Ideal and the Real to paragraphs 54-57. Interestingly, my reading of Victor's writings on the question of the ideal, such as in the quote above, is that his concept of the ideal is much closer to Hegel's than Ilyenkov's or Marx's, he is actually performing the same kind of secret twist of idealism that Ilyenkov attributes to Hegel and others, and Victor's distinction or boundary between the ideal and the real is not consistent with Ilyenkov's. None of my opinions or claims, of course, negate Victor's good advice and inspiration to me to study and make copious notes about the other books Ilyenkov has in English, as well as study relevant writings by Marx, Lenin, and Hegel. Nor do my philosophically sharp criticisms of what I perceive as erroneous interpretations by Victor of Ilyenkov's theory of the ideal take away from the respect and admiration I have for Victor's many intellectual accomplishments, which I have been privileged to learn much from in various internet venues. In all worthwhile discussions, there are points where it is best
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst
This 6/26 post by Victor seems like a good stopping place for the moment - I need to put our discussion about ideality aside for just a little while to tend to other projects, but I am certainly interested. I will follow up. Victor is perfectly correct, I must show what I claim. BTW, for anyone trying to follow this discussion, two different essays by Ilyenkov are quoted in Victor's post, both available on the internet at: http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/index.htm The main essay Victor and I have been debating interpretations of is: The Concept of the Ideal http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm This essay appeared in the book Problems of Dialectical Materialism; Progress Publishers, 1977 and was scanned by Andy Blunden. The numbering both Victor and I have been using refers to the sequence of 142 paragraphs in that essay. In Victor's 6/26 post, he quotes from paragraphs 49, 50 and 51. I have an important side point to bring up about this essay. In my scrutiny of this on-line version, the only version I have, I believe there are some scanning errors and possibly some original translation errors to contend with. There is also some reason to wonder if the original Russian that the translation was based on may also contain editorial errors. In other words, this version must be read with caution, and if something does not make sense, it may not be Ilyenkov's original writing. I bring this up because there are a handful of places in the essay where publishing errors like these seem to contribute to confusion over what Ilyenkov was really saying. In his 6/26 post Victor also quotes Ilyenkov using paragraph numbers 57, 58, 59, 60. However, these are from a different essay - chapter 8 in DIALECTICAL LOGIC (1974), Part Two Problems of the Marxist-Leninist Theory of Dialectics 8: The Materialist Conception of Thought as the Subject Matter of Logic http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay8.htm The scanned book is Dialectical Logic, Essays on its History and Theory; Progress Publishers, 1977; English translation 1977 by H. Campbell Creighton; Transcribed: Andy Blunden; HTML Markup: Andy Blunden. BTW, these paragraphs (found on pages 285-288) are from the same essay Victor mentioned on 5/26 and I quoted from on 5/30, and which were discussed a little on this list. The question of the ideal is a major topic of this essay and I agree with Victor that it should be discussed in conjunction with the Concept of the Ideal essay when we take this topic up again. The philosophical work we are doing here is to try to untangle the ideal and the material, closely studying Ilyenkov's work on this complex question in doing so. In the process, it seems we should also seek to keep untangled which citation by our philosopher-teacher we are talking about. :-)) Best, ~ Steve end of my post ___ At 07:32 PM 6/26/2005 +0200, Oudeyis (Victor) wrote: - Original Message - From: Steve Gabosch [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Forum for the discussion of theoretical issues raised by Karl Marx and thethinkers he inspired marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2005 12:40 Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst I am responding to a 6/22/2005 post from Victor, which I quote from. The quote below is a good example of where I think Victor gets Ilyenkov wrong 180 degrees. In the general section of Ilyenkov's 1977 essay The Concept of the Ideal that Victor quotes from, I believe Ilyenkov is making just the opposite point that Victor attributes to him. Victor quotes Ilyenkov: Paragraph 53: It is this fact, incidentally, that explains the persistent survival of such semantic substitutions; indeed, when we are talking about nature, we are obliged to make use of the available language of natural science, the language of science with its established and generally understood meanings. It is this, specifically, which forms the basis of the arguments of logical positivism, which quite consciously identifies nature with the language in which people talk and write about nature. Paragraph 54: It will be appreciated that the main difficulty and, therefore, the main problem of philosophy is not to distinguish and counterpose everything that is in the consciousness of the individual to everything that is outside this individual consciousness (this is hardly ever difficult to do), but to delimit the world of collectively acknowledged notions, that is, the whole socially organised world of intellectual culture with all its stable and materially established universal patterns, and the real world as it exists outside and apart from its expression in these socially legitimised forms of experience. (Ilyenkov The Concept of the Ideal 1977) Victor comments: The delimitation of what Ilyenkov calls
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst
Victor, I have read your response carefully. I think I am getting a handle on our differing approaches. They seem to emerge in the way we understand issues such as: a) where is ideality located? b) where is value is located? c) what is the essence of ideality? d) what is the essence of value? e) what is represented in a commodity? f) what does the stamping of human activity on a cultural artifact? Please correct me if I am getting your views wrong in any way. On several questions, I am not yet clear on what your answer would be. I am speaking roughly for each of us, hoping to drive out any essential paradigm differences. a) where is ideality located? I would answer a) in cultural artifacts, using the term in its broadest possible sense (tools, signs, all human creations and observations, etc.) I think you would answer a) in representations. b) where is value located? I would answer b) with each particular commodity. It appears that you would answer b) in concepts of commodities, but definitely not specific commodities. c) what is the essence of ideality? I would answer c) with human activity. You answer c) with representation. d) what is the essence of value? I would answer d) with abstract labor, or socially determined necessary labor time. I am not sure how you would answer this one. e) what is represented in a commodity? I would answer e) in terms of particular commodities being a combination of concrete and abstract labor. I am not yet clear on how you would answer this one. f) what does the stamping of ideality on a cultural artifact? I would answer f) direct human activity. You answer f) the interpretation of the ideal through human activity, but I am not yet clear on what this precisely means. There are several areas to clarify, but the pattern that seems to be emerging is that on several important issues I tend to think in terms of direct human activity where you tend to think in terms of concepts and representations. Thoughts? - Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst
Victor, I spent a little time reviewing Ilyenkov's article The Concept of the Ideal (available on MIA ), and the notes I published on xmca about it last year. Below, I have copied paragraphs 66 - 90 from EVI's 142-paragraph essay. I don't find your comments today about ideality and materiality consistent with Ilyenkov's theory as I interpret it. Even were I to somehow convince you of that, it still would not necessarily make Bakhurst right, of course. I notice that one big problem with Bakhurst's presentation in his chapter on the concept of the ideal is he does not focus on or even mention how Ilyenkov's concept of the ideal is a generalization of the labor theory of value to all human activity. In fact, he does not mention the labor theory of value at all. As I think about it, this avoidance of the most important argument by Ilyenkov considerably weakens his presentation. But as I say, I don't think the real issue is Bakhurst's comprehension of Ilyenkov's theory of the ideal. I think the real issue is Ilyenkov's theory itself, whether it can flow from the labor theory of value, and how does it apply. As I see it, the key concept in this regard that Ilyenkov offers is that just as Marx discovered how social relations can be embodied into things in the form of commodities - through the incorporation of abstract labor into the value-form - so too, Marxists can explain that social relations are embodied in all cultural objects - through the incorporation of meaningful cultural activity into the ideal form. Ilyenkov explains that plain materialists and idealists alike make the error of viewing the boundary between the material and the ideal as being the world of the inside versus that of the outside of each individual human head. In contrast, he argues that according to dialectical materialism, ideality and materiality must be distinguished in terms of the composition of each object - both the composition of the physical attributes, which of course are the sources of its materiality, and the composition of its social origins and social context, which are the sources of its ideality - just as Marx analyzed the composition of the commodity. According to Ilyenkov's theory, objects within the human cultural realm objectively possess both materiality and ideality, just as commodities in a market economy possess both concrete and abstract labor, possess both use-value and exchange-value. I think a close look at Ilyenkov is needed to proceed. Below are paragraphs 66-90 (my numbering) from the 142-word essay. I realize this is a lot of material, but it is a complex idea. Each paragraph is preceded by some comments or headings by me. My annotations have an SG in them and are preceded by *. The full article as at http://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/ideal/ideal.htm Please note there are some scanning errors in this version and I strongly suspect there are some translation errors in the printed edition, both of which contribute much to making this already difficult article fairly opaque to read. I annotated this important essay partially for my own learning, and partially in the hope that it could become the basis of an annotated edition of this essay at some point, which might help others study and understand it. - Steve selections from Evald Ilyenkov The Concept of the Ideal (1977), annotations by Steve Gabosch (SG): ___ 66 - 69 Ideality in Use-Value and Exchange Value SG *[66. SG. Ideality in the form of exchange value consists in the fact that a coat, for example, can be a form of expression of something quite different, for example, linen. Their exchange values are mutually represented. 66 According to Marx, the ideality of the form of value consists not, of course, in the fact that this form represents a mental phenomenon existing only in the brain of the commodity-owner or theoretician, but in the fact that the corporeal palpable form of the thing (for example, a coat) is only a form of expression of quite a different ?thing? (linen, as a value) with which it has nothing in common. The value of the linen is *represented*, expressed, ?embodied? in the form of a coat, and the form of the coat is the ?*ideal or represented* form? of the value of the linen. *[67. SG. EVI presents a well-read quote by Marx.] 67 ?As a use-value, the linen is something palpably different from the coat; as value, it is the same as the coat, and now has the appearance of a coat. Thus the linen acquires a value-form different from its physical form. The fact that it is value, is made manifest by its equality with the coat, just as the sheep?s nature of a Christian is shown in his resemblance to the Lamb of God.? [Capital, Vol. I, p. 58.] *[68. SG. This ideal or represented form of value is a completely objective relationship.] 68 This is a completely objective
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst
I am not at all up to speed on the German Marxist Sohn-Rethel (please help), but a thought immediately comes to mind on Popper's Three Worlds cosmology. If one ignores the positivist framework of these three worlds invented by Popper and attempts to make them as dynamic and dialectical as possible, one might have some success drawing some rough correspondence between a) Popper's world 1, the world of physical objects and organisms, and Ilyenkov's material world; b) Popper's world 2, of mental activity, and Ilyenkov's will and consciousness; and c) Popper's world 3, the products of the human mind, and Ilyenkov's realm of ideality. But there is still a fundamental difference that makes the two world views completely different. If we are to make Popper's three worlds dynamic and historical, and assign any meaning to his numbering system, then world 1, objects and organisms, must generate an emerging world 2, mental activities, which in turn (in conjunction with each other) generate world 3, the world of products of the human mind. Ilyenkov, however, makes it crystal clear that he sees just the opposite genetic-historic relationship between world 2 and world 3. He argues that it is ideality that generates will and consciousness, not the other way around. See paragraph 76. Also note Ilyenkov's brief mention of Popper in paragraph 77. To expand on Ilyenkov's discussion of the secret twist of idealism, (discussed earlier in the essay the Concept of the Ideal), it is this inversion of ideality, on one hand, and will and consciousness, on the other, that creates a major stumbling block in philosophy and science. When plain materialists and empiricists do this, they are committing an essential idealist error. It is one of the most common errors in bourgeois social science. - Steve At 01:02 PM 6/16/2005 -0400, Ralph wrote: This is the key. How would you compare Ilyenkov's view to that of Sohn-Rethel, or to Popper's 3-worlds theory? At 07:16 PM 6/15/2005 -0700, Steve Gabosch wrote: .. As I see it, the key concept in this regard that Ilyenkov offers is that just as Marx discovered how social relations can be embodied into things in the form of commodities - through the incorporation of abstract labor into the value-form - so too, Marxists can explain that social relations are embodied in all cultural objects - through the incorporation of meaningful cultural activity into the ideal form. Ilyenkov explains that plain materialists and idealists alike make the error of viewing the boundary between the material and the ideal as being the world of the inside versus that of the outside of each individual human head. In contrast, he argues that according to dialectical materialism, ideality and materiality must be distinguished in terms of the composition of each object - both the composition of the physical attributes, which of course are the sources of its materiality, and the composition of its social origins and social context, which are the sources of its ideality - just as Marx analyzed the composition of the commodity. According to Ilyenkov's theory, objects within the human cultural realm objectively possess both materiality and ideality, just as commodities in a market economy possess both concrete and abstract labor, possess both use-value and exchange-value. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst
Hi Victor, Interestingly, footnote one in a paper by Lantolf and Thorne that is getting discussed on the xmca list - the paper is at http://communication.ucsd.edu/MCA/Paper/JuneJuly05/LantolfThorne2005.pdfIntroduction, in Sociocultural Theory and the Genesis of Second Language Development - has a relevant quote from Bakhurst on the very topic you raise and we are discussing, the relationship of material (natural) objects and ideality. It is from page 183 in Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy (1991). from Lantolf and Thorne: footnote 1 David Bakhurst characterizes the production of objective culture this way: [BTW, the quoted Bakhurst sentence begins: To sum up, Ilyenkov holds that ... -sg] by acting on natural objects, human beings invest them with a significance or ideal form that elevates them to a new plane of existence. Objects owe their ideality to their incorporation into the aim-oriented life activity of a human community, to their *use*. The notion of significance is glossed in terms of the concept of representation: Artifacts represent the activity to which they owe their existence as artifacts. (1991: 183). - Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!: domains
CB said: However, analogizing to chemistry and biology, biology does not reduce to chemistry. Human psychology does not reduce to individual physiological psychology. Absolutely. On the first point, yes, biology cannot be reduced to chemistry. On the second point, I also completely agree: in the same way that biology does not reduce to chemistry, psychology does not reduce to physiology. These points, common among anti-reductionist thinkers such as Marxists, fits into a larger framework, in my opinion. I believe that comprehending and explaining the relations between, the structures of, and the functions of domains - and doing so in terms of their real genetic-historical development - are among the great challenges of modern science that I believe dialectical materialism can play a leading role in moving forward. In fact, differences in theoretical outlooks may be explainable by seeing conflicting views as conceptualizing domains differently - seeing the relations, structures, and functions of various domains in different, often opposite, ways. Hence, ontology remains a hot area of dispute and always will as long as different class outlooks remain in mortal struggle and conceptualize the domains of reality in incompatible ways. This argument of course begs for a clear explanation of what a domain is. Very good question! - Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! :Bakhurst
Victor, Thanks for the refresher course on Rosenburg, which becomes a history of the Nazi party from 1921. It is always good to be reminded of what happened in Germany. Your comments on Dubrovsky are very interesting, as is your analysis of Bakhurst. I also read your descriptions of ideality with great interest. It would help me if, to start out, (when you have a chance), you would locate some specific quotes from David Bakhurst that illustrate these observations that you make: Bakhurst argues that the material objects themselves are ideal. Bakhurst's identification of the ideal with the material goes beyond idealist hypostasy and takes idealist reification to ridiculous extremes ... Thanks, - Steve At 07:08 PM 6/14/2005 +0200, you wrote: Steve On Alfred Rosenberg: (Born January 12, 1893- Executed October 16, 1946) Alfred Rosenberg was a Nazi ideologist and politician. Rosenberg was one of the earliest members of the German Workers Party (later better known as the NSDAP or the Nazi Party), joining in January 1919; Hitler did not join until October 1919 Rosenberg became editor of the Völkischer Beobachter (National Observer), the Nazi party newspaper, in 1921. In 1923 after the failed Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler appointed Rosenberg leader of the Nazi Party, a position the latter occupied until Hitler was released from prison. In 1929, Rosenberg founded the Militant League for German Culture. He became a Reichstag deputy in 1930 and published his book on racial theory The Myth of the Twentieth Century (Der Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts). He was named leader of the foreign political office of the NSDAP in 1933 but played little actual part in office. In January 1934 he was deputized by Hitler with responsibility for the spiritual and philosophical education of the NSDAP and all related organizations. In 1940 he was made head of the Hohe Schule (literally high school), the Centre of National Socialistic Ideological and Educational Research. Following the invasion of the USSR Rosenberg was appointed head of the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories. Alfred Meyer was his deputy and represented him at the Wannsee conference. Rosenberg was captured by Allied troops at the end of the war. He was tried at Nuremberg and found guilty of conspiracy to commit crimes against peace; planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression; war crimes; and crimes against humanity. He was sentenced to death and executed with other guilty co-defendants at Nuremberg on the morning of October 16, 1946. He is considered the main author of key Nazi ideological screeds, including its racial theory, Lebensraum, abolition of the Versailles Treaty, and persecution of the Jews and of Christian churches. This article is about race as an intraspecies classification. Just another intellectual grotesque become monster. To separate the beasts from the confused. About Bakhurst: Bakhurst is not only a liberal social-democrat, he's also is a representative of exactly the kind of Logical Positivism, Neo-Kantianism, Neo-positivism, Machism, Empirio-criticism or what have you (the precise name of the movement is more a function of the provenience of the theorist than of his ideas) that motivated Lenin to write Materialism and Emperio-criticism (1908). The irony of Bakhurst's current stature as the interpreter of Ilyenkov is that his kind of thinking is receives more criticism from Ilyenkov than even the objective idealism of Plato and Hegel. Bakhurst, like D. Dubrovsky who Bakhurst wrongly calls a mechanist, just cannot comprehend the essence of dialectical synthesis. Where Ilyenkov describes the essence of ideality as the unity of consciousness (the subjectively imaged object of labour) and material formations (the material symbolic representations that embody and thereby enable transmission of ideal objects), Bakhurst argues that the material objects themselves are ideal. Material objects certainly acquire significance from their resemblance (perhaps correspondence is a better word) to the ideal, but material objects, i.e. physically and sensually perceived objects, as concrete objects are far to diversified to be regarded as ideal forms. After all, diversity is a basic property of being for both Hegelian and Marxist theories of knowledge [check out Hegel's criticism of the identity of A = A for this]. Dubrovsky, like Bakhurst, does not know how to handle dialectical synthesis, and his solution of the ideal/material antinomy is to identify the ideal as pure subjective consciousness. While Bakhurst's identification of the ideal with the material goes beyond idealist hypostasy and takes idealist reification to ridiculous extremes, Dubrovsky's restriction of the ideal to pure subjectivity compels him to regard all conceptualisation as a product of some internal transcendental features common to all human thought processes, i.e. a
[Marxism-Thaxis] just testing, please ignore
just testing, please ignore ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
On CB's first comment on SOCIO-history, I certainly completely agree, and think Ilyenkov would, too. On CB's second comment, about the subject matter of Marxist psychology, I think it is true that a dialectical materialist psychology must begin with sociology and social psychology, and the study of the individual must be based on sociology and social psychology - and as CB I think implies, cannot be developed without it. But in response to the phrase For Marxism there is only social psychology, no individual psychology separate from social psych I want to add the thought that the task of comprehending the individual cannot be *reduced* to the study of social psychology - that the individual constitutes a higher level or domain of complexity and requires a study of the laws of development and so forth associated with that realm - generalizations and observations that are not identical with those of social psychology, and require their own scientific study, etc. An analogy would be the study of chemistry compared with biology. - Steve end At 12:23 PM 6/10/2005 -0400, you wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 05/31/05 07:48AM from page 283: A consistently materialist conception of thought, of course, alters the approach to the key problems of logic in a cardinal way, in particular to interpretation of the nature of logical categories. Marx and Engels established above all that [the] external world was not given to the individual as it was in itself simply and directly in his contemplation, but only in the course of its being altered by man: and that both the contemplating man himself and the world contemplated were products of history. CB: History here being critically SOCIO-history, i.e. not just the individual doing the logic , but many people. A key Marxist modification of the notion of logic is that it is not the product of an individual brain, or the qualities of an individual organ, but the product of many people's experiences, including people who are dead at the time the particular individual in question is doing the logic. History here refers to people who are history, i.e. dead. Not just practice, but SOCIAL practice. Not just the result of one human's interaction and alteration of nature, but of many people's interaction and alteration of nature. from page 285: Psychological analysis of the act of reflexion of the external world in the individual head therefore cannot be the means of developing logic. The individual thinks only insofar as he has already mastered the general (logical) determinations historically moulded before him and completely independently of him. And psychology as a science does not investigate the development of human culture or civilisation, rightly considering it a premise independent of the individual. CB: does not or does ? For Marxism there is only social psychology, no individual psychology separate from social psych. from page 286-287: In labour (production) man makes one object of nature act on another object of the same nature in accordance with their own properties and laws of existence. Marx and Engels showed that the logical forms of man's action were the consequences (reflection) of real laws of human actions on objects, i.e. of practice in all its scope and development, laws that are independent of any thinking. Practice understood materialistically, appeared as a process in whose movement each object involved in it functioned (behaved) in accordance with its own laws, bringing its own form and measure to light in the changes taking place in it. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
I continue to enjoy this thread, but will be gone for some days and it will probably be a little while after that before I can reengage. I will think about the position Charles and Ralph have taken on the relationship of the brain to the origins of humanity. I think Engels' argument about how labor created the human hand applies also to the brain, language organs, bipedalism, etc. so I will try to make a case for that. And I have been enjoying the exchanges between Ralph and Victor, especially on the issues of the role of practice in science, the nature of scientific thought, and the big question, just what is nature - and can humans really know what nature is in any fundamental ontological sense. I recently read the book by Bakhurst that Victor mentions, and have a different take on it. Briefly put, I disagree with Bakhurst's negative assessment of Leninist politics, his tendency to see Stalinism as a form of Bolshevism, and his general opinion of dialectics. But I agree with many of his insights into Ilyenkov and Vygotsky. Oops, got to get packing. See you all again soon. - Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
[Marxism-Thaxis] Labor Theory of Human Origins was:O, Dialectics!
This particular discussion has moved in a different direction from investigating dialectics per se, and could be considered in part to be about the labor theory of the origins of humanity. In a way, we having been using the terms production and labor synonymously in our recent dialogues. But the concept of labor - and how it is different from animal activity - is in my opinion the key that unlocks the puzzle of how humanity originated and what it means to be human. I think Charles is entirely correct in going back to Marx, especially his most advanced work, _Capital_, to look for a dialectical materialist analysis of labor. I also basically agree with his insistence that it is the *social* dimension of labor that differentiates what humans do from all other species. However, since most animals are also social, a deeper inquiry is needed. More very good discussion of these issues can be found in George Novack's essay The Labor Theory of the Origins of Humanity, contained in his collection _Humanism and Socialism_ (1973). Novack is what I would call a Marxist continuist, meaning, he consciously continues in the tradition of Marx and Engels, and advocates a continuation of the fundamental concepts of Marxist doctrine. He returns to this labor theory theme many times in his writings, such as in his Long View of History contained in his collection _Understanding History_ (1972). Another Marxist continuist relevant to this issue of the origins of humanity is Evelyn Reed, who wrote numerous essays and books on Marxist anthropology in the '50's, '60's and '70's that also relied heavily on Marx and Engels. Her collection _Sexism and Science_ (1978) includes several of these essays. She also wrote a good introduction to _The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State_ by Engels in a 1972 Pathfinder Press edition. This edition also contains the Engels essay The Part Played By Labor in the Transition from Ape to Human, written in 1876 but not published until 1896, a year after his death. All of these books are in print and available from Pathfinder Press. BTW, for those unfamiliar with these writers, both were leaders of the US Socialist Workers Party and were longtime partners until Reed's death in 1979. I encourage Charles to incorporate these writings in his studies about the origins of humanity. - Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
Charles, your logic below unsuccessfully explains the relationship between human biology and human society. You merely repeat something no one disputes. All animals reproduce, just as they all breathe, and would die without doing so. But only humans produce - and probably would not even survive as animals anymore if they did not do so. The key question in my opinion is to address just what humans do that is new and different from other species. What makes humans human? Clearly, the answer begins with production and related activities. What is it about production and related activities, such as intergenerational transmission of culture, language, etc., that allows human collectives to continually transform both nature and themselves (including their methods of reproduction, family systems etc.)? A dialectical analysis of this continual process requires, in my opinion, a grasp of the fundamental logic of how human social labor and production creates an entirely new domain of life-existence unknown in non-human species. To see how little your paragraphs below contribute to this kind of understanding - I am not saying this about you, just the passages you offer below - substitute the term respiration for reproduction below - or for that matter, substitute any essential biological function. Humans would die from the lack of any of them (digestion, excretion, etc. etc.). You make this point yourself explicitly. But this point that humans absolutely require a successful biological existence to become the historical creatures we have become is certainly true, but unenlightening - even, if you will allow me to put this sharply, trivial, if that is as far as one goes. Who would dispute you? The challenge is to explain how we grew from being once upon a time *just* mammals to the sociological humans we are today - and the communists we aspire to be in the future. This line of inquiry is what Marx and Engels invented, and which I encourage all to continue developing. Again to put it bluntly, simply placing an equal sign between biology and sociology does not seem to contribute anything of much value that I can see. On the other hand, showing how the biological becomes sociological is very helpful. How did humanoid primates became historical beings? For example, a study into the role cultural transmission plays in production and socio-historical development, the investigation you suggested yesterday - based, I would urge, on the classical Marxist insights into the role of production in history as the motor force of the creation of humanity - could well qualify as such a helpful piece. That is my motivation for encouraging you to pursue your insights and studies on this - I believe this kind of study enhances Marxism and human science. On the rich question of reproduction that you raise below, much study is needed there, too - on how modes of reproduction have originated and developed in history, and how forms of reproduction, family systems, etc. have been major motor forces in the development (forward, backward, sideways and other ways) of human society and human psychology. Perhaps this is another formal piece of writing you could work on. Good luck! - Steve At 11:32 AM 6/2/2005 -0400, Charles Brown wrote: Actually , this essay ( rough copy here) is not on the issue that Steve suggested I develop. But it does deal with the anthropological passages at the beginning of _The German Ideology_ that are close to the one Steve first adduced for discussion. As I read this essay, I am claiming that M and E are not materialist enough in the GI. I don't have the part here, but in _The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State_ Engels has much more advanced anthro knowledge than in _The G I_ , and in the Preface , he says production AND the family are cofundamental in determining _history_. I sent this to Thaxis several years ago http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/marxism-thaxis/1998-April/008694.html Charles For Women's Liberation : Whoever heard of a one genearation species ? Every Marxist knows the A,B,C's of historical materialism or the materialist conception of history. The history of all hitherto existing society, since the breaking up of the ancient communes, is a history of class struggles between oppressor and oppressed. In The German Ideology, Marx and Engels asserted an elementary anthropological or human nature rationale for this conception. In a section titled (in one translation) History: Fundamental Conditions , they say: ...life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of material life itself. And indeed this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life.
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
Thanks for your response, it was a very good one. Charles, I think you have the makings of a coherent Marxist essay on these questions you raise. It seems you already have the ingredients at hand for such a study. For my part, I see the point you stress about the centrality of the intergenerational transmission of culture not as counterposed, but as complementary to the theorizing Marx and Engels did about human production and the social origins of humanity. I think they would heartily agree with you that the key is SOCIAL labor - (is there evidence to the contrary?) - and would welcome your bringing to bear some of the relevant wealth of new scientific knowledge from the social and life sciences that has emerged since their time - knowledge that has greatly increased our understanding of what humans have really done with nature, with one another, and just what it means to be and act human. Well-written and researched Marxist articles on these kinds of questions are always needed. Why not give it a go? Its a very important topic, and I think you are asking some really good questions. - Steve end At 02:04 PM 6/1/2005 -0400, Charles Brown wrote: Steve Gabosch Charles, in that quote from German Ideology below, ME refer to producing their *means* of subsistence, as in means of production, not the subsistence itself, as in gathered berries or hunted game, which as you point out humans did not domesticate until quite recently. CB: Could be as you interpret it. But means of subsistence could correspond to their later means of consumption as opposed to their later means of production. ^ Wouldn't social labor - including tools, like baskets and spears, as well as language to plan expeditions, and culture to pass on knowledge to future generations - count as means of subsistence? We of course know far more today about what pre-historic human life was like than anyone in the 19th Century did - or at least we have much more archeological data - but I think ME were on the right track on this one. I don't think they would disagree with your point about culture and language, which I think enhances their essential point about human social labor - the ability to produce - being the core difference between humans and animals. - Steve ^ CB: Yes, means of production could include language and planning as part of means of subsistence, but later on in this part of the German Ideology they make a big point about only then does consciousness arise or some such. Also, note they contrast producing means of subsistence with consciousness and religion. Well, in fact socalled ancestor worship would be a prime example of a method cultural transmission. But furthermore, even if we take producing means of subsistence to mean producing means of production or the famous tool-producing, I have concluded after many years of contemplating this that tool-producing is not the key distinction of humans. It is the passing on of how to make tools from one generation to the next that is uniquely human. Chimps in the wild today make tools. They just don't have tool making ,intergenerational traditions. I'm willing to discuss this more. This issue is a sort of speciality for me. It is a critique of Engels The role of labor in the whatever of man essay. The key is SOCIAL labor, not social LABOR. And even more social must most importantly include intergenerational sociality. I can elabortate if you like. To give another one of my favorite examples,each generation's not having to reinvent the wheel is the key, not inventing it in the first place. It is the cultural mechanism that allows ACCUMULATION of inventions that is critical, not the initial act of inventing some tool or form of labor. An individual primate might invent some tool, but they have no way to pass it on to future generations. Imitation is insufficient for that; culture is needed. Things like rituals and myths are needed. I know this is sort of heresy in that it seems to be idealism. I think not. Critique of idealism is only pertinent once we get to class divided society, antagonism between mental and physical labor, idealist philosophers and the like. I _am_ saying, frankly, that Marx and Engels essentially make a mistake in projecting this pertinent issue for the era of antagonism between mental and physical labor back onto the origin of human society. The great original human _material_ advantage compared with other primates is the ability to _pass on_ how to make a wheel. In other words, _not_ having to _re_invent the wheel because the original invention can be passed on to you via culture is the critically unique human ability. Allowing future generations to share the experiences of ancestors is a great _material_ advantage for the species, and the main , original distinguishing characterisitic of our species. To get back to your original point again
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
Charles, in that quote from German Ideology below, ME refer to producing their *means* of subsistence, as in means of production, not the subsistence itself, as in gathered berries or hunted game, which as you point out humans did not domesticate until quite recently. Wouldn't social labor - including tools, like baskets and spears, as well as language to plan expeditions, and culture to pass on knowledge to future generations - count as means of subsistence? We of course know far more today about what pre-historic human life was like than anyone in the 19th Century did - or at least we have much more archeological data - but I think ME were on the right track on this one. I don't think they would disagree with your point about culture and language, which I think enhances their essential point about human social labor - the ability to produce - being the core difference between humans and animals. - Steve At 04:11 PM 5/31/2005 -0400, Charles Brown wrote: Steve Gabosch quotes: Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life. ^ CB: Actually this isn't quite true. The first human modes of production are termed hunting and gathering because humans do not produce their own subsistence, but rather gather what nature has produced without human intervention. , so to speak. That doesn't happen until tens of thousands of years after the origin of the human species with horticulture, farming and domestication of animals. I'm not sure what implication this has for our dialectics and nature discussion What distinguishes humans from other animials is culture, language and methods of passing on experiences from one generation to the next. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics!
they would know how things work without a working experience with them or with things like them. Divine revelation perhaps? Finally, there is no doubt that nature must also include that which is beyond the observed and acted upon and that its existence is important for the creation of a materialist ideology. There are three ways the unknown makes itself felt in material human experience: 1.The fact that human practice and the science that represents it in thought is open ended or, better yet, appears to have no outward limits is a clear indication of the existence of more to nature than that which is treated by our current state of knowledge and practice. 2. The classic observations by Marx in the first chapter of German Ideology (1845) and the Critique of Hegelian Philosophy (1844) that the physical and sensual interface between man a nature in human labour is far more concrete than can ever be represented by even the most developed dialectics. The rational representation of men's activity in the world is then an inherently uncompletable task. 3. Hegel in his discussion of being makes the point that the logical formula A = A has no demonstrable correspondence with actual experience; diversity is an inherent property of identity (Andy B. presents a pretty thorough discussion on this in his The Meaning of Hegel, Chapter iv section, Diversity(essential Identity ) ). The whole basis of all rational activity, all dialectics, conscious and unconscious, deliberated and automatic, is the unity between the essential transitoriness of experienced moments and the determination of identities; qualities, quantities, measure and all the other things we have to know to develop a working model of the world. It's the unity of logical categorization and the essential temporality of immediate experience that fuels the dialectic and makes it so important a tool for exploration of the unknown. Second paragraph: The clarification of what exactly is the significance of the *objective* nature of nature is probably Ilyenkov's most important contributions to Scientific Marxism. Indeed for orthodox Marxists, including Lenin in his earlier writings (prior at very least to his readings in Hegel in 1914 and possibly as early as his article on Emprio-positivism), did indeed inherit the classical materialist concept of the objectivity of nature in the metaphysical sense of the essential being of nature; known, unknown, whatever. Ilyenkov in the last paragraphs of chapter 8 of Dialectical Logic summarizes the reasoning that is the basis of the concept of nature as prior to and independently of humankind. Here he distinguishes between Marx and Engel's theories of human activity and Hegel's idealism by recapitulating their description of man as a product and force of nature that transforms nature into the instruments of his activity in appropriating nature's goods and producing from them the means for the perpetuation of his body organic and inorganic. Nothing could more clearly describe the independence of abstract nature from the emergence of human activity in the world. After all, if man has his origins in the development of the natural world, then nature as a whole precedes and is a prerequisite for human activity. Nature regarded abstractly cannot be described as a product of human activity Then too, the laws and principles of nature whereby men transform nature into the instruments and products of labour are hardly a product of pure logic, of men's unfettered imagination. The laws of nature as men know and accommodate their actions to them are firmly connected to the physical and sensual properties of man the organism and to the natural conditions he confronts in the course of his prosecution of labour activity. Men do not produce in a vacuum which they then fill with ideas and concepts. Nature is a partner with man in his determination and production of his needs, and its presence is identifiable in all human activity in the world. All these descriptions of nature relate directly to the interaction of man with nature as a force of nature, and not one of these statements asserts some sort of universal state of being for nature itself. The activist interpretation of men's relation to the world first proposed by Kant, further developed by Hegel and given a material natural interpretation by Marx and Engels obviates all necessity to make broad ontological statements about the world in order to realize the objects of theory. with Regards, Oudeyis - Original Message - From: Steve Gabosch [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: marxism-thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu Sent: Sunday, May 29, 2005 9:35 AM Subject: Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] O, Dialectics! If I am reading Oudeyis correctly, he is saying that nature is determined by human interaction with it; that nature is strictly a product of the unity of human purposive activity and natural conditions; and that nature is a function of human labour. If by nature we are only referring
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Novack vs. Van Heijenoort on dialectics, 1943
At 02:42 AM 2/26/2005 -0500, you wrote: At 06:01 PM 2/25/2005 -0800, Steve Gabosch wrote: Yes, that would be an interesting discussion to read. Where does one get SWP internal bulletins from the 1940's? In New York, the best place is Tamiment Library at NYU, where I did a great deal of research in the '90s. Also Prometheus Research Library, a much more reasonable outfit than its parent organization the Spartacist League. They were very helpful to me. I think maybe the Center for Socialist History in Berkeley has this stuff too. And there are probably other places. Thanks. Are these collections fairly complete? I notice, Ralph, the occasional disparaging remark about Engels and the one below about Novack. I think I can make a case that while one may disagree with their views, their writings and thinking emanated from world views that were based on a scientific methodology, not on idiosyncratic intellectual inventions, muddled thinking, or just plain subjectivism. I think I can also make a case, even more controversial for some, that Marx and Engels were consistent, and, furthermore, Novack was reasonably consistent with them. That last one is especially controversial, of course. And as for the problem of dialectical laws, I think Novack explains or defends the concept pretty well, along the lines that Engels used it. Well, I'm not part of the anti-Engels Engels-betrayed-Marx industry. However, these are not sacred texts, so we do have to read them critically. Perhaps Novack was faithful in rendering Engels' confusion, I don't remember. But Novack was terribly confused, as was Trotsky, on these matters. However, confusion abounded in those days, e.g. that awful book by John Somerville. Fair enough. Evidence for consistency versus confusion seems like a productive line of inquiry down the road. And I agree that if Engels and Trotsky were confused, George Novack, who considered himself a disciple of them, most certainly would have been! BTW, what awful book and who was John Somerville? Best, - Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Novack vs. Van Heijenoort on dialectics, 1943
I see John Somerville wrote a number of books on Marxism. I don't think Novack ever mentioned him, and I do not remember ever hearing of him elsewhere or running across his work. A superficial scan of the article on line didn't impress me as contributing to any particular ongoing debate within the Marxist movement, but rather seemed have the purpose of offering a general academic description of basic dialectical materialist ideas to US readers, kind of like a Marxist philosophy 101 lecture. Of course, how much he actually grasped of Marxist philosophy and its method, which parts of Marxism he emphasized, who he was directing his writing at, and whether his perspective was revolutionary or just academic or what - would take some critical analysis, which of course would reflect the particular trend within Marxism of the critic as much as it would investigate Somerville. That of course is the nature of criticism - we often reveal more about ourselves than what we are critiquing, don't we? Anyway, two quick questions: is this article typical of Somerville's work? And what was his political orientation? I have visited the website the Somerville article is on before, by Paul Ballantyne. Terrific stuff. He studied under Charles W. Tolman, a Marxist-influenced writer and teacher who I have only read a few articles by, but could learn much from. Apropos to our discussion on emergence, Paul's work has much to offer, and wallah! he has the Novikoff paper on integrative levels on his site, which I have just run off, and will read soon. - Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Hegelian influence on library classification
What a delightful article, Ralph! Thanks! ~ Steve At 09:00 AM 2/25/2005 -0500, you wrote: W.T. Harris, the most influential of the St. Louis Hegelians, is determined to be the decisive influence on the organization of the Dewey Decimal Classification system: Hegel's Philosophy as Basis for the Dewey Classification Schedule by Eugene E. Graziano http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/hegelddc.html ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Novack vs. Van Heijenoort on dialectics, 1943
Yes, that would be an interesting discussion to read. Where does one get SWP internal bulletins from the 1940's? I notice, Ralph, the occasional disparaging remark about Engels and the one below about Novack. I think I can make a case that while one may disagree with their views, their writings and thinking emanated from world views that were based on a scientific methodology, not on idiosyncratic intellectual inventions, muddled thinking, or just plain subjectivism. I think I can also make a case, even more controversial for some, that Marx and Engels were consistent, and, furthermore, Novack was reasonably consistent with them. That last one is especially controversial, of course. And as for the problem of dialectical laws, I think Novack explains or defends the concept pretty well, along the lines that Engels used it. But of course, these are just opinions subject to critique and debate, which I hope we get some time down the road to explore some. I am sure I would learn from that. But not right now! Gotta get back to these other matters And thanks again for the rich supply of references and ideas and urls you have been offering, very much appreciated. Best, ~ Steve At 03:33 AM 2/25/2005 -0500, Ralph Dumain wrote: I have stumbled onto some long sought material in my files, i.e. my notes from 1991 on debates on dialectics conducted under pseudonyms, featuring William Warde (George Novack) and Marc Loris (Jean Van Heijenoort), with interventions by John G. Wright, J. Weber, George Sanders, Irwin Hyper Buddy Lens, and Ben Maxson. (I haven't checked my pseudonyms lists to determine who's who). It turns out that I even have a text file of my notes. I can't remember whether these e-mail lists allow attachments, but one way or another I could easily send my file. The question is: would anyone be able to understand my fragmentary notes? I had assumed that this material came from the very rare international bulletins of the 4th International (which I believe I also checked), but rather it's in the relatively (and I mean only relatively) more accessible SWP internal bulletins. I guess I was too cheap to have all this stuff photocopied when I researched it in New York 14 years ago. I was hoping to put the articles by Van Heijenoort online, but unfortunately I only have a photocopy of a relatively trivial piece: SURPLUS VALUE AND EXCHANGE OF EQUIVALENTS (NOTE ON AN EXAMPLE IN WILLIAM F. WARDE'S INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF MARXISM) by Marc Loris, SWP Internal Bulletin, vol. V, no. 5, Dec. 1943: p. 31-35. I also have a photocopy of two pages by George Sanders on the dialectics of tonality in music (Vol. V, no. 4, Oct. 1943: p. 14-15). Why I don't know. All of this discussion was a reaction to Novack's (Warde) DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM, OUTLINE COURSE #3 (National Education Dept., SWP (1943), 52 pp.). The debates that matter are found in: SWP. Internal Bulletin, vol. 5, no. 2, July 1943. 28 pp. Vol. V, no. 4, Oct. 1943. 15 pp. vol. V, no. 5, Dec. 1943. 35 pp. I don't have the wherewithal at the moment to track down this material (the repositories I know are in New York or Berkeley/S.F.) and get it photocopied, but if anyone else is game, let me know. My general evaluation is that Van Heijenoort had something important to say about the distinction and evaluation of the notions of subjective and objective dialectics, and Novack had his finger up his ass as usual. The other commentators took sides and there may be something interested in whoever backed Van Heijenoort. Van Hiejenoort used antoerh pseudonym, Gerland, and there's at least one relevant article in THE NEW INTERNATIONAL. It may have been The Algebra of Revolution. I thought I had a photocopy somewhere, but damned if I know where. Anyway, this is Van Heijenoort's prehistory, which is why I would like to find the material. As Irving Anellis reports, Van Heijenoort does not report discussing dialectics in WITH TROTSKY IN EXILE, probably because Trotsky was such a dogmatic prick Van Heijenoort didn't want to make trouble for himself. I'll upload my notes if anyone's interested. ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Old Thread: Dialectics of Nature
OK, here is one reference I owe. This is a page from the web site of Keith Sawyer with lots of urls to papers he has written. His whole website is interesting. His papers on emergence are relevant to our current discussion on the topic. His paper entitled Emergence in Psychology: Lessons from the History of Non-Reductionist Science (2002) has a useful history of the term and concept of emergence dating from 1875. I copied a few paragraphs below to give a quick flavor of Sawyer's more or less materialist-academic approach and his very readable style. Sawyer's site (home): http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~ksawyer/index.html his page on emergence: http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~ksawyer/emergence.htm from Sawyer: snip The British emergentists were a group of philosophers who elaborated a theory of emergence in the 1920s, focusing primarily on biological evolution [see Ablowitz, 1939; Blitz, 1992; McLaughlin, 1992]. By the late 1920s, emergence was a full-fledged intellectual fad. British emergentists cite Mill as the source of the emergence concept. In his LQgic [ 1843] Book III, Chapter 6, 'Of the composition of causes,' Mill elaborated the implications of the science of chemistry, and proposed two types of causation: mechanical causation, which was additive, and heteropathic causation, or emergent causation, which was not additive and not mechanical (vol. 2, p. 427). However, Mill did not use the term 'emergent'; this term was coined by his friend and colleague, philosopher George Henry Lewes [ 1875]. Like Mill, Lewes distinguished between mechanical and chemical effects, referring to them as resultants and emergents, respectively. The classic example of emergence invoked by both Mill and Lewes was the combination of hydrogen and oxygen, resulting in water. Water does not have any of the properties of either hydrogen or oxygen; its properties are emergent effects of the combination: Although each effect is the resultant of its components, the product of its factors, we cannot always trace the steps of the process, so as to see in the product the mode of operation of each factor. In this latter case, I propose to call the effect an emergent. It arises out of the combined agencies, but in a form which does not display the agents in action. [1875, vo1. 2, p. 412] If all effects were resultants, Lewes noted, the power of scientific rationality would be absolute, and mathematics could explain all phenomena. But Lewes claimed that 'effects are mostly emergents' [p. 414]. Thus, science must proceed by experiment and observation, rather than rational reasoning, since emergent effects are unpredictable before the event. Mill's distinction between mechanical and heteropathic causation and Lewes's concept of the emergent were elaborated by several English-language philosophers during World War I, including C. Lloyd Morgan [1923], Samuel Alexander [1920], and Edward Spaulding [ 1918]. Morgan, who was responsible for reintroducing Lewes's term 'emergence', claimed that in emergent evolution, 'one cannot predict ...the emergent expression of some new kind of relatedness among pre-existent events' [1923, p. 6]. Although emergent phenomena follow the laws of nature, they will not always submit to scientific study; 'such novelty is for us unpredictable owing to our partial knowledge of the plan of emergence up to date, and our necessary ignorance of what the further development of that plan will be' [p. 282]. snip At 08:32 PM 2/24/2005 -0800, you wrote: I will track down those references I promised and give all these posts the careful read they deserve. Great stuff! But I gotta devote some serious attention to an overdue project for the next week or something like that. I'll be back ... ~ Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Old Thread: Dialectics of Nature
Thanks for your response, Ralph. A little internet googling reveals that this concept had an interesting journey via library science in the 1950's - as a way of conceptualizing how reality is constructed - and was considered by some as a possible replacement to the Dewey Decimal system. Yes, I've read some of this literature. There's a book by Jolley on integrative levels I probably have somewhere. In actual fact, the Dewey Decimal System itself was influenced by Hegel via W.T. Harris, the most influential of the St. Louis Hegelians. Interesting comment on the Dewey Decimal System. Now I am curious about how it was invented and constructed, and how Hegelianism was part of that. The Library of Congress system also has a logic I haven't investigated but would like to understand. Also, BTW, who were the St. Louis Hegelians? There is something happening in emergence, it seems, though it remains controversial. I am very wary of the uses of Whitehead's process philosophy. Yes, I agree, that idealist form that emergence theorizing took in the 1920's definitely contains hazardous material. Vygotsky has a succinct remark about that trend I'll try to dig up. I also want to mention an article or two by an activity theory influenced theoretician named Keith Sawyer (teaches at Washington Univ in St Louis, by coincidence) where he traces the history of emergence theory back to the 1870's - but in a later post, kinda short on time this week. Another line of discussion this opens up - one of hundreds that are possible - is the problem of reductionism (which seemed to be what was slowing Lisa down) on one hand, and the problem of holism, on the other. Both are products of mechanical thinking. You are correct, sir. I wouldn't use the word mechanical, but that's semantics. Emergent materialism is not holist. it is also important not to confuse theory reduction with reductionism. There are two books on these questions from the Dialectics of Biology group. This question is treated in at least one of the essays. I realize I am swimming against certain classical Marxist terminology trends by using the term mechanical in this particular way, but it somehow seems to feel right to me to use this as the core concept - the organizing concept - behind formal, Aristotelian, and other non-dialectical kinds of logic. I would happily listen to an argument against this way of using mechanical. Also, I am interested in your inquiries into activity theory, which I have been studying the last couple years. I haven't had any time for this except for bibliographical research. See my web page: Salvaging Soviet Philosophy (1) http://www.autodidactproject.org/bib/ussrphil.html You will notice several links to activity theory as well as Ilyenkov. What a terrific web site you have, Ralph! I've used materials from it numerous times already and looking it over now am somewhat dizzied by the depth and breadth of the articles you have compiled. Bravo! ~ Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Old Thread: Dialectics of Nature
CB: Hello Steve, Seems to me emergence theory is very much the type of thing that Engels works on dialectics anticipates. No doubt the works of Soviet scientists and philosophers are a treasure trove of work in this area that is as yet only partly touched by Western Marxists. Hi, Charles. Yes, treasure trove is a very good description. Same with the wealth of discoveries in complexity science etc. - there is a tremendous field of knowledge now extant that dialectical materialism can help generalize, and like you and Ralph, I think emergence theory can be a terrific conceptual tool to help do that. Its an application so to speak of the concept of the transformation of quantity to quality simply not available in the 19th Century - or if so, only in a very rudimentary form. The kind of data that is really revealing this concept of emergence seems to have only become practically available since the 1960's, and especially since the 1980's. I've been reading Fuchs article recently. Fuchs, by the way, is the nephew of Comrade Klaus Fuchs, who was one of the main inventors of the bomb. Really! With Feynman? I read one of RF's delightful biographies some years ago. I wonder if Feynman picked one of Klaus' locks! Why do you say Comrade? I just got my latest Nature, Society and Thought (Vol. 17 No.3, 2004). It has an article by Herbert Horz, a philosopher from the former GDR, titled Quantum Physics and the Shaping of Life: Commentary on Klaus Fuch's Critique of Mechanistic Determinism. The puzzle of quantum mechanics suggests using Engels' notion of the dialectic of chance and necessity ( see _Anti-Duhring_) in solving same. I took a peek at this article but haven't tackled it. Quantum mechanics has always eluded me. Perhaps sometime if you have a little time and if the impulse hits you you'd be willing to review the article and give a little overview of quantum physics while you are at it. - Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Old Thread: Dialectics of Nature
Charles wrote: Yes, this concept of levels of organization or integration really gets at emergence. For example, biology cannot be _reduced_ to chemistry. There are emergent or qualitatively new aspects to biology that cannot be explained by chemistry principles alone. Emergent levels of integration is one of the main illustrations of the dialectics of natural science I very much agree with your points above. Or anthropology cannot be reduced to individual human psychology in the way that theromodynamics is reduced to mechanics by Boyle ( or is it Charles ?) I wrote a paper on this as a senior in college. ( By the way, at that time I had the wrong position; my professor disagreed). I have provocative comment on a piece of the above, on the relationship of anthropology to human psychology that is off the point you are making but calls into practice the notion of integrative or emergent levels. My thinking is that human psychology would be a higher or to grasp for a term later-generated level than phylogeny, anthropology or sociology, which I think can be seen as emergent levels in that order. Vygotsky also talks about something like an emergentist concept when he talks about the genetic-historic method, which means looking at both the origin and the development of things. Focusing on the genetic part, we can say, I believe, that human biology preceded human history, which preceded particular social systems, which preceded political-legal systems, and then comes culture, and finally psychology - painting with a broad brush, of course. I make a point of this and call it provocative - not to imply that you disagree with this - but because general bourgeois thinking argues a very different paradigm - biology creates psychology (human nature) which in turn creates history, society, and culture. This little difference in genetic-historic order or order of emergence if you will creates an enormous difference in method and analysis and world views, donchya think? And herein we see, I think, another powerful use of the concept of emergence as an explanatory principle. - Steve ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list Marxism-Thaxis@lists.econ.utah.edu To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Old Thread: Dialectics of Nature
would have been rather resistant to emergentist claims, from what I remember. I called her attention to some work on activity theory, which was presented at an APA meeting in New York--it must have been at the end of 1995. Lisa was not impressed. As an evolutionary biologist she used statistical models to study foraging behavior and did not believe that 'consciousness' mattered. I got rather short-tempered with her in some of the discussions we had, and we never had a chance to hammer out our differences. Beginning with my suspicions about sociobiology, I was very skeptical of the intellectual irresponsibility of biologists who overstep their limitations in making claims about society. Lisa was committed to natural science, was adamantly opposed to the social constructivism which had poisoned the left by this time, but was interested in Donna Haraway and curiously tolerant of Lucy Irigiray[sp?]. Besides being an environmentalist, Lisa was also a feminist and gay rights activist. Curiously, my shameless political incorrectness attracted rather than repelled Lisa. She considered me a kindred spirit, I suppose to the consternation of her many PC male feminist admirers in the left. I recall at least one other fellow who became infatuated with her. We used to talk about this as well as the craziness in the New York left and on the Marxism lists. She was a total e-mail addict: she couldn't enough of this stuff. Aside from biology, she was studying economics and philosophy on the side. She was insatiable in intellectual matters as in every other respect. She was a piranha in her passion for intellectual input and synthesis. She was also a very, emotional, sensitive person--she had a special look in her eyes, that haunts me to this very day. She had a variety of interests and talents in addition to science--she was into folk-dancing, and she made clothing. She had it all, she did it all. She was only beginning to realize her potential when she died shortly after her 35th birthday. How it pains me to write these lines. At 01:28 PM 2/19/2005 -0800, Steve Gabosch wrote: I took a peek at some of the posts on Engels and Dialectics of Nature. Sorry about the loss of Lisa, she was clearly a very able thinker and writer. Thank you, Ralph, for sharing your fond memory of her. My own take on dialectics fits very closely with Engels, along the lines George Novack argues. I do agree that the dialectical laws of nature can be generalized, as Engels attempted in his studies. But what Engels did was just a beginning. Christian Fuchs has an article in a 2003 issue of Nature Society and Thought (Vol 16 No 3) entitled The Self-Organization of Matter that continues the discussion of finding parallels between dialectics and what I tend to call emergence theory (aka hierarchy theory, self-organization theory, complexity science, and many other terms coming out of general systems theory from the 1960's and earlier). I think Engels, and for that matter, Novack, would find this exploration very fruitful. I am beginning to become aware of some of the work Soviet scientists have done in earlier decades along these lines - B.M. Kedrov, for example. The concept of the transformation of quantity into quality, thought of merely as mechanical cause and effect, is commonplace - apply enough heat and water boils. But in Dialectics of Nature, among other things, Engels was exploring something much more general about this concept - the transformation of energy from one form to another, such as from mechanical to electrical. A liquid changing to a gas is just one of countless examples of quantitative transformations of energy and with qualitative effects. The advent of scientific measuring instruments and computer processing since WWII has created an explosion of information about how things work - how things change. A more sophisticated concept of the transformation of energy forms largely unavailable to 19th century scientists has been gaining ground - the concept of what I tend to call emergent levels to help me organize my own thoughts about this. Quantitative changes in one level of organization of matter and energy generate changes in higher levels that in turn transform the overall system. Fuchs summarizes many of the principles of self-organization with many terms familiar from Prigogine, chaos theory, complexity science and so forth; terms like feedback loops, bifurcation points, complexity, hierarchy, synergism, historicity, etc. etc. Perhaps the most important application of this concept of emergence - (using this term this way is my layperson's (autodidactic) attempt at finding a generalizing term) - is the Marxist concept of base and superstructure summarized by Marx in that oft-quoted passage in Critique of Political Economy. Leaving aside the many instances of mechanical vulgarizations of this terminology of base or foundation
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Old Thread: Dialectics of Nature
I took a peek at some of the posts on Engels and Dialectics of Nature. Sorry about the loss of Lisa, she was clearly a very able thinker and writer. Thank you, Ralph, for sharing your fond memory of her. My own take on dialectics fits very closely with Engels, along the lines George Novack argues. I do agree that the dialectical laws of nature can be generalized, as Engels attempted in his studies. But what Engels did was just a beginning. Christian Fuchs has an article in a 2003 issue of Nature Society and Thought (Vol 16 No 3) entitled The Self-Organization of Matter that continues the discussion of finding parallels between dialectics and what I tend to call emergence theory (aka hierarchy theory, self-organization theory, complexity science, and many other terms coming out of general systems theory from the 1960's and earlier). I think Engels, and for that matter, Novack, would find this exploration very fruitful. I am beginning to become aware of some of the work Soviet scientists have done in earlier decades along these lines - B.M. Kedrov, for example. The concept of the transformation of quantity into quality, thought of merely as mechanical cause and effect, is commonplace - apply enough heat and water boils. But in Dialectics of Nature, among other things, Engels was exploring something much more general about this concept - the transformation of energy from one form to another, such as from mechanical to electrical. A liquid changing to a gas is just one of countless examples of quantitative transformations of energy and with qualitative effects. The advent of scientific measuring instruments and computer processing since WWII has created an explosion of information about how things work - how things change. A more sophisticated concept of the transformation of energy forms largely unavailable to 19th century scientists has been gaining ground - the concept of what I tend to call emergent levels to help me organize my own thoughts about this. Quantitative changes in one level of organization of matter and energy generate changes in higher levels that in turn transform the overall system. Fuchs summarizes many of the principles of self-organization with many terms familiar from Prigogine, chaos theory, complexity science and so forth; terms like feedback loops, bifurcation points, complexity, hierarchy, synergism, historicity, etc. etc. Perhaps the most important application of this concept of emergence - (using this term this way is my layperson's (autodidactic) attempt at finding a generalizing term) - is the Marxist concept of base and superstructure summarized by Marx in that oft-quoted passage in Critique of Political Economy. Leaving aside the many instances of mechanical vulgarizations of this terminology of base or foundation and superstructure, the essential dialectical explanation Marx and Engels offered with this concept - conceptualizing emergent levels (there I go, using that term again) in history between economic systems, classes and legal-political systems - between the forces of production and the relations of production - has become one of the most important scientific concepts of all time. It has become the scientific basis of working class revolution and the possibility of abolishing capitalism in our time. If Fuchs and others who are exploring this relationship between dialectics and what I am calling emergence - (Fuchs calls it self-organization, maybe that is a better term) - are on the right track, then we could see Engels' efforts in Dialectics of Nature as a remarkable anticipation of scientific concepts that could only develop decades later when the capacity to measure nature and process data about it has come much farther along. But more remarkably, the scientific approach to analysis and generalization that Engels and his cothinker Marx developed with the materialist dialectic is applicable to all sciences - not just to the latest discoveries of molecular biology and cosmic theory - but also to the science of social revolution, the greatest task facing humanity. And that is a powerful method, indeed. Thinking of Ralph's admiring comments and the handful of her posts that I looked at, I wonder what Lisa would think about this line of argument about dialectics, what questions she would ask, what evidence she would demand to back up such concepts and claims Best, - Steve Gabosch At 12:15 PM 2/19/2005 -0500, you wrote: Reading this old thread of my late beloved Lisa brings back a lot of memories. I do not, remember, however, how this discussion proceeded from there. I do remember that it was an unfinished discussion, and that I had it in the back of my mind to engage Lisa once again attempting to divert her attention from dead-end leads and toward another direction. She was engaged and committed to the study of this material,. and to engagement with the marxists on the lists she
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Fw: [marxistphilosophy] Evald Ilyenkov'sPhilosophy Revisited (Ralph Dumain)
OK. I took longer look at Ralph's website - what a project! I look forward to browsing it more. Thanks, Jim. - Steve At 04:34 PM 1/19/04 -0500, you wrote: Actually it was Ralph Dumain's discussion of Ilyenkov which I forwarded to this list. Jim Farmelant ___ Marxism-Thaxis mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] To change your options or unsubscribe go to: http://lists.econ.utah.edu/mailman/listinfo/marxism-thaxis
Re: [Marxism-Thaxis] Fw: [marxistphilosophy] Evald Ilyenkov'sPhilosophy Revisited (Ralph Dumain)
Hi Victor, I have been lurking on Marxism-Thaxis now for a few weeks. Jim's discussion of Evald Ilyenkov's Philosophy Revisited got my attention, too. Hi, Jim! Thanks for your post on that book, you are always expanding my horizons, as does Victor. On another discussion list last summer, I noticed some comments you made, Victory, about Ilyenkov and Peter Jones and the concept of ideality. I am glad you posted here on this topic. I am still a newcomer to Ilyenkov, but I am excited by what I have read of his so far. The compilation of essays in the book Jim discusses indeed look intriguing. I spent some time last year with a couple different versions of an essay Peter Jones wrote on the concept of the ideal - perhaps this is the essay of his in this compilation. Ilyenkov's essay The Concept of the Ideal was a key reading in one of the components of an internet course the xmca discussion list sponsored last spring, along with relevant writings from David Bakhurst and Peter Jones, who had different takes. This course had a big influence on me in seeing how Marxism and activity theory are connected. Ilyenkov was for me a turning point, along with Bakhurst. One conversation-starter in this line of inquiry on ideality, sort of like the old saw if a tree falls in the forest and no one is there, does it make a sound?, is the question, 'does an artifact such as a hammer have ideality (or, do representations only have ideality?)'. I found the Jones viewpoint very challenging on several levels. First, he answers the above question 'no', that artifacts such as hammers do not have ideality. Second, Jones makes the claim that Ilyenkov also answers 'no'. My reading of Ilyenkov's essay, following Bakhurst's writings on the subject, is that Ilyenkov answers very clearly, 'yes', and provides a compelling line of reasoning in support of this position. It is a wider and deeper look at the relationship of the material and the ideal than I had previously considered. I especially appreciated the implications of Ilyenkov's theorizing for cultural-historical psychology and psychology and philosophy in general. This discussion of materialism and ideality sounds like it would be of interest both here on Thaxis and also on xmca. I am not quite prepared for it right now - I would like to re-read the above materials, and try to see if I can find a copy of the compilation Jim talks about. I am also just getting a sense of the discussions about Soviet philosophy such as on the site Jim provides a URL to, so I have some homework. But it could be a worthy topic sometime down the line. Thoughts? - Steve At 08:04 PM 1/19/04 +0200, you wrote: Jim, Thanks for the reference. I'm well acquainted with Bakehurst and Jones's writings on Ilyenkov, but much less familiar with the works of the Japanese School. I expect reading it will be an interesting experience. Regards, Victor - Original Message - From: Jim Farmelant [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Monday, January 19, 2004 12:45 AM Subject: [Marxism-Thaxis] Fw: [marxistphilosophy] Evald Ilyenkov'sPhilosophy Revisited (Ralph Dumain) Unfortunately, this book is hard to come by, and I do not have my own copy, but I did manage to get a look at a library copy. I've put up the table of contents and other basic information: Evald Ilyenkov's Philosophy Revisited http://www.autodidactproject.org/other/ilyenkv2.html Just a few stray notes on the contents: Bakhurst's article focuses on Ilyenkov's aesthetics, which are profoundly humanistic though prejudiced against much of modern art. Zweerde's specialty is Soviet philosophical culture. In this article, he discussed how Ilyenkov interacted with Soviet philosophical culture, in terms of his own interests and original manner of expression, and both how he was curtailed by the Soviet regime while still permitted to function, and what this can tell us about ideological life in the USSR. Silvonen's comparison of Ilyenkov and Foucault is based on Ilyenkov's conception of ideality--his conception of the relation of mind and matter/body--and a comparison with Foucault's notions. Vartiainen makes use of Nonaka Takeuchi's ideas about knowledge creation and M. Polanyi's notion of tacit knowledge, and presents a schema involving conversions between explicit and tacit knowledge. Knuuttila combines Umberto Eco's semiotics and Ilyenkov's ideality. The articles on the logic of Capital in relation to ideality (Jones, Chiutty, Honkanen) are fascinating and merit close study, as does this facet of Ilyenkov's work. Honkanen discusses Ricardo, mathematical modelling, Uno and the Japanese school, and the history of historical vs. logical approaches to Capital. The best thing to hit the internet in years - Juno SpeedBand! Surf the web up to FIVE TIMES FASTER! Only $14.95/ month -
