RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, I hope we can avoid returning to the innate-vs-NOTInnate controversy, 
as we have zero chance of agreement there J

No, I’m not reducing causality to only one... far from it. I started writing 
out a spiel of exceptions and interpretations and realized that it would 
culminate in a blather that no-one would want to read. So for the sake of 
brevity, I have left out a lot. I assumed that most of us here are sufficiently 
well-versed on the topic that we don’t need to labour over the detail. But yes, 
strictly speaking, you are correct, of course there ARE other causalities.

So what is it that you are suggesting about how a tree develops from a seed 
into a tree? Is it in the DNA? We both agree, I assume, that DNA is very 
important. All I am doing is suggesting that there is something else going on, 
and it is not the infotech theory of DNA. It CANNOT be the infotech version, 
impossible, because it violates the laws of thermodynamics. I could, however, 
be persuaded if someone showed me the computer that processes the tree’s DNA 
software.

>”Furthermore, societal forms, such as the type of work you do, have nothing to 
>do with genes but with learning - and our species is, by definition, heavily 
>focused around learning.“

I get a bd feeling about this. Innate-vs-NOTInnate... nooo!

Edwina, all I’m trying to do is, in the spirit of brainstorming, to introduce 
the question into our narrative. I’m not even proposing definitive answers. 
You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 2:35 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen - I disagree; you are reducing causality to only one - efficient 
causality (i.e., proximate). A tree doesn't 'know how to be' merely and only if 
it is growing next to another similar tree.  Furthermore, societal forms, such 
as the type of work you do, have nothing to do with genes but with learning - 
and our species is, by definition, heavily focused around learning. 

 

Edwina

 

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Peirce-L'   

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 7:34 AM

Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

List,

The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the opinion that 
it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do not have all 
the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for expanding 
our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA entanglement).

The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the information 
technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a computer, is 
fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but the most 
obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in the DNA, there is 
nothing resembling a computer to process it. If the mainstream life-science 
community is to persist with this infotech narrative, then they need to be 
consistent. But how can they remain consistent if, in violation of the 
principles of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics (entropy), it is 
impossible for anything resembling a computer to occur in nature?

Thus, what we are left with at the heart of any cell, is DNA molecules... with 
no evidence of any infotech mechanism that might process the “data”. SHOW US 
THE COMPUTER! NO COMPUTER, NO DNA INFOTECH (and no genocentric paradigm). It’s 
that simple. This topic should be of interest to us in semiotics, because 
ultimately, I suggest, the principles on which DNA function are semiotic in 
character.

In their experiment testing for the possibility of non-local correlations 
between separated neural networks, Pizzi et al (2004) conclude that “after an 
initial stage where the system interacts by direct contact, also in the 
following stage where the system has been separated into two sections, a sort 
of correlation persists between sections. This is what , at a macroscopic 
level, we verify in our experiment: it seems that neurons utilize the quantum 
information to synchronize.”

Given what we know of entanglement between particles, the only way in which 
correlations between separated neural networks can occur is via the DNA 
molecules within the neurons .

Other similar experiments in biophysics arrive at similar or analogous 
conclusions. And the most common question raised among researchers in quantum 
biology, including Pizzi et al above, is along the lines of... how do 
mechanisms within the cell utilize entanglement? I would suggest that they have 
their reasoning back-to-front. It is not the mechanisms that utilize 
entanglement, but entanglement that is the source for 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Ozzie]

Stephen ~ 
DNA is a polymer that represents habits that persisted and experienced 
evolutionary success.  That is an exercise in Pragmatic logic.  The polymer is 
later activated by electrochemical energy in its immediate environment.  That 
is Pragmatic logic, too. 

The knowing-how-to-be behavior you emphasize may be the result of the DNA a 
polymer expressing itself as instinct. No computer is required for polymers to 
work, so the absence of a computer is not evidence of anything (other than a 
confused analysis).  The logic involving the polymer has already been performed 
(perhaps millions of years previously), so it responds to a trigger from the 
environment -- a logical "abduction" that the situation has changed. 

If a polymer is cut in two, I am not familiar with any rule of polymers that 
prevents each segment from reacting to a common field of electrochemical 
energy.  The "correlation" that exists between the segments is due to the 
common field (of electrochemical energy) they share.  Why not separate the two 
DNA strands (or neurons if you prefer) and immerse them in different 
electrochemical environments?   If they're still communicating or their 
behavior is still correlated after that, then your hypothesis has empirical 
support. 

This is a good illustration for my observation yesterday that any deeper 
analysis of logic must be grounded in physical reality. 

Regards,
Tom Wyrick




> On Oct 21, 2015, at 6:34 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:
> 
> List,
> 
> The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the opinion 
> that it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do not 
> have all the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for 
> expanding our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA 
> entanglement).
> 
> The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the information 
> technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a computer, is 
> fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but the most 
> obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in the DNA, there 
> is nothing resembling a computer to process it. If the mainstream 
> life-science community is to persist with this infotech narrative, then they 
> need to be consistent. But how can they remain consistent if, in violation of 
> the principles of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics (entropy), it is 
> impossible for anything resembling a computer to occur in nature?
> 
> Thus, what we are left with at the heart of any cell, is DNA molecules... 
> with no evidence of any infotech mechanism that might process the “data”. 
> SHOW US THE COMPUTER! NO COMPUTER, NO DNA INFOTECH (and no genocentric 
> paradigm). It’s that simple. This topic should be of interest to us in 
> semiotics, because ultimately, I suggest, the principles on which DNA 
> function are semiotic in character.
> 
> In their experiment testing for the possibility of non-local correlations 
> between separated neural networks, Pizzi et al (2004) conclude that “after an 
> initial stage where the system interacts by direct contact, also in the 
> following stage where the system has been separated into two sections, a sort 
> of correlation persists between sections. This is what , at a macroscopic 
> level, we verify in our experiment: it seems that neurons utilize the quantum 
> information to synchronize.”
> 
> Given what we know of entanglement between particles, the only way in which 
> correlations between separated neural networks can occur is via the DNA 
> molecules within the neurons .
> 
> Other similar experiments in biophysics arrive at similar or analogous 
> conclusions. And the most common question raised among researchers in quantum 
> biology, including Pizzi et al above, is along the lines of... how do 
> mechanisms within the cell utilize entanglement? I would suggest that they 
> have their reasoning back-to-front. It is not the mechanisms that utilize 
> entanglement, but entanglement that is the source for the mechanisms, 
> properties and predispositions. And this reframes the problem as one that 
> relates principally to semiotics.
> 
> As a tentative description for how this might relate to semiotics, here’s one 
> of my conjectures: Entanglement between DNA molecules, I suggest, enables the 
> body's cells to access the shared mind-body condition, to be informed by it. 
> In this way, DNA entanglement plays a crucial role in knowing how to be. This 
> would be analogous to how our telecommunication technologies provide every 
> person in a city with immediate access to the city's options, to inform its 
> people on how to be. For example, people growing up in working-class or 
> middle-class suburbs are more likely to know how to be tradesmen, 
> shopkeepers, nurses, police or the unemployed, while people growing up in 
> upper-class suburbs are more likely to know how to be professionals, 
> 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Stephen Jarosek]

>”But I don't agree that the existing model is broken and inconsistent with 
>natural law!”

Excellent! This means that you will be able to do one of two things:

1) You will be able to pinpoint the computer, where it lies, and explain how it 
works; OR

2) You will be able to provide a laboratory demonstration/simulation/proof 
outlining Tom’s (Ozzie) explanation just posted.

I await your account with eager anticipation! Thanking you in advance J

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 6:03 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen - YOU consider that 

 

"You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.
"

But I don't agree that the existing model is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law! So, as usual, you and I continue to disagree.

 

As for our species being heavily based around learning - yes, but our innate 
capacity for reasoning and logic enables us to learn.

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Edwina Taborsky'   ; 'Peirce-L' 
  

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 9:50 AM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Edwina, I hope we can avoid returning to the innate-vs-NOTInnate controversy, 
as we have zero chance of agreement there J

No, I’m not reducing causality to only one... far from it. I started writing 
out a spiel of exceptions and interpretations and realized that it would 
culminate in a blather that no-one would want to read. So for the sake of 
brevity, I have left out a lot. I assumed that most of us here are sufficiently 
well-versed on the topic that we don’t need to labour over the detail. But yes, 
strictly speaking, you are correct, of course there ARE other causalities.

So what is it that you are suggesting about how a tree develops from a seed 
into a tree? Is it in the DNA? We both agree, I assume, that DNA is very 
important. All I am doing is suggesting that there is something else going on, 
and it is not the infotech theory of DNA. It CANNOT be the infotech version, 
impossible, because it violates the laws of thermodynamics. I could, however, 
be persuaded if someone showed me the computer that processes the tree’s DNA 
software.

>”Furthermore, societal forms, such as the type of work you do, have nothing to 
>do with genes but with learning - and our species is, by definition, heavily 
>focused around learning.“

I get a bd feeling about this. Innate-vs-NOTInnate... nooo!

Edwina, all I’m trying to do is, in the spirit of brainstorming, to introduce 
the question into our narrative. I’m not even proposing definitive answers. 
You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 2:35 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen - I disagree; you are reducing causality to only one - efficient 
causality (i.e., proximate). A tree doesn't 'know how to be' merely and only if 
it is growing next to another similar tree.  Furthermore, societal forms, such 
as the type of work you do, have nothing to do with genes but with learning - 
and our species is, by definition, heavily focused around learning. 

 

Edwina

 

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Peirce-L'   

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 7:34 AM

Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

List,

The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the opinion that 
it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do not have all 
the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for expanding 
our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA entanglement).

The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the information 
technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a computer, is 
fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but the most 
obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in the DNA, there is 
nothing resembling a computer to process it. If the mainstream life-science 
community is to persist with this infotech narrative, then they need to be 
consistent. But how can they remain consistent if, in violation of the 
principles of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics (entropy), it is 
impossible for anything resembling a computer to occur in nature?

Thus, what we are left with at the heart of any 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Stephen Jarosek]

Tom, your explanation is an example of those self-consistent narratives that 
people construct in order to rationalize their assumptions. We all do it on 
occasion, some more than others, and we all have to be on guard against this 
predisposition. One of the ways we might do so is to formalize our thinking in 
terms of axioms – a framework of best guesses. Within the context of my 
axiomatic framework, your explanation does not work. Within an infinite 
universe, minute, complex structures might stumble into existence according to 
the laws of chance... and then blink out again just as quickly. With all the 
forces of entropy arrayed against them, the minutest, most complex structures 
won’t last. It is their persistence across time that is the deal-breaker. Of 
course I could be wrong, but then I do emphasize that my axiomatic framework is 
a best guess. Yours is a rationalization... a “just so” story... that is absent 
of an axiomatic framework to anchor to. sj

 

From: Ozzie [mailto:ozzie...@gmail.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 6:09 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen ~ 

DNA is a polymer that represents habits that persisted and experienced 
evolutionary success.  That is an exercise in Pragmatic logic.  The polymer is 
later activated by electrochemical energy in its immediate environment.  That 
is Pragmatic logic, too. 

 

The knowing-how-to-be behavior you emphasize may be the result of the DNA a 
polymer expressing itself as instinct. No computer is required for polymers to 
work, so the absence of a computer is not evidence of anything (other than a 
confused analysis).  The logic involving the polymer has already been performed 
(perhaps millions of years previously), so it responds to a trigger from the 
environment -- a logical "abduction" that the situation has changed. 

 

If a polymer is cut in two, I am not familiar with any rule of polymers that 
prevents each segment from reacting to a common field of electrochemical 
energy.  The "correlation" that exists between the segments is due to the 
common field (of electrochemical energy) they share.  Why not separate the two 
DNA strands (or neurons if you prefer) and immerse them in different 
electrochemical environments?   If they're still communicating or their 
behavior is still correlated after that, then your hypothesis has empirical 
support. 

 

This is a good illustration for my observation yesterday that any deeper 
analysis of logic must be grounded in physical reality. 

 

Regards,

Tom Wyrick

 

 

 


On Oct 21, 2015, at 6:34 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:

List,

The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the opinion that 
it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do not have all 
the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for expanding 
our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA entanglement).

The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the information 
technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a computer, is 
fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but the most 
obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in the DNA, there is 
nothing resembling a computer to process it. If the mainstream life-science 
community is to persist with this infotech narrative, then they need to be 
consistent. But how can they remain consistent if, in violation of the 
principles of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics (entropy), it is 
impossible for anything resembling a computer to occur in nature?

Thus, what we are left with at the heart of any cell, is DNA molecules... with 
no evidence of any infotech mechanism that might process the “data”. SHOW US 
THE COMPUTER! NO COMPUTER, NO DNA INFOTECH (and no genocentric paradigm). It’s 
that simple. This topic should be of interest to us in semiotics, because 
ultimately, I suggest, the principles on which DNA function are semiotic in 
character.

In their experiment testing for the possibility of non-local correlations 
between separated neural networks, Pizzi et al (2004) conclude that “after an 
initial stage where the system interacts by direct contact, also in the 
following stage where the system has been separated into two sections, a sort 
of correlation persists between sections. This is what , at a macroscopic 
level, we verify in our experiment: it seems that neurons utilize the quantum 
information to synchronize.”

Given what we know of entanglement between particles, the only way in which 
correlations between separated neural networks can occur is via the DNA 
molecules within the neurons .

Other similar experiments in biophysics arrive at similar or analogous 
conclusions. And the most common question raised among researchers in quantum 
biology, including Pizzi et al above, is along the lines of... how do 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen - YOU consider that 

"You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.
"
But I don't agree that the existing model is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law! So, as usual, you and I continue to disagree.

As for our species being heavily based around learning - yes, but our innate 
capacity for reasoning and logic enables us to learn.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 9:50 AM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement


  Edwina, I hope we can avoid returning to the innate-vs-NOTInnate controversy, 
as we have zero chance of agreement there J

  No, I’m not reducing causality to only one... far from it. I started writing 
out a spiel of exceptions and interpretations and realized that it would 
culminate in a blather that no-one would want to read. So for the sake of 
brevity, I have left out a lot. I assumed that most of us here are sufficiently 
well-versed on the topic that we don’t need to labour over the detail. But yes, 
strictly speaking, you are correct, of course there ARE other causalities.

  So what is it that you are suggesting about how a tree develops from a seed 
into a tree? Is it in the DNA? We both agree, I assume, that DNA is very 
important. All I am doing is suggesting that there is something else going on, 
and it is not the infotech theory of DNA. It CANNOT be the infotech version, 
impossible, because it violates the laws of thermodynamics. I could, however, 
be persuaded if someone showed me the computer that processes the tree’s DNA 
software.

  >”Furthermore, societal forms, such as the type of work you do, have nothing 
to do with genes but with learning - and our species is, by definition, heavily 
focused around learning.“

  I get a bd feeling about this. Innate-vs-NOTInnate... nooo!

  Edwina, all I’m trying to do is, in the spirit of brainstorming, to introduce 
the question into our narrative. I’m not even proposing definitive answers. 
You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.

  sj

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 2:35 PM
  To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

   

  Stephen - I disagree; you are reducing causality to only one - efficient 
causality (i.e., proximate). A tree doesn't 'know how to be' merely and only if 
it is growing next to another similar tree.  Furthermore, societal forms, such 
as the type of work you do, have nothing to do with genes but with learning - 
and our species is, by definition, heavily focused around learning. 

   

  Edwina

   

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek 

To: 'Peirce-L' 

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 7:34 AM

Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

List,

The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the opinion 
that it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do not 
have all the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for 
expanding our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA 
entanglement).

The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the information 
technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a computer, is 
fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but the most 
obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in the DNA, there is 
nothing resembling a computer to process it. If the mainstream life-science 
community is to persist with this infotech narrative, then they need to be 
consistent. But how can they remain consistent if, in violation of the 
principles of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics (entropy), it is 
impossible for anything resembling a computer to occur in nature?

Thus, what we are left with at the heart of any cell, is DNA molecules... 
with no evidence of any infotech mechanism that might process the “data”. SHOW 
US THE COMPUTER! NO COMPUTER, NO DNA INFOTECH (and no genocentric paradigm). 
It’s that simple. This topic should be of interest to us in semiotics, because 
ultimately, I suggest, the principles on which DNA function are semiotic in 
character.

In their experiment testing for the possibility of non-local correlations 
between separated neural networks, Pizzi et al (2004) conclude that “after an 
initial stage where the system interacts by direct contact, also in the 
following stage where the system has been separated into two sections, a sort 
of correlation persists between sections. This is what , at a macroscopic 
level, we verify in our 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

[Benjamin Udell]

Dear Ben Novak,

I haven't been following that thread carefully, since I've gotten busy 
with practical matters.


On re-reading my previous message, I find that I misplaced a phrase (in 
one of my two uses of it) in such a way that you may have thought that I 
was criticizing you, suggesting that you were trapped in a method of 
tenacity or authority, or whatever. I don't think that at all. Here it 
is with the phrase inserted in boldface into its proper place:


   [] Peirce of course would have been interested in all that,
   though it would take more a inspirational or exemplificative role
   than a dispositive role in his /philosophy/_ of how one _/ought/_ to
   think. **To pursue an abductive trail,** one needs to be not too
   trapped in inquiry methods of tenacity, authority, or the a priori
   []
   [End quote]

As to my question, I think I was getting myself into some contortions 
about deduction because in some half-conscious way I was still 
introducing the idea of conflict. Now, Peirce said that deduction is for 
prediction. That by itself is enough to suggest that an emotion of 
impatience belongs to the occasion of deduction — an impatience with the 
vagueness of the future, or the coyness of the present in telling us it 
— one doesn't want to wait for nature to take its course, one wants to 
find out ahead of time, on the basis of accumulated data, what is the 
fate, for example of the Milky Way. (It turns out to be on a collision 
course with the Andromeda galaxy.)


— In (attenuative) deduction one notices certain necessary but 
perspectivally new consequents about what is going to happen. (To reduce 
impatience.)
— In induction one expects certain unnecessary consequents sufficient 
for the antecedents, but also similar to them, about what is actually 
happening. (To reduce feeling of a skew or arbitrariness.)
— In abduction (a.k.a. retroduction) one supposes certain contingent, 
'can-be', but also particularly plausible, naturally simple, consequents 
about what has happened. (To reduce feeling of surprise, perplexity, 
conflict with assumptions or expectations.)


Tom Wyrick's comments might be taken as relevant to my question if one 
thought that I was pursuing a question of psychology. The philosophical 
study of semiotics, inference, etc., is at a cenoscopic level, concerned 
with positive phenomena in general, not with special classes or 
populations of concrete phenomena. One wouldn't expect questions about 
statistical inference and its principles to depend on results in brain 
studies any more than one would expect number theory to depend on 
results in brain studies. If brain study conclusions could be used to 
support conclusions in number theory, I doubt that number theorists 
would be too proud to use such brain studies. What the brain studies may 
help resolve instead are questions of /implementations/_ of logic, 
semiotics, statistical inference, number theory, etc., in homo sapiens. 
They might help show specific, mathematically or logically arbitrary 
skews of such implementations, and so on.


The positivists divided sciences into formal (i.e., mathematics and 
deductive logic) and factual. I never got clear on where they put 
philosophy, I suspect they hoped to make it into a formal science. 
Peirce divided discovery sciences into mathematics, cenoscopy 
(_/philosophia prima/ _) 
http://www.commens.org/dictionary/term/cenoscopy , and idioscopy 
(physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.). Understanding Peirce's 
views on this helps clarify his approach to (philosophical) logic as 
formal semiotic - the formal study of signs and semiosis, a study not 
resting _/logically/_ on neurology, psychology, linguistics, or 
sociology, but sometimes related to them genealogically, in drawing on 
them for examples, generalizing from them, where the word 
'generalization' is used in Peirce's preferred sense of _/selective/_ 
generalization of characters to a wider domain. I've argued a number of 
times here at peirce-l (somebody disagreed) that we should feel free to 
look at actual concrete historical cases without worrying too much about 
whether they'll bias us in philosophical inquiry. I think Peirce had no 
hesitation about it. On the other hand I think that Peirce was quite 
right to keep track of whether the dependence of one science on another 
is a logical dependence or a dependence for examples and inspiration.


Best, Ben

On 10/21/2015 9:28 AM, Ben Novak wrote:


Dear  Udell:

I wonder if this post on a different thread, which I am sure you read, 
is relevant to your question in this thread:


Ozzie via list.iupui.edu
3:13 PM (17 hours ago)
to Clark, PEIRCE-L

Clark, List ~
I believe your discomfort arises from the fact that at the
frontiers of knowledge (in any discipline), logical abduction tips
over into speculation when objects do not have Pragmatic
interpretants, and are replaced by nominalistic black-box
mechanisms whose true 

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Ozzie, Clark:

In regard to recent exchanges on open axiomatic frameworks, it is of critical 
importance to denote the distinctions between Newton's statements about the 
"hypothetical"  and the nine terms of trichotomy. 

For a summary of Newton's views, See Ernan McMullin's :

http://www.paricenter.com/library/papers/mullin02.php
The Impact of Newton's Principia on the Philosophy of Science

Ernan McMullin
Department of Philosophy
University of Notre Dame,


and, equally importantly,
http://www.pitt.edu/~mem208/courses/phph_s15/documents/mcmullin_the_origin_of_the_field_concept.pdf

Further, a critical distinction between the logic of physics and the logic of 
chemistry (as represented in CSP's nine terms of his trichotomy)  is the 
hypothesis of "gravitons" as mathematical objects (nominialistic philosophy?)  
and the hypothesis of chemical elements (electrical particles) in the chemical 
table of elements.

For CSP, the role of the index (molecular formula) lies at the center of his 
tabulation of operators. This concept of index is both the consequence of the 
chemical analysis and the antecedent of the arguments that generate the 
legisigns. 

If I understand Clark's post, his concern is his allegiance to the habits of 
physicists to invoke variables as universal explanatory operators.  A 
consequence of such habits of physical scientists is the LOSS of relations with 
pragmatic indices of nature.  Or, stated in more philosophical terms, apodictic 
signs are replaced by mathematical imagination and imaginary numbers.

In my view, a critical distinction that crisply separates CSP logic and 
physical logic (such as hypothetical gravitons) is centered precisely on the 
role of indices.  The example of molecular numbers as indices of integers and 
the derived physical (molecular) structures (such as DNA, RNA, Proteins and 
metabolites) illustrate the conundrum faced by both the semantics and syntax of 
physical symbols. Such physical structures are simply beyond the language of 
physical variables.  So, in order to paper-over the logical conundrums, the 
language of physics constructs hypothetical mathematical structures 
(n-dimensional spaces) that bear minimal connections to reality.

I believe that the history of physics is rich enough to remain apodictic and to 
work with local operators as well as the special cases invoking universal 
operators such as symmetry.
It appears to me that most (if not nearly all physicists) have abandoned 
apodictism.

CSP did not. 

Cheers

Jerry




On Oct 21, 2015, at 12:07 PM, Ozzie wrote:

> Clark ~
> It doesn't seem to me that you've followed the thread of my argument.  If you 
> have, then I'll simply say that I disagree with each of your major points. 
> 
> Regarding physics and gravitons:  I asserted they are hypothetical.  That is 
> widely known, and you didn't dispute it.  People do not use hypotheticals 
> when they can instead rely on facts and reality.  So physicists really do not 
> know what causes gravity; they have an unverified theory.   I asserted that 
> physicists were stalled -- unable to explain gravity in a satisfactory way 
> without resorting to hypothetical particles.  Your response: "It makes sense 
> by symmetry to assume gravity does the same sorts of things."  Yes, it makes 
> sense, if the prior unverified logic is correct, and if symmetry applies. 
> That's two "ifs," each with a probability of less than one, multiplied 
> together.  That is the analytical black box I described, with an admixture of 
> contents both real and imagined.  That black box with gravitons inside also 
> gets a lot of strings, particles and extra dimensions gratuitously thrown 
> into it by each Nobel-hopeful, which explains your lament: "Sadly physics 
> went down a theoretical dead end alley in my opinion."  Yet, you seem to like 
> that black box, as long as you first approve of its unverified contents.  
> 
> Maybe some day physicists will have the empirical data they require to answer 
> these questions.  They're certainly working on it, so I consider their black 
> box exercises as hypotheticals to eventually be tested/verified.   However, 
> those working on empirical issues regarding the physical mechanisms of 
> cognitive logic are brain researchers, not philosophers.  Each successful 
> test of their theories moves purely philosophical (non-empirical) theories of 
> logic toward the margin. 
> 
> Regards,
> Tom Wyrick
> 
> 
> 
> On Oct 20, 2015, at 9:44 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:
> 
>> 
>>> On Oct 20, 2015, at 1:13 PM, Ozzie  wrote:
>>> 
>>> I believe your discomfort arises from the fact that at the frontiers of 
>>> knowledge (in any discipline), logical abduction tips over into speculation 
>>> when objects do not have Pragmatic interpretants, and are replaced by 
>>> nominalistic black-box mechanisms whose true properties are unknown.  That 
>>> leaves each "thinker" free to assign "reasonable" 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Sungchul Ji]

Stephen J,

What is the mechanism of DNA entanglement ?
Without any realistic mechanism to go with it, wouldn't it be just a name ?

Sung

On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 7:34 AM, Stephen Jarosek 
wrote:

> List,
>
> The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the opinion
> that it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do not
> have all the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for
> expanding our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA
> entanglement).
>
> The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the information
> technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a computer, is
> fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but the most
> obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in the DNA,
> there is nothing resembling a computer to process it. If the mainstream
> life-science community is to persist with this infotech narrative, then
> they need to be consistent. But how can they remain consistent if, in
> violation of the principles of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics
> (entropy), it is impossible for anything resembling a computer to occur in
> nature?
>
> Thus, what we are left with at the heart of any cell, is DNA molecules...
> with no evidence of any infotech mechanism that might process the “data”.
> SHOW US THE COMPUTER! NO COMPUTER, NO DNA INFOTECH (and no genocentric
> paradigm). It’s that simple. This topic should be of interest to us in
> semiotics, because ultimately, I suggest, the principles on which DNA
> function are semiotic in character.
>
> In their experiment testing for the possibility of non-local correlations
> between separated neural networks, Pizzi et al (2004) conclude that “after
> an initial stage where the system interacts by direct contact, also in the
> following stage where the system has been separated into two sections, a
> sort of correlation persists between sections. This is what , at a
> macroscopic level, we verify in our experiment: it seems that neurons
> utilize the quantum information to synchronize.”
>
>
>
> *Given what we know of entanglement between particles, the only way in
> which correlations between separated neural networks can occur is via the
> DNA molecules within the neurons .*Other similar experiments in
> biophysics arrive at similar or analogous conclusions. And the most common
> question raised among researchers in quantum biology, including Pizzi et al
> above, is along the lines of... how do mechanisms within the cell utilize
> entanglement? I would suggest that they have their reasoning back-to-front. 
> *It
> is not the mechanisms that utilize entanglement, but entanglement that is
> the source for the mechanisms, properties and predispositions*. And this
> reframes the problem as one that relates principally to semiotics.
>
> As a tentative description for how this might relate to semiotics, here’s
> one of my conjectures: Entanglement between DNA molecules, I suggest,
> enables the body's cells to access the shared mind-body condition, to be
> informed by it. In this way, DNA entanglement plays a crucial role in *knowing
> how to be*. This would be analogous to how our telecommunication
> technologies provide every person in a city with immediate access to the
> city's options, to inform its people on *how to be*. For example, people
> growing up in working-class or middle-class suburbs are more likely to *know
> how to be* tradesmen, shopkeepers, nurses, police or the unemployed,
> while people growing up in upper-class suburbs are more likely to *know
> how to be* professionals, investors, office-workers or, simply, the idle
> rich. This interpretation would be consistent with how stem-cells develop,
> contingent on their location within the organs of the body. A stem-cell has
> to *know how to be* before it can become a productive cell with its role
> in an organ properly defined. And the stem-cell’s proximal/local context is
> what teases out its predispositions, in order to define its ultimate
> purpose. This line of thinking seems to resonate with aspects of David
> Bohm’s implicate/explicate order. [What I have in mind here is also
> analogous to Rupert Sheldrake’s theory of morphic resonance, where he
> regards the DNA molecule as analogous to a receiver (antenna).] *In
> summary, proximal context (face-to-face or synapse-to-synapse) is what
> teases out both the neuron’s AND the human’s nonlocal predispositions, to
> define their ultimate trajectories.*
>
> Anyone else interested in exploring this further? There seems to be a
> reluctance for people to step beyond their spheres of expertise, perhaps
> for fear of ridicule. But in any interdisciplinary endeavour, this needs to
> be done. We are ill-served when we allow The Establishment to dominate with
> a broken genocentric narrative. At the very least, these ideas merit
> brainstorming.
>
> sj
>
> Pizzi, R., Fantasia, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

[Clark Goble]

> On Oct 21, 2015, at 11:25 AM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:
> 
> The positivists divided sciences into formal (i.e., mathematics and deductive 
> logic) and factual. I never got clear on where they put philosophy, I suspect 
> they hoped to make it into a formal science. 

I think they differed among themselves on this, although I’m not an expert on 
the Vienna circle. (And especially not the 19th century positivists) It seemed 
that the spirit of the mid-20th century was to attempt to reduce philosophy to 
other matters. Either becoming clear on our semantics that would dissolve most 
problems or to reduce it to a kind of foundationalist epistemology of judgments 
with the rest being clear formalism. It was in most ways a rather bad dead end 
for philosophy IMO. Fortunately people drug themselves out of it while 
(hopefully) taking what was useful from both critiques.

I’ll confess that I’ve never quite understood the drive to taxonomy on these 
matters. (This is one Peircean drive I’ve never been able to quite embrace) If 
for only the reason that any practical analysis seems such a mix of different 
taxonomies. I just never quite was clear what the point was. Certainly keeping 
clear what one is doing (semantics vs. ontology) and so forth is important. But 
one can become clear on the parts one is doing while acknowledging that the 
item under analysis is usually a mix.

Perhaps I’m wrong in this though.

> As to my question, I think I was getting myself into some contortions about 
> deduction because in some half-conscious way I was still introducing the idea 
> of conflict. Now, Peirce said that deduction is for prediction. That by 
> itself is enough to suggest that an emotion of impatience belongs to the 
> occasion of deduction — an impatience with the vagueness of the future, or 
> the coyness of the present in telling us it — one doesn't want to wait for 
> nature to take its course, one wants to find out ahead of time, on the basis 
> of accumulated data, what is the fate, for example of the Milky Way. (It 
> turns out to be on a collision course with the Andromeda galaxy.)

I think you’re right although I’m not sure impatience gets at the feeling quite 
right. I think dissatisfaction is perhaps more apt since impatience implies a 
time component that’s not always present.



-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Stephen Jarosek]

Excellent question Sung, and a most important one!

The mechanism of DNA entanglement requires rethinking existing assumptions. I 
was hoping to initiate conversation around this theme in a spirit of 
brainstorming, but it seems that the forum is not overly receptive to this 
style of conversation... with due fairness, perhaps they’re right, as it 
diverges considerably from the established Peircean narrative. If you are 
interested, we can take the conversation further, offline from the forum.

sj

 

From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Sungchul Ji
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 8:14 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen J,

 

What is the mechanism of DNA entanglement ?

Without any realistic mechanism to go with it, wouldn't it be just a name ?

 

Sung

 

On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 7:34 AM, Stephen Jarosek  wrote:

List,

The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the opinion that 
it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do not have all 
the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for expanding 
our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA entanglement).

The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the information 
technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a computer, is 
fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but the most 
obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in the DNA, there is 
nothing resembling a computer to process it. If the mainstream life-science 
community is to persist with this infotech narrative, then they need to be 
consistent. But how can they remain consistent if, in violation of the 
principles of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics (entropy), it is 
impossible for anything resembling a computer to occur in nature?

Thus, what we are left with at the heart of any cell, is DNA molecules... with 
no evidence of any infotech mechanism that might process the “data”. SHOW US 
THE COMPUTER! NO COMPUTER, NO DNA INFOTECH (and no genocentric paradigm). It’s 
that simple. This topic should be of interest to us in semiotics, because 
ultimately, I suggest, the principles on which DNA function are semiotic in 
character.

In their experiment testing for the possibility of non-local correlations 
between separated neural networks, Pizzi et al (2004) conclude that “after an 
initial stage where the system interacts by direct contact, also in the 
following stage where the system has been separated into two sections, a sort 
of correlation persists between sections. This is what , at a macroscopic 
level, we verify in our experiment: it seems that neurons utilize the quantum 
information to synchronize.”

Given what we know of entanglement between particles, the only way in which 
correlations between separated neural networks can occur is via the DNA 
molecules within the neurons .

Other similar experiments in biophysics arrive at similar or analogous 
conclusions. And the most common question raised among researchers in quantum 
biology, including Pizzi et al above, is along the lines of... how do 
mechanisms within the cell utilize entanglement? I would suggest that they have 
their reasoning back-to-front. It is not the mechanisms that utilize 
entanglement, but entanglement that is the source for the mechanisms, 
properties and predispositions. And this reframes the problem as one that 
relates principally to semiotics.

As a tentative description for how this might relate to semiotics, here’s one 
of my conjectures: Entanglement between DNA molecules, I suggest, enables the 
body's cells to access the shared mind-body condition, to be informed by it. In 
this way, DNA entanglement plays a crucial role in knowing how to be. This 
would be analogous to how our telecommunication technologies provide every 
person in a city with immediate access to the city's options, to inform its 
people on how to be. For example, people growing up in working-class or 
middle-class suburbs are more likely to know how to be tradesmen, shopkeepers, 
nurses, police or the unemployed, while people growing up in upper-class 
suburbs are more likely to know how to be professionals, investors, 
office-workers or, simply, the idle rich. This interpretation would be 
consistent with how stem-cells develop, contingent on their location within the 
organs of the body. A stem-cell has to know how to be before it can become a 
productive cell with its role in an organ properly defined. And the stem-cell’s 
proximal/local context is what teases out its predispositions, in order to 
define its ultimate purpose. This line of thinking seems to resonate with 
aspects of David Bohm’s implicate/explicate order. [What I have in mind here is 
also analogous to Rupert Sheldrake’s theory of morphic resonance, where he 
regards the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Stephen Jarosek]

Edwina, if you accept the CAS interpretation as appropriate, while rejecting 
the mainstream’s preference for the infotech narrative, then there is still no 
solid theory, as far as I am aware, of how DNA engages within the context of a 
CAS. So whichever way we look at it, there is no adequate explanation anywhere, 
of how DNA works. For one, the paradigm is broken, while for the other, the 
question is not addressed. sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 9:58 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen - maybe you think that the 'existing model' of the Mind is a computer. 
But I don't. I think it's a neurological semiosic networked process, a CAS 
(complex adaptive system). 

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Edwina Taborsky'   ; 'Peirce-L' 
  

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 12:52 PM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

>”But I don't agree that the existing model is broken and inconsistent with 
>natural law!”

Excellent! This means that you will be able to do one of two things:

1) You will be able to pinpoint the computer, where it lies, and explain how it 
works; OR

2) You will be able to provide a laboratory demonstration/simulation/proof 
outlining Tom’s (Ozzie) explanation just posted.

I await your account with eager anticipation! Thanking you in advance J

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 6:03 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen - YOU consider that 

 

"You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.
"

But I don't agree that the existing model is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law! So, as usual, you and I continue to disagree.

 

As for our species being heavily based around learning - yes, but our innate 
capacity for reasoning and logic enables us to learn.

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Edwina Taborsky'   ; 'Peirce-L' 
  

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 9:50 AM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Edwina, I hope we can avoid returning to the innate-vs-NOTInnate controversy, 
as we have zero chance of agreement there J

No, I’m not reducing causality to only one... far from it. I started writing 
out a spiel of exceptions and interpretations and realized that it would 
culminate in a blather that no-one would want to read. So for the sake of 
brevity, I have left out a lot. I assumed that most of us here are sufficiently 
well-versed on the topic that we don’t need to labour over the detail. But yes, 
strictly speaking, you are correct, of course there ARE other causalities.

So what is it that you are suggesting about how a tree develops from a seed 
into a tree? Is it in the DNA? We both agree, I assume, that DNA is very 
important. All I am doing is suggesting that there is something else going on, 
and it is not the infotech theory of DNA. It CANNOT be the infotech version, 
impossible, because it violates the laws of thermodynamics. I could, however, 
be persuaded if someone showed me the computer that processes the tree’s DNA 
software.

>”Furthermore, societal forms, such as the type of work you do, have nothing to 
>do with genes but with learning - and our species is, by definition, heavily 
>focused around learning.“

I get a bd feeling about this. Innate-vs-NOTInnate... nooo!

Edwina, all I’m trying to do is, in the spirit of brainstorming, to introduce 
the question into our narrative. I’m not even proposing definitive answers. 
You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 2:35 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen - I disagree; you are reducing causality to only one - efficient 
causality (i.e., proximate). A tree doesn't 'know how to be' merely and only if 
it is growing next to another similar tree.  Furthermore, societal forms, such 
as the type of work you do, have nothing to do with genes but with learning - 
and our species is, by definition, heavily focused around learning. 

 

Edwina

 

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Peirce-L'   

Sent: Wednesday, 

Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Forwarded ( Clark sent this, but did not CC this list serve.)
On Oct 21, 2015, at 1:52 PM, Clark Goble wrote:

> 
>> On Oct 21, 2015, at 12:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> In regard to recent exchanges on open axiomatic frameworks, it is of 
>> critical importance to denote the distinctions between Newton's statements 
>> about the "hypothetical"  and the nine terms of trichotomy. 
> 
> Just to be clear, I’ve not really discussed the larger topics. I’ve not read 
> the links that have been given. I’ve just been commenting on specific bits 
> related to Peirce and to what I see is misunderstanding the evolution within 
> science. I hope to go back through the links this weekend. Alas I have 
> limited time (which is why I often go weeks between posts)
> 
>> If I understand Clark's post, his concern is his allegiance to the habits of 
>> physicists to invoke variables as universal explanatory operators.  A 
>> consequence of such habits of physical scientists is the LOSS of relations 
>> with pragmatic indices of nature.  Or, stated in more philosophical terms, 
>> apodictic signs are replaced by mathematical imagination and imaginary 
>> numbers.
> 
> I suspect I’d say structures rather than variables. That is that structures 
> are broad and underlie a lot of phenomena. Variables can of course refer as 
> an index to many things including other structures. As such they have a sign 
> like function. I was more thinking in terms of what the equations point to. 
> So one level removed from an analysis of the logic of equations scientists 
> use.
> 
> I think it is characteristic of physicists to make a double move of trying to 
> see how expansive such structures are (with the goal being universal laws) 
> while recognizing the limits our empirical investigations allow. The problems 
> of errors in measurement and what other laws might be causing deformations 
> from an expected law is one. (That is the ideal gas law is idealized and 
> never found in nature - and arguably this is true of most law) Then the 
> problems that of course we can only test a range of contexts. Thus physicists 
> often say Newton’s Laws are true in a certain set of areas but not at small 
> scale or massive scale. I’m not sure that’s a fair way to put it, but 
> physicists often get at the limits due to testing because of this.
> 
> So the double move of a physicist is this expansion by trusting 
> laws/structures and then skepticism of such expansion. (Again this is more a 
> claim about intents and aims of scientists)
> 
> The issue of losing indices seems just incorrect. First of course real 
> structures (the scholastic realism) have an indexical component. We can here 
> get into a bit of a debate regarding the debates about Platonism and how 
> particulars exemplify forms. I’m not sure that’s necessary in a Peircean 
> approach since any form that is exemplifying the form entails an indexical 
> relationship I’d think. To the degree a physicists thinks structures are real 
> (acknowledging the philosophical confusion of the typical physicist) and sees 
> those structures in phenomena there is always an explicit and implicit 
> assumption of an index. So equations as signs are representational of the 
> structures but also entail an indexical relationship to the degree they are 
> physics and not mathematics. 
> 
> This divide between physics and mathematics is something I think key to the 
> self-identity of physicists as physicists. It’s certainly a major component 
> of both sides in the rancorous string debates that are now winding down.
> 
> 
>> In my view, a critical distinction that crisply separates CSP logic and 
>> physical logic (such as hypothetical gravitons) is centered precisely on the 
>> role of indices.  The example of molecular numbers as indices of integers 
>> and the derived physical (molecular) structures (such as DNA, RNA, Proteins 
>> and metabolites) illustrate the conundrum faced by both the semantics and 
>> syntax of physical symbols. Such physical structures are simply beyond the 
>> language of physical variables.  So, in order to paper-over the logical 
>> conundrums, the language of physics constructs hypothetical mathematical 
>> structures (n-dimensional spaces) that bear minimal connections to reality.
> 
> Physicists often can get “lost in the equations” such that the indexical 
> relationship is forgotten. I think that socially this is generally seen as a 
> negative. Physics without the index is just mathematics. They must always be 
> kept in mind.
> 
> The hypothetical aspect is hypothetical in two ways it seems to me in a 
> Peircean framework. First there is the issue of doubt/belief. Generally 
> hypothesis and especially speculative theoretical hypothesis just aren’t 
> believed in strongly as a practical matter. Second they are usually seen 
> initially as models to be put forth for verification and falsification. That 
> is to be a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen - maybe you think that the 'existing model' of the Mind is a computer. 
But I don't. I think it's a neurological semiosic networked process, a CAS 
(complex adaptive system). 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 12:52 PM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement


  >”But I don't agree that the existing model is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law!”

  Excellent! This means that you will be able to do one of two things:

  1) You will be able to pinpoint the computer, where it lies, and explain how 
it works; OR

  2) You will be able to provide a laboratory demonstration/simulation/proof 
outlining Tom’s (Ozzie) explanation just posted.

  I await your account with eager anticipation! Thanking you in advance J

  sj

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 6:03 PM
  To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

   

  Stephen - YOU consider that 

   

  "You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.
  "

  But I don't agree that the existing model is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law! So, as usual, you and I continue to disagree.

   

  As for our species being heavily based around learning - yes, but our innate 
capacity for reasoning and logic enables us to learn.

   

  Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek 

To: 'Edwina Taborsky' ; 'Peirce-L' 

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 9:50 AM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Edwina, I hope we can avoid returning to the innate-vs-NOTInnate 
controversy, as we have zero chance of agreement there J

No, I’m not reducing causality to only one... far from it. I started 
writing out a spiel of exceptions and interpretations and realized that it 
would culminate in a blather that no-one would want to read. So for the sake of 
brevity, I have left out a lot. I assumed that most of us here are sufficiently 
well-versed on the topic that we don’t need to labour over the detail. But yes, 
strictly speaking, you are correct, of course there ARE other causalities.

So what is it that you are suggesting about how a tree develops from a seed 
into a tree? Is it in the DNA? We both agree, I assume, that DNA is very 
important. All I am doing is suggesting that there is something else going on, 
and it is not the infotech theory of DNA. It CANNOT be the infotech version, 
impossible, because it violates the laws of thermodynamics. I could, however, 
be persuaded if someone showed me the computer that processes the tree’s DNA 
software.

>”Furthermore, societal forms, such as the type of work you do, have 
nothing to do with genes but with learning - and our species is, by definition, 
heavily focused around learning.“

I get a bd feeling about this. Innate-vs-NOTInnate... nooo!

Edwina, all I’m trying to do is, in the spirit of brainstorming, to 
introduce the question into our narrative. I’m not even proposing definitive 
answers. You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 2:35 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen - I disagree; you are reducing causality to only one - efficient 
causality (i.e., proximate). A tree doesn't 'know how to be' merely and only if 
it is growing next to another similar tree.  Furthermore, societal forms, such 
as the type of work you do, have nothing to do with genes but with learning - 
and our species is, by definition, heavily focused around learning. 

 

Edwina

 

  - Original Message - 

  From: Stephen Jarosek 

  To: 'Peirce-L' 

  Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 7:34 AM

  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

   

  List,

  The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the 
opinion that it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do 
not have all the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for 
expanding our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA 
entanglement).

  The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the 
information technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a 
computer, is fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but 
the most obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

[Benjamin Udell]

Clark, list,

I think that the relevance of the classification of research is in the 
light shed on the logical supports among fields in the build-up of 
knowledge. Physics doesn't decide which math is mathematically right, 
which combined mathematical postulates are consistent and nontrivial, 
and so on, instead it decides which maths are applicable to, and 
illuminating in, physics. How far can one trace such structures of 
logical dependence and independence?


Sometimes physical research leads to mathematical discovery. Conical 
refraction was simultaneously a discovery in physics and in mathematics. 
But even if it hadn't proved applicable in physics, it still would have 
been mathematically valuable. If one thinks that mathematics depends 
logically on biology or psychology, one will start asking mathematicians 
to study biology or psychology to really get to the bottom of their 
subject. While they might find some inspiration and deep examples of 
math there, it still seems like a more refined and polite version of 
sending the mathematicians out to work in the collective farms. I think 
that mathematicians would already be studying a lot more biology or 
psychology if they thought that such studies could support their 
mathematical findings.


Moreover, one may suppose (as Peirce did) that the most general 
classifications will bear out logical structure, and that the layout of 
the city of research will come to reflect the collective structure of 
the subject matters like constellations above. One likes to see what 
that 'total population' of subject matters shapes up to look like in 
terms of parameters. I imagine that Peirce liked that. It seems 
philosophical enough. Peirce put such classification into 'Science of 
Review', which he also called 'Synthetic Philosophy'. At any rate such 
classification applies cenoscopic philosophy. If one extends parameters 
from a number of sample cases, one may even predict that there ought to 
be, or come to be, a certain field of study.


***

It's true, 'impatience' and 'suspense' seem strong words for the emotion 
belonging to the occasion of (attenuative) deduction. I'm thinking of a 
feeling of curiosity about the future such that one wishes to shorten by 
deduction the wait till discovery. You suggest the word 
'dissatisfaction'. One could think of a feeling of dissatisfaction with 
the facts known or hypothesized so far, as if they seemed coy, or 
insufficient for a worthwhile conclusion, to which one responds by 
managing to deduce a worthwhile conclusion. Yet "dissatisfaction" as the 
occasion of deduction seems too vague. Surprise and perplexity could 
also be taken as kinds of dissatisfaction. If we take seriously Peirce's 
idea that deduction _/predicts/_, then the idea of at least some mild 
feeling of suspense or impatience seems to follow logically enough as 
belonging to deduction's occasion. If one has abduced a hypothesis about 
which one cares, and can't think of a deductive, distinctive testable 
prediction, one is left to feel impatient for time's eventual 
confirmation or overturning of one's hypothesis in the natural course of 
events. Note also the nice opposition between surprise, perplexity, 
etc., and suspense. Well, I guess there's to brood on the question some 
more.


Best, Ben

On 10/21/2015 2:28 PM, Clark Goble wrote:


On Oct 21, 2015, at 11:25 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

The positivists divided sciences into formal (i.e., mathematics and 
deductive logic) and factual. I never got clear on where they put 
philosophy, I suspect they hoped to make it into a formal science.


I think they differed among themselves on this, although I’m not an 
expert on the Vienna circle. (And especially not the 19th century 
positivists) It seemed that the spirit of the mid-20th century was to 
attempt to reduce philosophy to other matters. Either becoming clear 
on our semantics that would dissolve most problems or to reduce it to 
a kind of foundationalist epistemology of judgments with the rest 
being clear formalism. It was in most ways a rather bad dead end for 
philosophy IMO. Fortunately people drug themselves out of it while 
(hopefully) taking what was useful from both critiques.


I’ll confess that I’ve never quite understood the drive to taxonomy on 
these matters. (This is one Peircean drive I’ve never been able to 
quite embrace) If for only the reason that any practical analysis 
seems such a mix of different taxonomies. I just never quite was clear 
what the point was. Certainly keeping clear what one is doing 
(semantics vs. ontology) and so forth is important. But one can become 
clear on the parts one is doing while acknowledging that the item 
under analysis is usually a mix.


Perhaps I’m wrong in this though.

As to my question, I think I was getting myself into some contortions 
about deduction because in some half-conscious way I was still 
introducing the idea of conflict. Now, Peirce said that deduction is 
for 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Ben, Lists,

Let me a add a piece to what you've said to see if we are on the same track.  I 
add this point in order to highlight some features of what Peirce is trying to 
accomplish in thinking architectonically about inquiry.  Many philosophers in 
the 20th century, especially those who are more analytic in their orientation, 
reject certain propositions that Peirce affirms about the value of working in 
an architectonic manner (that is, with a plan in hand) for the purposes of 
doing philosophy, so I'd like to make these points a bit more explicit.

Remarks that have been made by a number of contributors to the List about what 
philosophy might or might not contribute to questions about the origins of 
order in the cosmos, or the evolution of living beings from material systems, 
or the real character of the law and force of such things as gravity remind me 
of the dangers of not keeping things in a clearer order when it comes to 
setting up our explanations in both the cenoscopic science of philosophy and 
the idioscopic sciences of physics, chemistry, biology and the like.  I can't 
help but think that Peirce has pretty darned good reasons for insisting that 
doing philosophy well requires  that we reflect on matters architectonic.

The main thing I want to add to what you've said is prompted by a remark that 
Kant makes about philosophical methodology.  In the Preface of the Grounding, 
he puts a sharp edge on the claim.  He says:  "That philosophy which mixes pure 
principles with empirical ones does not deserve the name of philosophy" (G, 
390)  Later in Section 2, Kant makes the following point about any procedure 
which does not clearly separate between different kinds of questions (e.g., 
about questions concerning the justification of the primary principles of valid 
reasoning from questions about how we human beings often do in fact think).  He 
says:  "such a procedure turns out a disgusting mishmash of patchwork 
observations and half-reasoned principles in which shallowpates revel because 
all this is something quite useful for the chitchat of everyday life." (G, 410)

Drawing on the arguments that Kant is making about the how we ought to inquire 
about in normative questions, Peirce insists that it is essential that we 
refine our methods for the sake of inquiring into the following kinds of 
questions:  

1)  What ideals should we aspire to? 
2)  What principles determine whether an action is right or wrong?
3)  What principles should govern the conduct of my thought so that my 
reasoning will be valid an my inquiries will really lead me to truth?

One of the main reasons Peirce has for making a clear plan for his inquiries 
into the normative sciences is that these kinds of questions require that we 
employ the appropriate methods.  For better or worse, the methods that have 
been developed up to this point in the history of thought are not quite what we 
need if we hope to develop better answers to the questions.  As such, we need 
to refine and develop the appropriate methods.  One of the main purposes of 
formulating an architectonic plan for philosophical inquiry into these kinds of 
questions is that we are constantly in danger of 1) perpetuating longstanding 
confusions about the phenomena that we are trying to explain, 2) failing to 
understand what is special about the subject matter of our inquiries, 3) 
failing to clarify the goals that are guiding us and 4) failing to understand 
how we should use the methods we've got to improve upon our understanding of 
1-4.

--Jeff



Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354

From: Benjamin Udell [bud...@nyc.rr.com]
Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 1:11 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

Clark, list,

I think that the relevance of the classification of research is in the light 
shed on the logical supports among fields in the build-up of knowledge. Physics 
doesn't decide which math is mathematically right, which combined mathematical 
postulates are consistent and nontrivial, and so on, instead it decides which 
maths are applicable to, and illuminating in, physics. How far can one trace 
such structures of logical dependence and independence?

Sometimes physical research leads to mathematical discovery. Conical refraction 
was simultaneously a discovery in physics and in mathematics. But even if it 
hadn't proved applicable in physics, it still would have been mathematically 
valuable. If one thinks that mathematics depends logically on biology or 
psychology, one will start asking mathematicians to study biology or psychology 
to really get to the bottom of their subject. While they might find some 
inspiration and deep examples of math there, it still seems like a more refined 
and polite version of sending the mathematicians out to work in the collective 
farms. I think that mathematicians would already be 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Stephen Jarosek]

Please ignore my last post, Edwina (trying to do too many things at once)... 
I’m referring to the pervasiveness of the infotech narrative that persists down 
to the level of the cell... the idea of DNA as information. This assumption 
persists, even in CAS. The implication being that we need to find that computer 
that runs the DNA “software.” Take the field of epigenetics, for example... it 
is still a genocentric paradigm, even as it purports an explanation for 
phenotypic plasticity subject to environmental pressures. Norman Doidge’s “The 
brain that changes itself” and Howard Bloom’s “The global brain” are influenced 
by the same infotech narrative, even though the former is a pioneer in neural 
plasticity and the latter an innovator in CAS. The infotech narrative is a 
persistent beast that just refuses to go away, even within the context of 
complex adaptive systems. So what I want to know is, where within the cell is 
it that this “computer” resides? Is the computer in the nucleus of the cell? In 
the bloodstream? In a limb? In the pituitary gland? On the head of a pin? Point 
to this computer, this processor of DNA “software”, describe how it works, and 
then we’ll all be happy.  sj

 

From: Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 10:21 PM
To: 'Edwina Taborsky'; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Edwina, if you accept the CAS interpretation as appropriate, while rejecting 
the mainstream’s preference for the infotech narrative, then there is still no 
solid theory, as far as I am aware, of how DNA engages within the context of a 
CAS. So whichever way we look at it, there is no adequate explanation anywhere, 
of how DNA works. For one, the paradigm is broken, while for the other, the 
question is not addressed. sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 9:58 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen - maybe you think that the 'existing model' of the Mind is a computer. 
But I don't. I think it's a neurological semiosic networked process, a CAS 
(complex adaptive system). 

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Edwina Taborsky'   ; 'Peirce-L' 
  

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 12:52 PM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

>”But I don't agree that the existing model is broken and inconsistent with 
>natural law!”

Excellent! This means that you will be able to do one of two things:

1) You will be able to pinpoint the computer, where it lies, and explain how it 
works; OR

2) You will be able to provide a laboratory demonstration/simulation/proof 
outlining Tom’s (Ozzie) explanation just posted.

I await your account with eager anticipation! Thanking you in advance J

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Wednesday, 21 October 2015 6:03 PM
To: Stephen Jarosek; 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Stephen - YOU consider that 

 

"You’re putting up blocks based in pre-existing narratives that are in 
inconclusive, and an existing model that is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law.
"

But I don't agree that the existing model is broken and inconsistent with 
natural law! So, as usual, you and I continue to disagree.

 

As for our species being heavily based around learning - yes, but our innate 
capacity for reasoning and logic enables us to learn.

 

Edwina

- Original Message - 

From: Stephen Jarosek   

To: 'Edwina Taborsky'   ; 'Peirce-L' 
  

Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 9:50 AM

Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

 

Edwina, I hope we can avoid returning to the innate-vs-NOTInnate controversy, 
as we have zero chance of agreement there J

No, I’m not reducing causality to only one... far from it. I started writing 
out a spiel of exceptions and interpretations and realized that it would 
culminate in a blather that no-one would want to read. So for the sake of 
brevity, I have left out a lot. I assumed that most of us here are sufficiently 
well-versed on the topic that we don’t need to labour over the detail. But yes, 
strictly speaking, you are correct, of course there ARE other causalities.

So what is it that you are suggesting about how a tree develops from a seed 
into a tree? Is it in the DNA? We both agree, I assume, that DNA is very 
important. All I am doing is suggesting that there is something else going on, 
and it is not the infotech theory of DNA. It CANNOT be the infotech version, 
impossible, because it violates the laws of thermodynamics. I could, however, 

Re: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Edwina Taborsky]

Why use the term 'memes'? Why not simply say: 'unquestioned beliefs'?
Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Helmut Raulien 
  To: tabor...@primus.ca 
  Cc: John Collier ; cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 2:24 PM
  Subject: Aw: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)



  Dear Edwina and All,
  the binary sets I had mentioned all base on the binary set: Information 
transfer via sub-/unconscious structure elements versus via conscious structure 
elements. To say it in Peircean terms (as Stephen Rose has claimed): The first 
three methods of fixating belief (authority, tenacity, a-priori) all need 
subconscious structure: An authority is only sure, as long as the authority is 
not questioned. Tenacity only is effective, as long as the tenacious one does 
not have to answer the question, why he/she is so tenacious. A-priori only 
works for sure as long it is not analyzed either. An analysis of the 
subconscious structure elements makes them conscious, and thus puts an end to 
them. Then there remains the scientific method. Then there probably will be the 
case, that not everybody in the society agrees with the now conscious, and 
therefore negotiable elements, so the society may cease to be a system, lose 
its structure, fall apart into many systems, like political parties. But then 
there is still (hopefully) democracy, a system with the structure installed: 
The agreement that it is possible to disagree and still work together. About 
memes I really would say, that people swallow them. But they make sick, can 
even make a whole society sick. I think all this is better explained by the 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. To semiotize all this sociological stuff is a 
challenge, I think. Maybe memes would be a word for unquestioned habits of ways 
of thinking? Algorhithms including subconscious or for-granted-taken premises, 
turned into immediate objects? Virus-like immediate objects with a surface that 
only fits to the representamen "This is relevant and true", and to the 
interpretant "copy and spread"?
  Best,
  Helmut

   "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
   
  Right - they are 'very much like that of solid material particles'. That's 
what I mean by saying that they are not semiosic. What are you supposed to do 
with them? Swallow them? 

  And I would say that of course meaning is part of their essence - otherwise, 
what is the point of their existence? What is being transmitted if not meaning?

  Edwina
- Original Message -
From: John Collier
To: Edwina Taborsky ; Helmut Raulien
Cc: cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 3:46 PM
Subject: RE: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)

My understanding of Dawkins’ notion of meme is that it is specifically not 
anything more than a causal entity, passed on by repetition through receptive 
channels common to the transmitter and receiver. Meaning is not a part of their 
transmitability, though we can assign meaning to them, and often do, but this 
is an overlay, and not part of their essence as transmitable units. I think 
there are problems with making sense of their transmitability, not to mention 
of their identity conditions, but it seems to me that their “not being 
semiosic” is beside the point. Dawkins sees their dynamics as very much like 
that of solid material particles.



John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier



From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: October 20, 2015 9:36 PM
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: cl...@lextek.com; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)



Helmut - I'm against the very notion of 'memes' because they are 
non-semiosic. They are akin to solid material particles - and the cognitive 
process does not swallow solid material particles. It transforms them within 
the semiosic process. Again, memes are non-semiosic and not amenable to 
semiosis; you swallow them.



I don't get your binary sets of 

Meme-vs - rational belief

Diffusion - vs -narrative



Diffusion is a process; narrative is a 'thing'.

Meme is a 'thing'; a rational belief is a conclusion arrived at via reason.



Edwina

  - Original Message - 

  From: Helmut Raulien 

  To: h.raul...@gmx.de 

  Cc: cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L 

  Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 1:10 PM

  Subject: Aw: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best 
Morality)









  Supplement:

  Sorry that I always add supplements, but now there is something about 
diffusion I want tio add: A crystal of potassium permanganate diffuses in water 
and turns it pink, but in oil it does not. A meme or an idea diffuses only when 
it is put into a proper social environment, that is a social 

Aw: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

[Helmut Raulien]

 

Dear Edwina and All,

the binary sets I had mentioned all base on the binary set: Information transfer via sub-/unconscious structure elements versus via conscious structure elements. To say it in Peircean terms (as Stephen Rose has claimed): The first three methods of fixating belief (authority, tenacity, a-priori) all need subconscious structure: An authority is only sure, as long as the authority is not questioned. Tenacity only is effective, as long as the tenacious one does not have to answer the question, why he/she is so tenacious. A-priori only works for sure as long it is not analyzed either. An analysis of the subconscious structure elements makes them conscious, and thus puts an end to them. Then there remains the scientific method. Then there probably will be the case, that not everybody in the society agrees with the now conscious, and therefore negotiable elements, so the society may cease to be a system, lose its structure, fall apart into many systems, like political parties. But then there is still (hopefully) democracy, a system with the structure installed: The agreement that it is possible to disagree and still work together. About memes I really would say, that people swallow them. But they make sick, can even make a whole society sick. I think all this is better explained by the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. To semiotize all this sociological stuff is a challenge, I think. Maybe memes would be a word for unquestioned habits of ways of thinking? Algorhithms including subconscious or for-granted-taken premises, turned into immediate objects? Virus-like immediate objects with a surface that only fits to the representamen "This is relevant and true", and to the interpretant "copy and spread"?

Best,

Helmut



 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:
 



Right - they are 'very much like that of solid material particles'. That's what I mean by saying that they are not semiosic. What are you supposed to do with them? Swallow them? 

 

And I would say that of course meaning is part of their essence - otherwise, what is the point of their existence? What is being transmitted if not meaning?

 

Edwina


- Original Message -

From: John Collier

To: Edwina Taborsky ; Helmut Raulien

Cc: cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L

Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 3:46 PM

Subject: RE: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)

 


My understanding of Dawkins’ notion of meme is that it is specifically not anything more than a causal entity, passed on by repetition through receptive channels common to the transmitter and receiver. Meaning is not a part of their transmitability, though we can assign meaning to them, and often do, but this is an overlay, and not part of their essence as transmitable units. I think there are problems with making sense of their transmitability, not to mention of their identity conditions, but it seems to me that their “not being semiosic” is beside the point. Dawkins sees their dynamics as very much like that of solid material particles.

 


John Collier

Professor Emeritus, UKZN

http://web.ncf.ca/collier


 




From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: October 20, 2015 9:36 PM
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: cl...@lextek.com; Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)



 


Helmut - I'm against the very notion of 'memes' because they are non-semiosic. They are akin to solid material particles - and the cognitive process does not swallow solid material particles. It transforms them within the semiosic process. Again, memes are non-semiosic and not amenable to semiosis; you swallow them.



 



I don't get your binary sets of 



Meme-vs - rational belief



Diffusion - vs -narrative



 



Diffusion is a process; narrative is a 'thing'.



Meme is a 'thing'; a rational belief is a conclusion arrived at via reason.



 



Edwina




- Original Message - 



From: Helmut Raulien 



To: h.raul...@gmx.de 



Cc: cl...@lextek.com ; Peirce-L 



Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 1:10 PM



Subject: Aw: Re: Open axiomatic frameworks (was: [PEIRCE-L] A Second-Best Morality)



 




  


  


  





Supplement:



Sorry that I always add supplements, but now there is something about diffusion I want tio add: A crystal of potassium permanganate diffuses in water and turns it pink, but in oil it does not. A meme or an idea diffuses only when it is put into a proper social environment, that is a social system with a structure that allows the idea to diffuse (and copy itself). That is why I think, that the diffusion concept is not wrong, but neither complete.




Clark, Edwina, Stephen, List,



I do not see, that there is an either-or, regarding memes and rational beliefs, or diffusion versus narratives, or subconscious versus conscious structure-elements. I think, that there is both, and that it always is good to make the subconscious conscious, that is, to uncover memes to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] induction's occasion

[Ben Novak]

Dear Ben Udell:

Please rest assured that I did not take any of your comments as criticism.

Rather, I am very interested in the issues that you have raised, and eager
to understand them. I therefore appreciate very much your explanatory
emails, both in response to me and to others, as well as of all those
others who have contributed to this thread.

I find your puzzlement about the "emotion belonging to occasion of
(attenuative) deduction" to be fascinating, at least as you describe the
problem:

It's true, 'impatience' and 'suspense' seem strong words for the emotion
belonging to the occasion of (attenuative) deduction. I'm thinking of a
feeling of curiosity about the future such that one wishes to shorten by
deduction the wait till discovery. You suggest the word 'dissatisfaction'.
One could think of a feeling of dissatisfaction with the facts known or
hypothesized so far, as if they seemed coy, or insufficient for a
worthwhile conclusion, to which one responds by managing to deduce a
worthwhile conclusion. Yet "dissatisfaction" as the occasion of deduction
seems too vague. Surprise and perplexity could also be taken as kinds of
dissatisfaction. If we take seriously Peirce's idea that deduction _
*predicts*_, then the idea of at least some mild feeling of suspense or
impatience seems to follow logically enough as belonging to deduction's
occasion. If one has abduced a hypothesis about which one cares, and can't
think of a deductive, distinctive testable prediction, one is left to feel
impatient for time's eventual confirmation or overturning of one's
hypothesis in the natural course of events. Note also the nice opposition
between surprise, perplexity, etc., and suspense. Well, I guess there's to
brood on the question some more.

Previously, I had thought that deduction, at least insofar as it was the
second stage of abductive reasoning after a hypothesis was found, was the
"comfortable"stage of the process, where after the irritation of the
"surprising fact C is observed," comes the comfortable hypothesis that "But
if A were true, C would be a matter of course."

The next step is to apply what one knows of A, again presumably
comfortably, in order to trace out the known consequences of A, so that one
could then switch to induction to observe whether all the known
consequences are found, so that if one of the known consequences is not
found, then the hypothesis must be rejected, and then one must go back to
one's initial irritation to find another hypothesis.

However, I have just read your blog on "Deduction vs, Apliative; also
Repletive vs Attenuative" at
http://tetrast.blogspot.com/2015/08/idara.html
where you define attenuative as *Something* (explicit or entailed) *in the
premisses is not* (explicit or entailed) *in the conclusion.*

Therefore, I ask: If one assumed that "If A, then C would be a matter of
course," and then deduced from A that one should find not only C, but also
D and F, then when one checked and found that D or F were not found in the
circumstances in which one found C, would then one have an attenuative
deduction situation? Or would one only have the falsification of hypothesis
A?

Ben Novak


*Ben Novak *
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephones:
Magic Jack: (717) 826-5224 *Best to call and leave messages.*
Landline: 239-455-4200 *My brother's main phone line.*
Mobile (202) 509-2655* I use this only on trips--and in any event
messages arrive days late.*
Skype: BenNovak2

*"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of
Mozart will have ceased to be — **though possibly a colored canvas and a
sheet of notes may remain — **because the last eye and the last ear
accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler

On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 4:11 PM, Benjamin Udell  wrote:

> Clark, list,
>
> I think that the relevance of the classification of research is in the
> light shed on the logical supports among fields in the build-up of
> knowledge. Physics doesn't decide which math is mathematically right, which
> combined mathematical postulates are consistent and nontrivial, and so on,
> instead it decides which maths are applicable to, and illuminating in,
> physics. How far can one trace such structures of logical dependence and
> independence?
>
> Sometimes physical research leads to mathematical discovery. Conical
> refraction was simultaneously a discovery in physics and in mathematics.
> But even if it hadn't proved applicable in physics, it still would have
> been mathematically valuable. If one thinks that mathematics depends
> logically on biology or psychology, one will start asking mathematicians to
> study biology or psychology to really get to the bottom of their subject.
> While they might find some inspiration and deep examples of math there, it
> still seems like a more refined and polite version of sending the
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Edwina Taborsky]

Stephen - I disagree; you are reducing causality to only one - efficient 
causality (i.e., proximate). A tree doesn't 'know how to be' merely and only if 
it is growing next to another similar tree.  Furthermore, societal forms, such 
as the type of work you do, have nothing to do with genes but with learning - 
and our species is, by definition, heavily focused around learning. 

Edwina

  - Original Message - 
  From: Stephen Jarosek 
  To: 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Wednesday, October 21, 2015 7:34 AM
  Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement


  List,

  The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the opinion 
that it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do not 
have all the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for 
expanding our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA 
entanglement).

  The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the information 
technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a computer, is 
fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but the most 
obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in the DNA, there is 
nothing resembling a computer to process it. If the mainstream life-science 
community is to persist with this infotech narrative, then they need to be 
consistent. But how can they remain consistent if, in violation of the 
principles of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics (entropy), it is 
impossible for anything resembling a computer to occur in nature?

  Thus, what we are left with at the heart of any cell, is DNA molecules... 
with no evidence of any infotech mechanism that might process the “data”. SHOW 
US THE COMPUTER! NO COMPUTER, NO DNA INFOTECH (and no genocentric paradigm). 
It’s that simple. This topic should be of interest to us in semiotics, because 
ultimately, I suggest, the principles on which DNA function are semiotic in 
character.

  In their experiment testing for the possibility of non-local correlations 
between separated neural networks, Pizzi et al (2004) conclude that “after an 
initial stage where the system interacts by direct contact, also in the 
following stage where the system has been separated into two sections, a sort 
of correlation persists between sections. This is what , at a macroscopic 
level, we verify in our experiment: it seems that neurons utilize the quantum 
information to synchronize.”

  Given what we know of entanglement between particles, the only way in which 
correlations between separated neural networks can occur is via the DNA 
molecules within the neurons .

  Other similar experiments in biophysics arrive at similar or analogous 
conclusions. And the most common question raised among researchers in quantum 
biology, including Pizzi et al above, is along the lines of... how do 
mechanisms within the cell utilize entanglement? I would suggest that they have 
their reasoning back-to-front. It is not the mechanisms that utilize 
entanglement, but entanglement that is the source for the mechanisms, 
properties and predispositions. And this reframes the problem as one that 
relates principally to semiotics.

  As a tentative description for how this might relate to semiotics, here’s one 
of my conjectures: Entanglement between DNA molecules, I suggest, enables the 
body's cells to access the shared mind-body condition, to be informed by it. In 
this way, DNA entanglement plays a crucial role in knowing how to be. This 
would be analogous to how our telecommunication technologies provide every 
person in a city with immediate access to the city's options, to inform its 
people on how to be. For example, people growing up in working-class or 
middle-class suburbs are more likely to know how to be tradesmen, shopkeepers, 
nurses, police or the unemployed, while people growing up in upper-class 
suburbs are more likely to know how to be professionals, investors, 
office-workers or, simply, the idle rich. This interpretation would be 
consistent with how stem-cells develop, contingent on their location within the 
organs of the body. A stem-cell has to know how to be before it can become a 
productive cell with its role in an organ properly defined. And the stem-cell’s 
proximal/local context is what teases out its predispositions, in order to 
define its ultimate purpose. This line of thinking seems to resonate with 
aspects of David Bohm’s implicate/explicate order. [What I have in mind here is 
also analogous to Rupert Sheldrake’s theory of morphic resonance, where he 
regards the DNA molecule as analogous to a receiver (antenna).] In summary, 
proximal context (face-to-face or synapse-to-synapse) is what teases out both 
the neuron’s AND the human’s nonlocal predispositions, to define their ultimate 
trajectories.

  Anyone else interested in exploring this further? There seems to be a 
reluctance for people to step beyond their spheres of expertise, 

[PEIRCE-L] Show us the computer - reasons for DNA entanglement

[Stephen Jarosek]

List,

The more that I think about DNA entanglement, the more I am of the opinion that 
it needs to be factored into the semiotic narrative. Because we do not have all 
the facts, we should do so in a way that keeps open the option for expanding 
our narrative to include nonlocal phenomena (such as DNA entanglement).

The established narrative on DNA theory, based as it is in the information 
technology (infotech) metaphor that compares the brain to a computer, is 
fundamentally flawed. It is flawed for a number of reasons, but the most 
obvious one is that for all this purported data “software” in the DNA, there is 
nothing resembling a computer to process it. If the mainstream life-science 
community is to persist with this infotech narrative, then they need to be 
consistent. But how can they remain consistent if, in violation of the 
principles of complexity and the laws of thermodynamics (entropy), it is 
impossible for anything resembling a computer to occur in nature?

Thus, what we are left with at the heart of any cell, is DNA molecules... with 
no evidence of any infotech mechanism that might process the “data”. SHOW US 
THE COMPUTER! NO COMPUTER, NO DNA INFOTECH (and no genocentric paradigm). It’s 
that simple. This topic should be of interest to us in semiotics, because 
ultimately, I suggest, the principles on which DNA function are semiotic in 
character.

In their experiment testing for the possibility of non-local correlations 
between separated neural networks, Pizzi et al (2004) conclude that “after an 
initial stage where the system interacts by direct contact, also in the 
following stage where the system has been separated into two sections, a sort 
of correlation persists between sections. This is what , at a macroscopic 
level, we verify in our experiment: it seems that neurons utilize the quantum 
information to synchronize.”

Given what we know of entanglement between particles, the only way in which 
correlations between separated neural networks can occur is via the DNA 
molecules within the neurons .

Other similar experiments in biophysics arrive at similar or analogous 
conclusions. And the most common question raised among researchers in quantum 
biology, including Pizzi et al above, is along the lines of... how do 
mechanisms within the cell utilize entanglement? I would suggest that they have 
their reasoning back-to-front. It is not the mechanisms that utilize 
entanglement, but entanglement that is the source for the mechanisms, 
properties and predispositions. And this reframes the problem as one that 
relates principally to semiotics.

As a tentative description for how this might relate to semiotics, here’s one 
of my conjectures: Entanglement between DNA molecules, I suggest, enables the 
body's cells to access the shared mind-body condition, to be informed by it. In 
this way, DNA entanglement plays a crucial role in knowing how to be. This 
would be analogous to how our telecommunication technologies provide every 
person in a city with immediate access to the city's options, to inform its 
people on how to be. For example, people growing up in working-class or 
middle-class suburbs are more likely to know how to be tradesmen, shopkeepers, 
nurses, police or the unemployed, while people growing up in upper-class 
suburbs are more likely to know how to be professionals, investors, 
office-workers or, simply, the idle rich. This interpretation would be 
consistent with how stem-cells develop, contingent on their location within the 
organs of the body. A stem-cell has to know how to be before it can become a 
productive cell with its role in an organ properly defined. And the stem-cell’s 
proximal/local context is what teases out its predispositions, in order to 
define its ultimate purpose. This line of thinking seems to resonate with 
aspects of David Bohm’s implicate/explicate order. [What I have in mind here is 
also analogous to Rupert Sheldrake’s theory of morphic resonance, where he 
regards the DNA molecule as analogous to a receiver (antenna).] In summary, 
proximal context (face-to-face or synapse-to-synapse) is what teases out both 
the neuron’s AND the human’s nonlocal predispositions, to define their ultimate 
trajectories.

Anyone else interested in exploring this further? There seems to be a 
reluctance for people to step beyond their spheres of expertise, perhaps for 
fear of ridicule. But in any interdisciplinary endeavour, this needs to be 
done. We are ill-served when we allow The Establishment to dominate with a 
broken genocentric narrative. At the very least, these ideas merit 
brainstorming.

sj

Pizzi, R., Fantasia, A., Gelain, F., Rosetti, D., & Vescovi, A. (2004). 
Non-local correlations between separated neural networks (E. Donkor, A. Pirick, 
& H. Brandt, Eds.). Quantum Information and Computation (Proceedings of SPIE), 
5436(II), 107-117. Retrieved August 2, 2015, from
http://faculty.nps.edu/baer/CompMod-phys/PizziWebPage/pizzi.pdf