date:20170327

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread Jerry Rhee

":--*O wonderful being, and to what are you looking?

I hope not to red...

On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 9:16 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:

>
> On Mar 27, 2017, at 7:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but
> I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this.
>
> JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
> every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
> ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
> you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
> law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?
>
>
> What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal
> "lion"?  How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular
> lion, to such a diagram?
>
>
> I can’t speak for John, but I’d assume a theoretical diagram would be a
> specification of the locations of all red things.
>
> This is an other reason why I think the appeal to diagrams isn’t quite
> what it’s portrayed to be since a diagram for any robust universal would
> seem to require an infinite space.
>
>
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Clark, List:

I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but I
still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this.

JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?

What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal
"lion"?  How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular
lion, to such a diagram?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 5:25 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:
>
> On Mar 27, 2017, at 4:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> CG:  To my eyes the main issue is the realism vs. nominalism issue both in
> terms of the nature of possibilities as well as the relationship of
> individuals to generals.
>
>
> Is there a way to connect this with John Sowa's earlier comment, which I
> am still pondering?
>
> I think John’s point was largely orthogonal to the issue of
> realism/nominalism.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread John F Sowa


Clark, Jon A.S., and Claudio,

I'm trying to relate Peirce's logic, mathematics, semiotic,
theory of truth, and logic of pragmatism to his insights
into perception, cognition, and purposeful action.

CSP's essential insights:  triadic semiotic; icons as the
starting point; symbols growing from icons; laws for relating
and defining anything; diagrams as lawful constructions from
icons; logic of pragmatism for constructing, refining, and
testing diagrams; phaneroscopy for examining imagery from any
source, external (all sensory modalities) or internal (mental
models or a kind of virtual reality); and language for social
interaction and collaboration on all of the above.

Clark

There’s a bit to unpack there - most particularly who the “we” is...
the ideal community of inquirers rather than any particular person...
while the universe is knowable and therefore imaginable it doesn’t
follow that it is imaginable for any finite group of people.


Re 'we':  I meant anybody and everybody, individually or in any
kind of collaboration.  The human methods of perception, cognition,
and action as individuals are the basis for communication and
collaboration with any groups of individuals in any place or time.

Re imaginable:  All perception and imagination is by individuals.
But by collaboration, we can share our imaginations, build on them,
refine them, correct them.

Clark

As you note this is also separate from the nominalist debate
since a nominalist can agree with this.


Yes.  As Peirce himself said, he began as a nominalist, but his
continued studies and analyses led him to a kind of extreme realism.
I prefer CSP's later interpretations.

Claudio

Do you mean the LAWS OF NATURE, or just what we think that laws
of nature are?


Either or both.  Our methods of reasoning are independent of the
nominalist-realist debate.  But the methods of making predictions
and testing them can give us some confidence than we are at least
approximating them -- at least for those areas we have tested.

Claudio

everybody has to check twice... before 'believing'...


Yes.  When we communicate and collaborate with others, we need
to recognize that they are just as fallible as we are.  Even
worse, they may have confused, misguided, or hostile motives.

Claudio

I would NEVER say that truth is irrelevant!!!


I wasn't accusing you.  But there are people who use terms
like 'post truth' or 'alternate facts'.  They even claim
"Whatever you repeat often enough becomes the truth."
That way of thinking and talking is extremely dangerous.

Jon

Peirce carefully distinguished between images and diagrams as two
different types of icons (or "hypoicons").  "Those which partake
of simple qualities, or First Firstnesses, are images; those which
represent the relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts
of one thing by analogous relations in their own parts, are diagrams"
(CP 2.277; c. 1902).


That's exactly what I intended.  Thanks for digging up the quotation.

Jon

did Peirce himself ever affirm that every sign begins with an
"external" image, and that every sign constructed from other
signs is an "internal" diagram?


I don't think that he used the term 'internal' and 'external'.
But I wanted to relate what Peirce said to the modern work in
neuroscience.  Note the following point by Antonio Damasio:

The distinctive feature of brains such as the one we own is their
uncanny ability to create maps...  But when brains make maps,
they are also creating images, the main currency of our minds.
Ultimately consciousness allows us to experience maps as images,
to manipulate those images, and to apply reasoning to them.


I quoted that passage in slide 56 of http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
In those slides, I was trying to relate and extend Peirce's version of
existential graphs to a more general kind of diagrammatic reasoning.

In slide 55, I quoted the psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird who
claimed that Peirce's EGs "anticipate the theory of mental models
in many respects, including their iconic and symbolic components,
their eschewal of variables, and their fundamental operations of
insertion and deletion."

JFS

Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can
imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine.


Jon

Does it help to amend the initial statement to form a subjunctive
conditional?  "Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to
everything we would be able to imagine, if the right conditions were
to occur."  If so, is this formulation still unobjectionable to a
nominalist?


Carnap introduced possible worlds to support modal logic.
He might accept the term 'knowable'.

But Quine objected to the term 'possible world'.  I suspect
that he would also object to the term 'knowable universe'.

John

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Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-27 Thread Helmut Raulien

List,

Edwina, I think, that there are four kinds of dynamical objects, two of which do not change, one that may change, also due to the sign, and one that changes for sure with every sign that has it for dynamical object: Metaphysical laws and axioms (given they exist) do not change, events and constellations from the past do not either, persisting objects may, common concepts do for sure.

Now, given I am right with this, is it so, that the final interpretant of a sign with a changing dyn. object is not only the theoretical approximation of the immediate object towards the dynamical one, but the approximation of immediate and dynamical objects towards each other?

Or is it so, that, as the dynamical object never changes at the time of the sign (because then it is independent from it), only later, and the final interpretant is part of this sign and not of one of the following, it (the final interpretant) also is the theoretical approximation of the immediate object towards the dynamical, theoretically frozen in time, object? Uh, I dont understand myself anymore, so nevermind if you dont either.

Best,

Helmut

27. März 2017 um 20:05 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"

Claudio - I'm not sure if I would agree that we can never change the Dynamic Object. Since semiosis is an interactive and continuous process, then I would say that our semiosic interactions are continuously changing 'that with which we interact'.

As an example, if I take a spring crocus as the Dynamic Object. It is, in itself, also a Dynamic Interpretant of a semiosic process made up of the triad of multiple Dynamic Objects with which it interacts [earth, sun, water.which are also ALL triadic Signs .]...operating within the Representamen habits of both itself [the bulb] and of the other triadic Signs [earth, sun..]. And my interaction with it, as a Dynamic Object, and an Immediate Object...mediated by my own Representamen knowledge...to result in that Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants of acknowledging it as a flower to be observed and not garbage to be thrown out.

My point is that everything exists within a triadic Set [Object-Representamen-Interpretant] and so we cannot say that the Dynamic Interpretant exists 'per se' on its own. It exists only within interactions, not necessarily with we humans, but with other forms of matter [in this case, earth, sun, water, insects, birds].. and all these interactions - which are also carried out within triadic Signs, will 'change' that Dynamic Interpretant. It will grow; it will produce more, it will supply food for another Sign [an insect, a bird]...

Edwina

--
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
largest alternative telecommunications provider.

http://www.primus.ca

On Mon 27/03/17 8:11 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com sent:

Edwina, Helmut, List,
I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that there is no 'THE TRUTH' anymore.
Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.), perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228).
But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this is very good for us: humans!!!
So, there is no sense for 'religious' fights, because everything is only a little aspect a bigger whole, which can be considered the 'Dynamic Object'.
We don't need to "achieve a true representation of a fact", because it IS "changing all the time".
It is enough if we can figure out a good explanation for our time, hoping that we will enlarge the concept tomorrow.
Art, Architecture, Design in general is only possible because of that fact: we can only construct an Immediate Object, one after an other... endlessly...
and that is exactly the chance to exist, and to be artists, architects, designers, composers, poets, etc., etc...
if the inquiry don't need anymore to be endless... then, we will be also definitively out of work.

To Edwina: "We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic object or our interactions with it." (quote)
You will probably agree that we can only change the Immediate Object
we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without transforming it at the same time in an Immediate Object
the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey" (I don't know if this is also an English _expression_), we will never reach it... happily...

All the best
Claudio

Helmut Raulien escribió el 26/03/2017 a las 15:12:

Claudio, Edwina, List,

I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as the two kinds of object. When two people talk about a common concept of a fact, then the dynamical object is the common concept as it exists outside of the talk (the sign). But this dynamical object is not the truth-as-the-fact. Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact that the common concept exists and is like it is.

The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.

So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is changing all

Re: Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-27 Thread Edwina Taborsky

 

Claudio - I'm not sure if I would agree that we can never change the
Dynamic Object. Since semiosis is an interactive and continuous
process, then I would say that our semiosic interactions are
continuously changing 'that with which we interact'. 

As an example, if I take a spring crocus as the Dynamic Object. It
is, in itself, also a Dynamic Interpretant of a semiosic process made
up of the triad of multiple Dynamic Objects with which it interacts
[earth, sun, water.which are also ALL triadic Signs .]...operating
within the Representamen habits of both itself [the bulb] and of the
other triadic Signs [earth, sun..].  And my interaction with it, as a
Dynamic Object, and an Immediate Object...mediated by my own
Representamen knowledge...to result in that Immediate and Dynamic
Interpretants of acknowledging it as a flower to be observed and not
garbage to be thrown out.

My point is that everything exists within a triadic Set
[Object-Representamen-Interpretant] and so we cannot say that the
Dynamic Interpretant exists 'per se' on its own. It exists only
within interactions, not necessarily with we humans, but with other
forms of matter [in this case, earth, sun, water, insects, birds]..
and all these interactions - which are also carried out within
triadic Signs, will 'change' that Dynamic Interpretant. It will grow;
it will produce more, it will supply food for another Sign [an insect,
a bird]...

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Mon 27/03/17  8:11 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, Helmut, List,
 I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that
there is no 'THE TRUTH' anymore.
 Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts,
speeches,etc.), perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP
2.228).
 But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this is very
good for us: humans!!!
 So, there is no sense for 'religious' fights, because everything
is only a little aspect a bigger whole, which can be considered
the 'Dynamic Object'.
 We don't need to "achieve a true representation of a fact",
because it IS "changing all the time".
 It is enough if we can figure out a good explanation for our
time, hoping that we will enlarge the concept tomorrow.
 Art, Architecture, Design in general is only possible because of
that fact: we can only construct an Immediate Object, one after an
other... endlessly...
 and that is exactly the chance to exist, and to be artists,
architects, designers, composers, poets, etc., etc...
 if the inquiry don't need anymore to be endless... then, we will
be also definitively out of work.
 To Edwina: "We would have no capacity to change both that
dynamic object or our interactions with it." (quote)
 You will probably agree that we can only change the Immediate
Object
 we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without
transforming it at the same time in an Immediate Object
 the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey"
(I don't know if this is also an English expression), we will
never reach it... happily...
 All the best
 Claudio
 Helmut Raulien escribió el 26/03/2017 a   las 15:12:
 Claudio, Edwina, List,  
I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the
same as the two kinds of object. When two people talk about  
  a common concept of a fact, then the dynamical object is the
common concept as it exists outside of the talk (the sign).   
 But this dynamical object is not the truth-as-the-fact.  
  Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact that the   
 common concept exists and is like it is.   The
common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one
sign.   So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a
fact which is changing all the time. I guess, that the
only facts or dynamical objects that donot change, are
metaphysical laws, like axioms, or deductions that have
these axioms for premisses.   That is why I doubt
the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final interpretant
can always be achieved or even just approached by
(perhaps even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling
lizard hunting a leaping frog.   Besides changing facts, and
metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is a third kind of
fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened, or
something that has been in a certain state in the past.  
I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be
achieved by endless inquiry, because there might be
information

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-27 Thread Jerry Rhee

Dear list:

rather ironic that the ultimate, immutable aim- the one that should accord
with a free development of the agent's own esthetic quality- takes on the
form of a carrot, no?

Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Claudio Guerri 
wrote:

> Mein lieber Helmut, List,
> again answer between the lines with >>>
> (this was taught to me by T.A.Sebeok just at the beginning of e-mails)
>
> Helmut Raulien escribió el 27/03/2017 a las 13:14:
>
> Claudio, List,
>  So it is a bit paradoxical: On one hand we should be aware, that we are
> carrot-chasing donkeys, on the other hand we should not abandon the carrot
> chasing projects, inquiry. And we must respect other donkeys who are
> chasing different carrots.
>
> >>> EXACTLY!!! with no offense to donkeys and carrots...
> and with no offense to thousands of years of inquiery in which all
> scholars where traying to chase the DO-carrot.
>
> And, for not thinking that there are alternative carrots, we should
> believe that there is only one carrot of each kind, that is to say too that
> the carrots exist.
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> >>> I could agree with this, if you say "one carrot of each kind" but only
> for not more than 5 minutes...
> Let as hope that we are able to THINK seriously.
> All the best
> Dein
> CLaudio
>
>
>
>
>  27. März 2017 um 14:11 Uhr
>  "Claudio Guerri"  
>
> Edwina, Helmut, List,
> I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that there is no
> 'THE TRUTH' anymore.
> Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.),
> perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228).
> But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this is very good for
> us: humans!!!
> So, there is no sense for 'religious' fights, because everything is only a
> little aspect a bigger whole, which can be considered the 'Dynamic Object'.
> We don't need to "achieve a true representation of a fact", because it IS
> "changing all the time".
> It is enough if we can figure out a good explanation for our time, hoping
> that we will enlarge the concept tomorrow.
> Art, Architecture, Design in general is only possible because of that
> fact: we can only construct an Immediate Object, one after an other...
> endlessly...
> and that is exactly the chance to exist, and to be artists, architects,
> designers, composers, poets, etc., etc...
> if the inquiry don't need anymore to be endless... then, we will be also
> definitively out of work.
>
> To Edwina: "We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic object
> or our interactions with it." (quote)
> You will probably agree that we can only change the Immediate Object
> we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without transforming it
> at the same time in an Immediate Object
> the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey" (I don't
> know if this is also an English expression), we will never reach it...
> happily...
>
> All the best
> Claudio
>
>
> Helmut Raulien escribió el 26/03/2017 a las 15:12:
>
> Claudio, Edwina, List,
> I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as the two
> kinds of object. When two people talk about a common concept of a fact,
> then the dynamical object is the common concept as it exists outside of the
> talk (the sign). But this dynamical object is not the truth-as-the-fact.
> Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact that the common concept
> exists and is like it is.
> The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.
> So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is changing
> all the time. I guess, that the only facts or dynamical objects that donot
> change, are metaphysical laws, like axioms, or deductions that have these
> axioms for premisses.
> That is why I doubt the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final
> interpretant can always be achieved or even just approached by (perhaps
> even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling lizard hunting a leaping frog.
> Besides changing facts, and metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is a third
> kind of fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened, or something that
> has been in a certain state in the past.
> I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be achieved by endless
> inquiry, because there might be information missing due to non-complete
> documentation.
> So I guess, that Peirces truth theory about endless inquiry merely applies
> to metaphysical facts.
> Or when the inquiry goes much faster than the change of fact, or when the
> documentation is complete...
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  26. März 2017 um 16:48 Uhr
>  "Edwina Taborsky"   wrote:
>
>
>
> The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are
> different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say that it makes us
> 'humans'. That is, I'd remove the 'just' from the phrase. That means that
> our cognitive capacity, our

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-27 Thread Claudio Guerri

Mein lieber Helmut, List,
again answer between the lines with >>>
(this was taught to me by T.A.Sebeok just at the beginning of e-mails)

Helmut Raulien escribió el 27/03/2017 a las 13:14:

Claudio, List,
 So it is a bit paradoxical: On one hand we should be aware, that we 
are carrot-chasing donkeys, on the other hand we should not abandon 
the carrot chasing projects, inquiry. And we must respect other 
donkeys who are chasing different carrots.

>>> EXACTLY!!! with no offense to donkeys and carrots...
and with no offense to thousands of years of inquiery in which all 
scholars where traying to chase the DO-carrot.

And, for not thinking that there are alternative carrots, we should 
believe that there is only one carrot of each kind, that is to say too 
that the carrots exist.

Best,
Helmut
>>> I could agree with this, if you say "one carrot of each kind" but 
only for not more than 5 minutes...

Let as hope that we are able to THINK seriously.
All the best
Dein
CLaudio

 27. März 2017 um 14:11 Uhr
 "Claudio Guerri" 
Edwina, Helmut, List,
I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that there is 
no 'THE TRUTH' anymore.
Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.), 
perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228).
But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this is very good 
for us: humans!!!
So, there is no sense for 'religious' fights, because everything is 
only a little aspect a bigger whole, which can be considered the 
'Dynamic Object'.
We don't need to "achieve a true representation of a fact", because it 
IS "changing all the time".
It is enough if we can figure out a good explanation for our time, 
hoping that we will enlarge the concept tomorrow.
Art, Architecture, Design in general is only possible because of that 
fact: we can only construct an Immediate Object, one after an other... 
endlessly...
and that is exactly the chance to exist, and to be artists, 
architects, designers, composers, poets, etc., etc...
if the inquiry don't need anymore to be endless... then, we will be 
also definitively out of work.

To Edwina: "We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic 
object or our interactions with it." (quote)

You will probably agree that we can only change the Immediate Object
we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without transforming 
it at the same time in an Immediate Object
the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey" (I 
don't know if this is also an English expression), we will never reach 
it... happily...

All the best
Claudio

Helmut Raulien escribió el 26/03/2017 a las 15:12:

Claudio, Edwina, List,
I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as
the two kinds of object. When two people talk about a common
concept of a fact, then the dynamical object is the common concept
as it exists outside of the talk (the sign). But this dynamical
object is not the truth-as-the-fact. Though it is the
truth-as-another-fact: The fact that the common concept exists and
is like it is.
The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.
So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is
changing all the time. I guess, that the only facts or dynamical
objects that donot change, are metaphysical laws, like axioms, or
deductions that have these axioms for premisses.
That is why I doubt the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final
interpretant can always be achieved or even just approached by
(perhaps even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling lizard
hunting a leaping frog.
Besides changing facts, and metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is
a third kind of fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened,
or something that has been in a certain state in the past.
I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be achieved by
endless inquiry, because there might be information missing due to
non-complete documentation.
So I guess, that Peirces truth theory about endless inquiry merely
applies to metaphysical facts.
Or when the inquiry goes much faster than the change of fact, or
when the documentation is complete...
Best,
Helmut
 26. März 2017 um 16:48 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:

The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are
different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say that it makes
us 'humans'. That is, I'd remove the 'just' from the phrase. That
means that our cognitive capacity, our capacity to learn, to 'have
knowledge' means that we, with that capacity for reasoning and
analysis, can think about that dynamic object; can think about our
immediate object - and, the three interpretants.

Without such a capacity, we would be unable to do anything other
than mechanically react. We would have no capacity to change both
that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

Clark, List:

Right, I had in mind Peirce's definition of reality/truth at the third
degree of clarity.  Is this any better?  "Therefore, the knowable universe
is limited to everything that an *infinite *community of investigators *would
*be able to imagine, if it *were *to carry out an *indefinite* inquiry."

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 12:17 PM, Clark Goble  wrote:

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 11:14 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Does it help to amend the initial statement to form a subjunctive
> conditional?  "Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything
> we *would *be able to imagine, if the right conditions *were *to occur."
>  If so, is this formulation still unobjectionable to a nominalist?
>
> I’m not sure I’d agree with that reformulation simply because I think
> Peirce distinguishes between knowability and what individuals know. I guess
> you might wrap that up under “right conditions” but my complaint is more
> that the notion of continuity seems very wrapped up in Peirce’s project of
> knowability here. Things can in principle be knowable but simultaneously be
> unknowable for finite knowers.
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread Claudio Guerri


John, Clark, List,
answers/comments between the lines with >>>

John F Sowa escribió el 27/03/2017 a las 12:59:

Clark and Claudio,

Clark

I think my point about modal realism is more that connection
between universals and particulars. Does he make that connection
with mathematics early on? Again I don’t know. It’s one thing to
speak about the nature of mathematics as possibilities and quite
an other to speak about the relationship of mathematics to
particulars. The old “why is the universe so mathematical.”


I would relate two of Peirce's points:  Mathematics is necessary
reasoning.  And all necessary reasoning consists of drawing (or
imagining) a diagram and making observations about the diagram.
Therefore, everything we can understand is limited to the kinds
of diagrams we are able to invent and apply.  Every universal is
a specification for some kind of diagram, and every particular
is something we classify by relating it to some diagram.
I'm using the word 'diagram' in a very broad sense that includes
all kinds of images or icons in any sensory modality.

>>> I agree completely on this point.

Then the
distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way you
interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or
is it a law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?
>>> Do you mean the LAWS OF NATURE, or just what we think that laws of 
nature are?
who is saying which are the laws of nature? As far as I know there are 
very different points of view...
So, I would not care too much about the 'real' LAWS OF NATURE, but about 
which is the best explanation for my purposes of research, inquiry, 
professional practice, or whatever...
and if the day comes that they are not good enough, I will change for a 
better explanation...
some time ago, the earth was supported by four elephants on turtles, 
etc... Today we have an other 'better' idea... what about tomorrow?
For me, the problem is to workout the IO, the best we can... the DO is a 
carrot...


Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can
imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine.
(This point is independent of the nominalist-realist debate.)

Claudio

Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.),
perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228).


Yes.  And every kind of sign begins with an image (icon),
and every sign constructed from other signs is a diagram.
Therefore, all reasoning begins with perception of external
images and continues with internal images (diagrams).  Higher
cognition consists of constructing and examining diagrams.

>>> I agree completely.
there is a very nice explanation about the concept of diagram by Gilles 
Deleuze "Pinutra. El concepto de diagram" Buenos Aires: Cactus2007. I 
could not quickly find an English version. It's about some lectures by G 
Deleuze in 1981.


The simpler constructions are called "common sense", and the
more disciplined constructions are called logic or mathematics
or the many kinds of -ologies.

Claudio

I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that
there is no 'THE TRUTH' anymore.


But it's misleading to say that -- because all the "fake news"
people will take that as justification for their outright lies.

>>> On the contrary, everybody has to check twice... before 'believing'...
I am sure that you would no dare to explain to me what happens in 
Argentina with our new government... or?


Peirce's version is more general and nuanced:

It is easy to speak with precision upon a general theme.
Only, one must commonly surrender all ambition to be certain.
It is equally easy to be certain. One has only to be sufficiently
vague.  It is not so difficult to be pretty precise and fairly
certain at once about a very narrow subject.  (CP 4.237)


This is the answer to both extremes:  those who seek absolute
certainty and those who claim that truth is irrelevant.
John

>>> I would NEVER say that truth is irrelevant!!!
I only insist in the convenience for inquiry and for 'designing', 
thinking, etc. to consider an explanation like something that can be 
thought around again and again.

All the best
CLaudio



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt

John S., Clark, List:

JFS:  Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and
every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram
... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way
you interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a
law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?


This is a very compact and insightful way of explaining nominalism vs.
realism.  Would you mind elaborating, perhaps including some specific
examples?

JFS:  I'm using the word 'diagram' in a very broad sense that includes all
kinds of images or icons in any sensory modality ... And every kind of sign
begins with an image (icon), and every sign constructed from other signs is
a diagram.  Therefore, all reasoning begins with perception of external
images and continues with internal images (diagrams).  Higher cognition
consists of constructing and examining diagrams.


Peirce carefully distinguished between images and diagrams as two *different
*types of icons (or "hypoicons").  "Those which partake of simple
qualities, or First Firstnesses, are *images*; those which represent the
relations, mainly dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by
analogous relations in their own parts, are *diagrams*" (CP 2.277; c.
1902).  Are you using the terms "image" and "diagram" in a different way?
In particular, did Peirce himself ever affirm that *every *sign begins with
an "external" image, and that *every *sign constructed from other signs is
an "internal" diagram?

JFS:  Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can
imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine.


CG:  I think Peirce rejects the idea of the unknowable with his rejection
of Kant’s thing-in-itself. Yet he also ties this to the ideal community of
inquirers rather than any particular person. Put simply while the universe
is knowable and therefore imaginable it doesn’t follow that it is
imaginable for any finite group of people.


Does it help to amend the initial statement to form a subjunctive
conditional?  "Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to
everything we *would
*be able to imagine, if the right conditions *were *to occur."  If so, is
this formulation still unobjectionable to a nominalist?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread Clark Goble

> On Mar 27, 2017, at 9:59 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can
> imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine.
> (This point is independent of the nominalist-realist debate.)

There’s a bit to unpack there - most particularly who the “we” is in that 
sentence. I think Peirce rejects the idea of the unknowable with his rejection 
of Kant’s thing-in-itself. Yet he also ties this to the ideal community of 
inquirers rather than any particular person. Put simply while the universe is 
knowable and therefore imaginable it doesn’t follow that it is imaginable for 
any finite group of people.

As you note this is also separate from the nominalist debate since a nominalist 
can agree with this. 
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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-27 Thread Helmut Raulien

Claudio, List,

So it is a bit paradoxical: On one hand we should be aware, that we are carrot-chasing donkeys, on the other hand we should not abandon the carrot chasing projects, inquiry. And we must respect other donkeys who are chasing different carrots. And, for not thinking that there are alternative carrots, we should believe that there is only one carrot of each kind, that is to say too that the carrots exist.

Best,

Helmut

27. März 2017 um 14:11 Uhr
"Claudio Guerri"

All the best
Claudio

Helmut Raulien escribió el 26/03/2017 a las 15:12:

Claudio, Edwina, List,

The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.

So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is changing all the time. I guess, that the only facts or dynamical objects that donot change, are metaphysical laws, like axioms, or deductions that have these axioms for premisses.

That is why I doubt the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final interpretant can always be achieved or even just approached by (perhaps even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling lizard hunting a leaping frog.

Besides changing facts, and metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is a third kind of fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened, or something that has been in a certain state in the past.

I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be achieved by endless inquiry, because there might be information missing due to non-complete documentation.

So I guess, that Peirces truth theory about endless inquiry merely applies to metaphysical facts.

Or when the inquiry goes much faster than the change of fact, or when the documentation is complete...

Best,

Helmut

26. März 2017 um 16:48 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" wrote:

The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say that it makes us 'humans'. That is, I'd remove the 'just' from the phrase. That means that our cognitive capacity, our capacity to learn, to 'have knowledge' means that we, with that capacity for reasoning and analysis, can think about that dynamic object; can think about our immediate object - and, the three interpretants.

Without such a capacity, we would be unable to do anything other than mechanically react. We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic object or our interactions with it.

Edwina Taborsky
--
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largest alternative telecommunications provider.

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On Sun 26/03/17 10:22 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com sent:

List,
forgive me for jumping in only very shortly
but...
I agree that that there can not be "alternative facts"
but for sure, there are only alternative interpretations.
And both concepts of immediate and dynamic object are a very clear explanation of that difference that makes as just humans...
All the best
Claudio
Helmut Raulien escribió el 25/03/2017 a las 20:05:

List,

In common language the word "truth" is used for two

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread John F Sowa


Clark and Claudio,

Clark

I think my point about modal realism is more that connection
between universals and particulars. Does he make that connection
with mathematics early on? Again I don’t know. It’s one thing to
speak about the nature of mathematics as possibilities and quite
an other to speak about the relationship of mathematics to
particulars. The old “why is the universe so mathematical.”


I would relate two of Peirce's points:  Mathematics is necessary
reasoning.  And all necessary reasoning consists of drawing (or
imagining) a diagram and making observations about the diagram.

Therefore, everything we can understand is limited to the kinds
of diagrams we are able to invent and apply.  Every universal is
a specification for some kind of diagram, and every particular
is something we classify by relating it to some diagram.

I'm using the word 'diagram' in a very broad sense that includes
all kinds of images or icons in any sensory modality.  Then the
distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way you
interpret the specification:  Is it just a verbal agreement, or
is it a law of nature that is independent of anything we may say?

Therefore, the knowable universe is limited to everything we can
imagine, and mathematics can analyze anything we can imagine.
(This point is independent of the nominalist-realist debate.)

Claudio

Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.),
perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228).


Yes.  And every kind of sign begins with an image (icon),
and every sign constructed from other signs is a diagram.
Therefore, all reasoning begins with perception of external
images and continues with internal images (diagrams).  Higher
cognition consists of constructing and examining diagrams.

The simpler constructions are called "common sense", and the
more disciplined constructions are called logic or mathematics
or the many kinds of -ologies.

Claudio

I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that
there is no 'THE TRUTH' anymore.


But it's misleading to say that -- because all the "fake news"
people will take that as justification for their outright lies.

Peirce's version is more general and nuanced:

It is easy to speak with precision upon a general theme.
Only, one must commonly surrender all ambition to be certain.
It is equally easy to be certain. One has only to be sufficiently
vague.  It is not so difficult to be pretty precise and fairly
certain at once about a very narrow subject.  (CP 4.237)


This is the answer to both extremes:  those who seek absolute
certainty and those who claim that truth is irrelevant.

John

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

2017-03-27 Thread Jon Awbrey


Peircers,

There's a more readable copy on my blog:

Pragmatic Theory Of Truth • 10
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2017/03/27/pragmatic-theory-of-truth-%e2%80%a2-10/

A paragraph from Kant and associated discussion I added to
the Wikipedia article on the Correspondence Theory of Truth:

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Correspondence_theory_of_truth=61243441

in June 2006:

https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Correspondence_theory_of_truth=next=59135261

is useful at this point, and it serves to set up a corresponding
statement from Peirce that we'll take up in due course.

A version of this material survives on the InterSciWiki site:

http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth



Immanuel Kant discussed the correspondence theory of truth in the following 
manner:

Truth is said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object.  According to this mere verbal definition, then, 
my knowledge, in order to be true, must agree with the object.  Now, I can only compare the object with my knowledge by 
this means, namely, by taking knowledge of it.  My knowledge, then, is to be verified by itself, which is far from being 
sufficient for truth.  For as the object is external to me, and the knowledge is in me, I can only judge whether my 
knowledge of the object agrees with my knowledge of the object.  Such a circle in explanation was called by the ancients 
Diallelos.  And the logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who remarked that this account of truth was 
as if a man before a judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of it to a witness whom no one 
knows, but who defends his own credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a witness is an honourable man. 
(Kant, 45).


According to Kant, the definition of truth as correspondence is a “mere verbal definition”, here making use of 
Aristotle's distinction between a nominal definition, a definition in name only, and a real definition, a definition 
that shows the true cause or essence of the thing whose term is being defined.  From Kant's account of the history, the 
definition of truth as correspondence was already in dispute from classical times, the “skeptics” criticizing the 
“logicians” for a form of circular reasoning, though the extent to which the “logicians” actually held such a theory is 
not evaluated in this account.


A careful analysis of what Kant is saying here can help to explain why there are so many theories of truth on the 
contemporary scene.  In other words, why would thinkers who examine the question of truth not be satisfied to rest with 
this very first theory that usually comes to mind?




Reference
=

* Kant, Immanuel (1800), Introduction to Logic.  Reprinted,
  Thomas Kingsmill Abbott (trans.), Dennis Sweet (intro.),
  Barnes and Noble, New York, NY, 2005.

Resources
=

* Pragmatic Theory Of Truth
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Pragmatic_theory_of_truth

* Correspondence Theory Of Truth
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Correspondence_theory_of_truth

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Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

2017-03-27 Thread Claudio Guerri


Edwina, Helmut, List,
I think that a very good aspect of Peirce's proposal is that there is no 
'THE TRUTH' anymore.
Signs can only construct other signs (images, texts, speeches,etc.), 
perhaps, sometimes, "a more developed sign" (CP 2.228).
But never a definitive 'final explanation'... and this is very good for 
us: humans!!!
So, there is no sense for 'religious' fights, because everything is only 
a little aspect a bigger whole, which can be considered the 'Dynamic 
Object'.
We don't need to "achieve a true representation of a fact", because it 
IS "changing all the time".
It is enough if we can figure out a good explanation for our time, 
hoping that we will enlarge the concept tomorrow.
Art, Architecture, Design in general is only possible because of that 
fact: we can only construct an Immediate Object, one after an other... 
endlessly...
and that is exactly the chance to exist, and to be artists, architects, 
designers, composers, poets, etc., etc...
if the inquiry don't need anymore to be endless... then, we will be also 
definitively out of work.


To Edwina: "We would have no capacity to change both that dynamic object 
or our interactions with it." (quote)

You will probably agree that we can only change the Immediate Object
we can never grasp anything of the Dynamic Object without transforming 
it at the same time in an Immediate Object
the Dynamic Object is like "the carrot in front of the donkey" (I don't 
know if this is also an English expression), we will never reach it... 
happily...


All the best
Claudio


Helmut Raulien escribió el 26/03/2017 a las 15:12:

Claudio, Edwina, List,
I wonder whether the two kinds of truth are exactly the same as the 
two kinds of object. When two people talk about a common concept of a 
fact, then the dynamical object is the common concept as it exists 
outside of the talk (the sign). But this dynamical object is not the 
truth-as-the-fact. Though it is the truth-as-another-fact: The fact 
that the common concept exists and is like it is.

The common-concept-as-a-fact changes, even due to this one sign.
So it is hard to achieve a true representation of a fact which is 
changing all the time. I guess, that the only facts or dynamical 
objects that donot change, are metaphysical laws, like axioms, or 
deductions that have these axioms for premisses.
That is why I doubt the theory by Peirce, that truth or a final 
interpretant can always be achieved or even just approached by 
(perhaps even endless) inquiry: It is like a crawling lizard hunting a 
leaping frog.
Besides changing facts, and metaphysical (eternal) facts, there is a 
third kind of fact: A fact that is an event-as-it-has-happened, or 
something that has been in a certain state in the past.
I think, that also this kind of truth cannot always be achieved by 
endless inquiry, because there might be information missing due to 
non-complete documentation.
So I guess, that Peirces truth theory about endless inquiry merely 
applies to metaphysical facts.
Or when the inquiry goes much faster than the change of fact, or when 
the documentation is complete...

Best,
Helmut
 26. März 2017 um 16:48 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"  wrote:


The FACT that the content of the immediate and dynamic object are 
different indeed 'makes us just humans' but I'd say that it makes us 
'humans'. That is, I'd remove the 'just' from the phrase. That means 
that our cognitive capacity, our capacity to learn, to 'have 
knowledge' means that we, with that capacity for reasoning and 
analysis, can think about that dynamic object; can think about our 
immediate object - and, the three interpretants.


Without such a capacity, we would be unable to do anything other than 
mechanically react. We would have no capacity to change both that 
dynamic object or our interactions with it.


Edwina Taborsky
--
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On Sun 26/03/17 10:22 AM , Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com sent:

List,
forgive me for jumping in only very shortly
but...
I agree that that there can not be "alternative facts"
but for sure, there are only alternative interpretations.
And both concepts of immediate and dynamic object are a very clear
explanation of that difference that makes as just humans...
All the best
Claudio
Helmut Raulien escribió el 25/03/2017 a las 20:05:

List,
In common language the word "truth" is used for two different
things: The fact and it´s representation (the truth
independent of observation, and the truth as represented-
correct representatrion). In philosophy it mostly is only used
for the representation, and means a correct representation of
a fact.
With one exception: Having looked at Wikipedia: "Truth": I
would say, that the redundancy theory uses the term for the
fact,

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