Clark, List: I apologize for repeating myself--or rather, for repeating John Sowa--but I still find myself struggling to understand exactly what he meant by this.
JFS: Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram, and every particular is something we classify by relating it to some diagram ... Then the distinction between nominalism & realism depends on the way you interpret the specification: Is it just a verbal agreement, or is it a law of nature that is independent of anything we may say? What kind of diagram does the universal "red" specify, or the universal "lion"? How do we relate a particular instance of redness, or a particular lion, to such a diagram? Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 27, 2017 at 5:25 PM, Clark Goble <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Mar 27, 2017, at 4:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > CG: To my eyes the main issue is the realism vs. nominalism issue both in > terms of the nature of possibilities as well as the relationship of > individuals to generals. > > > Is there a way to connect this with John Sowa's earlier comment, which I > am still pondering? > > I think John’s point was largely orthogonal to the issue of > realism/nominalism. >
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