Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

[John F Sowa]

On 4/10/2017 11:46 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

The unique role of the chemical elements in the composition of chemical
sentences serve as an excellent model for the logical structures of
other sentences in other symbol systems.


I agree that the system of chemical elements is more tractable
than most systems in nature, but that is only a matter of degree.

Every element that occurs in nature occurs as a mixture of isotopes.
Every chemical reaction depends on quantum mechanical effects, and
the different masses of various isotopes shift the probabilities
of side effects for different isotopes.

When you add the uncertainty principle as a fundamental limit
on measurements, chemical sentences have nothing special to
offer "as an excellent model for the logical structures of
other sentences in other symbol systems."

I agree with Wittgenstein that natural languages are a better
model for communication than any artificial notation -- including
chemical notation.  I also believe that Frank Ramsey, whom LW
credited with the insights that led him to develop his later
philosophy, had conveyed some Peircean insights in the discussions
they had in the late 1920s.

I also believe that Peirce himself would have approved of the
general direction that LW pursued in his debates with Alan Turing
in the late 1930s.  (But I'm sure that CSP would have added much
more to that debate, if he could have been present.)

My claim (which I believe is compatible with the writings of
both LW and CSP):

 1. Every artificial notation that anyone has ever invented
is a language game (Sprachspiel) whose symbols may be
interpreted as abbreviations for words or phrases in
at least one natural language.

 2. The moves (syntactic and semantic transformations) in
any such language game may be explained and taught by
the same methods as those used to describe any NL.

 3. Because of points #1 and #2, any statement in any
artificial notation can be translated to a statement
in a natural language that is just as precise as the
version in the artificial notation -- however, the NL
translation is likely to be much more verbose.

 4. Because of points #1, #2, and #3, I believe that any
artificial language may be viewed as a specialized
language game whose rules and symbols are a stylized
(abbreviated and rigidified) version of a natural language.

I believe that the notation of chemistry is a fine example
that could be used to illustrate these principles.  But there
are many other notations that would also be good examples.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 10, 2017, at 12:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'?  
> What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it?

I take it primarily as the problem of reference. While Peirce does have the 
index, he doesn’t require firm ground to use the index. It’s signs all the way 
down due to the way he conceives of signs. 

> "Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the future, 
> but it obviously does not include any other universes or "Platonic worlds."

Not sure what you mean by that. 



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Kirsti, List:

I am indeed exploring the hypothesis that all Signs can be classified, but
not necessarily assuming that this is always easy to do.  On the contrary,
I recognize the difficulty in many cases, including this one in
particular--which is why I sought input from the List.

"Our existing universe" is not limited to the past; it includes the future,
but it obviously does not include any other universes or "Platonic worlds."

How exactly would you pose "the Kantian question about 'Das Ding an sich'?
What makes you think that I am "trying to get a short way out of" it?

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 10, 2017 at 7:29 AM,  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the
> presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If you
> look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, and
> you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.
>
> "Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws  of nature".
> The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if so
> and so...). So they are about the future, just as well.
>
> It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian
> question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no short
> and simple way!
> That much is shown beyond doubt by today.
>
> Best, Kirsti Määttänen

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 8, 2017, at 10:46 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Indeed, Peirce defined "potential" as "indeterminate yet capable of 
> determination in any special case" (CP 6.185; 1898), but wrote that "Ideas, 
> or Possibles"--i.e., the constituents of the Universe of 1ns, "whatever has 
> its Being in itself alone"--are "incapable of perfect actualization on 
> account of [their] essential vagueness" (EP 2:478-479; 1908).  I found this 
> distinction very helpful in sorting out Peirce's cosmology when we were 
> discussing it on the List last fall.

I think this is more the distinction for Peirce between generality and 
vagueness. The difference is in who is able to make the determination. Vague 
could mean there is a determinate quality which is simply unknown or that the 
thing itself is developing that quality. Whereas generality is wrapped up in 
being able to simply pick one and is wrapped up in his notion of continuity.

My thought is that these are vague because they are symbols under growth and 
are coming to have the properties they will have one day. In the same way that 
I might only be able to speak vaguely of my son’s qualities since his life is 
just partially underway.

> I think that both of us agree with Edwina that all three Categories were 
> present from the very beginning of our existing universe.

I should hasten to add that I agree with that too. I take Peirce’s cosmology to 
be in logical time before there was anytime. Further, while I differ somewhat 
with Edwina regarding what Peirce believed about this, my own views are 
actually closer to hers..

> Gary quoted Clark as having written, "I think Peirce has [two] categories of 
> chance. One is discontinuous whereas the other is continuous. This ends up 
> being important in various ways."  However, I do not recall seeing that 
> statement in any of Clark's messages, and it also does not show up in the 
> List archive.  More importantly, where does this notion arise in Peirce's 
> writings?

I could have sworn I put that in the email. Looking I realize I didn’t. Part of 
it arises out of the continuum behind the continuum which we’ve discussed in 
the past here with the blackboard metaphor.

I draw a chalk line on the board. This discontinuity is one of those brute acts 
by which alone the original vagueness could have madea  step towards 
definiteness. There is a certain element of continuity in this line. Where did 
this continuity come from? It is nothing but the original continuity of the 
blackboard which makes everything upon it continuous. (6.203)

The one quote I’d give would be this one:

My definition of a continuum only prescribes that, after every innumerable 
series of points, there shall be a next following point, and does not forbit 
this to follow at the interval of a mile. That, therefore, certainly permits 
cracks everywhere. (4.126)

That’s not fully satisfying though although it points to the distinction. I was 
primarily thinking of the two tendencies after rereading Reynold’s paper 
“Peirce’s Cosmology and the Laws of Thermodynamics” which I referred to last 
week. An other way of putting the distinction is as reversible and irreversible 
rather than continuous and discontinuous. The idea that ideas spread 
continuously yet can also change really is the same distinction.



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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List,

did I get it right, that "individuation" is just a thought-experiment about what and how a thing (or law...) would be, if it was totally rid of any representation? just, what a "thing in itself" would be: Something incomprehensible for the scholastic doctors, as Gary wrote? Not only for them. But, as Gary wrote, it is possible to assume, that there is always a representation, if not by humans, then by "some vast consciousness", which is "a Deity relatively to us". Peirce called it "Quasi-mind of the universe". So- problem about the incomprehensibility of "thing in itself" solved.

So why did you write, that the ""laws of nature"...are a product of the human mind"? They can also be a product of the universe´s mind, I guess, otherwise there would not have been planets before there have been humans. Other than the human representations of the laws of nature, they are a product of the human mind. Oh, I see: You wrote ""laws of nature"", in quotation marks, and these quotation marks indicate, that a representation of the human mind is meant, so your statement is correct.

Did I get it right?

Best,

Helmut

 

 10. April 2017 um 17:46 Uhr
Von: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
 


List:
 

The following quote deserves rigorous study.  It is deeply relevant to three critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science:

1. issues that relate realism to idealism 

2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and

3. issues that relate the sciences to the relationships between reality and mathematics. 

 

 (Thanks to Gary for posting this quotes from the Harvard lecture  (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7):

 




On Apr 8, 2017, at 4:17 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
 


All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service.”

 





A literal interpretation of EP2:184, CP 5.106-7 is as follow:

 



All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol.



The “laws of nature” as well as the symbols of mathematics are a product of the human mind.  The existence of the formula is expressed in symbol systems generated as descriptions of thoughts and observations.  The formula is only one possible representation among all possible representations of a thing.  Thus, the second sentence can be thought of as the inverse order of CSP’s earlier assertion regarding “thing, representation, form.”  This is the basis of scientific realism and the development of the logic of the natural sciences.  Note that the distinction between the laws of physics and the habits of chemistry is missing!   

 



An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign.



The second part of this sentence: 

 



 thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign.



focuses on the absence of “representation” in the concept of a thing.  

Things, in and of themselves, lack the capacity to create symbols and to create a symbolic logic. 

In particular, mathematical symbols are “utterly  foreign” to things. 

 



Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.



The contrast is between the general formulas of mathematics and the "the principle of individuation”.  This “utter foreign”ness persists today. 

 

Two deep consequences follow from these assertions.  

 

The critical importance of this clear and crisp distinction between the “general” and the "the principle of individuation” lies in the nature of empirical observations. 

1.  Empirical observations can only be made on specific objects.  Consequently, any generalization to mathematical symbols 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Clark Goble]

> On Apr 9, 2017, at 7:41 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> The surface is a vague boundary.  All plants and animals have
> exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark)
> and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins).
> 
> The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from
> all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject
> to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental
> (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming
> themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water).
> 
> Even the interior is not well defined.  There are many more billions
> of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body.  Some
> of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health.

This seems right, although the word vague in a Peircean sense might not quite 
fit. I think not well defined is a better way to put it.

I especially like the point you and Kirstima make about non-human cells. Our 
body is very much a symbol in a certain sense that when examined closely does 
not have the type of unity we like to imagine. Even ignoring the issue of the 
human biome, we’re finding that even the DNA of our food can end up in odd 
places of our body, potentially interacting in more complex ways than we can 
yet determine. In the bodies of mothers the remnants of their children’s DNA 
can remain and have effects. Lines become blurry and complex. Even the very 
notion of inside and outside fail us. (Is the digestion system ‘inside’ and if 
so when?)

> Very few molecules exist in isolation.  For example, salt (NaCl)
> rarely consists of Na-CL pairs.  In a crystal, the atoms are
> organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms
> of both kinds.  In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions.

And the very notion of atoms and molecules when examined more technically is 
better seen as a quantum field which is itself a type of potentiality.

We simplify both because we have to in order to reason about these things, but 
also because our simplifications work most of the time. Even if we could create 
a gigantic complex Hamiltonian to express the field of salt crystal, it 
wouldn’t necessarily help us.

> I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics.
> But I'd say that the major difference was caused by the first
> quasi-minds, which created the first non-degenerate Thirdness
> (purpose, goals, or intentions).

I’d more put it that biological descriptions typically aren’t reducible to 
chemistry or physics. Although for all the problems philosophy of science 
created here in the 50’s through 70’s attempting to make the reduction, I think 
it did perhaps help in getting biologists to think more carefully about the 
type of descriptions they make.





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

The following quote deserves rigorous study.  It is deeply relevant to three 
critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science:
1. issues that relate realism to idealism 
2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and
3. issues that relate the sciences to the relationships between reality and 
mathematics. 

 (Thanks to Gary for posting this quotes from the Harvard lecture  (EP2:184, CP 
5.106-7):

> On Apr 8, 2017, at 4:17 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence 
> matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An 
> existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all 
> generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general 
> formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But it will be 
> of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least 
> constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we 
> have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the 
> scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were 
> obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that 
> the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast 
> consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to 
> us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely 
> philosophical hypothesis, that has the advantage of being supported by 
> analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond that support to the imagination 
> it is of any particular scientific service.”
>  

A literal interpretation of EP2:184, CP 5.106-7 is as follow:

> All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence 
> matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol.

The “laws of nature” as well as the symbols of mathematics are a product of the 
human mind.  The existence of the formula is expressed in symbol systems 
generated as descriptions of thoughts and observations.  The formula is only 
one possible representation among all possible representations of a thing.  
Thus, the second sentence can be thought of as the inverse order of CSP’s 
earlier assertion regarding “thing, representation, form.”  This is the basis 
of scientific realism and the development of the logic of the natural sciences. 
 Note that the distinction between the laws of physics and the habits of 
chemistry is missing!   

> An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all 
> generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign.

The second part of this sentence: 

>  thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is 
> utterly foreign.

focuses on the absence of “representation” in the concept of a thing.  
Things, in and of themselves, lack the capacity to create symbols and to create 
a symbolic logic. 
In particular, mathematical symbols are “utterly  foreign” to things. 

> Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the 
> scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were 
> obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.

The contrast is between the general formulas of mathematics and the "the 
principle of individuation”.  This “utter foreign”ness persists today. 

Two deep consequences follow from these assertions.  

The critical importance of this clear and crisp distinction between the 
“general” and the "the principle of individuation” lies in the nature of 
empirical observations. 
1.  Empirical observations can only be made on specific objects.  Consequently, 
any generalization to mathematical symbols requires judgments and substitution 
of mathematical symbols for symbols representing “things”
2. "the principle of individuation” plays a fundamentally different role in the 
physical and chemical sciences in the following sense, a sense which a 
consequence of the representation of things. (CSP ignores the physical concept 
of mass!) The table of chemical elements represents individual forms of matter, 
each form of matter carries intrinsic physical assets of mass and electricity. 
The compositions of matter (molecules, cells, organisms, human bodies,…, 
planets,…,???)  are directly reducible to the individual members of the 
chemical table of elements. "the principle of individuation” is applicable to 
all compositions of individuals.  Generality in the sense of mathematical 
symbols infers the loss of individuality.  For examples, the mathematical 
terms, such as token, type and category are “utterly foreign" to the concept of 
individuality. 

A direct pragmatic consequence of "the principle of individuation” is the 
language of chemistry.  Each unique molecule must be assigned a specific name 
that represents the thing itself.  Each and every atom in the molecular formula 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 John, a very nice post - but I do have some quibbles. I don't think
that you can reduce the differentiation and subsequent networking of
these differences that is the basis of complexity- to vagueness.
That is, complexity, which operates via both  differentiations and
commonalities, is a key factor in the ability of the universe to
prevent entropy. 

Therefore, the development of differentiation of Form, which implies
boundaries to that Form, and a severance of This from That, and thus
enables Secondness, is a reality in our universe. Just as is the
vagueness of Firstness and the commonalities of Thirdness.

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sun 09/04/17  9:41 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Helmut, Edwina, Jon, list, 
 Few borders in any realm, animate or inanimate, are clearly defined.

 There is a continuum.  The inanimate realm has extremes from sharp 
 boundaries (a crystal) to extremely vague boundaries (the earth's 
 atmosphere).  The borders of living things are an intermediate case.

 HR 
 > In animate world, organisms have clear borders, their skin
surface. 
 The surface is a vague boundary.  All plants and animals have 
 exterior cells that are dead or dying (hair, skin, scales, bark) 
 and they have secretions (sweat, tears, oils, sap, resins). 
 The outer layers are always mixed with liquids and solids from 
 all kinds of sources (living or non-living), and they are subject 
 to various abrasions and adhesions -- deliberate or accidental 
 (e.g., a bird preening its feathers, animals scratching, grooming 
 themselves or others, rolling in the dust, or washing in water). 
 Even the interior is not well defined.  There are many more billions

 of bacterial cells than human cells in and on the human body.  Some 
 of them are pathogens, but most are *essential* to human health. 
 HR 
 > I was thinking, that a token is something separate (discontinuous)

 > by nature. But if it isn´t necessarily... 
 Many discontinuities are caused by the way we think and talk. 
 The Russian ruka corresponds to English hand + wrist + forearm. 
 We count trees by the number of trunks that grow out of the ground, 
 but an aspen may consist of a single root system with dozens of
trunks. 
 ET 
 > The fact that [a molecule's] composition is specific; i.e., 
 > a specific number of electrons/protons/neutrons - gives it 
 > a distinct identity that differentiates it from another TYPE 
 > of chemical. 
 Very few molecules exist in isolation.  For example, salt (NaCl) 
 rarely consists of Na-CL pairs.  In a crystal, the atoms are 
 organized in a lattice where each atom is surrounded by atoms 
 of both kinds.  In water, Na ions float independently of CL ions. 
 ET 
 > in the biological realm, ... Each token is more or less unique 
 > from other tokens even if they all belong to the same TYPE. That
is, 
 > a particular species of dog will, each one, be slightly different 
 > in temperament and even look, but all will be members of ONE 
 > particular Type/Breed of dog... 
 There are no clear boundaries between breeds (varieties) and 
 species.  Dogs interbreed with wolves, which interbreed with 
 coyotes.  Domestic cats interbreed with many kinds of wild cats. 
 The methods of genetic engineering use the same mechanisms as 
 gene transfers that occur naturally. 
 Furthermore, the DNA of every living thing is constantly changing 
 throughout life.  Most epigenetic changes are normal and necessary 
 for maturation.  Others may be harmful, beneficial, or neutral. 
 And many can be inherited.  The only reason why DNA remains 
 relatively stable is that repair mechanisms in each cell are 
 constantly fixing errors -- but they don't catch all errors. 
 ET 
 > in the physico-chemical realm, the majority of tokens are similar.

 > This gives the physico-chemical realm a great deal of stability. 
 The stability results from laws of nature (or known approximations 
 called laws of physics):  conservation of mass-energy, momentum, 
 angular momentum, charge, etc. 
 But the question of "majority" depends on what you're counting. 
 Photons from the early universe can be stable for billions of 
 years.  But the instant they hit your retina or a photocell in 
 a camera, they change. 
 Electrons, protons, and neutrons are relatively stable, but most 
 other particles are highly unstable.  In quantum electrodynamics, 
 the vacuum supposedly consists of virtual particles that are 
 constantly popping in and out of a shadowy state that is on the 
 borderline of existence. 
 JAS 
 > biological Types are less restrictive and thus more flexible than 
 > most physico-chemical Types--which is one reason why biology is 
 > not reducible to chemistry and/or physics. 
 I agree that biology is not reducible to chemistry or physics. 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Awbrey]

Kirsti,

Thanks for the notice.

Of course that setup is barely a beginning.

It is only the grounds out of which understanding must grow,
IF our understanding is to proceed on these two conditions:

MAT. We take the methods and tools that C.S. Peirce gave us seriously.
COR. We take the context of research in scientific inquiry seriously.

In practice, of course, we do not take the whole actual universe U
as our starting point, but begin by constructing concrete examples
of systems, say, a system defined by its state space X, and we try
to determine what sort of conditions X must satisfy in order for X
to possess any sort of representation at all of its own structure.

That is the sort of thing has been investigated a lot when it comes
to ordinary sorts of axiom systems and computational systems, where
people speak of the system having a “reflective property” but there
needs to be much more work done with reflection in semiotic systems.

Regards,

Jon

On 4/10/2017 9:25 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:

Jon A.

Seems valid to me. But it does not answer the quest for understanding. - If you 
see my point.

Kirsti

Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 7.4.2017 02:02:

Jon, List ...

I've mentioned the following possibility several times before, but
maybe not too recently.

A sign relation L is a subset of a cartesian product O×S×I, where O,
S, I are the object, sign, interpretant domains, respectively. In a
systems-theoretic framework we may think of these domains as dynamical
systems.

We often work with sign relations where S = I but it is entirely
possible to consider sign relations where all three domains are one
and the same. Indeed, we could have O=S=I=U, where the system U is the
entire universe. This would make the entire universe a sign of itself
to itself.

A very general way to understand a system-theoretic law is in terms of
a constraint — the fact that not everything that might happen
actually does. And that is nothing but a subset relation.

So the law embodying how the universe represents itself to itself
could be nothing other than a sign relation L ⊆ U×U×U.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com [3]

On Apr 6, 2017, at 3:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
 wrote:


List:

With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis
in the physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred
to me. What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to
how we _describe_ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or
other _representation_ of it; I am talking about the law of nature
_itself_, the real general that governs actual occurrences.

As a law, it presumably has to be a Legisign. What is its Dynamic
Object--the inexhaustible continuum of its _potential_
instantiations, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-O
relation? It is not conventional (Symbol), so is it an existential
connection (Index)? What is its Dynamic Interpretant--any given
_actual _instantiation, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-I
relation--Dicent, like a proposition, or Rheme, like a term?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Laws of Nature as Signs

[kirstima]

Jon A.

Seems valid to me. But it does not answer the quest for understanding. - 
If you see my point.


Kirsti

Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 7.4.2017 02:02:

Jon, List ...

I've mentioned the following possibility several times before, but
maybe not too recently.

A sign relation L is a subset of a cartesian product O×S×I, where O,
S, I are the object, sign, interpretant domains, respectively. In a
systems-theoretic framework we may think of these domains as dynamical
systems.

We often work with sign relations where S = I but it is entirely
possible to consider sign relations where all three domains are one
and the same. Indeed, we could have O=S=I=U, where the system U is the
entire universe. This would make the entire universe a sign of itself
to itself.

A very general way to understand a system-theoretic law is in terms of
a constraint — the fact that not everything that might happen
actually does. And that is nothing but a subset relation.

So the law embodying how the universe represents itself to itself
could be nothing other than a sign relation L ⊆ U×U×U.

Regards,

Jon

http://inquiryintoinquiry.com [3]

On Apr 6, 2017, at 3:36 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
 wrote:


List:

With the discussions going on in a couple of threads about semeiosis
in the physico-chemical and biological realms, a question occurred
to me. What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to
how we _describe_ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or
other _representation_ of it; I am talking about the law of nature
_itself_, the real general that governs actual occurrences.

As a law, it presumably has to be a Legisign. What is its Dynamic
Object--the inexhaustible continuum of its _potential_
instantiations, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-O
relation? It is not conventional (Symbol), so is it an existential
connection (Index)? What is its Dynamic Interpretant--any given
_actual _instantiation, perhaps? How should we characterize its S-I
relation--Dicent, like a proposition, or Rheme, like a term?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[kirstima]

John,

I found it very interesting that you took up metaphor in connection with 
"laws of nature". I once got across with a study on metaphors in science 
with a side note by the researchers that natural scientist often got 
angry on any hint that they may have been using such. - It was just 
something unthinkable for them.


I assume something like that is still going on within computer science. 
Artificial Intelligence being notoriously unable to handle anything like 
that. - To the detriment of all of us.


You used the term in a very, vary vague sense. - The quote you were 
commenting on, nothing metaphorical was intended. You presented your 
point very nicely, by taking up a language game "gone on a holiday".


Have you given any thought on the difference between unintended and 
intended metaphors? And on kinds of metaphors which work, do the job, 
and kinds which fail?


I also thank you for the papers you have shared in the List. Truly 
admiradle, truly clear.


Best,

Kirsti Määttänen





John F Sowa kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:35:


Jon

What class of Sign is a law of nature?  I am not referring to how we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature /itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.


Edwina

But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
'shared reality' could be developed.


That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is strange.
Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
gone on a holiday".  It takes a phrase "general laws" from a language
game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from Peirce's
language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language game
of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real" for
which we have no words for describing.  In short, it's a metaphor.

To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:

Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth:  If you drop something
in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
to t squared:  x = ½ gt²

Kepler's law of planetary orbits:  Planets in the solar system travel
in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.

Newton's law of gravity:  A generalization that explains the laws
of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.

Einstein's general relativity:  A generalization that explains
all the above plus many more phenomena.

Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
domain of applicability.  The more general laws, which cover
a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
reality -- but each one is still a law of science.

In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
for aspects of nature that we can only describe.  The ultimate
laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
might be very accurate.  But when stated, they would be signs
expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[kirstima]

Jon,

The presupposition in your question(s)you do not take up is the 
presupposition that all signs can and may be (easily) classified. - If 
you look up some detailed versions of Peirces classifications of signs, 
and you'll see what kinds of problems I mean.


"Our existing universe" does not go hand in hand with "laws  of nature". 
The nature of laws is to predict what is to come, what will happen (if 
so and so...). So they are about the future, just as well.


It seems to me that you are trying to get a short way out of the Kantian 
question about "Das Ding an sich", the thing in itself. - There is no 
short and simple way!

That much is shown beyond doubt by today.

Best, Kirsti Määttänen


Jon Alan Schmidt kirjoitti 7.4.2017 00:51:

John S., List:


JFS: In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a
metaphor for aspects of nature that we can only describe.


Again, I am asking about those aspects of nature _themselves_, not our
linguistic or mathematical descriptions of them.  What class of Signs
are they?  Obviously, in posing this question I am presupposing that
general laws of nature are real, and that our existing universe
consists of Signs all the way down; i.e., "all this universe is
perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs."

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2]

On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:35 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:


Jon and Edwina,

Jon


What class of Sign is a law of nature? I am not referring to how
we
/describe/ a law of nature in human language, an equation, or
other
/representation/ of it; I am talking about the law of nature
/itself/,
the real general that governs actual occurrences.


Edwina


But a symbol is not merely convention; ... could it be a reference
to the general laws held within the Dynamic Object such that a
'shared reality' could be developed.


That phrase "general laws held within the Dynamic Object" is
strange.
Wittgenstein would call it a fragment of a language game that "has
gone on a holiday". It takes a phrase "general laws" from a
language
game of science, mixes it with a phrase "Dynamic Object" from
Peirce's
language game of semiotic, combines it with a physical language
game
of "holding something", and applies it to something "really real"
for
which we have no words for describing. In short, it's a metaphor.

To analyze that metaphor, consider some examples:

Galileo's law of falling bodies on earth: If you drop something
in a vacuum, the distance x that it falls in time t is proportional
to t squared: x = ½ gt²

Kepler's law of planetary orbits: Planets in the solar system
travel
in elliptical orbits with the sun at one focus of each ellipse.

Newton's law of gravity: A generalization that explains the laws
of Galileo and Kepler plus many related phenomena.

Einstein's general relativity: A generalization that explains
all the above plus many more phenomena.

Note that each of these laws makes true predictions within its
domain of applicability. The more general laws, which cover
a broader range of phenomena, are closer approximations to
reality -- but each one is still a law of science.

In summary, I believe that the term 'law of nature' is a metaphor
for aspects of nature that we can only describe. The ultimate
laws that science might discover in the far, far distant future
might be very accurate. But when stated, they would be signs
expressed in the same ways as other laws of science.

John



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[PEIRCE-L] Jaakko Hintikka - Memorial Issue - Logica Universalis

[jean-yves beziau]

Jaakko Hintikka Memorial
Special Issue of Logica Universalis
Edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen

Call for Papers
Any paper related to the work of Hintikka is welcome, in particular those
dealing with the following topics:
- Knowledge and Belief
- Independence-friendly logic
- Lingua Universalis vs Calculus Ratiocinator
- Game-Theoretical Semantics
- The Principles of Mathematics Revisited
- The Logic of Scientific Discovery
- Hintikka and Wittgenstein
- Hintikka and Aristotle

For more details
Have a look at
http://www.logica-universalis.org

Jean-Yves Beziau
Editor-in-Chief
Logica Universalis

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