Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[John F Sowa]

Gary F, Mary L, Kirsti, Jerry LRC, and list,

In 1911, Peirce presented his clearest and simplest version of EGs.
He explained the essentials in just 8 pages of NEM (3:162 to 169).
I believe that it is his final preferred version, and I'll use it
for explaining issues about the more complex 1903 version.

Gary

[Mary's] question about the “blot” has me thinking again about
“the two peculiar graphs” which are “the blank place which asserts
only what is already well-understood between us to be true, and
the blot which asserts something well understood to be false”


Kirsti,

instead of warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would
have been most interesting to hear how they are related. 


In his 1911 terminology, Peirce did not use the words 'spot', 'dot',
or 'blot'.  Instead, a spot is just a very short line of identity.
The line represents an existential quantifier, and there is no
reason to distinguish long lines from short lines (spots).

He used the word 'peg' instead of 'dot'.   Each relation has zero
or more pegs, to which lines of identity may be attached.

He also shaded negative areas (nested in an odd number of negations)
and left positive areas unshaded (nested in an even number, zero or
more, negations).  A blot is just a shaded area that contains
nothing but a blank.

Gary

[The blank place and the blot] are peculiar in several ways,
and each is in some sense the opposite of the other.


Each is the negation of the other.  The blank place is unshaded,
and the blot is a shaded blank.

Gary

For instance, the blank cannot be erased, but any graph can be
added to it on the sheet of assertion; while the blot can be
erased, but nothing can be added to it, because it “fills up
its area.”


One reason why the "the blank place" is "peculiar" is that Peirce
had talked about it in two different ways.  He called the sheet
of assertion the universe of discourse when it contains all the
EGs that Graphist and Grapheus agree is true.

But the blank, by itself, is true before anything is asserted.
In modern terminology, the blank is Peirce's only axiom.  Any EG
that can be proved without any other assumptions is a theorem.

In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'.  The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.

Gary, quoting Peirce

[A blot] "fills up its area."


In 1911, Peirce no longer used this metaphor.  With the rules
of 1903 or 1911, a blot or a shaded blank implies every graph.
To prove that any graph g can be proved from it:

 1. Start with a sheet of paper that contains a shaded blank.

 2. By the rule of insertion in a shaded area, insert the graph
for not-g inside the shaded area.  All the shaded areas of not-g
then become unshaded, and the unshaded areas become shaded.

 3. The resulting graph consists of g in an unshaded area that is
surrounded by a shaded ring that represents a double negation.

 4. Finally, erase the double negation to derive g.

Another important point:  In 1911, Peirce allowed any word, not
just verbs, to be the name of a relation.  From NEM, page 3.162:
Every word makes an assertion.  Thus ——man means "There is a man" 
in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to.  The dash before

"man" is the "line of identity."


This EG is Peirce's first example in 1911.  And note that he begins
with a Beta graph.  In fact, he does not even mention the distinction
between Alpha and Beta.  The same rules of inference apply to both.

For Peirce's version of 1911 with my commentary, see
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm

Jerry,

CSP’s genius [etc.] make it difficult for anyone to project his
thoughts into rarefied logical, mathematical, scientific or
philosophical atmospheres.


Yes.  He wrote volumes of insights that we still need to explore.
But you can't put words in his mouth.  If you can't find where he
stated something explicitly, you can't claim him as the source.

Note my discussion above.  Every one of my claims is based on
something that Peirce explicitly wrote.

John

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[PEIRCE-L] RE: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

[gnox]

Jon A.S.,

 

Thanks very much for posting here some of the Peirce passages which demonstrate 
that, as you put it, “"categories" and "elements" were effectively 
interchangeable for Peirce, precisely at the time of the Lowell Lectures” (and, 
I would add, afterwards, depending on Peirce’s context and audience).

 

The specifically logical usage of the term “categories” was virtually inherited 
by Peirce from Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, and logicians and metaphysicians 
could be expected to be familiar with this terminology, so it was convenient in 
that sense for Peirce to use it in his phenomenology/phaneroscopy. But it was 
also misleading, because Peirce’s “categories” were quite different from those 
of his predecessors, and I think that after 1902 especially, he increasingly 
used the term “elements” because it was less familiar in this context, and 
better suited to his phenomenology, i.e. to his way of arriving at the three 
conceptions as “indecomposable elements.” But he continued to use both; in 
Lowell 3, for instance, which is mostly about Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness, 
he referred to them 16 times as “categories” and 35 times as “elements”, 
beginning with this:

“Phenomenology is the science which describes the different kinds of elements 
that are always present in the Phenomenon, meaning by the Phenomenon whatever 
is before the mind in any kind of thought, fancy, or cognition of any kind. 
Everything that you can possibly think involves three kinds of elements.”

 

You are right that the phrase “kinds of elements” is ambiguous in a way, and 
when he refers to (for instance) Thirdness as an “element”, we could regard 
that as a mere abbreviation for “kind of element.” But he does this so often 
that “element” becomes in these texts interchangeable with “category” in their 
technical senses, as you said. Anyway, we should get back to this discussion 
when we have Lowell 3 in front of us. 

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 26-Nov-17 17:06
To: Gary Fuhrman 
Cc: Peirce List 
Subject: Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

 

Gary F., List:

 

As you may recall, I offered the hypothesis over a year ago that late in his 
life, Peirce shifted his terminology from "categories" to "universes," or 
perhaps confined "categories" to phenomenology/phaneroscopy and employed 
"universes" for metaphysics, or at least suggested that predicates/relations 
are assigned to "categories" while subjects belong to "universes."  Back then, 
Gary R. cited a passage from one of the drafts of "Pragmatism" that finally 
convinced me to abandon this conjecture, and it would seem to stand equally 
against the suggestion that Peirce definitively shifted from "categories" to 
"elements."

 

CSP:  To assert a predicate of certain subjects (taking these all in the sense 
of forms of words) means,—intends,—only to create a belief that the real things 
denoted by those subjects possess the real character or relation signified by 
that predicate. The word "real," pace the metaphysicians, whose phrases are 
sometimes empty, means, and can mean, nothing more nor less. Consequently, to 
the three forms of predicates there must correspond three conceptions of 
different categories of characters: namely, of a character which attaches to 
its subject regardless of anything else such as that of being hard, massive, or 
persistent; of a character which belongs to a thing relatively to a second 
regardless of any third, such as an act of making an effort against a 
resistance; and of a character which belongs to a thing as determining a 
relation between two others, such as that of being transparent or opaque or of 
coloring what is seen through it. Moreover, turning from the three kinds of 
predicates to their subjects, since by the "mode of being" of anything can be 
meant only the kinds of characters which it has, or is susceptible of taking, 
corresponding to the three kinds of characters, there must be three categories 
of things: first, those which are such as they are regardless of anything else, 
like the living consciousness of a given kind of feeling, say of red; secondly, 
those which are such as they are by virtue of their relation to other things, 
regardless of any third things, which is the case with the existence of all 
bodies, whose reality consists in their acting on each other, in pairs; 
thirdly, those which are such as they are by virtue of bringing two others into 
relation, as signs of all sorts are such only so far as they bring their 
significations to bear upon the objects to which they are applied. (EP 
2:427-428, 1907; bold mine)

 

That "categories" and "elements" were effectively interchangeable for Peirce, 
precisely at the time of the Lowell Lectures, is evident from the Syllabus that 
he prepared to supplement them.

 

CSP:  Phenomenology is that branch of science ... in which the author 

[PEIRCE-L] Categories vs. Elements (was Lowell Lecture 2.14)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

As you may recall, I offered the hypothesis over a year ago that late in
his life, Peirce shifted his terminology from "categories" to "universes,"
or perhaps confined "categories" to phenomenology/phaneroscopy and employed
"universes" for metaphysics, or at least suggested that
predicates/relations are assigned to "categories" while subjects belong to
"universes."  Back then, Gary R. cited a passage from one of the drafts of
"Pragmatism" that finally convinced me to abandon this conjecture, and it
would seem to stand equally against the suggestion that Peirce definitively
shifted from "categories" to "elements."

CSP:  To assert a predicate of certain subjects (taking these all in the
sense of forms of words) means,—intends,—only to create a belief that the
real things denoted by those subjects possess the real character or
relation signified by that predicate. The word "real," *pace *the
metaphysicians, whose phrases are sometimes empty, means, and can mean,
nothing more nor less. Consequently, to the three forms of predicates there
must correspond three conceptions of different *categories *of characters:
namely, of a character which attaches to its subject regardless of anything
else such as that of being hard, massive, or persistent; of a character
which belongs to a thing relatively to a second regardless of any third,
such as an act of making an effort against a resistance; and of a character
which belongs to a thing as determining a relation between two others, such
as that of being transparent or opaque or of coloring what is seen through
it. Moreover, turning from the three kinds of predicates to their subjects,
since by the "mode of being" of anything can be meant only the kinds of
characters which it has, or is susceptible of taking, corresponding to the
three kinds of characters, there must be three *categories *of things:
first, those which are such as they are regardless of anything else, like
the living consciousness of a given kind of feeling, say of red; secondly,
those which are such as they are by virtue of their relation to other
things, regardless of any third things, which is the case with the
existence of all bodies, whose reality consists in their acting on each
other, in pairs; thirdly, those which are such as they are by virtue of
bringing two others into relation, as signs of all sorts are such only so
far as they bring their significations to bear upon the objects to which
they are applied. (EP 2:427-428, 1907; bold mine)


That "categories" and "elements" were effectively *interchangeable *for
Peirce, precisely at the time of the Lowell Lectures, is evident from the
Syllabus that he prepared to supplement them.

CSP:  *Phenomenology *is that branch of science ... in which the author
seeks to make out what are the *elements*, or, if you please, the *kinds of
elements*, that are invariably present in whatever is, in any sense, in
mind. According to the present writer, these *universal categories* are
three. Since all three are invariably present, a pure idea of any one,
absolutely distinct from the others, is impossible; indeed, anything like a
satisfactorily clear discrimination of them is a work of long and active
meditation. They may be termed *Firstness*, *Secondness*, and *Thirdness *...
In the ideas of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, the three *elements*,
or *Universal Categories*, appear under their forms of Firstness ...
Phenomenology studies the *Categories *in their forms of Firstness. (EP
2:267, 272, 1903; bold mine)


The only potential distinction that I can discern here is that "elements"
might be used to refer to the *constituents *of the "categories," if the
latter are defined as "kinds of elements."  On the other hand, in between
these two writings, a version of "The Basis of Pragmaticism"--the one to
whose title the EP2 editors appended "in Phaneroscopy"--eschewed any
mention of "categories" in favor of "indecomposable elements."

CSP:  I invite the reader to join me in a little survey of the Phaneron
(which will be sufficiently identical for him and for me) in order to
discover what different forms of indecomposable *elements *it contains ...
The expression "indecomposable *element*" sounds pleonastic; but it is not
so, since I mean by it something which not only is elementary, since it
seems so, and seeming is the only being a constituent of the Phaneron has,
as such, but is moreover incapable of being separated by logical analysis
into parts, whether they be substantial, essential, relative, or any other
kind of parts ... We are to consider what *forms *are possible, rather than
what *kinds *are possible, because it is universally admitted, in all sorts
of inquiries, that the most important divisions are divisions according to
*form*, and not according to qualities of *matter*, in case division
according to form is possible at all. Indeed, this necessarily results from
the very idea of the distinction between *form *and *matter*. If we 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[gnox]

Jerry, Kirsti, list,

 

“Spot”, “dot” and “blot” are three of the many technical terms used by Peirce 
to explain his system of existential graphs. Peirce has given both visual 
examples and definitions of all three in those parts of Lowell Lecture 2 which 
I have posted to the list. If you are confused about their exact role in the EG 
system, you probably need to review Lowell 2 by studying the complete text, 
which is online at http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm . Secondary sources such as 
Roberts are also helpful, but you need to study them carefully in order to see 
how the system elucidates Peirce’s logic of relations, and perhaps set aside 
your preconceptions about the meanings of key terms.

 

“Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness” and “Thirdness” are all 
technical terms of Peircean phenomenology which also have “meanings” (i.e. 
intensions) in ordinary language. As Peirce said and wrote repeatedly, the last 
three are concepts which are extremely difficult to grasp; sometimes the 
ordinary-language meanings of terms listed above are helpful, and sometimes 
they are misleading. These concepts are pretty much unique to Peirce, so you 
have to pay close attention to Peirce’s usage of them in context if you want to 
understand what they mean. Lowell Lecture 3 is one of his most extensive and 
cogent explanations of his phenomenology, which is (from 1902 on) foundational 
to both his logic and his classification of signs. This will all be discussed 
in connection with Lowell Lecture 3, and I don’t have time now for dozens of 
examples and detailed explanations of these points, so that’s all I’ll say 
about them for now.

 

My previous commentary on 2.14 consisted mostly of direct quotations from 
Peirce and some factual observations about the sources of those quotations, 
which I identified in the post. Kirsti, it’s not clear what you are disagreeing 
with, or what exactly you think I am “mistaken” about. If you will quote my 
words that you disagree with, I’ll try to resolve the disagreement. But if you 
don’t believe that Peirce used both “categories” and “elements” as terms 
referring to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, I think you need to read the 
Peirce texts (especially the Lowells and the Syllabus texts given in EP2) and 
see for yourself. As I said, I don’t have time right now to search out and 
paste in dozens of examples to demonstrate what should be obvious from a 
careful reading of Peirce. The question of why Peirce chose the terms that he 
did is interesting, but I’ll leave that for the discussion of Lowell 3. If you 
want to get a head start on that, there’s a fairly large chunk from Lowell 3 
starting at CP 1.343.

 

And finally, my comments on the Lowell bits I’m posting are just that, comments 
— they are not meant to be a substitute for reading the actual Peirce texts, 
and probably don’t make much sense to those who haven’t read those Peirce texts.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 26-Nov-17 08:29
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

 

Gary f.,

 

Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different meaning. 
It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about terminonology. They are not 
synonyms.

 

But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names for 
classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.

 

If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.

 

Kirsti

 

  g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:

> Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in quotation 

> marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for Firstness, 

> Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898.

> In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the 

> term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for instance. I’m 

> drawing attention to the shift in terminology because I think it 

> reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly evident in 

> Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on.

> 

> As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it should 

> be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I can add 

> anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in the 

> terminology of EGs.

> 

> Gary f.

> 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry, list,

JC quoted me:

GR: I have no idea where this peculiar comment  (GF appearing "to avoid the
basic logic of CSP" and his interpretations appearing "to be remote from
other interpreters of CSP writings) might mean, nor where it is coming
from.


Then commented: JC: "H…   “… no idea”???

I had continued in the snippet JC quoted above:

GR: Can you offer support for your comments Jerry? Just a few examples
would do for us to mull over what you might have in mind.


I still have no idea what your point is, Jerry. I think when you make such
really startling comments such as Gary Fuhrman is "avoiding the *basic
logic* of Peirce" and that his interpretations are "remote from other
interpreters" of Peirce that the onus is on *you* to: 1. provide examples
where GF's interpretations 'avoid P's logic' or 2. 'are remote from other
interpreters' take on the Lowell's we'tr considering, and then 3. show us
how these intepretations 'avoid P's logic' and, as well, 4  provide
examples of other interpretations of the same (or at least equivalent)
material that 'are remote' from GF's.

You have so far not even done 1. and 2. let alone 3. and 4. Until you do
that you appear to me to be disparaging Gary's thinking with no solid
support for your opinion. What you have written doesn't--at least
yet--directly relate to Gary's interpretations.

Btw, through my involvement with the SPIN project (and discussing some of
this with NYC based Peirceans), I know Peirce scholars who would tend to
disagree with your assessment of Gary's interpretations because I've
discussed some of them with them.

So, please, offer us some passages from Gary F's interpretations with which
you disagree  (which is what I meant by "examples" in my earlier post),
interpretations which either do *not* employ Peirce's logic, or, are *not
supported* by the community of Peirce scholarship. Then give us evidence of
Gary's illogic and remoteness from other interpreters (as you see it).
There can really be no valuable discussion of your claims until you do
that, nor can Gary F be expected to respond to your alleged claims of his
misinterpretation.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 2:58 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Gary R, List:
>
> On Nov 26, 2017, at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> I have no idea where this peculiar comment  (GF appearing "to avoid the
> basic logic of CSP" and his interpretations appearing "to be remote from
> other interpreters of CSP writings) might mean, nor where it is coming from.
>
>
> H…   “… no idea”???
>
> Puzzling comment to me.
>
> I wrote, in response, not to CSP’s texts, but rather to Gary’s
> interpretations in subsequence correspondence to the questions raised by
> readers of this list.
> "While I deeply appreciate your efforts to stimulate discussions here, I
> am equally deeply concerned that your interpretations are flawed because of
> the absence of associations to the structure of logical propositions.”
> .
> This sentence is about as straight-forward as I can express myself in this
> extremely abstract domain.
> And, I provided several references to CSP and Robert’s book on Existential
> Graphs that cohere with my interpretation of the text.
>
> The essential questions that CSP is attempting to address, in my opinion,
> (see 4.438,Roberts, p. 114-115.)
> 1. What are the relationships between grammar and propositions using
> proper names?
> 2. What are the relationships between propositions and the logic of
> subject - copula - predicate with proper names?
> 3. What are the relationships between mathematical pairings (Kempe’s
> “spots”) and logical propositions with proper names?
>
> I believe that these questions are addressed in Roberts book in the pages
> cited.
>
> At this this point, I am tempted to cite Sherlock Homes, on seeking
> explanations.  "When all else fails...
>
> Is your source of drastic disconnection from CSP’s texts your views on the
> particular logics of Proper Names?
>
> Perhaps, it would be helpful for your understanding to provide a crisp
> re-cap of your logical positions on the role of Proper Names in semiotics
> and syntax and then relate your propositions to Existential Graphs and then
> relate it to the opinions of Roberts (especially on the role of Kempe’s
> logic of “spots” in relation to pairings of objects.)  [Symbolically, does
> A —> B —> C]. If A, B and C are the antecedents, are the consequences
> coherent or nonsense?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary R, List:
> On Nov 26, 2017, at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> I have no idea where this peculiar comment  (GF appearing "to avoid the basic 
> logic of CSP" and his interpretations appearing "to be remote from other 
> interpreters of CSP writings) might mean, nor where it is coming from.

H…   “… no idea”???

Puzzling comment to me.

I wrote, in response, not to CSP’s texts, but rather to Gary’s interpretations 
in subsequence correspondence to the questions raised by readers of this list. 
"While I deeply appreciate your efforts to stimulate discussions here, I am 
equally deeply concerned that your interpretations are flawed because of the 
absence of associations to the structure of logical propositions.”  
.
This sentence is about as straight-forward as I can express myself in this 
extremely abstract domain. 
And, I provided several references to CSP and Robert’s book on Existential 
Graphs that cohere with my interpretation of the text.

The essential questions that CSP is attempting to address, in my opinion, (see 
4.438,Roberts, p. 114-115.)
1. What are the relationships between grammar and propositions using proper 
names?
2. What are the relationships between propositions and the logic of subject - 
copula - predicate with proper names?
3. What are the relationships between mathematical pairings (Kempe’s “spots”) 
and logical propositions with proper names?

I believe that these questions are addressed in Roberts book in the pages cited.

At this this point, I am tempted to cite Sherlock Homes, on seeking 
explanations.  "When all else fails...

Is your source of drastic disconnection from CSP’s texts your views on the 
particular logics of Proper Names?

Perhaps, it would be helpful for your understanding to provide a crisp re-cap 
of your logical positions on the role of Proper Names in semiotics and syntax 
and then relate your propositions to Existential Graphs and then relate it to 
the opinions of Roberts (especially on the role of Kempe’s logic of “spots” in 
relation to pairings of objects.)  [Symbolically, does A —> B —> C]. If A, B 
and C are the antecedents, are the consequences coherent or nonsense?

Cheers

Jerry




 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry, List,

Gary F's comments on the Lowell Lectures he's been transcribing seem to me
to be just that: comments. Nothing definitive about them; they seem offered
as Gary's understanding of the text and meant merely to spur, hopefully,
substantive discussion (as he suggested early on). While I may not fully
agree with him in a very few details, in general I think his comments,
including these most recent ones, have been spot on.

Jerry wrote:

Your responses to the distinctions between spot, dot and blot appear to
avoid the basic logic of CSP and also appears to be remote from other
interpreters of CSP writings.


I have no idea where this peculiar comment  (GF appearing "to avoid the
basic logic of CSP" and his interpretations appearing "to be remote from
other interpreters of CSP writings) might mean, nor where it is coming
from. I see *none* of this and quite the contrary. Can you offer support
for your comments Jerry? Just a few examples would do for us to mull over
what you might have in mind.

As for Kirsti's remarks, Gary F responded:

Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in quotation
marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for Firstness, Secondness
and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898. In the Lowell Lectures
(and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the term “elements” instead, as
we’ll see in Lecture 3, for instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in
terminology because I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes
increasingly evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on.


This change in the terminology used to refer to 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns from the
1898 Lectures to the Lowells and Syllabus of 1903 is Peirce's, *not* Gary
F's. And while I will want to see where exactly he's going with this as we
approach Lowell 3 (I'm not reading ahead as I previously noted), the phrase
"*elements* of the phaneron" (emphasis added) immediately comes to mind for
how Peirce can refer to the three categories in consideration of
phenomenology.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 1:07 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Gary, Kirsti:
>
> Your responses to the distinctions between spot, dot and blot appear to
> avoid the basic logic of CSP and also appears to be remote from other
> interpreters of CSP writings.
>
> By your usage, Roberts appears to use the term “spot” ambiguously.
> (p.114-115) (CSP, 2003)
> “Let a heavy dot or dash be used in place of a noun which has been erased
> from a proposition”
> “A blank form of proposition produced by such erasures as can be filled,
> each with a proper name, to make a proposition again, is called a rhema,
> or, relatively to the proposition of which it is conceived, the predicate
> of that proposition.”
>
> I read this passage to mean that the term “spot” is used to represent
> particular nouns (proper names) in the grammar of propositions!  Within
> this context, how can one image that, as logical terms, *spot*, *dot* and
> *blot* can be substituted for one another?
>
> Gary, does CSP usage of the term “spot” in the context of this passage,
> correspond with your assertions?
> A “dot” may infer a point on a line.
> A blot may infer a particular (irregular) geometric form.
> Can you provide examples of how you would substitute the terms “element”
> and “category” in this context?
>
> While I deeply appreciate your efforts to stimulate discussions here, I am
> equally deeply concerned that your interpretations are flawed because of
> the absence of associations to the structure of logical propositions.
>
> I find Kirsti’s comments to be well poised.  Absolutely nothing is to be
> gained by avoiding CSP’s writings as a whole.
>
> Can anyone provide resolutions to these conundrums?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
> On Nov 26, 2017, at 7:29 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
>
> Gary f.,
>
> Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different
> meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about terminonology.
> They are not synonyms.
>
> But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names for
> classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.
>
> If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.
>
> Kirsti
>
> g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:
>
> Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in
> quotation marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for  Firstness,
> Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898.
> In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the
> term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for
> instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because
> I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly
> evident in Peirce’s 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gary, Kirsti:

Your responses to the distinctions between spot, dot and blot appear to avoid 
the basic logic of CSP and also appears to be remote from other interpreters of 
CSP writings.

By your usage, Roberts appears to use the term “spot” ambiguously. (p.114-115) 
(CSP, 2003)
“Let a heavy dot or dash be used in place of a noun which has been erased from 
a proposition”
“A blank form of proposition produced by such erasures as can be filled, each 
with a proper name, to make a proposition again, is called a rhema, or, 
relatively to the proposition of which it is conceived, the predicate of that 
proposition.”

I read this passage to mean that the term “spot” is used to represent 
particular nouns (proper names) in the grammar of propositions!  Within this 
context, how can one image that, as logical terms, spot, dot and blot can be 
substituted for one another?

Gary, does CSP usage of the term “spot” in the context of this passage, 
correspond with your assertions?
A “dot” may infer a point on a line.
A blot may infer a particular (irregular) geometric form.
Can you provide examples of how you would substitute the terms “element” and 
“category” in this context?

While I deeply appreciate your efforts to stimulate discussions here, I am 
equally deeply concerned that your interpretations are flawed because of the 
absence of associations to the structure of logical propositions. 

I find Kirsti’s comments to be well poised.  Absolutely nothing is to be gained 
by avoiding CSP’s writings as a whole. 

Can anyone provide resolutions to these conundrums?

Cheers

Jerry



> On Nov 26, 2017, at 7:29 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Gary f.,
> 
> Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different 
> meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about terminonology. 
> They are not synonyms.
> 
> But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names for 
> classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.
> 
> If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.
> 
> Kirsti
> 
> g...@gnusystems.ca  kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:
>> Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in
>> quotation marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for  Firstness, 
>> Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898.
>> In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the
>> term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for
>> instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because
>> I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly
>> evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on.
>> As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it
>> should be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I
>> can add anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in
>> the terminology of EGs.
>> Gary f.
>> -Original Message-
>> From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
>> Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38
>> To: g...@gnusystems.ca
>> Cc: 'Peirce List' 
>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14
>> Gary f.,
>> I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his
>> "categories"??? Insted of... his categories???
>> Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it
>> would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is
>> all about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?
>> Not about just classification.
>> Kirsti
>> g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:
>>> List, Mary,
>>> Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with
>>> either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth
>>> comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898
>>> (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before
>>> Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness,
>>> Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more
>>> specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained
>> "by
>>> means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the
>>> unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll
>>> include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:
>>> Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity
>>> attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion,
>> I
>>> call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached
>>> to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs
>> according
>>> to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads,
>>> triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete
>> assertion,
>>> like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb,
>>> needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as
>>> --obeys mamma
>>> you obey--
>>> A _dyad_, or simple active 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[kirstima]

Gary f.,

Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different 
meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about 
terminonology. They are not synonyms.


But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names 
for classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.


If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:

Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in
quotation marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for  
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898.

In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the
term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for
instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because
I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly
evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on.

As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it
should be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I
can add anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in
the terminology of EGs.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

Gary f.,

I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his
"categories"??? Insted of... his categories???

Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it
would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is
all about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?

Not about just classification.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:


List, Mary,







Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with



either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth



comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898



(RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before



Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness,




Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more



specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained

"by


means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the



unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll



include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:







Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity



attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion,

I


call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached




to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs

according


to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads,



triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete

assertion,


like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb,



needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as







--obeys mamma



you obey--







A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete




the assertion as







—OBEYS—



or —IS IDENTICAL WITH—







A _triad_ needs just three subjects as







--gives--to--



--obeys both--and--







The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology:

what


Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or

"predicate"


in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the

semiotic


trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus,

EP2:292


or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here



represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy

dot"


in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate"



of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces



well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph,

and


the interpreter of it."







The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT



155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to




the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold

in


the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of




identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the



line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which



would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb,



though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with,"

its


subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of

the


"spots."







In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very




different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety.



Among these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends

of


the line of identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as