Re: Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[John F Sowa]

Jerry,

Your discussion and references about chirality are convincing.
But they go beyond issues that Peirce would have known in his day.
I think that he was using issues about chirality as examples
for making a stronger claim:

For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends with 
a discussion of chirality and the laws of motion (Right—handed and 
Left-handed  screws)


“There, then, is a physical phenomenon absolute inexplicable by 
mechanical action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the 
corpuscular philosophy.”


By the end of the 19th century, the general consensus in physics
was that all the major problems had been solved.  But the first
decade of the 20th c. shattered their complacency.

If Peirce had access to a university library with the latest
journals, he might have found stronger arguments to "overthrow
the corpuscular philosophy."

John

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Chirality (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:

The issue of chirality is a critical issue in scientific philosophy.  The logic 
of chirality is vastly more perplex than the simple logic of mathematics or 
physics because it is necessary to invoke the logic of multiple scientific 
symbol systems in a coherent manner such that the predicates of the entity are 
coherent in all the relevant systems of logic. CSP recognized this. (EP2:159)

Your brief geometric explanation was “spot on” from the mathematical 
perspective of space and motion.
For a book-length inquiry into the relationship between mathematical graph 
theory of knots and chirality, see: 
“When Topology Meets Chemistry” CUP, Flapan, 2000. (Minor technical errors, but 
very sound over all.)

But, chemical chirality, in CSP’s lifespan, was defined in terms of Pasteur’s 
(1822-1895) separation of two crystalline forms of tartaric acid (from wine 
residues.) The sole difference between the two forms of the tartaric acid were 
two geometric forms, VISIBLE to the naked eye and the rotation of polarized 
light.  The two forms were identical in all other aspects; in chemical 
composition (carbon, hydrogen and oxygen), molecular weight, chemical 
reactivity and chemical reaction product and in physical attribute, melting 
point, etc. 

In the 1870’s, Van’t Hoff and LaBell, proved that this was only possible if the 
central carbon atoms organized the four substituents in a form of a 
tetrahedron. This requires that the four substituents must be separate and 
distinct from each other.  If the four substituents are non-identical to each 
other, then, if one observes the order FROM ANY of the FOUR corners of the 
tetrahedron, then the arrangements of the other three will be either a 
clock-wise or counterclockwise in the two crystal forms AND will rotate plane 
polarized light in OPPOSITE directions. 

The BIG question to CSP was how was this possible? He deemed it critical for 
scientific philosophy of matter.
For example, in his lecture on phenomenology, (EP2, 159), ends with a 
discussion of chirality and the laws of motion (Right—handed and Left-handed  
screws)
  “There, then, is a physical phenomena absolute inexplicable by mechanical 
action. This single instance suffices to overthrow the corpuscular philosophy.”

Thus, I think the notion of chirality was a significant factor in his mistaken 
beliefs about the Boscowitz hypothesis.

I would note two further facts that are important in assessing the scientific 
importance of chirality.

1. Virtually all biological molecules are chiral because virtually all the 
chemical building blocks fro constructing the anatomy of living beings are 
chiral. 
2. Even the induced “taste” of chiral molecules differ.

We can compare the mathematical perspective of chirality with the chemical 
perspective of chirality, because of the difference between geometric logic and 
chemical logic, very roughly speaking:

1. The scaling of circles is not a possible logical action on atoms or 
molecules, that is, atoms and molecules are not scalable in the mathematical 
sense of topology.
2. The logical origin of chemical chirality is not the direction of motion of a 
point on the circle, but, roughly speaking, the order of substitution of 
structurally distinct radicals on a points of a tetrahedron, all bonded to a 
central ligand.  

Finally, I would note that the entire collection of facts about chemical 
isomers (see Jeff D. post) illustrate the deep mathematical distinctions 
between the meaning of chemical and physical symbols.


Cheers
jerry

BTW, see the book by the nobel laureate, R. Hoffmann for a deeper look on the 
meaning of “isomers”.
The Same and Not the Same



> On Dec 19, 2017, at 12:43 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> On 12/17/2017 3:24 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
>> Now, do you think that there is chirality also in other contexts than 
>> molecules, e.g. in signs?
> 
> To illustrate that issue, consider the analogs in 2 dimensions
> and 3 dimensions.
> 
> For example, any circle on a plane can be made congruent with any
> other circle by two transformation:  movement and size.
> 
> Given two circles A and B, move A to B so that the center point
> of A coincides with the center point of B.  Then enlarge or contract
> the radius of A until its circumference coincides with B.
> 
> But if you put an arrowhead on A that points clockwise and
> an arrowhead on B that points counterclockwise, there is no
> way to make A and B congruent by those two transformations:
> the arrows will always point in opposite directions.
> 
> However, if you're allowed to move A out of the plane into
> 3-D space, you can flip it over, put it back on the plane,
> and make it congruent with both the circle and arrow of B.
> 
> The same issue holds for chiral pairs in 3-D space:  there is
> no transformation by movement and size that can make your left
> and right hands coincide.  But if you could move out of 3-D
> space into 4-D space, it would be possible to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



A human being may well ask the animal:

‘Why do you not speak to me of your happiness but only stand and gaze at
me.’



The animal would like to answer, and say:

‘The reason is I always forget what I was going to say’—

but then he forgot this answer too, and stayed silent.



It is long ago that I experienced the reasons for mine opinions.  Should I
not have to be a cask of memory, if I also wanted to have my reasons with
me?



To make them as distinct as it is in their nature to be is, however, no
small task.



*From CP 5.402 to CP 5.189*



With best wishes,

Jerry Rhee

On Tue, Dec 19, 2017 at 12:44 PM,  wrote:

> Jeff, list,
>
>
>
> That’s an interesting question — for my part, I don’t see that Peirce's 
> explanations
> of the alpha or beta parts of EG in the Lowell Lectures tell us much about
> what’s necessary “to arrive at conclusions about what is *observable*
> under different kinds of possible tests.” But maybe we’ll learn something
> about that from the gamma graphs. Or John may have something to say about
> this.
>
>
>
> When you say that those elements of experience are universal and necessary
> “with respect to the requirements that cognitive agents must meet in order
> to improve their understanding of the world by testing explanations against
> observations,” that strikes me as a corollary to the proposition that those
> elements are universal and necessary *for cognition*. In *Turning Signs*
> I argue that the inquiry cycle which is finely articulated in scientific
> method is already present in a less articulated form in even the most
> primitive forms of cognition. I take this to be the Peircean view, and I
> also quote Karl Popper, who sees the essence of scientific method as “trial
> and error” (or to use the bigger words, “hypothesis and refutation.” Popper
> says “The method of trial and error is applied not only by Einstein but, in
> a more dogmatic fashion, by the amoeba also” (Popper 1968, 68). Any such
> “method” is inconceivable without Thirdness, which necessarily involves
> Secondness, which necessarily involves Firstness.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu]
> *Sent:* 18-Dec-17 20:59
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6
>
>
>
> Gary F, John S, List,
>
>
>
> The passage cited earlier from the Carnegie application helps to clarify
> what is unique about Peirce's phenomenological account of the elements of
> experience.
>
>
>
> In May 1867 I presented to the Academy in Boston a paper of ten pages, or
> about 4000 words, upon a *New List of Categories*. It was the result of
> full two years' intense and incessant application. It surprises me today
> that in so short a time I could produce a statement of that sort so nearly
> accurate, especially when I look back at my notebooks and find by what an
> unnecessarily difficult route I reached my goal. For this list of
> categories differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel in
> attempting much more than they. They merely took conceptions which they
> found at hand, already worked out. Their labor was limited to selecting the
> conceptions, slightly developing some of them, arranging them, and in
> Hegel's case, separating one or two that had been confused with others. But
> what I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of
> whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds, and by examining it to
> form clear conceptions of its radically different classes of elements,
> without relying upon any previous philosophizing, at all. This was the most
> difficult task I ever ventured to undertake. [Carnegie application (1902)]
>
>
>
> In what ways does the account of the formal elements of firstness,
> secondness and thirdness "attempt much more" than is provided in the lists
> and tables of categories developed by Aristotle, Kant and Hegel? My
> understanding is that it attempts much more because it is meant to be an
> account of the *formal* elements in any possible experience that are, in
> some sense, *universal* and *necessary*?
>
>
>
> Let us ask:  in what senses are the elemental relations of what is
> monadic, dyadic or triadic in experience universal and necessary? My
> interpretative hypothesis is that they are not taken to be universal and
> necessary in themselves (i.e., simpliciter). Rather, they are universal and
> necessary elements of experience with respect to the requirements that
> cognitive agents must meet in order to improve their understanding of the
> world by testing explanations against observations.
>
>
>
> As such, the idea is that Peirce is asking a question that Aristotle, Kant
> and Hegel failed to adequately answer, which is:  what are the formal
> elements in experience that are necessary for (a) drawing on observations
> of surprising phenomena for the sake of formulating explanatory hypotheses
> by abduction, (b) deducing the testable 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[gnox]

Jeff, list,

 

That's an interesting question - for my part, I don't see that Peirce's
explanations of the alpha or beta parts of EG in the Lowell Lectures tell us
much about what's necessary "to arrive at conclusions about what is
observable under different kinds of possible tests." But maybe we'll learn
something about that from the gamma graphs. Or John may have something to
say about this.

 

When you say that those elements of experience are universal and necessary
"with respect to the requirements that cognitive agents must meet in order
to improve their understanding of the world by testing explanations against
observations," that strikes me as a corollary to the proposition that those
elements are universal and necessary for cognition. In Turning Signs I argue
that the inquiry cycle which is finely articulated in scientific method is
already present in a less articulated form in even the most primitive forms
of cognition. I take this to be the Peircean view, and I also quote Karl
Popper, who sees the essence of scientific method as "trial and error" (or
to use the bigger words, "hypothesis and refutation." Popper says "The
method of trial and error is applied not only by Einstein but, in a more
dogmatic fashion, by the amoeba also" (Popper 1968, 68). Any such "method"
is inconceivable without Thirdness, which necessarily involves Secondness,
which necessarily involves Firstness.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 18-Dec-17 20:59
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

 

Gary F, John S, List,

 

The passage cited earlier from the Carnegie application helps to clarify
what is unique about Peirce's phenomenological account of the elements of
experience.

 

In May 1867 I presented to the Academy in Boston a paper of ten pages, or
about 4000 words, upon a New List of Categories. It was the result of full
two years' intense and incessant application. It surprises me today that in
so short a time I could produce a statement of that sort so nearly accurate,
especially when I look back at my notebooks and find by what an
unnecessarily difficult route I reached my goal. For this list of categories
differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel in attempting much more
than they. They merely took conceptions which they found at hand, already
worked out. Their labor was limited to selecting the conceptions, slightly
developing some of them, arranging them, and in Hegel's case, separating one
or two that had been confused with others. But what I undertook to do was to
go back to experience, in the sense of whatever we find to have been forced
upon our minds, and by examining it to form clear conceptions of its
radically different classes of elements, without relying upon any previous
philosophizing, at all. This was the most difficult task I ever ventured to
undertake. [Carnegie application (1902)]

 

In what ways does the account of the formal elements of firstness,
secondness and thirdness "attempt much more" than is provided in the lists
and tables of categories developed by Aristotle, Kant and Hegel? My
understanding is that it attempts much more because it is meant to be an
account of the formal elements in any possible experience that are, in some
sense, universal and necessary?

 

Let us ask:  in what senses are the elemental relations of what is monadic,
dyadic or triadic in experience universal and necessary? My interpretative
hypothesis is that they are not taken to be universal and necessary in
themselves (i.e., simpliciter). Rather, they are universal and necessary
elements of experience with respect to the requirements that cognitive
agents must meet in order to improve their understanding of the world by
testing explanations against observations.

 

As such, the idea is that Peirce is asking a question that Aristotle, Kant
and Hegel failed to adequately answer, which is:  what are the formal
elements in experience that are necessary for (a) drawing on observations of
surprising phenomena for the sake of formulating explanatory hypotheses by
abduction, (b) deducing the testable consequences of what might possibly be
observed if a given hypothesis were to be true and (c), inducing from given
observations what explanations tend to be confirmed or disconfirmed by the
data.

 

In abduction and induction, the observations that are actually made supply
us with the premisses of the arguments. In making deductions of the testable
consequences from purported hypotheses, we are asking what we would expect
to observable given an explanation as a supposition. If this interpretative
hypothesis is on the right track, then Peirce is arguing that the formal
elements of firstness, secondness and thirdness that are universally part of
any possible experience are necessary for the purpose of drawing valid
inferences by abduction or induction from such observations--or for deducing
the consequences of what could be observed 

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.4

[John F Sowa]

On 12/17/2017 3:24 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:
Now, do you think that there is chirality also in other contexts 
than molecules, e.g. in signs?


To illustrate that issue, consider the analogs in 2 dimensions
and 3 dimensions.

For example, any circle on a plane can be made congruent with any
other circle by two transformation:  movement and size.

Given two circles A and B, move A to B so that the center point
of A coincides with the center point of B.  Then enlarge or contract
the radius of A until its circumference coincides with B.

But if you put an arrowhead on A that points clockwise and
an arrowhead on B that points counterclockwise, there is no
way to make A and B congruent by those two transformations:
the arrows will always point in opposite directions.

However, if you're allowed to move A out of the plane into
3-D space, you can flip it over, put it back on the plane,
and make it congruent with both the circle and arrow of B.

The same issue holds for chiral pairs in 3-D space:  there is
no transformation by movement and size that can make your left
and right hands coincide.  But if you could move out of 3-D
space into 4-D space, it would be possible to "flip" your left
hand to give yourself two right hands.  (But don't do that.
It would have bad effects on the rest of your body.)

To generalize:  In a space of any number of dimensions,
the operations of movement and size can be specified by a
dyadic relation of A to B.  But the operation of "flipping"
requires some space (a Third) that cannot be specified within
the original space.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Dec 18, 2017, at 7:58 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> For this list of categories differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and 
> Hegel in attempting much more than they. They merely took conceptions which 
> they found at hand, already worked out. Their labor was limited to selecting 
> the conceptions, slightly developing some of them, arranging them, and in 
> Hegel's case, separating one or two that had been confused with others. But 
> what I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of whatever 
> we find to have been forced upon our minds, and by examining it to form clear 
> conceptions of its radically different classes of elements, without relying 
> upon any previous philosophizing, at all. . [Carnegie application (1902)]

Jerry R responded: 
"Dear list,

"For this list of categories differs from the lists of Aristotle, Kant, and 
Hegel in attempting much more than they."

It may be incumbent on our part to ask whether Peirce was lying, and why it is 
obviously so."  


Firstly, this extremely broad assertion is puzzling to me.  Its philosophical 
content is obscure if one attempts to compare the earlier categories of 
Aristotle, Kant and Hegel on a term by term basis.  
Since, philosophically, I believe that one only forms categories with a 
specific purpose in mind, is CSP merely asserting that he has a different 
purpose in mind? 

 Can anyone show how CSP’s categories differ in the sense of “attempting much 
more than they?”

The assertion, 
"and by examining it to form clear conceptions of its radically different 
classes of elements, without relying upon any previous philosophizing, at all."

appears to place an extreme constraint on the conceptual meaning of the term 
“philosophizing”.
After all, many many philosophers, great and small, have offered concrete lists 
of categories, usually embracing a good bit of metaphysics in the process.

What justifies CSP's extreme constraint, especially is view of the huge role of 
personal philosophy in defining categories?

Cheers
Jerry






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