Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[John F Sowa]

On 1/21/2018 3:52 PM, Stephen C. Rose wrote:

Is Peirce's anti-psychologism really putting down the brain as
a source  of conscious thinking?


No, not at all.

In the 19th century, some philosophers claimed that the validity
of logic depended on human psychology.   But the mainstream of
logic from Aristotle to the present has been very clear:  a valid
proof must be based on rules of inference that preserve truth.

That was Aristotle's criterion for determining which patterns
of syllogisms are valid.  It was and still is the criterion
for valid rules of inference by every major logician, including
Peirce.

Sometimes an informal method may be quicker at reaching
a conclusion that has a high probability of being true.

When you're being chased by an alligator, you might not have
time for a formal proof.  So you run, without being certain
whether it's the right direction.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Stephen C. Rose]

Is Peirce's anti-psychologism really putting down the brain as a source of
conscious thinking? I thought he was simply flagging the limits of
psychology as a basis for explaining things. Not a big deal but I do think
the brain or whatever we take to be our inner thinking mechanism is quite a
precious piece of work and that we can combat psychologist just the same.
We can question Cartesianism without throwing out thinking.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Sun, Jan 21, 2018 at 9:46 AM,  wrote:

> John,
>
>
>
> Yes, there are plenty of “earlier thoughts along those lines” of a
> semiotic generalized beyond the human experience of signs. In fact they are
> “as plenty as blackberries,” if you read Peirce chronologically looking for
> them. His anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently maintained
> from the 1860s on, is essentially a refusal to limit the application of
> logical principles to what goes on in *human* minds or brains. But his
> logic/semiotic was always generalized *from* the human experience of sign
> use, as he says in CP 1.540. And necessarily so, because “experience is our
> only teacher” and we humans can only learn from *our* experience.
>
>
>
> I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here, *unless *it’s the
> change in usage of the word “sign” which occurred *after *1903. The
> *terminological* change was that Peirce gave up using the term “sign” in
> a way that limited it to the human realm. In Lowell 3.13 he distinguished
> between “sign” and “representamen”; after 1905 the distinction disappears
> and “sign” means the same thing as “representamen.” But that change was
> *only* terminological, in my view; there was no change in the *object* to
> which Peirce used those words to direct our attention. So I don’t see what
> it is that you think needs more explanation.
>
>
>
> By the way, this is one of the areas where the unPeircean use of the word
> “sign” to refer to a triadic relation (rather than a *subject* of a
> triadic relation) tends to cause confusion. Peirce’s 1903 distinction
> between “sign” and “representamen” was *not* a distinction between the
> whole triadic relation and one component of it. *This* terminological
> issue is perfectly clear if you read what Peirce actually wrote instead of
> someone else’s revised version of semiotics — and if it’s *Peircean*
> semiotics that you’re trying to understand.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: 20-Jan-18 23:11
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
>
>
>
> On 1/20/2018 4:54 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>
> > What change in terminology are you referring to?
>
>
>
> I was thinking about the following point:
>
>
>
> Gary F
>
> > Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign”
>
> > which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures
>
> > may represent his first clear move in that direction.
>
>
>
> I was asking about signs "not limited to human use".
>
>
>
> If the Lowell lectures show the "first clear move", are there earlier
> unclear moves?  Hints?  Suggestions?  Musements?
>
>
>
> The clearest MSS were the most likely to be selected for publication in CP
> and EP.  But there may be fragmentary MSS with passages that are crossed
> out.  Perhaps he had earlier thoughts along those lines, but he didn't have
> a "sop for Cerberus".
>
>
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list - this is far too convoluted for me to reply to very
easily. I'll try to make a few comments.

1] My view of Peircean semiosis is that nothing exists except within
a triadic infrastructure. So, there is no such thing as a separate
isolate Dynamic Object. There are external objects - outside of your
or my interaction - but - they exist because they are in semiosic
interaction with other semiosic objects. So, that tree several miles
away from me is certainly beyond my personal interaction - but - it's
in a semiosic interaction with other trees, with the soil, the air,
insects and so on. And thus, all of them are changing slightly
because of these interactions. 

2] It is not, in my view, that an Object is 'in Secondness'. These
modes refer to Relations. So, let's say that I am actually touching
that tree; my semiosic interaction would be triadic. The Relation
between my knowledge base [Representamen] and the external Dynamic
Object could be an interaction, a relation, of Secondness and also,
Secondness-as-Firstness. My Immediate Object is strictly internal to
my semiosic experience.

Then, my Representamen might be in a Relational mode of Thirdness -
providing me with the experience to Interpret that sensation of 2-1
as 'A Tree'..and I might articulate this within the Dynamic
Interpretant as such...

3] I don't get your 2.2.1 or 2.2.2. These are triads, i.e.,
semiosic. ..and need more explanation.

Edwina
 On Sun 21/01/18  1:13 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, List, I agree that the object changes, and that a sign not
just replicates it, but also further constructs it, at least the
immediate object, and the part of the dynamical one that is concept.
The material part of the dynamical object may, but does not have to
change due to the sign, or maybe much later (if you e.g. talk about a
star which is light years away). My proposal is: If (just if) object
is 2ns, then the immediate object is 2.1., the dynamical is 2.2., the
conceptual part of the dynamical object is 2.2.1., and the
material/energetic part of it is 2.2.2. So I see, that it it is
problematic to e.g. say that an astronomer´s sign functionally
consists of e.g. the andromeda galaxy too, that would be a quite
ample definition of functional composition, a non-interactive one.
Best, Helmut 21. Januar 2018 um 00:30 Uhr
 Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign,
is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen
[transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s]. 

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists
alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say,
'consist of itself and other things too'. 

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of
the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would
deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign
simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than
transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its
own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a
mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is
that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms
and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant. 

Edwina
 On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Gary, List, I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is
possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And,
because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally)
consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole
interpretant, not only the immediate ones. 1ns: Composition from
traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition. Best,
Helmut 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
 Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
John, you wrote, 

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection
and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about
these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing
his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]] 

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
quotations”? 
The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using
“representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2)
using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term
“representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift
that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s
the “brief quotatio

Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 
 


Suppsupplement: Or just define "same" as not the same as identical, like tomorrow I will be the same person as today, but will not be identical.
 

Supplement: If it is ok. to call the mattergetic part of the dynamical object the "subject", then I would (unhumbly I´m afraid) replace Peirces saying that the next sign in a semiosis has the same object with saying that it has a new object containing the same subject.




Edwina, List,

I agree that the object changes, and that a sign not just replicates it, but also further constructs it, at least the immediate object, and the part of the dynamical one that is concept. The material part of the dynamical object may, but does not have to change due to the sign, or maybe much later (if you e.g. talk about a star which is light years away). My proposal is: If (just if) object is 2ns, then the immediate object is 2.1., the dynamical is 2.2., the conceptual part of the dynamical object is 2.2.1., and the material/energetic part of it is 2.2.2.

So I see, that it it is problematic to e.g. say that an astronomer´s sign functionally consists of e.g. the andromeda galaxy too, that would be a quite ample definition of functional composition, a non-interactive one.

Best,

Helmut

 

 21. Januar 2018 um 00:30 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself and other things too'.

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant.

Edwina

 

On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition.

Best, Helmut

 

 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”?

 

The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here it is again :

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought.  ] SS p.193 ]

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,

 

Edwina

> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex

> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro

> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.

 

Yes.  I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her career to studying bacteria:  “The growth, reproduct

Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: If it is ok. to call the mattergetic part of the dynamical object the "subject", then I would (unhumbly I´m afraid) replace Peirces saying that the next sign in a semiosis has the same object with saying that it has a new object containing the same subject.




Edwina, List,

I agree that the object changes, and that a sign not just replicates it, but also further constructs it, at least the immediate object, and the part of the dynamical one that is concept. The material part of the dynamical object may, but does not have to change due to the sign, or maybe much later (if you e.g. talk about a star which is light years away). My proposal is: If (just if) object is 2ns, then the immediate object is 2.1., the dynamical is 2.2., the conceptual part of the dynamical object is 2.2.1., and the material/energetic part of it is 2.2.2.

So I see, that it it is problematic to e.g. say that an astronomer´s sign functionally consists of e.g. the andromeda galaxy too, that would be a quite ample definition of functional composition, a non-interactive one.

Best,

Helmut

 

 21. Januar 2018 um 00:30 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself and other things too'.

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant.

Edwina

 

On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition.

Best, Helmut

 

 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”?

 

The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here it is again :

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought.  ] SS p.193 ]

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,

 

Edwina

> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex

> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro

> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.

 

Yes.  I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her career to studying bacteria:  “The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria”

lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our sensitivities and sti

Aw: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

I agree that the object changes, and that a sign not just replicates it, but also further constructs it, at least the immediate object, and the part of the dynamical one that is concept. The material part of the dynamical object may, but does not have to change due to the sign, or maybe much later (if you e.g. talk about a star which is light years away). My proposal is: If (just if) object is 2ns, then the immediate object is 2.1., the dynamical is 2.2., the conceptual part of the dynamical object is 2.2.1., and the material/energetic part of it is 2.2.2.

So I see, that it it is problematic to e.g. say that an astronomer´s sign functionally consists of e.g. the andromeda galaxy too, that would be a quite ample definition of functional composition, a non-interactive one.

Best,

Helmut

 

 21. Januar 2018 um 00:30 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign, is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen [transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say, 'consist of itself and other things too'.

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant.

Edwina

 

On Sat 20/01/18 5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition.

Best, Helmut

 

 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”?

 

The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here it is again :

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought.  ] SS p.193 ]

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,

 

Edwina

> I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex

> or larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro

> bacterium to the plant world to the animal world.

 

Yes.  I like to quote the biologist Lynn Margulis, who devoted her career to studying bacteria:  “The growth, reproduction, and communication of these moving, alliance-forming bacteria”

lie on a continuum “with our thought, with our happiness, our sensitivities and stimulations.”

https://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/n-Ch.7.html

 

Gary R

> Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing the

> thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on

> this.

 

Following is the article I presented at 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John,list

I think the evidence for Peirce considering that semiosis is
operative in all realms - the physical-chemical, the biological and
the human conceptual, is in his many references to 'Mind as Matter'
[6.277]; that matter is 'effete Mind' 6.25; 6.158 and that
'protoplasm feels and has Mind [6.251]. 

And of course, that 4.551 assertion that 'thought is not necessarily
connected with a brain but appears in the work of bees, of crystals
and throughout the purely physical world'.

His outline of the role of chance and spontaneity inthe emergence of
novel forms of matter in his discussion of evolution; and his outline
of cosmology - again, both show the actions of semiosis in Mind
-as-Matter.

His rejection of consciousness as necessary in this semiosis
[7.364,5]

Even the notion of the semiosic process as 'transformation' 4.572

I see his semiosis as an active formative process - of Mind forming
as Matter. I don't see Peircean semiosis as confined to the human
intellect, to the rhetorical interpretation of 'things-to-words or
concepts so to speak..

--

Just one other comment. I think that we have to be careful on this
list [and I am NOT referring to you, John] that we do not set
ourselves up as gatekeepers to Peirce. One or two people on this list
seem to think that way - i.e.,I've been told several times that my
views are 'UnPeircean'.  My response is that we are all equal; I, for
example, am as smart and as dumb as any other person. I don't think
that anyone can tell another person that their views are 'unPeircean'
or are 'not Peirce' because none of us are the Authoritative
Gatekeepers of What is Peirce.  All one can say is: 'I disagree with
your view'.and outline your own view. That's it.



Edwina
 On Sun 21/01/18 12:23 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 On 1/21/2018 9:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca [1] wrote: 
 > His anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently
maintained  
 > from the 1860s on, is essentially a refusal to limit the
application of  
 > logical principles to what goes on in /human/ minds or brains. 
 But advocating anti-psychologism is independent of advocating 
 biosemiotics.  In discussing logic, he was emphasizing the point 
 that the definitions are purely formal.  They are independent 
 of any limitation to biological processes. 
 > But his logic/semiotic was always generalized from the human 
 > experience of sign use, as he says in CP 1.540. And necessarily
so, 
 > because “experience is our only teacher”  
 In CP 1.540, he was also talking about math and logic.  The fact 
 that he generalized his definition from human use does not imply 
 any limitation to just human use.  Such an assumption would 
 "block the way of inquiry". 
 > I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here, unless
it’s the 
 > change in usage of the word “sign” which occurred after 1903.
The 
 > terminological change was that Peirce gave up using the term
“sign” 
 > in a way that limited it to the human realm. 
 What I'd like to know is when Peirce generalized his views about 
 semiosis to animals.  I'll restate the question:  How and when did 
 Peirce's thoughts on biosemiosis (as implied by his MSS) develop? 
 In 1887, he published an article about logical machines.  Among 
 other things, he cited Jacquard looms (early 1800s) and Babbage's 
 machines.  Ada Lovelace wrote her memoirs about programming them 
 in 1843.  If machines could use signs, there would be no logical 
 objection to claiming that animals could use signs. 
 He talked about the use of signs by any "scientific intelligence" 
 -- for which the only criterion is the ability to learn from 
 experience.  His anecdotes about dogs and parrots showed how they 
 learn from experience.  He also mentioned other kinds of animals 
 in various writings.  His principle of continuity and his knowledge 
 of Darwin's studies (1859) would lead him to extend at least some 
 subset of semiosis to animals. 
 He must have been thinking about generalizing semiosis long 
 before 1903.  Where can we find the evidence? 
 John 


Links:
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[John F Sowa]

On 1/21/2018 9:46 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
His anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently maintained 
from the 1860s on, is essentially a refusal to limit the application of 
logical principles to what goes on in /human/ minds or brains.


But advocating anti-psychologism is independent of advocating
biosemiotics.  In discussing logic, he was emphasizing the point
that the definitions are purely formal.  They are independent
of any limitation to biological processes.


But his logic/semiotic was always generalized from the human
experience of sign use, as he says in CP 1.540. And necessarily so,
because “experience is our only teacher” 


In CP 1.540, he was also talking about math and logic.  The fact
that he generalized his definition from human use does not imply
any limitation to just human use.  Such an assumption would
"block the way of inquiry".


I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here, unless it’s the
change in usage of the word “sign” which occurred after 1903. The
terminological change was that Peirce gave up using the term “sign”
in a way that limited it to the human realm.


What I'd like to know is when Peirce generalized his views about
semiosis to animals.  I'll restate the question:  How and when did
Peirce's thoughts on biosemiosis (as implied by his MSS) develop?

In 1887, he published an article about logical machines.  Among
other things, he cited Jacquard looms (early 1800s) and Babbage's
machines.  Ada Lovelace wrote her memoirs about programming them
in 1843.  If machines could use signs, there would be no logical
objection to claiming that animals could use signs.

He talked about the use of signs by any "scientific intelligence"
-- for which the only criterion is the ability to learn from
experience.  His anecdotes about dogs and parrots showed how they
learn from experience.  He also mentioned other kinds of animals
in various writings.  His principle of continuity and his knowledge
of Darwin's studies (1859) would lead him to extend at least some
subset of semiosis to animals.

He must have been thinking about generalizing semiosis long
before 1903.  Where can we find the evidence?

John

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Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list:

Exactly - it's Peircean semiotics that we are focused on. And that
remains - a triadic process - something that can disappear when one
focuses only on the individual terminology. The key to Peircean
semiosis is that the triad is ONE 'complete' action of three subsets
or relations or correlates or whatever terms one uses [and Peirce
used both correlate and relation]and what is important, in my
view, is considering what that WHOLE process does.

I suspect, moreover, that you, Gary F., think of a function only as
an equation of two terms, i.e., where x=y. But a function has three
terms, of f(x)=y - and that's NOT a representational interaction but
a transformative interaction.

For example, you can get a number of hydrogen and oxygen atoms
lurking  around [X or Dynamic Objects]..and the Function
[f/representamen] will say: "According to my Rules of Chemical
Organization, you objects will be transformed into
Y/Interpretant..Water Molecules.

And...I hear some bird sounds [X/Dynamic Object]. According to
F/Representamen or my Knowledge BaseI transform these sounds to
be: Y/Interpretant/Robins.

then..I take the Y/Interpretant of Robin...and it becomes X/Dynamic
Object.

According to F/Representamen/my Knowledge Baseit is transformed
to a new Interpretant/Y...to mean 'It's Spring!'

[That's wishful thinking, I know].

Edwina
 On Sun 21/01/18  9:46 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
John,
Yes, there are plenty of “earlier thoughts along those lines” of
a semiotic generalized beyond the human experience of signs. In fact
they are “as plenty as blackberries,” if you read Peirce
chronologically looking for them. His anti-psychologism, for example,
which he consistently maintained from the 1860s on, is essentially a
refusal to limit the application of logical principles to what goes
on in  human minds or brains. But his logic/semiotic was always
generalized from the human experience of sign use, as he says in CP
1.540. And necessarily so, because “experience is our only
teacher” and we humans can only learn from our experience.
I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here,  unless
it’s the change in usage of the word “sign” which occurred
after 1903. The terminological change was that Peirce gave up using
the term “sign” in a way that limited it to the human realm. In
Lowell 3.13 he distinguished between “sign” and
“representamen”; after 1905 the distinction disappears and
“sign” means the same thing as “representamen.” But that
change was only terminological, in my view; there was no change in
the object  to which Peirce used those words to direct our attention.
So I don’t see what it is that you think needs more explanation.
By the way, this is one of the areas where the unPeircean use of the
word “sign” to refer to a triadic relation (rather than a subject
of a triadic relation) tends to cause confusion. Peirce’s 1903
distinction between “sign” and “representamen” was  not a
distinction between the whole triadic relation and one component of
it. This terminological issue is perfectly clear if you read what
Peirce actually wrote instead of someone else’s revised version of
semiotics — and if it’s Peircean semiotics that you’re trying
to understand.
 Gary f.
-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 23:11
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
On 1/20/2018 4:54 PM,  g...@gnusystems.ca [1] wrote:

> What change in terminology are you referring to?
I was thinking about the following point:
Gary F 

> Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of
“sign”

> which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell
lectures 

> may represent his first clear move in that direction.
 I was asking about signs "not limited to human use".
If the Lowell lectures show the "first clear move", are there
earlier unclear moves?  Hints?  Suggestions?  Musements?
The clearest MSS were the most likely to be selected for publication
in CP and EP.  But there may be fragmentary MSS with passages that are
crossed out.  Perhaps he had earlier thoughts along those lines, but
he didn't have a "sop for Cerberus". 
John 


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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[gnox]

John,

 

Yes, there are plenty of “earlier thoughts along those lines” of a semiotic 
generalized beyond the human experience of signs. In fact they are “as plenty 
as blackberries,” if you read Peirce chronologically looking for them. His 
anti-psychologism, for example, which he consistently maintained from the 1860s 
on, is essentially a refusal to limit the application of logical principles to 
what goes on in human minds or brains. But his logic/semiotic was always 
generalized from the human experience of sign use, as he says in CP 1.540. And 
necessarily so, because “experience is our only teacher” and we humans can only 
learn from our experience.

 

I still don’t see a “change in terminology” here, unless it’s the change in 
usage of the word “sign” which occurred after 1903. The terminological change 
was that Peirce gave up using the term “sign” in a way that limited it to the 
human realm. In Lowell 3.13 he distinguished between “sign” and 
“representamen”; after 1905 the distinction disappears and “sign” means the 
same thing as “representamen.” But that change was only terminological, in my 
view; there was no change in the object to which Peirce used those words to 
direct our attention. So I don’t see what it is that you think needs more 
explanation.

 

By the way, this is one of the areas where the unPeircean use of the word 
“sign” to refer to a triadic relation (rather than a subject of a triadic 
relation) tends to cause confusion. Peirce’s 1903 distinction between “sign” 
and “representamen” was not a distinction between the whole triadic relation 
and one component of it. This terminological issue is perfectly clear if you 
read what Peirce actually wrote instead of someone else’s revised version of 
semiotics — and if it’s Peircean semiotics that you’re trying to understand.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 20-Jan-18 23:11
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

On 1/20/2018 4:54 PM,   g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:

> What change in terminology are you referring to?

 

I was thinking about the following point:

 

Gary F

> Peircean semiotics is naturally associated with a notion of “sign”

> which is not limited to human use of signs; but the Lowell lectures 

> may represent his first clear move in that direction.

 

I was asking about signs "not limited to human use".

 

If the Lowell lectures show the "first clear move", are there earlier unclear 
moves?  Hints?  Suggestions?  Musements?

 

The clearest MSS were the most likely to be selected for publication in CP and 
EP.  But there may be fragmentary MSS with passages that are crossed out.  
Perhaps he had earlier thoughts along those lines, but he didn't have a "sop 
for Cerberus".

 

John


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Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list: I disagree. A function is ..understood as a complex
process of transforming/assigning meaning...which is exactly what the
semiosic triad does. 

The section of 1.540 does not say one word about 'function'. Not one
word. I don't think you can justify your assertion that Peirce's term
of 'representation' is a synonym of a function. 

Peirce's use of 'representation' is NOT synonymous with the
transformative nature of a function; it is merely dyadic, in the
Saussurian sense; all it does is provide a term for the interpreter. 
But the mediate representamen is entirely different - 

We are talking about agency, an action, ..."the concrete subject
that represents I call a sign or representamen'. 1.540.

The key point is that agential power of mediation to assign meaning
to a Dynamic Object.[ the concrete subject that represents].  That
is, the semiosic action is not passive but active, via that
mediation. 

The key nature of Peircean semiosis is its agential power. 

Edwina
 On Sun 21/01/18  8:22 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Gary R, list,
 Yes, I agree that the usage of “sign” in reference to a
“function” is a significant departure from Peircean semiotics.
Peirce does define a function in Lowell 3 (specifically CP 1.540),
but he calls it “Representation,” which is “the operation  of a
sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of the
representation.” The word “Representation” is a hypostatic
abstraction which nominalizes the function, which is also regarded by
Peirce as a “relation.” The triadic relation which must “consist
in a power of the representamen to determine some interpretant to
being a representamen of the same object” (CP 1.542, emphasis
Peirce’s). That determining power can only be exercised by what
Peirce calls a “concrete subject,” a “sign” or a
“representamen.” 
Peirce says that “representation is precisely genuine Thirdness”
(CP 1.532). Representation is not a sign but the operation of a sign.
Logic is “the Philosophy of Representation” (CP 1.539). Using the
word “sign” as a synonym for the function of “representation,”
or for the triadic  relation instead of the one subject which
determines another subject to represent a third subject, is not only
unnecessary but misleading, for anyone trying to understand
Peirce’s semiotic. It virtually robs the sign of its life, its
power to determine.
 Gary f.
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 23:39
 To: Peirce-L 
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Gary f, Helmut, Edwina,
Gary f wrote: 
[Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic
relation. The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete
subject that represents” (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words 
are synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign"
as as synonym with "representamen".”
Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing
"Sign" as a "correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and  not to
mean a function (as I also suggested in an earlier post)
“consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” This idea of
"consisting" leads astray, in my opinion. 
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking 

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690
On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM,  wrote:

Helmut,
Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have
even made a habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the
word, and he did not use it to mean “a function,” or as
“consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used it as one
“correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the
representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP
1.540). In this respect the two words  are synonymous; there is no
need to make up “a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen".”
I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is
reading exactly what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin off
from that, the more confused we become.
Gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de [2]] 
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 17:34
 To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]
 Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 
Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is
possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And,
because function is not the same as do

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[gnox]

Gary R, list,

 

Yes, I agree that the usage of “sign” in reference to a “function” is a 
significant departure from Peircean semiotics. Peirce does define a function in 
Lowell 3 (specifically CP 1.540), but he calls it “Representation,” which is 
“the operation of a sign or its relation to the object for the interpreter of 
the representation.” The word “Representation” is a hypostatic abstraction 
which nominalizes the function, which is also regarded by Peirce as a 
“relation.” The triadic relation which must “consist in a power of the 
representamen to determine some interpretant to being a representamen of the 
same object” (CP 1.542, emphasis Peirce’s). That determining power can only be 
exercised by what Peirce calls a “concrete subject,” a “sign” or a 
“representamen.”

 

Peirce says that “representation is precisely genuine Thirdness” (CP 1.532). 
Representation is not a sign but the operation of a sign. Logic is “the 
Philosophy of Representation” (CP 1.539). Using the word “sign” as a synonym 
for the function of “representation,” or for the triadic relation instead of 
the one subject which determines another subject to represent a third subject, 
is not only unnecessary but misleading, for anyone trying to understand 
Peirce’s semiotic. It virtually robs the sign of its life, its power to 
determine.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Sent: 20-Jan-18 23:39
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

Gary f, Helmut, Edwina,

 

Gary f wrote: 

 

[Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The 
sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP 
1.540). In this respect the two words are synonymous; there is no need to make 
up “a way of seeing "sign" as as synonym with "representamen".”

 

Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing "Sign" as a 
"correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and not to mean a function (as I also 
suggested in an earlier post) “consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” This 
idea of "consisting" leads astray, in my opinion. 

 

Best,

 

Gary R




  

 

 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690

 

On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > wrote:

Helmut,

 

Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have even made a habit 
of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the word, and he did not use it 
to mean “a function,” or as “consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used 
it as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the 
representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP 1.540). In this 
respect the two words are synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of 
seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen".”

 

I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is reading exactly 
what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin off from that, the more 
confused we become.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de  ] 
Sent: 20-Jan-18 17:34
To: g...@gnusystems.ca  
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu  
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with "representamen": A sign 
consisting of sign, object, interpretant is possible, because this kind of 
"consisting" is a functional composition (A sign is a function, consisting of 
other functions), which is different from a spatial composition (range 
consisting of domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is 
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And, because 
function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally) consists of (besides 
itself) the whole object and the whole interpretant, not only the immediate 
ones.

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional 
composition.

Best, Helmut

  

 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca  
 

John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection and 
transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about these issues 
for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing his terminology.  But 
those brief quotations don't explain why. ]]

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief quotations”?

 

The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using “representamen” as a more 
general term than “sign” to (2) using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with 
the term “representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that 
I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s th

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list:

The triadic Sign consists of the Object-Representamen-Interpretant.
The Function is also triadic, made up of input/functional act/output.
The focus is on the mediation action by the Repesentamen or Function
which is a powerful agent/subject that assigns meaning to the input
data of the Dynamic Object.

I think it is vital to differentiate the sign/representamen and its
singular action from the triadic Sign of
Object-Representamen-Interpretant. 

The "concrete subject that represents' is, in my view, a good
definition of that mediate functional action. 

Edwina
 On Sat 20/01/18 11:39 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Gary f, Helmut, Edwina,
 Gary f wrote: 
 [Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic
relation. The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete
subject that represents” (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words 
are synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign"
as as synonym with "representamen".”
 Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing
"Sign" as a "correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and  not to
mean a function (as I also suggested in an earlier post)
“consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” This idea of
"consisting" leads astray, in my opinion. 
 Best,
  Gary R
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York718 482-5690
 On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM,   wrote:
Helmut, 
Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have
even made a habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the
word, and he did not use it to mean “a function,” or as “
consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used it as one
“correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the
representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP
1.540). In this respect the two words are synonymous; there is no
need to make up “ a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen".”
I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is
reading exactly what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin off
from that, the more confused we become. 
Gary f.
From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de [2]] 
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 17:34
 To: g...@gnusystems.ca [3]
 Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [4]
 Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12 
Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is
possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And,
because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally)
consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole
interpretant, not only the immediate ones. 

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns:
Functional composition.

Best, Helmut
 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
 Von: g...@gnusystems.ca [5]
John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection
and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about
these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing
his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]] 

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
quotations”?
The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using
“representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2)
using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term
“representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift
that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s
the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave
unexplained? Here it is again :

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a
wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in
almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly
preferred the term  representamen. But there was no need of this
horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having
a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable in
the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal definition
is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought. ] SS p.193 ] 
Gary f.
-Original Message-
 From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net [6]]
 Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [7]
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12
Edwina, Gary R, Stephen, and Gary F,
 Edwina

> I emphasize tha

Re: Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, list - and I don't see how the outline of the semiosic
process can't be understood as a function. At each 'instance' of
semiosis, there is a single output; but the semiosic process is not
isolate but productive - and there can be, using the same Object,
multiple Interpretants over, let's say, a period of even a few
minutes. [Is that sound an insect, is it an intruder, is it just the
water pipes creaking]...

the definition: 'a function is a relation between a set of inputs
and a set of permissible outputs with the property that each input is
related to exactly one output."

I don't see how this contradicts Peirce. The focus is on the power
of the function, that mediate action, that assigns a meaning to the
input that relates that meaning to the input.  And that is exactly
what the Representamen does.

Edwina
 On Sat 20/01/18 11:19 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, Helmut, Gary f, list,]
Lowell 3.13: "A representamen is a subject of a triadic relation to
a Second, called its  Object,  for a Third, called its Interpretant,
this triadic relation being such that the Representamen determines
its Interpretant to stand in the same triadic relation to the same
Object for some Interpretant."
I know we've been here before, but I do not yet see how " the
Representamen determin[ing] its Interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relation to the same Object (emphasis added)" can be seen as
a function,  defined as "a special relationship where each input has
a single output." I don't see how this gels with the snippet of
Peirce's above (quite a characteristic one, I believe). 
Best,
Gary R
 Gary RichmondPhilosophy and Critical Thinking Communication
StudiesLaGuardia College of the City University of New York718
482-5690 [1]
 On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:30 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Helmut, list - yes, I agree. The semiosic process, the triadic Sign,
is a function. It fits in exactly: f(x)=y. Or representamen
[transforms the sensate data of the Object] into an Interpretant[s].

And yes, this consists of other functions, since no Sign, exists
alone but is networked with other Signs - so, it does as you say,
'consist of itself and other things too'. 

I'm not sure that I'd agree that the Sign, that triad, consists of
the 'whole object' and the 'whole interpretant' - because that would
deny the capacity for diversity and variation. That is, if a Sign
simply replicated the 'whole object' rather than
transforming/interpreting it into effectively a NEW objectvia its
own knowledge basethen, this replication would merely be a
mechanical rather than semiosic action. The strength of semiosis is
that the mediation of the knowledge base [representamen] transforms
and enables novelty within the resultant Interpretant. 

Edwina
 On Sat 20/01/18  5:33 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de [3]
sent:
  Gary, List, I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant is
possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too. And,
because function is not the same as domain, a sign (functionally)
consists of (besides itself) the whole object and the whole
interpretant, not only the immediate ones. 1ns: Composition from
traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns: Functional composition. Best,
Helmut 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
 Von: g...@gnusystems.ca [4]
John, you wrote, 

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection
and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking about
these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons for changing
his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't explain why. ]] 

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
quotations”? 
The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using
“representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2)
using them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term
“representamen” as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift
that I quoted was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s
the “brief quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave
unexplained? Here it is again : 

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a
wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in
almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly
preferred the term representamen. But there was no need of this
horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having
a formal definition all drawn up. This sort o

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[John Collier]

A quick google search found plenty. Here some of the first few.

http://blog.uvm.edu/aivakhiv/2010/05/12/between-whitehead-peirce/
between Whitehead & Peirce
May 12, 2010 by Adrian J Ivakhiv

http://www.unav.es/users/PeirceWhitehead.html
Peirce and Whitehead

http://koutroufinis.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/5a4393e048c409a9677b45899fdd7286.pdf
Uexküll, Whitehead, Peirce. Rethinking the Concept of ‘Umwelt’ from a
Process Philosophical Perspective.




On 2018/01/21 6:39 AM, Gary Richmond wrote:


Gary f, Helmut, Edwina,


Gary f wrote:

[Peirce] used [Sign] as one “correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. 
The sign, like the representamen, is “the concrete subject that 
represents” (CP 1.540). In this respect the two words *are 
*synonymous; there is no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign" as as 
synonym with "representamen".”


Gary, I fully concur, as you can imagine, with your emphasizing "Sign" 
as a "correlate" of a genuine triadic relation and /not/ to mean a 
function (as I also suggested in an earlier post) “consisting of sign, 
object, interpretant.” This idea of "consisting" leads astray, in my 
opinion.


Best,

Gary R

Gary Richmond*
*
*
*
*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 6:19 PM, > wrote:


Helmut,

Many have tried using the word “sign” that way, and some have even
made a habit of it. But I prefer Peirce’s definition(s) of the
word, and he did not use it to mean “a function,” or as
“consisting of sign, object, interpretant.” He used it as one
“correlate” of a genuine triadic relation. The sign, like the
representamen, is “the concrete subject that represents” (CP
1.540). In this respect the two words *are* synonymous; there is
no need to make up “a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen".”

I think the key challenge in understanding Peircean semiosis is
reading exactly what Peirce wrote about it. The further we spin
off from that, the more confused we become.

Gary f.

*From:*Helmut Raulien [mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de
]
*Sent:* 20-Jan-18 17:34
*To:* g...@gnusystems.ca 
*Cc:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
*Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

Gary, List,

I have made up a way of seeing "sign" as synonym with
"representamen": A sign consisting of sign, object, interpretant
is possible, because this kind of "consisting" is a functional
composition (A sign is a function, consisting of other functions),
which is different from a spatial composition (range consisting of
domains). In a functional composition this kind of re-entry is
possible: Something consisting of itself and other things too.
And, because function is not the same as domain, a sign
(functionally) consists of (besides itself) the whole object and
the whole interpretant, not only the immediate ones.

1ns: Composition from traits, 2ns: Spatial composition, 3ns:
Functional composition.

Best, Helmut

 20. Januar 2018 um 22:54 Uhr
*Von:* g...@gnusystems.ca 

John, you wrote,

[[ This is one more reason for getting a more complete collection
and transcription of Peirce's MSS.  He was undoubtedly thinking
about these issues for years, and he must have had good reasons
for changing his terminology.  But those brief quotations don't
explain why. ]]

What change in terminology are you referring to? And which “brief
quotations”?

The change I mentioned was the change from (1) using
“representamen” as a more general term than “sign” to (2) using
them as synonyms to (3) dispensing with the term “representamen”
as unnecessary. And the explanation of that shift that I quoted
was an excerpt from a 1905 letter to Welby. If that’s the “brief
quotations” you mean, what is it that they leave unexplained? Here
it is again:

[[ I use ‘sign’ in the widest sense of the definition. It is a
wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in
almost the exact sense of the scientific definition. … I formerly
preferred the term /representamen/. But there was no need of this
horrid long word. … The truth is that I went wrong from not having
a formal definition all drawn up. This sort of thing is inevitable
in the early stages of a strong logical study; for if a formal
definition is attempted too soon, it will only shackle thought.]
SS p.193 ]

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 20-Jan-18 15:01
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

Edwina, Gary 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary,

 

I recall Hulswit had an interest in both. I do think it has helped him in his 
work on (teleological) causation, especially with regard to getting a clear 
sight on the notion of process.

 

Auke 

 

Van: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] 
Verzonden: zaterdag 20 januari 2018 18:34
Aan: Peirce-L 
Onderwerp: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Biosemiosis (was Lowell Lecture 3.12

 

John, Edwina, list,

 

I've nothing to add at the moment,  I too completely agree with the thrust of 
John's post. Let's hope that some of those untranscribed manuscripts will one 
day yield more relevant material on this topic.

 

In reading Whitehead years ago I too noted many similarities to Peirce's 
thinking. Has there been any work (articles, dissertations, etc.) comparing the 
thinking of the two? As I recall, John, some of your papers touch on this. But 
I'm wondering if there has been any more extensive work in this area?

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 






 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

718 482-5690

 

On Sat, Jan 20, 2018 at 11:40 AM, Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote:

John, list

Thank you so much for your perceptive and articulate post. Of course - I 
strongly agree.

And I emphasize that semiosis is operative not merely in the more complex or 
larger-brain animals, but in all matter, from the smallest micro bacterium to 
the plant world to the animal world. And yes, even in the complex adaptive 
multi-unit systems such as human societies. 

 I keep saying that 'plants talk to each other' and we are certainly finding 
out, by research, that they do just that.

However, semiosis is not equivalent to communication - a view that many become, 
I think, entrapped in. My view is that semiosis is morphological; that is, it 
forms matter ...transforming matter from one finite form to another finite form 
- within that semiosic triad.

And of course, this includes the physico-chemical realm where semiosic 
transformation also takes place, albeit at a, [thankfully] slower pace - which 
slow pace maintains the stability of this realm. The biological is a dynamic, 
active, constantly transformative and thus, is a ' productive of diversity'  
realm.

Again - thanks so much for your post.  

Edwina

 

On Sat 20/01/18 11:19 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net 
  sent:

Edwina and Gary R, 

I changed the subject line to biosemiosis in order to emphasize that 
Peirce had intended semiosis to cover the full realm of all living 
things. Note what he wrote in a letter to Lady Welby: 

CSP, MS 463 (1908) 
> I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, 
> called its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which 
> effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately 
> determined by the former. My insertion of “upon a person” is a sop 
> to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception 
> understood. 

I believe that "despair" is the primary reason why he didn't say more. 
His insistence on continuity implied that the faculties of the human 
mind must be continuous with the minds (or quasi-minds) of all living 
things anywhere in the universe. But if he had said that, he would 
have been denounced by a huge number of critics from philosophy, 
psychology, science, religion, and politics. 

Edwina 
> I do think that limiting Peircean semiosis to the human conceptual 
> realm is a disservice to Peircean semiosis... I won't repeat my 
> constant reference to 4.551. 

Gary 
> I believe, you've had to depend on CP 4.551 as much as you have 
> (there are a very few other suggestions scattered through his work, 
> but none of them are much developed). 

The reason why there are so few is that Peirce felt a need to 
throw a "sop to Cerberus" in order to get people to take his ideas 
seriously. I'm sure that he would gladly have written much more 
if they were ready to listen. 

For a very important and carefully worded quotation, see CP 2.227: 
> all signs used by a "scientific" intelligence, that is to say, 
> by an intelligence capable of learning by experience. 

That comment certainly includes all large animals. In addition 
to explicit statements about signs, it's important to note his 
anecdotes about dogs and parrots. He observed some remarkable 
performances, which implied "scientific intelligence". Although 
he didn't say so explicitly, he wouldn't have made the effort 
to write those anecdotes if he didn't think so. 

Since Peirce talked about "crystals and bees" in CP 4.551, he must 
have been thinking about the continuity to zoosemiosis, and from that 
to the intermediate stages of phytosemiosis, biosemiosis by microbes, 
crystal formation, and eventually to all of chemistry and physics. 
He would have been delighted to learn about the signs called DNA 
and the semiosis that interprets those signs in all aspects of life. 

Many