Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

To be honest, I am still not sure that I understand your question.  As I
see it right now, the subjects of *both *propositions (A and B) are opium
(Matter) and dormative virtue (Form).  As an Interpretant, A posits the
unity of opium and dormative virtue (Entelechy); i.e., the continuous
predicate is "_ possesses the character of _."

Presumably the further inquiry prompted by B will seek to identify which
specific physical/chemical attributes of opium--i.e., more detailed aspects
of its Form--account for the dormative virtue that it exhibits when it is
taken by a patient.  Consequently, it will involve additional retroductive
conjectures, followed by deductive explications and inductive
examinations.  This obviously takes us far beyond exploring the basic
metaphysics of semiosis, which is all that I am trying to do at this point;
more on that soon.

As a related comment, at the recommendation of Gary F., I am now reading
Francesco Bellucci's new book, *Peirce's Speculative Grammar:  Logic as
Semiotics*.  He provides an interesting analysis of the Immediate Objects
of propositions based on the 1908 letters to Lady Welby, most notably EP
2:484-485.  In your example, he would say that your proposition A is a
Copulative in itself, a Designative with respect to opium, and a
Descriptive with respect to dormative virtue.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 3:58 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, List,
>
> Consider one of Peirce's own examples, such as a physician inferring
> that "opium has dormative virtue." As a conclusion of an abductive
> inference, we can suppose that it followed as a plausible explanation from
> premisses involving observations that a patient, or two or three, fell
> asleep shortly after taking opium. In such a case, "Opium has dormative
> virtue" is the logical interpretant of the explanatory argument because
> it is the conclusion of the abductive inference. Let us call the
> proposition as it functions as a conclusion of the argument (A)
>
> As a side point, I find it interesting that, on Peirce's account, the
> logical principle guiding the abductive inference is the object of the
> argument. Considered as a proposition in isolation, the logical principle
> is not the object of the proposition. Rather, I take it that the general
> nature of opium with respect to its sleep inducing powers--considered as a
> general fact about opium--is the dynamical object of that proposition.
>
> If the physician goes further and asks:  "What is the nature of the
> dormative virtue of opium?", then she is hypostatically abstracting from
> the predicate, and treating it as an object of further inquiry. Let us call
> the proposition expressed as it is in this further question that takes
> inquiry yet further (B).
>
> In such a case, the purported dormative virtue of opium is functioning in
> the first argument (A) as the predicate asserted in the logical
> interpretant. In the second case (B), it is the object of further inquiry
> about which further conclusions might be drawn.  In both cases, the
> dormative virtue has the character of a general habit. As such, I don't see
> how the analysis you've offered in terms of the firstness, secondness and
> thirdness of objects and interpretants will put us in a position of
> explaining the services that the proposition concerning the
> dormative virtue of opium is performing when it is functioning first as a
> logical interpretant (in case A) and then later as an object of further
> inquiry (in case B).
>
> Hope that helps to clarify the question I am trying to raise about the
> account you are offering. You might be able to further refine your
> explanations to handle this kind of case, but it isn't clear to me how that
> might go.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Sunday, March 4, 2018 12:20:37 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited
>
> Jeff, List:
>
> For clarification, could you please offer a concrete example of a scenario
> that you believe my proposal cannot sufficiently take into account?  I
> agree that each of the two Objects and each of the three Interpretants--as
> well as the Sign itself and its external relations with the other
> non-immediate Correlates--can be classified as Possible, Existent, or
> Necessitant; although only certain combinations are feasible, depending
> upon how one arranges them into an order of determination.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 12:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, Gary F, List,
>>
>> The proposal Jon is putting forward for distinguishing between the object
>> and interpretant in a semiotic process seems, on the face of it, to be
>> insufficient to account for cases of hypostati

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Jon, Jeff, list,



You said,

For clarification, could you please offer a concrete example of a scenario
that you believe my proposal cannot sufficiently take into account?



Given your proposal, please explain this concrete scenario:



*What is man?*

*What is pleasure?*



For if you say ‘man is a sign’ or ‘this is man’, it will be clear that your
proposal will leave us unsatisfied.



Thanks for your time and effort,
Jerry R


On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 1:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Jeff, List:
>
> For clarification, could you please offer a concrete example of a scenario
> that you believe my proposal cannot sufficiently take into account?  I
> agree that each of the two Objects and each of the three Interpretants--as
> well as the Sign itself and its external relations with the other
> non-immediate Correlates--can be classified as Possible, Existent, or
> Necessitant; although only certain combinations are feasible, depending
> upon how one arranges them into an order of determination.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 12:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, Gary F, List,
>>
>> The proposal Jon is putting forward for distinguishing between the object
>> and interpretant in a semiotic process seems, on the face of it, to be
>> insufficient to account for cases of hypostatic abstraction. In this type
>> of abstraction, the interpretant is--in the next stage of
>> inference--treated as the object in relation to some further sign and
>> interpretant. The primary way Peirce seems to distinguish between an
>> interpretant and one that is later taken as an object in some further
>> inference is in terms of the services each is serving and the relations
>> that hold--and not in terms of the categories that are prominent in each
>> correlate of the triadic sign relation considered in itself. After all,
>> each kind of object can be characterized as a possible, an existent or a
>> necessitant, as can each kind of interpretant.
>>
>> --Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>> --
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> *Sent:* Saturday, March 3, 2018 5:52:27 PM
>> *To:* Peirce-L
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited
>>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>> I agree that it is important to maintain a sharp distinction between the
>> Object and the Interpretant, and I believe that this is reflected in my
>> current exposition of EP 2:304 in light of EP 2:305-307 and NEM 4:292-300.
>>
>> Matter (2ns) and Form (1ns) both pertain to the Object.  The Matter is
>> what the Sign *denotes*, corresponding to its logical *breadth*; the
>> Form is what the Sign *signifies*, corresponding to its logical *depth*.
>> A pure Index is perfect in denotation but lacking in signification, while a
>> pure Icon is perfect in signification but lacking in denotation.
>>
>> Entelechy (3ns) pertains to the Interpretant.  It is what the Sign 
>> *determines
>> *as the (purported) unity of the denoted Matter with the signified Form,
>> corresponding to its *information* (breadth x depth).  As you noted, the
>> latter two can both be analyzed as *subjects *of any Sign, leaving only
>> their logical relation as a *continuous predicate*.
>>
>> As for the distinction between the two Objects, I have suggested that the
>> Dynamic Object is the Matter and the Immediate Object is the Form; hence my
>> description of the latter as a "*partial *combination of attributes."
>> This is consistent with situating the Immediate Object "within the Sign"
>> (EP 2:480; 1908) and recognizing the latter as "a Medium for the
>> communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:53 AM,  wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks Jon and Gary for your well articulated answers to my questions in
>>> this thread.
>>>
>>> My main concern was that your Immediate Object was sounding too much
>>> like an interpretant. The object/interpretant distinction is of course
>>> vital to triadic semiosis, and closely related to the subject/predicate
>>> distinction in propositions and the matter/form distinction which Jon
>>> mentions in Peirce’s 1904 writings. As Jon wrote, “Only the Sign
>>> *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that
>>> unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
>>> (determination).” How then can an immediate *object *consist of
>>> “attributes” (or characters or predicates) of the Dynamic Object?
>>>
>>> But I was forgetting that these distinctions get relativized in Peirce’s
>>> late semiotic, so that parts of what is usually considered the predicate
>>> can alternatively be “thrown into” the subject, leaving only a cont

Aw: Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 
(: Correction: Decades, not centuries :)


 

List,

I would distinguish between science, technology, and technology application. I think, most of what might be called dataism, big data, smart this and smart that, is merely technology and its application.

 

I guess there are up- and downsides. Blockchain technology may be very helpful for establishing better methods of fair trade, and to bypass banks and middle/wo/men.

 

About the strong and many downsides of dataism I recommend reading Byung Chul Han and Jaron Lanier.

I just have read a short sci-fi- novel by E.M. Forster: "The Machine Stops", 1909. On the book´s back  is a recommendation by Jaron Lanier: I try to translate the from English into German translated text back into English:

 

"The novel The Machine Stops, published 1909- so centuries before there were the first computers- presumably is the earliest, and probably still today the most striking description of the internet. How E.M. Forster has done this, remains a secret."

 

Best, Helmut


 03. März 2018 um 23:52 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" 
 



Gene, list,

 

You concluded: 

 



EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem. 



 

I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been emphasizing. 

 

I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our very existence on the earth, but I locate these more within the political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and "deus-ex-machina goals" are "essential features" of that system. I disagree. 

 

Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on a number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are causing global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and studies that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch (1999). "Climate Science: An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science(PDF). Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society. 80 (3): 439–455. 

 

In my view the global climate change deniers are not for the most part scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and greedy and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to support policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the detriment of the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind, water, etc.) The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of scientists who deny human caused global warming in service to their greed, power, and "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."

 

But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather the misuse of science and technology by the world's power players. That they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising for our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly did find the essential "wicked problems" to be a consequence of the political-economic system, not science itself. In what I see to be his view, science is not, as you seem to imply, some "blue sky" ideal. Rather science and technology can be seen as part of our human destiny, part of what we humans ought to be doing, part of our aspiration to know the world, ourselves, and the cosmos better. How unfortunate that corporate and political power elites have virtually kidnapped the potential for humane good of science in the interest of their own greed. And how unfortunate that so few can experience Nature in the direct way that even Peirce and Whitman and the generation were still able to. How amazing it has been for me when, far away from my beloved NYC, say in northern Michigan or central Colorado, I've looked up to the sky and been able to see myriad stars!

 

As an aside notice that the "powers that be," at least in the US, have also undermined public education, stripping many, perhaps most school systems of opportunities for aesthetic education (the arts, music, etc.) and critical thinking (for example, the GOP platform in Texas a few years ago had a clause which stipulated that critical thinking not be taught in the s

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

For clarification, could you please offer a concrete example of a scenario
that you believe my proposal cannot sufficiently take into account?  I
agree that each of the two Objects and each of the three Interpretants--as
well as the Sign itself and its external relations with the other
non-immediate Correlates--can be classified as Possible, Existent, or
Necessitant; although only certain combinations are feasible, depending
upon how one arranges them into an order of determination.

Thanks,

Jon S.

On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 12:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Jon S, Gary F, List,
>
> The proposal Jon is putting forward for distinguishing between the object
> and interpretant in a semiotic process seems, on the face of it, to be
> insufficient to account for cases of hypostatic abstraction. In this type
> of abstraction, the interpretant is--in the next stage of
> inference--treated as the object in relation to some further sign and
> interpretant. The primary way Peirce seems to distinguish between an
> interpretant and one that is later taken as an object in some further
> inference is in terms of the services each is serving and the relations
> that hold--and not in terms of the categories that are prominent in each
> correlate of the triadic sign relation considered in itself. After all,
> each kind of object can be characterized as a possible, an existent or a
> necessitant, as can each kind of interpretant.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
> --
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt 
> *Sent:* Saturday, March 3, 2018 5:52:27 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited
>
> Gary F., List:
>
> I agree that it is important to maintain a sharp distinction between the
> Object and the Interpretant, and I believe that this is reflected in my
> current exposition of EP 2:304 in light of EP 2:305-307 and NEM 4:292-300.
>
> Matter (2ns) and Form (1ns) both pertain to the Object.  The Matter is
> what the Sign *denotes*, corresponding to its logical *breadth*; the Form
> is what the Sign *signifies*, corresponding to its logical *depth*.  A
> pure Index is perfect in denotation but lacking in signification, while a
> pure Icon is perfect in signification but lacking in denotation.
>
> Entelechy (3ns) pertains to the Interpretant.  It is what the Sign *determines
> *as the (purported) unity of the denoted Matter with the signified Form,
> corresponding to its *information* (breadth x depth).  As you noted, the
> latter two can both be analyzed as *subjects *of any Sign, leaving only
> their logical relation as a *continuous predicate*.
>
> As for the distinction between the two Objects, I have suggested that the
> Dynamic Object is the Matter and the Immediate Object is the Form; hence my
> description of the latter as a "*partial *combination of attributes."
> This is consistent with situating the Immediate Object "within the Sign"
> (EP 2:480; 1908) and recognizing the latter as "a Medium for the
> communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:53 AM,  wrote:
>
>> Thanks Jon and Gary for your well articulated answers to my questions in
>> this thread.
>>
>> My main concern was that your Immediate Object was sounding too much like
>> an interpretant. The object/interpretant distinction is of course vital to
>> triadic semiosis, and closely related to the subject/predicate distinction
>> in propositions and the matter/form distinction which Jon mentions in
>> Peirce’s 1904 writings. As Jon wrote, “Only the Sign *itself*--not its
>> Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter (denotation)
>> and Form (signification) in its Interpretant (determination).” How then can
>> an immediate *object *consist of “attributes” (or characters or
>> predicates) of the Dynamic Object?
>>
>> But I was forgetting that these distinctions get relativized in Peirce’s
>> late semiotic, so that parts of what is usually considered the predicate
>> can alternatively be “thrown into” the subject, leaving only a continuous
>> predicate. I just came across a passage about this written by Peirce in
>> December 1909:
>>
>> [[ The determination by a Sign of its Interpreting Mind,– i.e. the idea
>> that mind gets, or the feeling it sets up, or the action it stimulates,
>> I call its "Interpretant"; and there is all the difference in the world
>> between the *Object *of a sign, of which the Interpreter must have some
>> *collateral *experience, immediate or mediate, or he won't know at all
>> what it is that the Sign represents [ ... ] and whoever questions that
>> point simply fails to understand what I mean by the Ob

Aw: Re: Scientific inquiry does not involve matters "of vital importance," was, [PEIRCE-L] A footnote on reason

[Helmut Raulien]

 

List,

I would distinguish between science, technology, and technology application. I think, most of what might be called dataism, big data, smart this and smart that, is merely technology and its application.

 

I guess there are up- and downsides. Blockchain technology may be very helpful for establishing better methods of fair trade, and to bypass banks and middle/wo/men.

 

About the strong and many downsides of dataism I recommend reading Byung Chul Han and Jaron Lanier.

I just have read a short sci-fi- novel by E.M. Forster: "The Machine Stops", 1909. On the book´s back  is a recommendation by Jaron Lanier: I try to translate the from English into German translated text back into English:

 

"The novel The Machine Stops, published 1909- so centuries before there were the first computers- presumably is the earliest, and probably still today the most striking description of the internet. How E.M. Forster has done this, remains a secret."

 

Best, Helmut


 03. März 2018 um 23:52 Uhr
 "Gary Richmond" 
 



Gene, list,

 

You concluded: 

 



EH: The greed, power, and especially crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals are not simply external to actually existing science and technology, but are essential features of the system, despite the many admirable individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable world with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing science and technology must be critically confronted as part of the problem. 



 

I think we may disagree mainly in terms of what we have been emphasizing. 

 

I certainly agree with you that greed, power, and what you call "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals" are threats to our very existence on the earth, but I locate these more within the political-economic 'system' (as I believe Peirce did), while you apparently locate them within the 'system' of "actually existing science and technology." Despite your seeing "admirable individuals" within the scientific-technological 'system', you maintain that greed, power, and "deus-ex-machina goals" are "essential features" of that system. I disagree. 

 

Take climate change, for example. A multi-authored 2016 paper based on a number of independent studies found a 97% consensus that humans are causing global warming. This is entirely consistent with other surveys and studies that I know of. See: Bray, Dennis; Hans von Storch (1999). "Climate Science: An Empirical Example of Postnormal Science(PDF). Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society. 80 (3): 439–455. 

 

In my view the global climate change deniers are not for the most part scientists, but greedy and unethical global corporate magnates and greedy and unethical politicians, typically in cahoots with each other to support policies which, for example, greatly benefit "Big Oil" to the detriment of the development of sustainable energy sources (solar, wind, water, etc.) The power brokers use (and even employ and pay) the 3% of scientists who deny human caused global warming in service to their greed, power, and "crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals."

 

But, again, there are counter-arguments to my view of science and scientists, many of which you employ in your books. Still, I remain unconvinced that it is science that is the essential problem, but rather the misuse of science and technology by the world's power players. That they seemingly hold all (or most) of the strings isn't very promising for our future on the Earth. Whether "many Peirceans" hold this view of science, I have no idea. But some do, and Peirce himself almost certainly did find the essential "wicked problems" to be a consequence of the political-economic system, not science itself. In what I see to be his view, science is not, as you seem to imply, some "blue sky" ideal. Rather science and technology can be seen as part of our human destiny, part of what we humans ought to be doing, part of our aspiration to know the world, ourselves, and the cosmos better. How unfortunate that corporate and political power elites have virtually kidnapped the potential for humane good of science in the interest of their own greed. And how unfortunate that so few can experience Nature in the direct way that even Peirce and Whitman and the generation were still able to. How amazing it has been for me when, far away from my beloved NYC, say in northern Michigan or central Colorado, I've looked up to the sky and been able to see myriad stars!

 

As an aside notice that the "powers that be," at least in the US, have also undermined public education, stripping many, perhaps most school systems of opportunities for aesthetic education (the arts, music, etc.) and critical thinking (for example, the GOP platform in Texas a few years ago had a clause which stipulated that critical thinking not be taught in the schools), while what one might call an ethical e

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Gary F, List,


The proposal Jon is putting forward for distinguishing between the object and 
interpretant in a semiotic process seems, on the face of it, to be insufficient 
to account for cases of hypostatic abstraction. In this type of abstraction, 
the interpretant is--in the next stage of inference--treated as the object in 
relation to some further sign and interpretant. The primary way Peirce seems to 
distinguish between an interpretant and one that is later taken as an object in 
some further inference is in terms of the services each is serving and the 
relations that hold--and not in terms of the categories that are prominent in 
each correlate of the triadic sign relation considered in itself. After all, 
each kind of object can be characterized as a possible, an existent or a 
necessitant, as can each kind of interpretant.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Saturday, March 3, 2018 5:52:27 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited

Gary F., List:

I agree that it is important to maintain a sharp distinction between the Object 
and the Interpretant, and I believe that this is reflected in my current 
exposition of EP 2:304 in light of EP 2:305-307 and NEM 4:292-300.

Matter (2ns) and Form (1ns) both pertain to the Object.  The Matter is what the 
Sign denotes, corresponding to its logical breadth; the Form is what the Sign 
signifies, corresponding to its logical depth.  A pure Index is perfect in 
denotation but lacking in signification, while a pure Icon is perfect in 
signification but lacking in denotation.

Entelechy (3ns) pertains to the Interpretant.  It is what the Sign determines 
as the (purported) unity of the denoted Matter with the signified Form, 
corresponding to its information (breadth x depth).  As you noted, the latter 
two can both be analyzed as subjects of any Sign, leaving only their logical 
relation as a continuous predicate.

As for the distinction between the two Objects, I have suggested that the 
Dynamic Object is the Matter and the Immediate Object is the Form; hence my 
description of the latter as a "partial combination of attributes."  This is 
consistent with situating the Immediate Object "within the Sign" (EP 2:480; 
1908) and recognizing the latter as "a Medium for the communication of a Form" 
(EP 2:544n22; 1906).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:53 AM, 
mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>> wrote:
Thanks Jon and Gary for your well articulated answers to my questions in this 
thread.
My main concern was that your Immediate Object was sounding too much like an 
interpretant. The object/interpretant distinction is of course vital to triadic 
semiosis, and closely related to the subject/predicate distinction in 
propositions and the matter/form distinction which Jon mentions in Peirce’s 
1904 writings. As Jon wrote, “Only the Sign itself--not its Immediate 
Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter (denotation) and Form 
(signification) in its Interpretant (determination).” How then can an immediate 
object consist of “attributes” (or characters or predicates) of the Dynamic 
Object?
But I was forgetting that these distinctions get relativized in Peirce’s late 
semiotic, so that parts of what is usually considered the predicate can 
alternatively be “thrown into” the subject, leaving only a continuous 
predicate. I just came across a passage about this written by Peirce in 
December 1909:
[[ The determination by a Sign of its Interpreting Mind,– i.e. the idea that 
mind gets, or the feeling it sets up, or the action it stimulates, I call its 
"Interpretant"; and there is all the difference in the world between the Object 
of a sign, of which the Interpreter must have some collateral experience, 
immediate or mediate, or he won't know at all what it is that the Sign 
represents [ ... ] and whoever questions that point simply fails to understand 
what I mean by the Object, and confounds it with the Interpretant. The latter 
is all that the sign conveys. The Object is the otherwise known something 
concerning which what it conveys relates. The distinction is a real distinction 
and yet it is purely relative, in the sense that the line of demarcation 
between the two can just as well be drawn in one place as another. [ ... ] The 
point is that the artificiality of a line of demarcation does not prove that 
the twoness of the parts that line of demarcation may be regarded as separating 
does not correspond to any twoness in re.— RL 36 ]]

So I have nothing more to say on that subject!

Gary f.

} In a consumer society there are inevitably two k

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] F.E. Abbot

[Helmut Raulien]

John, Stephen,

I often am too quick with judgements. Now I agree with John, that Abbot probably was too harsh against religions, and was alienating people. Instead of just rejecting dogmas and myths, I guess it always is better to refute dogmas by redefining myths from dogmas towards parables, and at the same time pointing out the value of these parables. That is not only senseful, but also diplomatic, as it leaves the opponent an open backdoor instead of driving him against a wall.

Best, Helmut

 

 03. März 2018 um 23:47 Uhr
 "Stephen C. Rose" 
 


Sounds like we are pretty much agreed, John. I have posited that we have about a century to get things right and that would include leeching science of nominalism and I would add binary proclivities. Peirce and Abbot were staunch realists who are one in moving metaphysics into a configuration that would have made it amenable to the stringent demands of the pragmaticist maxim. My background is on the liberal side of American religion and I can suggest that Peirce and Abbot would have felt just as alienated as I have by what has passed for liberalism even in its Niebuhrian garb. The theological makeover desired by both men would have led them inexorably toward both universalism and nonviolence and away from the creedal messianism that continues to hold sway. The late Gene Sharp would have appealed to both men. 

 








amazon.com/author/stephenrose








 

On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 5:30 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

Stephen and Helmut,

SCR
I completely disagree that we live in a time of breakdown.
 
I did not say 'breakdown'.  I said 'fragmentation'.

SCR
The civilization the two men aimed at philosophically is an
integration of the best of inherited metaphysics with science,
arriving at a post-religious spirituality. Of course it builds
on the past, but not all of it. 
 
That is certainly what Peirce was aiming at.  From your citation
of Abbot's defense, he seems to have similar hopes.

But the "Unified Science" that Carnap & Co. were trying to achieve
in the 1930s was nominalism at its most pernicious.  He used the
phrase "That's poetry!" to denounce any kind of value judgments
-- or any concept that resembled Thirdness.

I recall one anecdote about a student who came to the first lecture
of a philosophy class taught by a highly regarded logician.  At the
end of the lecture, the student raised his hand and timidly asked
a question:  "Professor, when will we get to the meaning of life?"
The professor glared at him, pointed to the door, and shouted "OUT!"

For evidence of fragmentation, the political sphere is the worst,
and it's affecting every aspect of our daily lives.
 
I would not agree that [Abbot] had wide influence or even that
he could have had.

I did not say that he had.  I said that he had a position as pastor,
which gave him a weekly opportunity to preach to his congregation.
I don't know his personal style, but I suspect it was more preachy
than sympathetic.  Any teacher who listens to the students could
get an excellent education in how to communicate.

>From reading Peirce's writings chronologically, one can see that much
of his best writings came after his travels abroad, his occasional
lecture series, and the few years he taught at Johns Hopkins.  I also
believe that his correspondence with Lady Welby was a very important
influence on getting him to clarify and systematize his insights.

Since I don't know much about Abbot, I can't say anything certain.
But I do know colleagues who started with an abysmal teaching style,
listened to feedback from their students, and revised their methods
to the point where they became very popular as teachers.  One extreme
example is James Martin, who made a fortune as a lecturer and author:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/James_Martin_(author)

Martin was no genius.  But he listened to students and colleagues.
After ten years of teaching IBM employees, he developed his style,
published some popular textbooks, and took a leave of absence from
IBM to go on a world-wide tour -- from which he earned more money
than he ever got from IBM.  So he never went back.

HR
I like Abbot very much, especially for showing progressive or
enlightened people a way to worship god and divinity, instead
of having to become atheists like Dawkins. Abbot is literally
a soul-saver, I think.
 
Perhaps so.  But I think he could have been more successful in saving
souls and himself if he had listened to the people in his congregation.
Like the people who heard him preach, Abbot started with a Christian
background.  Instead of alienating people, he could have listened
sympathetically.  As Unitarians, they would have been happy to hear
how their Judeo-Christian background was related to other religions.

If Abbot had listened to their complaints, he could have included
more Christian and Jewish stories and proverbs in his sermons without
in any way compromising his own beliefs.  He could have gradually
broadened his perspe

[PEIRCE-L] Scientific inquiry does not involve matters

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gene, list:

I think that your switch of what I consider the basic capacity of
mankind to explore the environment, examine its nature, and also, to
develop technologies to more productively interact with the world -
into a psychological need to dominate  - is actually non-Peircean.
After all, Peirce included man in the universe and did not see
mankind as an external Agent, but rather, as an integral part of the
complex universe. 

Another thing Peirce insisted on - was the increasing complexity of
this world - within the operation of the  three modes: Firstness -
which introduces novelty; Secondness, which solidifies or
particularizes it, so to speak ; and Thirdness, which generalizes its
nature to enable the novel and individual to participate in the vast
network of the universe.

I fail to see your view that technology is 'the greatest threat to a
sustainable world'. After all, the fossil fuel energy source which you
reject,[ and yet it has enabled you as well as myself, to use this
technological advancement that is a computer] - has provided clean
water, sanitation, medical advances,  heat, food, shelter for
millions. I presume you do not personally reject the use of any of
these services - nor the use of a car, phone, train, plane and so on.


I am unsure of your goal - is it to return to a pre-industrial
lifestyle, i.e., one without fossil fuels? After all - developing a
non-fossil fuel source of energy can only be achieved using the
current fuel sources to develop the high-technology required to
develop non-fossil fuels. 

I see your view as confining mankind to operating only within the
isolate boundaries of Secondness - which sees matter as interacting
directly, and in a brute manner - with other matter. This would be a
world of both physical  and psychological domination of one vs
another. But Peirce rejected the psychological as an explanation for
action - and he therefore also included two other modes.

There is Firstness - which is the open freshness of curiosity,
novelty and exploration. No boundaries. And there is Thirdness, which
is commonality and interaction rather than individual brute
psychological action. You seem to reject these two modes and focus
only on a type of mankind operative only within Secondness.

But - I think that most Peirceans wouldn't see science and
technology as operating only within one categorical mode - but within
all three. 

Edwina
 On Sat 03/03/18  4:12 PM , Eugene Halton eugene.w.halto...@nd.edu
sent:
 Dear Gary R.,
  Yes, thanks, you understood my critique and likely difference
of opinion. 
  From my point of view your response, like that of many
Peirceans, and sci-tech proponents more generally, takes an ideal of
what science and technology should be as an excuse to deny their
actual complicity in the delusion of limitless development of
human-all-too-human purposes that has brought us to the likelihood of
an emerging collapse. The greed, power, and especially
crypto-religious reverence for deus-ex-machina goals are not simply
external to actually existing science and technology, but are
essential features of the system, despite the many admirable
individuals within it. That is why actually existing science and
technology represent possibly the greatest threat to a sustainable
world with humans still a part of it, and why actually existing
science and technology must be critically confronted as part of the
problem.  
   Gene
 On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 1:27 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
 Gene, list,
  Gary R: "Of course it goes without saying, I'd hope, that the
positive results of scientific inquiry, for example, new
technologies, may be applied to matters of vital importance (for
example, in medicine, etc.)"
  Actually Gary, the jury is still out on that one. Ask the dying,
overpopulated earth.  Such is man's glory! 
 You know, of course, that I agree with the underlying sensibility of
your comment. All​​​ I meant to say in the snippet you quoted,
by writing "positive results of scientific inquiry," was that there
were definite, concrete, incontrovertible results of such inquiry,
not that they were necessarily well applied "to matters of vital
importance." All too often they haven't been, or there have been
unforeseen negative, even tragic results of their application (think
gun powder, fossil fuels, etc.) 
 However, in my opinion, the principal cause of "the dying,
overpopulated earth" is precisely the misuse of the fruits of science
by greedy, power-crazed, unethical, cruel, and thoughtless men and
institutions. Yet, can I say that some of the advances, say, in my
example of medicine, haven't been of value? Well, surely not to many
or even most (but, again, that's because of greed, etc.)  
 Still, I'm glad to have been able to in recent years have had both
hips replaced, cataract surgery on both eyes allowing