Dear Jon, Jeff, list,
You said,
For clarification, could you please offer a concrete example of a scenario
that you believe my proposal cannot sufficiently take into account?
Given your proposal, please explain this concrete scenario:
*What is man?*
*What is pleasure?*
For if you say ‘man is a sign’ or ‘this is man’, it will be clear that your
proposal will leave us unsatisfied.
Thanks for your time and effort,
Jerry R
On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 1:20 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
> Jeff, List:
>
> For clarification, could you please offer a concrete example of a scenario
> that you believe my proposal cannot sufficiently take into account? I
> agree that each of the two Objects and each of the three Interpretants--as
> well as the Sign itself and its external relations with the other
> non-immediate Correlates--can be classified as Possible, Existent, or
> Necessitant; although only certain combinations are feasible, depending
> upon how one arranges them into an order of determination.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 12:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Jon S, Gary F, List,
>>
>> The proposal Jon is putting forward for distinguishing between the object
>> and interpretant in a semiotic process seems, on the face of it, to be
>> insufficient to account for cases of hypostatic abstraction. In this type
>> of abstraction, the interpretant is--in the next stage of
>> inference--treated as the object in relation to some further sign and
>> interpretant. The primary way Peirce seems to distinguish between an
>> interpretant and one that is later taken as an object in some further
>> inference is in terms of the services each is serving and the relations
>> that hold--and not in terms of the categories that are prominent in each
>> correlate of the triadic sign relation considered in itself. After all,
>> each kind of object can be characterized as a possible, an existent or a
>> necessitant, as can each kind of interpretant.
>>
>> --Jeff
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>> ------------------------------
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> *Sent:* Saturday, March 3, 2018 5:52:27 PM
>> *To:* Peirce-L
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited
>>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>> I agree that it is important to maintain a sharp distinction between the
>> Object and the Interpretant, and I believe that this is reflected in my
>> current exposition of EP 2:304 in light of EP 2:305-307 and NEM 4:292-300.
>>
>> Matter (2ns) and Form (1ns) both pertain to the Object. The Matter is
>> what the Sign *denotes*, corresponding to its logical *breadth*; the
>> Form is what the Sign *signifies*, corresponding to its logical *depth*.
>> A pure Index is perfect in denotation but lacking in signification, while a
>> pure Icon is perfect in signification but lacking in denotation.
>>
>> Entelechy (3ns) pertains to the Interpretant. It is what the Sign
>> *determines
>> *as the (purported) unity of the denoted Matter with the signified Form,
>> corresponding to its *information* (breadth x depth). As you noted, the
>> latter two can both be analyzed as *subjects *of any Sign, leaving only
>> their logical relation as a *continuous predicate*.
>>
>> As for the distinction between the two Objects, I have suggested that the
>> Dynamic Object is the Matter and the Immediate Object is the Form; hence my
>> description of the latter as a "*partial *combination of attributes."
>> This is consistent with situating the Immediate Object "within the Sign"
>> (EP 2:480; 1908) and recognizing the latter as "a Medium for the
>> communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906).
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:53 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks Jon and Gary for your well articulated answers to my questions in
>>> this thread.
>>>
>>> My main concern was that your Immediate Object was sounding too much
>>> like an interpretant. The object/interpretant distinction is of course
>>> vital to triadic semiosis, and closely related to the subject/predicate
>>> distinction in propositions and the matter/form distinction which Jon
>>> mentions in Peirce’s 1904 writings. As Jon wrote, “Only the Sign
>>> *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that
>>> unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant
>>> (determination).” How then can an immediate *object *consist of
>>> “attributes” (or characters or predicates) of the Dynamic Object?
>>>
>>> But I was forgetting that these distinctions get relativized in Peirce’s
>>> late semiotic, so that parts of what is usually considered the predicate
>>> can alternatively be “thrown into” the subject, leaving only a continuous
>>> predicate. I just came across a passage about this written by Peirce in
>>> December 1909:
>>>
>>> [[ The determination by a Sign of its Interpreting Mind,– i.e. the idea
>>> that mind gets, or the feeling it sets up, or the action it stimulates,
>>> I call its "Interpretant"; and there is all the difference in the world
>>> between the *Object *of a sign, of which the Interpreter must have some
>>> *collateral *experience, immediate or mediate, or he won't know at all
>>> what it is that the Sign represents [ ... ] and whoever questions that
>>> point simply fails to understand what I mean by the Object, and
>>> confounds it with the Interpretant. The latter is *all *that the sign
>>> *conveys.
>>> * The Object is the otherwise known something concerning which what it
>>> conveys relates. The distinction is a *real *distinction and yet it is
>>> *purely
>>> relative, *in the sense that the line of demarcation between the two
>>> can just as well be drawn in one place as another. [ ... ] The point is
>>> that the artificiality of a line of demarcation does not prove that the
>>> *twoness
>>> * of the parts that line of demarcation may be regarded as separating
>>> does not correspond to any twoness *in re.* — RL 36 ]]
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So I have nothing more to say on that subject!
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> } In a consumer society there are inevitably two kinds of slaves: the
>>> prisoners of addiction and the prisoners of envy. [Ivan Illich] {
>>>
>>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway
>>>
>>
>
> -----------------------------
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
