Jeff, List: To be honest, I am still not sure that I understand your question. As I see it right now, the subjects of *both *propositions (A and B) are opium (Matter) and dormative virtue (Form). As an Interpretant, A posits the unity of opium and dormative virtue (Entelechy); i.e., the continuous predicate is "_____ possesses the character of _____."
Presumably the further inquiry prompted by B will seek to identify which specific physical/chemical attributes of opium--i.e., more detailed aspects of its Form--account for the dormative virtue that it exhibits when it is taken by a patient. Consequently, it will involve additional retroductive conjectures, followed by deductive explications and inductive examinations. This obviously takes us far beyond exploring the basic metaphysics of semiosis, which is all that I am trying to do at this point; more on that soon. As a related comment, at the recommendation of Gary F., I am now reading Francesco Bellucci's new book, *Peirce's Speculative Grammar: Logic as Semiotics*. He provides an interesting analysis of the Immediate Objects of propositions based on the 1908 letters to Lady Welby, most notably EP 2:484-485. In your example, he would say that your proposition A is a Copulative in itself, a Designative with respect to opium, and a Descriptive with respect to dormative virtue. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 3:58 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, List, > > Consider one of Peirce's own examples, such as a physician inferring > that "opium has dormative virtue." As a conclusion of an abductive > inference, we can suppose that it followed as a plausible explanation from > premisses involving observations that a patient, or two or three, fell > asleep shortly after taking opium. In such a case, "Opium has dormative > virtue" is the logical interpretant of the explanatory argument because > it is the conclusion of the abductive inference. Let us call the > proposition as it functions as a conclusion of the argument (A) > > As a side point, I find it interesting that, on Peirce's account, the > logical principle guiding the abductive inference is the object of the > argument. Considered as a proposition in isolation, the logical principle > is not the object of the proposition. Rather, I take it that the general > nature of opium with respect to its sleep inducing powers--considered as a > general fact about opium--is the dynamical object of that proposition. > > If the physician goes further and asks: "What is the nature of the > dormative virtue of opium?", then she is hypostatically abstracting from > the predicate, and treating it as an object of further inquiry. Let us call > the proposition expressed as it is in this further question that takes > inquiry yet further (B). > > In such a case, the purported dormative virtue of opium is functioning in > the first argument (A) as the predicate asserted in the logical > interpretant. In the second case (B), it is the object of further inquiry > about which further conclusions might be drawn. In both cases, the > dormative virtue has the character of a general habit. As such, I don't see > how the analysis you've offered in terms of the firstness, secondness and > thirdness of objects and interpretants will put us in a position of > explaining the services that the proposition concerning the > dormative virtue of opium is performing when it is functioning first as a > logical interpretant (in case A) and then later as an object of further > inquiry (in case B). > > Hope that helps to clarify the question I am trying to raise about the > account you are offering. You might be able to further refine your > explanations to handle this kind of case, but it isn't clear to me how that > might go. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Sunday, March 4, 2018 12:20:37 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited > > Jeff, List: > > For clarification, could you please offer a concrete example of a scenario > that you believe my proposal cannot sufficiently take into account? I > agree that each of the two Objects and each of the three Interpretants--as > well as the Sign itself and its external relations with the other > non-immediate Correlates--can be classified as Possible, Existent, or > Necessitant; although only certain combinations are feasible, depending > upon how one arranges them into an order of determination. > > Thanks, > > Jon S. > > On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 12:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > [email protected]> wrote: > >> Jon S, Gary F, List, >> >> The proposal Jon is putting forward for distinguishing between the object >> and interpretant in a semiotic process seems, on the face of it, to be >> insufficient to account for cases of hypostatic abstraction. In this type >> of abstraction, the interpretant is--in the next stage of >> inference--treated as the object in relation to some further sign and >> interpretant. The primary way Peirce seems to distinguish between an >> interpretant and one that is later taken as an object in some further >> inference is in terms of the services each is serving and the relations >> that hold--and not in terms of the categories that are prominent in each >> correlate of the triadic sign relation considered in itself. After all, >> each kind of object can be characterized as a possible, an existent or a >> necessitant, as can each kind of interpretant. >> >> --Jeff >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> >> ------------------------------ >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Saturday, March 3, 2018 5:52:27 PM >> *To:* Peirce-L >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited >> >> Gary F., List: >> >> I agree that it is important to maintain a sharp distinction between the >> Object and the Interpretant, and I believe that this is reflected in my >> current exposition of EP 2:304 in light of EP 2:305-307 and NEM 4:292-300. >> >> Matter (2ns) and Form (1ns) both pertain to the Object. The Matter is >> what the Sign *denotes*, corresponding to its logical *breadth*; the >> Form is what the Sign *signifies*, corresponding to its logical *depth*. >> A pure Index is perfect in denotation but lacking in signification, while a >> pure Icon is perfect in signification but lacking in denotation. >> >> Entelechy (3ns) pertains to the Interpretant. It is what the Sign >> *determines >> *as the (purported) unity of the denoted Matter with the signified Form, >> corresponding to its *information* (breadth x depth). As you noted, the >> latter two can both be analyzed as *subjects *of any Sign, leaving only >> their logical relation as a *continuous predicate*. >> >> As for the distinction between the two Objects, I have suggested that the >> Dynamic Object is the Matter and the Immediate Object is the Form; hence my >> description of the latter as a "*partial *combination of attributes." >> This is consistent with situating the Immediate Object "within the Sign" >> (EP 2:480; 1908) and recognizing the latter as "a Medium for the >> communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906). >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:53 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Thanks Jon and Gary for your well articulated answers to my questions in >>> this thread. >>> >>> My main concern was that your Immediate Object was sounding too much >>> like an interpretant. The object/interpretant distinction is of course >>> vital to triadic semiosis, and closely related to the subject/predicate >>> distinction in propositions and the matter/form distinction which Jon >>> mentions in Peirce’s 1904 writings. As Jon wrote, “Only the Sign >>> *itself*--not its Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that >>> unites Matter (denotation) and Form (signification) in its Interpretant >>> (determination).” How then can an immediate *object *consist of >>> “attributes” (or characters or predicates) of the Dynamic Object? >>> >>> But I was forgetting that these distinctions get relativized in Peirce’s >>> late semiotic, so that parts of what is usually considered the predicate >>> can alternatively be “thrown into” the subject, leaving only a continuous >>> predicate. I just came across a passage about this written by Peirce in >>> December 1909: >>> >>> [[ The determination by a Sign of its Interpreting Mind,– i.e. the idea >>> that mind gets, or the feeling it sets up, or the action it stimulates, >>> I call its "Interpretant"; and there is all the difference in the world >>> between the *Object *of a sign, of which the Interpreter must have some >>> *collateral *experience, immediate or mediate, or he won't know at all >>> what it is that the Sign represents [ ... ] and whoever questions that >>> point simply fails to understand what I mean by the Object, and >>> confounds it with the Interpretant. The latter is *all *that the sign >>> *conveys. >>> * The Object is the otherwise known something concerning which what it >>> conveys relates. The distinction is a *real *distinction and yet it is >>> *purely >>> relative, *in the sense that the line of demarcation between the two >>> can just as well be drawn in one place as another. [ ... ] The point is >>> that the artificiality of a line of demarcation does not prove that the >>> *twoness >>> * of the parts that line of demarcation may be regarded as separating >>> does not correspond to any twoness *in re.* — RL 36 ]] >>> >>> >>> >>> So I have nothing more to say on that subject! >>> >>> >>> >>> Gary f. >>> >>> >>> >>> } In a consumer society there are inevitably two kinds of slaves: the >>> prisoners of addiction and the prisoners of envy. [Ivan Illich] { >>> >>> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >>> >>
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