Jeff, List: For clarification, could you please offer a concrete example of a scenario that you believe my proposal cannot sufficiently take into account? I agree that each of the two Objects and each of the three Interpretants--as well as the Sign itself and its external relations with the other non-immediate Correlates--can be classified as Possible, Existent, or Necessitant; although only certain combinations are feasible, depending upon how one arranges them into an order of determination.
Thanks, Jon S. On Sun, Mar 4, 2018 at 12:05 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > Jon S, Gary F, List, > > The proposal Jon is putting forward for distinguishing between the object > and interpretant in a semiotic process seems, on the face of it, to be > insufficient to account for cases of hypostatic abstraction. In this type > of abstraction, the interpretant is--in the next stage of > inference--treated as the object in relation to some further sign and > interpretant. The primary way Peirce seems to distinguish between an > interpretant and one that is later taken as an object in some further > inference is in terms of the services each is serving and the relations > that hold--and not in terms of the categories that are prominent in each > correlate of the triadic sign relation considered in itself. After all, > each kind of object can be characterized as a possible, an existent or a > necessitant, as can each kind of interpretant. > > --Jeff > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354> > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Saturday, March 3, 2018 5:52:27 PM > *To:* Peirce-L > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Quasi-minds Revisited > > Gary F., List: > > I agree that it is important to maintain a sharp distinction between the > Object and the Interpretant, and I believe that this is reflected in my > current exposition of EP 2:304 in light of EP 2:305-307 and NEM 4:292-300. > > Matter (2ns) and Form (1ns) both pertain to the Object. The Matter is > what the Sign *denotes*, corresponding to its logical *breadth*; the Form > is what the Sign *signifies*, corresponding to its logical *depth*. A > pure Index is perfect in denotation but lacking in signification, while a > pure Icon is perfect in signification but lacking in denotation. > > Entelechy (3ns) pertains to the Interpretant. It is what the Sign *determines > *as the (purported) unity of the denoted Matter with the signified Form, > corresponding to its *information* (breadth x depth). As you noted, the > latter two can both be analyzed as *subjects *of any Sign, leaving only > their logical relation as a *continuous predicate*. > > As for the distinction between the two Objects, I have suggested that the > Dynamic Object is the Matter and the Immediate Object is the Form; hence my > description of the latter as a "*partial *combination of attributes." > This is consistent with situating the Immediate Object "within the Sign" > (EP 2:480; 1908) and recognizing the latter as "a Medium for the > communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22; 1906). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Mar 3, 2018 at 10:53 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Thanks Jon and Gary for your well articulated answers to my questions in >> this thread. >> >> My main concern was that your Immediate Object was sounding too much like >> an interpretant. The object/interpretant distinction is of course vital to >> triadic semiosis, and closely related to the subject/predicate distinction >> in propositions and the matter/form distinction which Jon mentions in >> Peirce’s 1904 writings. As Jon wrote, “Only the Sign *itself*--not its >> Immediate Object--can be a concept (Symbol) that unites Matter (denotation) >> and Form (signification) in its Interpretant (determination).” How then can >> an immediate *object *consist of “attributes” (or characters or >> predicates) of the Dynamic Object? >> >> But I was forgetting that these distinctions get relativized in Peirce’s >> late semiotic, so that parts of what is usually considered the predicate >> can alternatively be “thrown into” the subject, leaving only a continuous >> predicate. I just came across a passage about this written by Peirce in >> December 1909: >> >> [[ The determination by a Sign of its Interpreting Mind,– i.e. the idea >> that mind gets, or the feeling it sets up, or the action it stimulates, >> I call its "Interpretant"; and there is all the difference in the world >> between the *Object *of a sign, of which the Interpreter must have some >> *collateral *experience, immediate or mediate, or he won't know at all >> what it is that the Sign represents [ ... ] and whoever questions that >> point simply fails to understand what I mean by the Object, and >> confounds it with the Interpretant. The latter is *all *that the sign >> *conveys. >> * The Object is the otherwise known something concerning which what it >> conveys relates. The distinction is a *real *distinction and yet it is >> *purely >> relative, *in the sense that the line of demarcation between the two can >> just as well be drawn in one place as another. [ ... ] The point is that >> the artificiality of a line of demarcation does not prove that the *twoness >> * of the parts that line of demarcation may be regarded as separating >> does not correspond to any twoness *in re.* — RL 36 ]] >> >> >> >> So I have nothing more to say on that subject! >> >> >> >> Gary f. >> >> >> >> } In a consumer society there are inevitably two kinds of slaves: the >> prisoners of addiction and the prisoners of envy. [Ivan Illich] { >> >> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ *Turning Signs* gateway >> >
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