Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear JAS, list,



Thank you for all your work in collating.



*Now let us turn to the phaneron and see what we find in fact. (CP 1.299)*



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 9:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> List:
>
> Speculating is easy and sometimes even fun, but I suggest that the best
> way to ascertain what Peirce means by "predestinate" is carefully studying
> how else he uses the word and its close cognates in his writings (all bold
> added).
>
> CSP:  Because the only purpose of inquiry is the settlement of opinion, we
> have seen that everyone who investigates, that is, pursues an inquiry by
> the fourth method [that of science] assumes that that process will, if
> carried far enough, lead him to a certain conclusion, he knows not what
> beforehand, but which no further investigation will change. No matter what
> his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one
> *predestinated* belief. (CP 7.327, 1873)
>
> CSP:  Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but
> the progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves
> to one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are
> carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the
> operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no
> selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can
> enable a man to escape the *predestinate *opinion. This great hope is
> embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is
> fated* to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean
> by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That
> is the way I would explain reality.
> *Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be
> avoided. It is a superstition to suppose that a certain sort of events are
> ever fated, and it is another to suppose that the word fate can never be
> freed from its superstitious taint. We are all fated to die. (CP 5.407, EP
> 1:138-139, 1878)
>
> CSP:  At the same time that this process of inference, or the spontaneous
> development of belief, is continually going on within us, fresh peripheral
> excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits. Thus, belief
> is partly determined by old beliefs and partly by new experience. Is there
> any law about the mode of the peripheral excitations? The logician
> maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that
> of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain *predestinate *conclusions
> which are the same for all men. This is the faith of the logician. This is
> the matter of fact, upon which all maxims of reasoning repose. In virtue of
> this fact, what is to be believed at last is independent of what has been
> believed hitherto, and therefore has the character of *reality*. Hence,
> if a given habit, considered as determining an inference, is of such a sort
> as to tend toward the final result, it is correct; otherwise not. Thus,
> inferences become divisible into the valid and the invalid; and thus logic
> takes its reason of existence. (CP 3.161, 1880)
>
> CSP:  [T]he only object to which inquiry seeks to make our opinion conform
> is itself something of the nature of thought; namely, it is the
> *predestined* ultimate idea, which is independent of what you, I, or any
> number of men may persist, for however long, in thinking, yet which remains
> thought, after all. (CP 8.101, c. 1900)
>
> CSP:  In the light of what has been said, what are we to say to that
> logical fatalism whose stock in trade is the argument that I have already
> indicated? I mean the argument that science is *predestined *to reach the
> truth, and that it can therefore make no difference whether she observes
> carefully or carelessly nor what sort of formulae she treats as reasons.
> The answer to it is that the only kind of *predestination *of the
> attainment of truth by science is an eventual *predestination*,--a 
> *predestination
> **aliquando denique*. Sooner or later it will attain the truth, nothing
> more. ... Let us remember, then, that the precise practical service of
> sound theory of logic is to abbreviate the time of waiting to know the
> truth, to expedite the *predestined *result. (CP 7.78, c. 1905-6)
>
> CSP:  I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so
> far as there is any "truth") to its being the *predestined *result to
> which sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907)
>
>
> It is not that reality *itself *is predestined, but that reality is the 
> *object
> *of "the predestinate opinion," which is "the ultimate interpretant of
> every sign" (EP 2:304, 1904)--whatever *would *be believed by an infinite
> community after infinite inquiry.  Brute 2ns and spontaneous 1ns ensure
> that the necessities of the future are *conditional*, rather than actual;
> as Vincent Colapietro has put it, "It 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

Speculating is easy and sometimes even fun, but I suggest that the best way
to ascertain what Peirce means by "predestinate" is carefully studying how
else he uses the word and its close cognates in his writings (all bold
added).

CSP:  Because the only purpose of inquiry is the settlement of opinion, we
have seen that everyone who investigates, that is, pursues an inquiry by
the fourth method [that of science] assumes that that process will, if
carried far enough, lead him to a certain conclusion, he knows not what
beforehand, but which no further investigation will change. No matter what
his opinion at the outset may be, it is assumed that he will end in one
*predestinated* belief. (CP 7.327, 1873)

CSP:  Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the
progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to
one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are
carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the
operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no
selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can
enable a man to escape the *predestinate *opinion. This great hope is
embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is
fated* to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean
by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That
is the way I would explain reality.
*Fate means merely that which is sure to come true, and can nohow be
avoided. It is a superstition to suppose that a certain sort of events are
ever fated, and it is another to suppose that the word fate can never be
freed from its superstitious taint. We are all fated to die. (CP 5.407, EP
1:138-139, 1878)

CSP:  At the same time that this process of inference, or the spontaneous
development of belief, is continually going on within us, fresh peripheral
excitations are also continually creating new belief-habits. Thus, belief
is partly determined by old beliefs and partly by new experience. Is there
any law about the mode of the peripheral excitations? The logician
maintains that there is, namely, that they are all adapted to an end, that
of carrying belief, in the long run, toward certain *predestinate *conclusions
which are the same for all men. This is the faith of the logician. This is
the matter of fact, upon which all maxims of reasoning repose. In virtue of
this fact, what is to be believed at last is independent of what has been
believed hitherto, and therefore has the character of *reality*. Hence, if
a given habit, considered as determining an inference, is of such a sort as
to tend toward the final result, it is correct; otherwise not. Thus,
inferences become divisible into the valid and the invalid; and thus logic
takes its reason of existence. (CP 3.161, 1880)

CSP:  [T]he only object to which inquiry seeks to make our opinion conform
is itself something of the nature of thought; namely, it is the
*predestined* ultimate idea, which is independent of what you, I, or any
number of men may persist, for however long, in thinking, yet which remains
thought, after all. (CP 8.101, c. 1900)

CSP:  In the light of what has been said, what are we to say to that
logical fatalism whose stock in trade is the argument that I have already
indicated? I mean the argument that science is *predestined *to reach the
truth, and that it can therefore make no difference whether she observes
carefully or carelessly nor what sort of formulae she treats as reasons.
The answer to it is that the only kind of *predestination *of the
attainment of truth by science is an eventual *predestination*,--a
*predestination
**aliquando denique*. Sooner or later it will attain the truth, nothing
more. ... Let us remember, then, that the precise practical service of
sound theory of logic is to abbreviate the time of waiting to know the
truth, to expedite the *predestined *result. (CP 7.78, c. 1905-6)

CSP:  I hold that truth's independence of individual opinions is due (so
far as there is any "truth") to its being the *predestined *result to which
sufficient inquiry would ultimately lead. (CP 5.494, EP 2:419, 1907)


It is not that reality *itself *is predestined, but that reality is the *object
*of "the predestinate opinion," which is "the ultimate interpretant of
every sign" (EP 2:304, 1904)--whatever *would *be believed by an infinite
community after infinite inquiry.  Brute 2ns and spontaneous 1ns ensure
that the necessities of the future are *conditional*, rather than actual;
as Vincent Colapietro has put it, "It means what *would *occur, not what
will inevitably despite all else occur."  There is no agency implied,
immaterial or otherwise.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

>

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Robert, List:

I apologize for the apparent lack of clarity in my posts.  In this one, I
will try to limit myself to addressing your two specific requests as
directly as I can.

I have no objection whatsoever to the hexad sequence Od → Oi → S → Id →
Ie → Iex where Od = dynamoid object, Oi = immediate object, S = sign, Id =
destinate interpretant, Ie = effective interpretant, Iex = explicit
interpretant, and → = determines.  After all, this is exactly what Peirce
states at EP 2:481 (1908).

Right before this, he defines "determines" in what I call the *logical*
sense--"a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible" and "a Necessitant
can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant."  In other words,
the universe to which any one correlate belongs *constrains *the
universe(s) to which the next correlate in the sequence can belong.  If the
dynamical object is a possible (1ns), then all the subsequent correlates
are likewise possibles (1ns).  If the explicit interpretant is a
necessitant (3ns), then all the previous correlates are likewise
necessitants (3ns).  If the sign itself is an existent (2ns), then the
destinate interpretant is either a possible (1ns) or an existent (2ns).
And so on, yielding 28 classes of signs rather than 729.

As far as I know, we agree that the dynamoid object is what Peirce
elsewhere calls the dynamical object, and that the effective interpretant
is what he elsewhere calls the dynamical interpretant.  Our disagreement
thus seems to be limited to the other two interpretants.  For reasons that
I have explained, I believe that the destinate interpretant is what Peirce
elsewhere calls the final interpretant, and that the explicit interpretant
is what he elsewhere calls the immediate interpretant.  Just as the genuine
(dynamical) object logically determines the degenerate (immediate) object,
the genuine (final) interpretant logically determines the degenerate
(dynamical) interpretant, which logically determines the doubly degenerate
(immediate) interpretant.  I define these three interpretants as follows.

   - The immediate (explicit) interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly
   could* signify to someone who possesses the requisite acquaintance with
   the system of signs to which it belongs.
   - The dynamical (effective) interpretant is whatever an individual sign
   token *actually does* signify to someone on an individual occasion.
   - The final (destinate) interpretant is whatever the sign itself
*necessarily
   would* signify to someone under ideal circumstances, including the
   ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.

Is that helpful?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:49 PM robert marty 
wrote:

> Jon Alan, Gary F., List
>
> I agree for only one place for "destinate" but none for "predestinate" ,
> otherwise I'm sure you would have found it and brandished it like a trophy
> ... 
>
>
>
> Now I have to admit that I can't figure out what you say is clear so much
> you're making little effort in the presentation to be precisely clear. You
> produce such a fog of quotations, sentences that say what a thing is mixed
> with what it is not, that a logical order in ideal circumstances is not
> chronological order in other circumstances, ... that I declare myself
> incapable in the current state of our exchanges to take a critical look at
> your statement. I would like to quote Jean-Jacques Rousseau:
>
>
>
> "*On pourrait, pour élaguer peu les tortillages et les amphigouris,
> obliger tout harangueur à énoncer au commencement de son discours la
> proposition qu'il veut faire".*(J.J. Rousseau, Le Gouvernement de
> Pologne.)
>
>
>
> a sentence with two old terms untranslatable but you guess criticisms that
> I like which means that it would "*require any speaker to state at the
> beginning of his speech the proposal he wishes to make*"...  It's an
> effort I made to look at what was behind your Sà(S-Od) à (S-If)  sequence
> and I think I made it clear, which took me a long time.
>
>
>
> Also I would be very obliged to expose you
>
>
> ·what sequence you object exactly to the sequence:
>
>Od à Oi à S à Id à Ie à Iex  (LW December 23 1908) ?
>
>(understanding that this sequence must be understood with the
> definitions I haveclearly stated for each of its elements including the
> arrows)
>
>
>
> ·and of course, for each of its elements, the exact definition
> you give of them, including the arrows.
>
>
>
> Otherwise we will leave it by force of things…
>
>
>
> In the meantime,
>
> Well cordially to you
>
> Robert
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parts of Propositions (was qualisigns)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jerry C., List:

JLRC:  I find the notion of “of an incomplete proposition” to be novel. Do
you happen to recall the origin of it?


I believe that it is a well-known and uncontroversial aspect of Peirce's
thought.  For example ...

CSP:  In the first place, I say that every relationship concerns some
definite number of correlates ... We may express this as saying that every
relation has a definite number of blanks to be filled by indices, or
otherwise ...

In a complete proposition there are no blanks. (CP 3.464-465, 1897)

CSP:  By a *rheme*, or *predicate*, will here be meant a blank form of
proposition which might have resulted by striking out certain parts of a
proposition, and leaving a *blank* in the place of each, the parts stricken
out being such that if each blank were filled with a proper name, a
proposition (however nonsensical) would thereby be recomposed. (CP 4.560,
1906)


Similar passages include CP 2.379 (1902), CP 2.272 (1903), and CP 4.454
(1903).  Rhemes as incomplete propositions are monads, dyads, triads, etc.
based on the number of blanks; but a complete proposition is a medad,
because it has no blanks.

JLRC:  A graphic line of identity is connector between terms / Symbols.
Are you mixing Apples and Oranges?


Not at all.  Each line of identity is a subject (concretive designative
term) that denotes an indefinite individual ("something"), while each
labeled spot that is connected to it by means of a peg is a subject
(abstractive descriptive term) that denotes a general concept (quality or
relation) being attributed to that individual by the resulting
proposition.  Again, the predicate is signified by the syntax of the
existential graph, not any distinct component that corresponds to the
copula, since pegs are not scribed.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, May 18, 2020 at 11:12 PM Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> List, Jon:
>
> Thank you for your comments, which I found to be curious.
>
> The curiosity response arises from a CSP text that made a lot of sense to
> me from a grammatical perspective, a scientific (chemical causality)
> perspective and a philosophical perspective.  I am referring to MS 229 from
> Spring 1873, W3, 90-92. Chap.VIII Of the Copula.
> Is your rhetorical response justified?   Some comments are inserted below.
>
> On May 11, 2020, at 8:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Jerry C., List:
>
> JLRC:  I suggest that CSP was consistent in his deployment of the triadic
> grammatical relatives (subject, copula, predicate).
>
>
> On my reading, Peirce did not consider the copula to be an essential part of
> a proposition in the same sense as the subjects and predicate.
>
> Is this assertion anything more than a tautology?
> “The term that precedes the copula is called the subject of the
> proposition and that which follows it the predicate.” [W3,90-92]
> The gloss of the “copula” includes the logical notation " —<  “ which some
> find to be a critical aspect of CSP’s originality as a logician.
>
> CSP:  I have said that the subjects and predicate are the two parts of an
> assertion. (Abelard reckoned the copula as a third part; and in a certain
> sense, it is a part of an assertion, but not in the sense in which the
> subject and predicate are parts. It is nothing but a mark that the
> predicate is to be understood predicatively, that is, as conveying
> information, and not as limiting the denotation of the grammatical
> subject.) (R 339:492, 1908)
>
> How else is a predicate to be understood?
> Historically, this perspective was offered by Leibniz more than a century
> earlier.
>
> That is why joining the copula with a term creates a *rheme*, which can
> be treated as the entire predicate of an *incomplete *proposition.
> However, this is an accidental property of certain languages; in others, 
> *syntax
> *is sufficient to signify predication.
>
> This sentence makes no sense at all to me.
> It is my understanding that the logical usage of the word “term” is merely
> a shortening of the word “terminal”, that is the beginning and ending words
> of a simple sentence.  (Bill marries Rita.)
>
> I find the notion of “of an incomplete proposition” to be novel. Do you
> happen to recall the origin of it?  Would this notion
>
> CSP:  Finally, our conclusions require that the proposition should have an
> actual *Syntax*, which is represented to be the Index of those elements
> of the fact represented that correspond to the Subject and Predicate. This
> is apparent in all propositions. Since Abelard it has been usual to make
> this Syntax a third part of the proposition, under the name of the Copula.
> The historical cause of the emergence of this conception in the twelfth
> century was, of course, that the Latin of that day did not permit the
> omission of the verb *est*, which was familiarly, though 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

“Let us acknowledge, then, that we have no preamble.  ..

 for the statement that is to follow the prelude is one of no small
importance, and it makes no difference whether these statements are
distinctly or indistinctly remembered.”~ *Laws*, 723c



I hope that helps.



With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 6:14 PM Jerry Rhee  wrote:

> Dear Cecile, Helmut, Michael, Robert, Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> Hence, this is why I do not believe it.
>
>
>
> With best wishes,
> Jerry R
>
>
>
>
>
> Helmut said:
> do I understand it correctly, that the paradoxon here is, that the final
> interpretant is the first element in logical order, but the last in
> temporal order? In this case I would propose a solution attempt like this:
> The truth works as a motive, a quest for it, although it is not yet
> achieved. People (animals, organisms, molecules?) have a feeling,
> intuition, instinct, internalised law or axiom, that everything has or
> would have a true representation. This final interpretant, though not
> realised, does nevertheless do its work for the sign this way here and now.
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 6:01 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry- you are moving into Alice in Wonderland territory: Why is a raven
>> like a writing desk?
>>
>> And remember, the White Queen in Alive Through the Looking Glass could
>> remember future events before they even happened!
>>
>> And I quote the Queen..."Why sometimes I've believed as many as six
>> impossible things before breakfast!.
>>
>> And the Cat said: "We're all mad here. I'm made. You're mad..
>>
>> How do you know I'm mad? said Alice. ' You must be, said the Cat, or you
>> wouldn't have come here.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 19/05/20 6:23 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Dear Edwina, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Isn’t the a priori before the opinion, whether predestinate or destinate?
>>
>> So we could even decide whether we intend the a priori as necessary when
>> we refer to predestinate opinion.
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:14 PM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry - surely you are joking with me!
>>>
>>> How can there be such a 'thing' as a predestinate opinion???  Is there
>>> any 'thing' whether material or cognitive (an opinion) that is
>>> 'predestinate', ie, is there any actuality that is predetermined to become
>>> that actuality??? Is there anything that has been preplanned such that the
>>> outcome is necessary and unchangeable?  I can't think of a single material
>>> or cognitive 'thing'.. Necessity is always confronted with possibility.
>>>
>>> You cannot use me as your authority or guide as to whether a
>>> 'predestinate' is good or bad; you must make up your own mind.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue 19/05/20 5:30 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thank you for your response.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
>>> attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not believe
>>> in it.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> If it is good, I ought to believe in it because
>>>
>>> predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth
>>>
>>> and I prefer truth to untruth.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared to
>>> act,
>>>
>>> or would you recommend against it?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best wishes,
>>>
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation out
 of an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.

 To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the
 decision to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial agency
 making such a decision

 Edwina



 On Tue 19/05/20 2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:

 Dear Edwina, list,



 What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate opinion’?

 I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move,

 as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
 habitual hiccup.



 I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and
 supposition,

 preamble and amble or precognition and cognition?



 Best,
 Jerry R

 On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky 
 wrote:

> Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis
> generates regulative principles but as to whether these are 'abductive
> hopes' - hmm. I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the Universe
> actually 'hope'?  I think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with Will 
> understood
> only as the Will-to-Generate the 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Cecile, Helmut, Michael, Robert, Edwina, list,



Hence, this is why I do not believe it.



With best wishes,
Jerry R





Helmut said:
do I understand it correctly, that the paradoxon here is, that the final
interpretant is the first element in logical order, but the last in
temporal order? In this case I would propose a solution attempt like this:
The truth works as a motive, a quest for it, although it is not yet
achieved. People (animals, organisms, molecules?) have a feeling,
intuition, instinct, internalised law or axiom, that everything has or
would have a true representation. This final interpretant, though not
realised, does nevertheless do its work for the sign this way here and now.

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 6:01 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jerry- you are moving into Alice in Wonderland territory: Why is a raven
> like a writing desk?
>
> And remember, the White Queen in Alive Through the Looking Glass could
> remember future events before they even happened!
>
> And I quote the Queen..."Why sometimes I've believed as many as six
> impossible things before breakfast!.
>
> And the Cat said: "We're all mad here. I'm made. You're mad..
>
> How do you know I'm mad? said Alice. ' You must be, said the Cat, or you
> wouldn't have come here.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue 19/05/20 6:23 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Dear Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> Isn’t the a priori before the opinion, whether predestinate or destinate?
>
> So we could even decide whether we intend the a priori as necessary when
> we refer to predestinate opinion.
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:14 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry - surely you are joking with me!
>>
>> How can there be such a 'thing' as a predestinate opinion???  Is there
>> any 'thing' whether material or cognitive (an opinion) that is
>> 'predestinate', ie, is there any actuality that is predetermined to become
>> that actuality??? Is there anything that has been preplanned such that the
>> outcome is necessary and unchangeable?  I can't think of a single material
>> or cognitive 'thing'.. Necessity is always confronted with possibility.
>>
>> You cannot use me as your authority or guide as to whether a
>> 'predestinate' is good or bad; you must make up your own mind.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 19/05/20 5:30 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Edwina, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thank you for your response.
>>
>>
>>
>> To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
>> attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative.
>>
>>
>>
>> For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not believe
>> in it.
>>
>>
>>
>> If it is good, I ought to believe in it because
>>
>> predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth
>>
>> and I prefer truth to untruth.
>>
>>
>>
>> There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.
>>
>>
>>
>> So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared to
>> act,
>>
>> or would you recommend against it?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best wishes,
>>
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation out
>>> of an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.
>>>
>>> To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the
>>> decision to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial agency
>>> making such a decision
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue 19/05/20 2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>>
>>> Dear Edwina, list,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate opinion’?
>>>
>>> I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move,
>>>
>>> as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
>>> habitual hiccup.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and
>>> supposition,
>>>
>>> preamble and amble or precognition and cognition?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>> Jerry R
>>>
>>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis
 generates regulative principles but as to whether these are 'abductive
 hopes' - hmm. I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the Universe
 actually 'hope'?  I think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with Will understood
 only as the Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.

 Edwina



 On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:

 Edwina, All ...

 In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the last
 couple of decades I think it's most commonly
 been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
 principles, in effect falling into the category of
 abductive hopes.

 Regards,

 Jon

 On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
 >
 >
 > Robert, Gary F, list - 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jerry- you are moving into Alice in Wonderland territory: Why is a
raven like a writing desk?

And remember, the White Queen in Alive Through the Looking Glass
could remember future events before they even happened!

And I quote the Queen..."Why sometimes I've believed as many as six
impossible things before breakfast!.

And the Cat said: "We're all mad here. I'm made. You're mad..

How do you know I'm mad? said Alice. ' You must be, said the Cat, or
you wouldn't have come here.

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20  6:23 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Dear Edwina, list, 
Isn’t the a priori before the opinion, whether predestinate or
destinate?

So we could even decide whether we intend the a priori as necessary
when we refer to predestinate opinion.   
Best,
 Jerry R
 On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:14 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jerry - surely you are joking with me!

How can there be such a 'thing' as a predestinate opinion???  Is
there any 'thing' whether material or cognitive (an opinion) that is
'predestinate', ie, is there any actuality that is predetermined to
become that actuality??? Is there anything that has been preplanned
such that the outcome is necessary and unchangeable?  I can't think
of a single material or cognitive 'thing'.. Necessity is always
confronted with possibility.  

You cannot use me as your authority or guide as to whether a
'predestinate' is good or bad; you must make up your own mind.

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20  5:30 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com [2] sent:
Edwina, list, 
Thank you for your response. 
To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative. 
For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not
believe in it. 
If it is good, I ought to believe in it because  

predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth 

and I prefer truth to untruth. 
There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.

So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared
to act,  

or would you recommend against it? 
Best wishes, 

Jerry R
 On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation
out of an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.


To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the
decision to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial
agency making such a decision

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20  2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Dear Edwina, list, 
What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate
opinion’? 

I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move, 


as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
habitual hiccup.   
I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and
supposition,  

preamble and amble or precognition and cognition? 
Best,
 Jerry R
 On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis
generates regulative principles but as to whether these are
'abductive hopes' - hmm. I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the
Universe actually 'hope'?  I think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with
Will understood only as the Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
 Edwina, All ... 
 In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the
last couple of decades I think it's most commonly  
 been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
principles, in effect falling into the category of  
 abductive hopes. 
 Regards, 
 Jon 
 On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 >
 >  
 >  Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept
of 
 > a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a 
 > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an
agenda 
 > is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'. 
 >  
 >  Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both 
 > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this
'thing'. 
 > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that
there 
 > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a
poison; 
 > in the factual nature of an historical event. 
 >  
 >  But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean 
 > semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that
'if 
 > you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of
whether 
 > X is a poison or the truth of what happened' 
 >  
 >  This 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Edwina, list,



Isn’t the *a priori* before the opinion, whether predestinate or destinate?

So we could even decide whether we intend the *a priori* as necessary when
we refer to predestinate opinion.



Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 5:14 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jerry - surely you are joking with me!
>
> How can there be such a 'thing' as a predestinate opinion???  Is there any
> 'thing' whether material or cognitive (an opinion) that is 'predestinate',
> ie, is there any actuality that is predetermined to become that
> actuality??? Is there anything that has been preplanned such that the
> outcome is necessary and unchangeable?  I can't think of a single material
> or cognitive 'thing'.. Necessity is always confronted with possibility.
>
> You cannot use me as your authority or guide as to whether a
> 'predestinate' is good or bad; you must make up your own mind.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 19/05/20 5:30 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> Thank you for your response.
>
>
>
> To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
> attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative.
>
>
>
> For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not believe in
> it.
>
>
>
> If it is good, I ought to believe in it because
>
> predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth
>
> and I prefer truth to untruth.
>
>
>
> There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.
>
>
>
> So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared to act,
>
> or would you recommend against it?
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation out
>> of an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.
>>
>> To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the decision
>> to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial agency making
>> such a decision
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 19/05/20 2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> Dear Edwina, list,
>>
>>
>>
>> What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate opinion’?
>>
>> I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move,
>>
>> as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
>> habitual hiccup.
>>
>>
>>
>> I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and supposition,
>>
>> preamble and amble or precognition and cognition?
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis generates
>>> regulative principles but as to whether these are 'abductive hopes' - hmm.
>>> I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the Universe actually 'hope'?  I
>>> think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with Will understood only as the
>>> Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, All ...
>>>
>>> In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the last
>>> couple of decades I think it's most commonly
>>> been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
>>> principles, in effect falling into the category of
>>> abductive hopes.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of
>>> > a 'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a
>>> > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda
>>> > is the 'nature of Peircean semiosis'.
>>> >
>>> > Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both
>>> > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'.
>>> > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there
>>> > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison;
>>> > in the factual nature of an historical event.
>>> >
>>> > But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean
>>> > semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if
>>> > you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether
>>> > X is a poison or the truth of what happened'
>>> >
>>> > This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can
>>> > never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness. It
>>> > ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally
>>> > ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it
>>> > ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty.
>>> >
>>> > I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or'
>>> > [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not] ….that
>>> > Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power
>>> > of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jerry - surely you are joking with me!

How can there be such a 'thing' as a predestinate opinion???  Is
there any 'thing' whether material or cognitive (an opinion) that is
'predestinate', ie, is there any actuality that is predetermined to
become that actuality??? Is there anything that has been preplanned
such that the outcome is necessary and unchangeable?  I can't think
of a single material or cognitive 'thing'.. Necessity is always
confronted with possibility. 

You cannot use me as your authority or guide as to whether a
'predestinate' is good or bad; you must make up your own mind.

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20  5:30 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Edwina, list, 
Thank you for your response. 
To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative. 
For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not
believe in it. 
If it is good, I ought to believe in it because  

predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth 

and I prefer truth to untruth. 
There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.

So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared
to act,  

or would you recommend against it? 
Best wishes, 

Jerry R
 On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation
out of an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.


To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the
decision to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial
agency making such a decision

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20  2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com [2] sent:
Dear Edwina, list, 
What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate
opinion’? 

I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move, 


as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
habitual hiccup.   
I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and
supposition,  

preamble and amble or precognition and cognition? 
Best,
 Jerry R
 On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis
generates regulative principles but as to whether these are
'abductive hopes' - hmm. I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the
Universe actually 'hope'?  I think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with
Will understood only as the Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
 Edwina, All ... 
 In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the
last couple of decades I think it's most commonly  
 been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
principles, in effect falling into the category of  
 abductive hopes. 
 Regards, 
 Jon 
 On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 >
 >  
 >  Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept
of 
 > a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a 
 > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an
agenda 
 > is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'. 
 >  
 >  Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both 
 > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this
'thing'. 
 > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that
there 
 > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a
poison; 
 > in the factual nature of an historical event. 
 >  
 >  But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean 
 > semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that
'if 
 > you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of
whether 
 > X is a poison or the truth of what happened' 
 >  
 >  This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which
can 
 > never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.
 It 
 > ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally 
 > ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it 
 > ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty. 
 >  
 >  I consider that - apart from these factual situations of
'either-or' 
 > [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that 
 > Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the
power 
 > of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects
predestination 
 > of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic
and 
 > open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'. 
 >  
 >  Edwina 
 >  


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosis and Truth

[Helmut Raulien]

 

 
 

Supplement: But I have understood, that this is the categorial sequence order, and the determination order is different, and starts wit Od.



Robert,

 

I am not a Peirce-expert. I have thought to have understood, that it is (3.3.), thirdness of thirdness, and the same as normal interpretant. The hexadic sign is {(1.), (2.1.), (2.2.), (3.1.), (3.2.), (3.3.)}, or (S, Oi, Od, Ii, Id, If), is it? If what I wrote is correct, I find it amazing, that the If´s function and determinational action is *merely* to confirm, that the object is, like all objects, identical with itself, and not identical with any other object. Something like the Pauli-Principle, a sort of basic axiom, that is part of common sense.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 
 

 19. Mai 2020 um 21:08 Uhr
 "robert marty" 
wrote:



Helmut, 

you are very close to what I say... however, I would like to know where you place this final interpretant in the hexadic sign... 

 

Best

Robert

 

 


Le mar. 19 mai 2020 à 17:08, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :




Edwina, List,

 

I think, that "final" in "final interpretant" is not meant like "in the future" or predestined, but just, that to everything could exist a unique, unambiguous representation of its momentary state and being. If a thing is blurred or ambiguous, this vagueness or ambiguity would be exactly and unambiguously represented by this final interpretant. Though the FI as a correlate is different from all other FIs, the sign´s correlation with it is always the same: It just is regarding any object as identical, unique, non-exchangeable, non-alternative. That is, taking it seriously. This is a very trivial relation, which is the basis for all relations and all communication. I think that atoms, organisms, people, have all internalized it, with only one exception, that is the president of the US, who claims being able to construe alternative facts.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 19. Mai 2020 um 14:09 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'.

Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'. Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison; in the factual nature of an historical event.

But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether X is a poison or the truth of what happened'

This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.  It ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty.

I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or' [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'.

Edwina

 
 

 

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the classification of signs

[robert marty]

Jon Alan, Gary F., List

I agree for only one place for "destinate" but none for "predestinate" ,
otherwise I'm sure you would have found it and brandished it like a trophy
... 



Now I have to admit that I can't figure out what you say is clear so much
you're making little effort in the presentation to be precisely clear. You
produce such a fog of quotations, sentences that say what a thing is mixed
with what it is not, that a logical order in ideal circumstances is not
chronological order in other circumstances, ... that I declare myself
incapable in the current state of our exchanges to take a critical look at
your statement. I would like to quote Jean-Jacques Rousseau:



"*On pourrait, pour élaguer peu les tortillages et les amphigouris, obliger
tout harangueur à énoncer au commencement de son discours la proposition
qu'il veut faire".*(J.J. Rousseau, Le Gouvernement de Pologne.)



a sentence with two old terms untranslatable but you guess criticisms that
I like which means that it would "*require any speaker to state at the
beginning of his speech the proposal he wishes to make*"...  It's an effort
I made to look at what was behind your Sà(S-Od) à (S-If)  sequence and I
think I made it clear, which took me a long time.



Also I would be very obliged to expose you


·what sequence you object exactly to the sequence:

   Od à Oi à S à Id à Ie à Iex  (LW December 23 1908) ?

   (understanding that this sequence must be understood with the
definitions I haveclearly stated for each of its elements including the
arrows)



·and of course, for each of its elements, the exact definition you
give of them, including the arrows.



Otherwise we will leave it by force of things…



In the meantime,

Well cordially to you

Robert



Le dim. 17 mai 2020 à 02:14, Jon Alan Schmidt  a
écrit :

> Robert, Edwina, List:
>
> I would simply like to offer three brief clarifications of my own views,
> and leave it at that.
>
> First, the object and interpretant in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy evidently
> correspond to the *dynamical *object and *final *interpretant in his
> later taxonomies, because he assigns the same names to the trichotomies for
> their relations with the sign--icon/index/symbol and
> rheme/dicisign/argument, although the latter eventually becomes
> seme/pheme/delome.
>
> Second, I have never suggested that the final interpretant "functions
> BEFORE" the immediate and dynamical interpretants.  What I have argued is
> that the final interpretant *logically determines* the dynamical
> interpretant, such that a sign that *would* produce a feeling under ideal
> circumstances can only *actually *produce a feeling, while only a sign
> that *would *produce a further sign under ideal circumstances can *actually
> *produce a further sign.  Moreover, I have explicitly and repeatedly
> denied that this has anything whatsoever to do with the *temporal *sequence
> of these interpretants.
>
> Third, consistent with this assessment, I believe that the destinate or
> intended interpretant corresponds to the final interpretant, while the
> explicit interpretant corresponds to the immediate interpretant.  I have
> explained my reasoning for these assignments here
> , here
> , and
> here .
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, May 16, 2020 at 5:02 PM robert marty 
> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, List
>>
>> I first clarify that I think I agree with most people on the list that
>> the hexadic sign is a refinement of the triadic sign and therefore
>> naturally responds to more precise ones. It is a difficult exercise to do
>> an analysis of a concrete case.
>>
>> As far as the question of interpretants is concerned, you know that when
>> mathematical objects are given they don't care what you put in the "place
>> marks". But I will not avoid your question because I have already had
>> debates on this, especially at the early days of the list. I have probably
>> moved on this issue.
>>
>> But here's what I think today: I prefer the hexad Od à Oi à S à Id à Ie à
>> Iex  (LW December 23 1908) for the reasons concerning Id, the intended
>> interpretant, that for me is induced by the Od influencing  the mind across
>> the S that it determines .
>>
>> In terms of communication it would be the interpretation on which the
>> issuer of a sign can count in a society where cultural codes are fixed
>> (temporarily but it is in a long time) ; intended taking with the value of
>> "hoped".
>>
>> Ie the effective interpretant is clearly the actual effect obtained that
>> is not is necessarily the same (and therefore one see the possibilities of
>> collective evolution 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosis and Truth

[Helmut Raulien]

Robert,

 

I am not a Peirce-expert. I have thought to have understood, that it is (3.3.), thirdness of thirdness, and the same as normal interpretant. The hexadic sign is {(1.), (2.1.), (2.2.), (3.1.), (3.2.), (3.3.)}, or (S, Oi, Od, Ii, Id, If), is it? If what I wrote is correct, I find it amazing, that the If´s function and determinational action is *merely* to confirm, that the object is, like all objects, identical with itself, and not identical with any other object. Something like the Pauli-Principle, a sort of basic axiom, that is part of common sense.

 

Best,

 

Helmut

 
 

 19. Mai 2020 um 21:08 Uhr
 "robert marty" 
wrote:



Helmut, 

you are very close to what I say... however, I would like to know where you place this final interpretant in the hexadic sign... 

 

Best

Robert

 

 


Le mar. 19 mai 2020 à 17:08, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :




Edwina, List,

 

I think, that "final" in "final interpretant" is not meant like "in the future" or predestined, but just, that to everything could exist a unique, unambiguous representation of its momentary state and being. If a thing is blurred or ambiguous, this vagueness or ambiguity would be exactly and unambiguously represented by this final interpretant. Though the FI as a correlate is different from all other FIs, the sign´s correlation with it is always the same: It just is regarding any object as identical, unique, non-exchangeable, non-alternative. That is, taking it seriously. This is a very trivial relation, which is the basis for all relations and all communication. I think that atoms, organisms, people, have all internalized it, with only one exception, that is the president of the US, who claims being able to construe alternative facts.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 19. Mai 2020 um 14:09 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'.

Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'. Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison; in the factual nature of an historical event.

But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether X is a poison or the truth of what happened'

This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.  It ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty.

I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or' [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'.

Edwina

 
 

 

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Edwina, list,



Thank you for your response.



To make the matter more clear, perhaps you can tell me whether your
attitude toward predestinate opinion is positive or negative.



For if the predestinate opinion is bad, then surely I ought not believe in
it.



If it is good, I ought to believe in it because

predestinate opinion-> destinate opinion -> truth

and I prefer truth to untruth.



There appears to be some measure of adequacy implied in the problem.



So, is predestinate opinion that upon which I ought to be prepared to act,

or would you recommend against it?



Best wishes,

Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 4:06 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation out of
> an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.
>
> To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the decision
> to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial agency making
> such a decision
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 19/05/20 2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Dear Edwina, list,
>
>
>
> What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate opinion’?
>
> I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move,
>
> as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
> habitual hiccup.
>
>
>
> I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and supposition,
>
> preamble and amble or precognition and cognition?
>
>
>
> Best,
> Jerry R
>
> On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis generates
>> regulative principles but as to whether these are 'abductive hopes' - hmm.
>> I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the Universe actually 'hope'?  I
>> think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with Will understood only as the
>> Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
>>
>> Edwina, All ...
>>
>> In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the last
>> couple of decades I think it's most commonly
>> been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
>> principles, in effect falling into the category of
>> abductive hopes.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon
>>
>> On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>> >
>> >
>> > Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of
>> > a 'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a
>> > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda
>> > is the 'nature of Peircean semiosis'.
>> >
>> > Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both
>> > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'.
>> > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there
>> > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison;
>> > in the factual nature of an historical event.
>> >
>> > But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean
>> > semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if
>> > you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether
>> > X is a poison or the truth of what happened'
>> >
>> > This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can
>> > never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness. It
>> > ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally
>> > ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it
>> > ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty.
>> >
>> > I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or'
>> > [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not] ….that
>> > Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power
>> > of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination
>> > of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and
>> > open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'.
>> >
>> > Edwina
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jerry - good point. I suppose the 'pre' somehow moves the situation
out of an 'actuallity' and into some kind of amorphous pre-actuality.


To say 'destinate' implies, possibly, an actual agent making the
decision to 'move ahead'; while 'predestinate' implies an immaterial
agency making such a decision

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20  2:40 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Dear Edwina, list, 
What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate
opinion’? 

I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move, 


as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a
habitual hiccup.   
I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and
supposition,  

preamble and amble or precognition and cognition? 
Best,
 Jerry R
 On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis
generates regulative principles but as to whether these are
'abductive hopes' - hmm. I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the
Universe actually 'hope'?  I think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with
Will understood only as the Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net [2] sent:
 Edwina, All ... 
 In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the
last couple of decades I think it's most commonly  
 been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
principles, in effect falling into the category of  
 abductive hopes. 
 Regards, 
 Jon 
 On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 >
 >  
 >  Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept
of 
 > a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a 
 > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an
agenda 
 > is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'. 
 >  
 >  Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both 
 > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this
'thing'. 
 > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that
there 
 > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a
poison; 
 > in the factual nature of an historical event. 
 >  
 >  But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean 
 > semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that
'if 
 > you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of
whether 
 > X is a poison or the truth of what happened' 
 >  
 >  This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which
can 
 > never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.
 It 
 > ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally 
 > ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it 
 > ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty. 
 >  
 >  I consider that - apart from these factual situations of
'either-or' 
 > [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that 
 > Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the
power 
 > of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects
predestination 
 > of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic
and 
 > open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'. 
 >  
 >  Edwina 
 >  


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jawb...@att.net\',\'\',\'\',\'\')

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosis and Truth

[robert marty]

Helmut,

you are very close to what I say... however, I would like to know where you
place this final interpretant in the hexadic sign...


Best

Robert



Le mar. 19 mai 2020 à 17:08, Helmut Raulien  a écrit :

> Edwina, List,
>
> I think, that "final" in "final interpretant" is not meant like "in the
> future" or predestined, but just, that to everything could exist a unique,
> unambiguous representation of its momentary state and being. If a thing is
> blurred or ambiguous, this vagueness or ambiguity would be exactly and
> unambiguously represented by this final interpretant. Though the FI as a
> correlate is different from all other FIs, the sign´s correlation with it
> is always the same: It just is regarding any object as identical, unique,
> non-exchangeable, non-alternative. That is, taking it seriously. This is a
> very trivial relation, which is the basis for all relations and all
> communication. I think that atoms, organisms, people, have all internalized
> it, with only one exception, that is the president of the US, who claims
> being able to construe alternative facts.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>
>  19. Mai 2020 um 14:09 Uhr
>  "Edwina Taborsky" 
> *wrote:*
>
> Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of a
>  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a 'final
> truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda is the
> 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'.
>
> Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both assumptions
> include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'. Now, in some
> instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there is a truth vs a
> non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison; in the factual nature
> of an historical event.
>
> But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean semiosis.
> Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if you or a group
> work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether X is a poison or
> the truth of what happened'
>
> This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can never
> change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.  It ignores
> the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally ignores the
> chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it ignores evolution and
> adaptation and novelty.
>
> I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or' [is
> it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that Peircean semiosis
> rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power of Secondness and
> Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination of any kind and sets
> up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and open to pure novelty,
> There is no 'final truth'.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List"
> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should
> go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to
> PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L"
> in the BODY of the message. More at
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Edwina, list,



What is the significance of ‘pre-‘ in ‘predestinate opinion’?

I’ve noticed not only you but others also, make this subtle move,

as if there is no significance- that it can be explained away as a habitual
hiccup.



I mean, is it like the difference between presupposition and supposition,

preamble and amble or precognition and cognition?



Best,
Jerry R

On Tue, May 19, 2020 at 11:49 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis generates
> regulative principles but as to whether these are 'abductive hopes' - hmm.
> I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the Universe actually 'hope'?  I
> think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with Will understood only as the
> Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
>
> Edwina, All ...
>
> In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the last
> couple of decades I think it's most commonly
> been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
> principles, in effect falling into the category of
> abductive hopes.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
> On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> >
> >
> > Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of
> > a 'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a
> > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda
> > is the 'nature of Peircean semiosis'.
> >
> > Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both
> > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'.
> > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there
> > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison;
> > in the factual nature of an historical event.
> >
> > But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean
> > semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if
> > you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether
> > X is a poison or the truth of what happened'
> >
> > This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can
> > never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness. It
> > ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally
> > ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it
> > ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty.
> >
> > I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or'
> > [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not] ….that
> > Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power
> > of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination
> > of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and
> > open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'.
> >
> > Edwina
> >
>
>
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - yes, if I understand you correctly - then, yes, semiosis
generates regulative principles but as to whether these are
'abductive hopes' - hmm. I agree with the 'abductive' - but- does the
Universe actually 'hope'?  I think I'd prefer the term ' Will', with
Will understood only as the Will-to-Generate the semiosic triad.

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20 12:25 PM , Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net sent:
 Edwina, All ... 
 In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the
last couple of decades I think it's most commonly  
 been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative
principles, in effect falling into the category of  
 abductive hopes. 
 Regards, 
 Jon 
 On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: 
 >
 >  
 >  Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept
of 
 > a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a 
 > 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an
agenda 
 > is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'. 
 >  
 >  Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both 
 > assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this
'thing'. 
 > Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that
there 
 > is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a
poison; 
 > in the factual nature of an historical event. 
 >  
 >  But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean 
 > semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that
'if 
 > you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of
whether 
 > X is a poison or the truth of what happened' 
 >  
 >  This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which
can 
 > never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.
 It 
 > ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally 
 > ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it 
 > ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty. 
 >  
 >  I consider that - apart from these factual situations of
'either-or' 
 > [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that 
 > Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the
power 
 > of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects
predestination 
 > of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic
and 
 > open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'. 
 >  
 >  Edwina 
 >  

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Semiosis and Truth

[Jon Awbrey]

Edwina, All ...

In the many, many discussions we've had along these lines over the last couple of decades I think it's most commonly 
been understood that such convergence theses amount to regulative principles, in effect falling into the category of 
abductive hopes.


Regards,

Jon

On 5/19/2020 8:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
  


Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of
a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a
'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda
is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'.

Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both
assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'.
Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there
is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison;
in the factual nature of an historical event.

But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean
semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if
you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether
X is a poison or the truth of what happened'

This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can
never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.  It
ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally
ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it
ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty.

I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or'
[is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that
Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power
of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination
of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and
open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'.

Edwina




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Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosis and Truth

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list

1] I will not get into any political commentary on this list.

2] If we can stick to Peirce - the phrase of  'in the future' is
definitely NOT a synonym for 'predestined'. 

 And Peirce's outline of the Final Interpretant is '"that which
would be finally decided to be the true interpretation if
consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate
opinion were reached' EP 2.496. 1909

"the Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any
mind does act but in the way in which every mind would act 8.315;
1909

"My Final Interpretant is […] the effect the Sign would produce
upon any mind upon which the circumstances should permit it to work
out its full effect'SS 110-1.1909

"The third sense in which we may properly speak of the interpretant
is that in which I speak of the Final Interpretant meaning that Habit
in the production of which the function of the Sign, as such, is
exhausted" 1910. ILS 285

There are two areas in which the 'Final Interpretant' is operative
in the above quotations. One is that among human communicators who
are examining a 'thing' and desiring to understand its true identity
'in itself'. As such - there is indeed a 'final opinion' , a true
interpretation of what A-person said or wrote. The focus is not on
any single person achieving this 'final truth' but that all [or
almost all] of the population would reach that same conclusion.

Is this predestination? In a way! If one considers that there is
only ONE truth about whether X is a poison [to humans but not to
lizards]...one can say that this 'truth' exists 'per se' but it is
certainly not predetermined that we humans will ever arrive at such
knowledge.

But again - my point is that Peirce's massive work over many years
is not merely about human communication. That- to me, is not what
semiosis is about. Notice his 1910 definition - which doesn't refer
to A-person talking to B-person, but refers to HABITS, ie, the laws
as generated within the actions of semiosis. Here, Peirce defines the
Final Interpretant to mean that these laws, these habits have become
'solidified' and no longer open to adaptation and change - and
produces not only the same result, that Final Interpretant; but even,
possibly, can no longer function as an interpretant and the triad
collapses.

Therefore - to me, semiosis is an open, adaptive, generative process
and to speak of this hexagram only with reference to an interaction
between A-person and B-person trying to understand each other - is a
reference to only a minor aspect.

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20 11:08 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
 Edwina, List,   I think, that "final" in "final interpretant" is not
meant like "in the future" or predestined, but just, that to
everything could exist a unique, unambiguous representation of its
momentary state and being. If a thing is blurred or ambiguous, this
vagueness or ambiguity would be exactly and unambiguously represented
by this final interpretant. Though the FI as a correlate is different
from all other FIs, the sign´s correlation with it is always the
same: It just is regarding any object as identical, unique,
non-exchangeable, non-alternative. That is, taking it seriously. This
is a very trivial relation, which is the basis for all relations and
all communication. I think that atoms, organisms, people, have all
internalized it, with only one exception, that is the president of
the US, who claims being able to construe alternative facts.   Best,
Helmut   19. Mai 2020 um 14:09 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of
a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a
'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda
is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'. 

Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both
assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'.
Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there
is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison;
in the factual nature of an historical event. 

But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean
semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if
you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether
X is a poison or the truth of what happened' 

This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can
never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.  It
ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally
ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it
ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty. 

I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or'
[is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that
Peircean semiosis 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Semiosis and Truth

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, List,

 

I think, that "final" in "final interpretant" is not meant like "in the future" or predestined, but just, that to everything could exist a unique, unambiguous representation of its momentary state and being. If a thing is blurred or ambiguous, this vagueness or ambiguity would be exactly and unambiguously represented by this final interpretant. Though the FI as a correlate is different from all other FIs, the sign´s correlation with it is always the same: It just is regarding any object as identical, unique, non-exchangeable, non-alternative. That is, taking it seriously. This is a very trivial relation, which is the basis for all relations and all communication. I think that atoms, organisms, people, have all internalized it, with only one exception, that is the president of the US, who claims being able to construe alternative facts.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 19. Mai 2020 um 14:09 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a 'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'.

Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'. Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison; in the factual nature of an historical event.

But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether X is a poison or the truth of what happened'

This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.  It ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty.

I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or' [is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'.

Edwina

 
 

 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Forgot attachment (was To put an end to the false debate...

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, list

I don't think that Peircean semiosis is just about 'interpretation'
in the sense of human language or communication; i.e., where A-Person
interprets [truthfully] what B-Person said or wrote. I don't think
that his years or work and massive texts can be reduced to such a
frankly, minor role.

As he said - 'all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not
composed exclusively of signs' [ EP 394; please note 'signs' is plural
not singular]. This universe is not composed only of human
communication but as I have frequently referred 'Thought is not
necessarily connected with  a brain. It appears in the work of bees,
of crystals and throughout the purely physical world" [4.551]

I don't see the point of a flood of quotations - but his focus on
the active and adaptive process of Mind, as generalizing, [3ns] and
instantiating its habits in discrete instances  [2ns] - with the
openness of novelty [1ns] - extends his analysis far beyond the
interactions of human communication. 

His focus on indefiniteness and generality- and the fact that his
notion of the semiosic triad and hexagon is not a closed triangle
where B-person finally understands what A-person said/wrote - but is
an open network of 'tails' connecting to other triads..

Edwina
 On Tue 19/05/20 10:22 AM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
  Original Message

Subject:  Re: [Peirce-L] To put an end to the false debate on the   
  classification of signs
 From:"John F. Sowa" 
 Date:Tue, May 19, 2020 10:05
 To:  "Peirce-L" 
 Robert M, Gary F, Jon AS, List
 For quotations by Peirce on these issues, see the attached file,
science.txt.  Also note the last quotation by Edward Moore:

ECM> Peirce has left us, not any kind of final word, but a work in
progress, one eminently worth carrying on, in the spirit of the one
who started it.  Which is to say that we must be as resolutely
critical, and as ruthless in paring away what does not work, as
 Peirce was at his best.  [E.C. Moore, "Is Synechism Necessary?" 
(2012), p. 12] 

In the many debates about what Peirce meant and how we should adopt
his writings as a basis for our own work, it's essential to remember
that his ideas were constantly growing. The year 1914 was a stopping
point for him, but he made many comments about how future researchers
might continue.  I agree with Moore's comment, but there is, as
always, much more to say.

John 

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RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the classification of signs

[gnox]

Helmut, I think what you say here is just about right:

HR: The truth works as a motive, a quest for it, although it is not yet 
achieved. People (animals, organisms, molecules?) have a feeling, intuition, 
instinct, internalised law or axiom, that everything has or would have a true 
representation. This final interpretant, though not realised, does nevertheless 
do its work for the sign this way here and now.

GF: Peirce says ‘Every man is fully satisfied that there is such a thing as 
truth, or he would not ask any question’ (EP2:240). So that belief is a 
motivation for asking the question, as you say. (I doubt, however, that 
molecules have any such motivations; I think it takes a self-organizing system 
to have motivations in that psychological sense.)

Gary f.

 

From: Helmut Raulien  
Sent: 18-May-20 14:24
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the 
classification of signs

 

 

List

 

do I understand it correctly, that the paradoxon here is, that the final 
interpretant is the first element in logical order, but the last in temporal 
order? In this case I would propose a solution attempt like this: The truth 
works as a motive, a quest for it, although it is not yet achieved. People 
(animals, organisms, molecules?) have a feeling, intuition, instinct, 
internalised law or axiom, that everything has or would have a true 
representation. This final interpretant, though not realised, does nevertheless 
do its work for the sign this way here and now.

 

Best,

Helmut


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[PEIRCE-L] Forgot attachment (was To put an end to the false debate...

[John F. Sowa]

 Original Message


Subject:  Re: [Peirce-L] To put an
end to the false debate on the  classification of signs
From:   
"John F. Sowa" 
Date:Tue, May
19, 2020 10:05
To:  "Peirce-L"


Robert M, Gary F, Jon AS,
List

For quotations by Peirce on these issues, see the attached
file, science.txt.  Also note the last quotation by Edward
Moore:
ECM> Peirce has left us, not any kind of final word, but a
work in progress, one eminently worth carrying on, in the spirit of the
one who started it.  Which is to say that we must be as resolutely
critical, and as ruthless in paring away what does not work, as
Peirce was at his best.  [E.C. Moore, "Is Synechism
Necessary?"  (2012), p. 12] 
In the many debates about what
Peirce meant and how we should adopt his writings as a basis for our own
work, it's essential to remember that his ideas were constantly growing.
The year 1914 was a stopping point for him, but he made many comments
about how future researchers might continue.  I agree with Moore's
comment, but there is, as always, much more to say.
John

Some quotations about science, philosophy, and truth.

"The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what
we already know, something else which we do not know" [CP 5.365].

-- there is one thing even more vital to science than intelligent
methods; and that is, the sincere desire to find out the truth, whatever
it may be -- [CP 5.84, Lecture 3, Lectures on Pragmatism (1903)]

Indeed, out of a contrite fallibilism, combined with a high faith in the
reality of knowledge, and an intense desire to find things out, all my
philosophy has always seemed to me to grow... [CP 1.14, fragment,
c. 1897]

-- there is one thing even more vital to science than intelligent
methods; and that is, the sincere desire to find out the truth, whatever
it may be -- [CP 5.84, Lecture 3, Lectures on Pragmatism (1903)]

The method of modern science is social in respect to the solidarity of
its efforts.  The scientific world is like a colony of insects, in that
the individual strives to produce that which he himself cannot hope to
enjoy.  One generation collects premises in order that a distant
generation may discover what they mean.  Peirce (1902)

2.123.  -- the mass of mankind -- are thoroughly persuaded that they
reason well enough already.  I do not mean to say that they maintain
that none of them ever reasons wrong.  Far from that; though they trust
to common sense as affording all the security that could be desired for
reasoning, yet their adhesion is majestically unanimous to the
proposition that of all the race there is but one single individual who
never falls into fallacy; and their only point of difference is that
each is quite sure that he himself is that man.  Unfortunately, to be
cocksure that one is an infallible reasoner is to furnish conclusive
evidence either that one does not reason at all, or that one reasons
very badly, since that deluded state of mind prevents the constant
self-criticism which is, as we shall see, the very life of reasoning.
Congratulations, then, from my heart go out to you, my dear Reader, whom
I assume to have a sincere desire to learn, not merely the dicta of
common sense, but what good reasoning, scientifically examined, shall
prove to be.  You are already an unusually good logician.  [Minute
Logic, "Why Study Logic" (1902)]

A comment about Peirce by Edward C. Moore:

Peirce has left us, not any kind of final word, but a work in progress,
one eminently worth carrying on, in the spirit of the one who started
it.  Which is to say that we must be as resolutely critical, and as
ruthless in paring away what does not work, as Peirce was at his best.
[E.C. Moore, "Is Synechism Necessary?"  (2012), p. 12]
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[PEIRCE-L] Re: [Peirce-L] To put an end to the false debate on the classification of signs

[John F. Sowa]

Robert M, Gary F, Jon AS, List

For quotations by Peirce on
these issues, see the attached file, science.txt.
Also note the last
quotation by Edward Moore:
ECM> Peirce has left us, not any kind
of final word, but a work in progress, one eminently worth carrying on, in
the spirit of the one who started it.  Which is to say that we must be as
resolutely critical, and as ruthless in paring away what does not work, as
Peirce was at his best.  [E.C. Moore, "Is Synechism Necessary?" 
(2012), p. 12]
In the many debates about what Peirce meant and how
we should adopt his writings as a basis for our own work, it's essential
to remember that his ideas were constantly growing. The year 1914 was a
stopping point for him, but he made many comments about how future
reseachers might continue.  I agree with Moore's comment, but there is, as
always, much more to say.
John

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[PEIRCE-L] Semiosis and Truth

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Robert, Gary F, list - with regard to concerns about the concept of
a  'predestination' identity of something, i.e., the notion of a
'final truth' about this 'thing' - I question whether such an agenda
is the 'nature of  Peircean semiosis'.

Whether one assumes that truth is a fact or an ideal - both
assumptions include the view that 'truth' exists about this 'thing'.
Now, in some instances of semiosis, we can indeed accept that there
is a truth vs a non-truth. For example, in the identity of a poison;
in the factual nature of an historical event.

But surely this is not definitive of the full nature of Peircean
semiosis. Did he spend all his years and work merely writing that 'if
you or a group work hard enough - you'll find out the truth of whether
X is a poison or the truth of what happened'

This notion of an almost predestined reality of a 'thing'. which can
never change...seems to me to function only within pure Thirdness.  It
ignores the brute accidents and changes of Secondness and totally
ignores the chance novelties introduced by Firstness. That is, it
ignores evolution and adaptation and novelty. 

I consider that - apart from these factual situations of 'either-or'
[is it a poison or not; did this event occur or not]  ….that
Peircean semiosis rejects a predestined Truth. Indeed, with the power
of Secondness and Firstness - Peircean semiosis rejects predestination
of any kind and sets up the world as complex, interactive, dynamic and
open to pure novelty, There is no 'final truth'.

Edwina

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the classification of signs

[gnox]

Robert, I asked my question because you wrote:

RM: Because this quote troubles me a little: "In that second part, I call 
"truth" the predestinate opinion,17 by which I ought to have meant that which 
would ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that 
particular direction." (The Essential Peirce A Sketch of Logical Critics  p.457)

GF: You are apparently troubled by this statement of Peirce’s because you 
interpret it as implying that “the whole of humanity would be doomed to wait 
until the end of eternity to succeed in its first communication.” Yet we all 
(including Peirce) agree that this is not the case; and I think this points to 
a problem with your interpretation of Peirce’s statement. I think a better (and 
more charitable) interpretant would recognize that “truth”, as the end of 
inquiry, is an ideal, while the intended outcome of an act of communication is 
that the minds of interpreter and utterer should actually be “fused” in the 
commens for the time being. In other words, what a communicator intends is an 
achievement of something like consensus — something which the communicants, as 
honest inquirers, know very well to be temporary and subject to further 
revision.

When it comes to naming the trichotomy of interpretants, then, the “destinate” 
(or “predestinate”) interpretant cannot be the “intended” or “intentional” 
interpretant. In English usage “destinate” implies “final” and refers to an 
ideal future; a subject’s “intention” is an actual and present state of mind, 
which includes an expectation of what the immediate (short-term) result of the 
subject’s action or utterance will be. For that reason I have to disagree with 
your definition of the “destined interpretant” as “the one that the issuer of 
the sign can expect given his knowledge and mastery of the cultural codes 
currently in force at the very moment of the issuance of the sign.”

By the way, a charitable reading or interpretant is not one that ‘forgives’ the 
utterer for saying something wrong or untrue, it’s the reading that assumes the 
utterer’s intention to be an achievement of consensus, and therefore looks for 
a way to resolve any differences in usage habits between the interpreter and 
the utterer. This is explained in Chapter 2 of my book, 
http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/dlg.htm#Char. I mention this because I’ve seen some 
different (less charitable!) interpretations of “charity” on the list lately — 
not from you, but from others.

Gary f. 

 

From: robert marty  
Sent: 18-May-20 16:22
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] To put an end to the false debate on the classification 
of signs

 

Gary , List

 

Surely not and I even think otherwise!   The  destined interpretant is the one 
that the issuer of the sign can expect given his knowledge and mastery of the 
cultural codes currently in force at the very moment of the issuance of the 
sign.  His intention consist of an anticipation of sharing the "commens" with 
the receiver. That is why, in my opinion, Peirce also calls the intended 
interpreter, intentional interpretant, and it is very explicit below:

 

There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of 
the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind 
of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the 
Cominterpretant,

which is a determination of that mind into which the minds of utterer and 
interpreter have to be fused in order that any communication should take place. 
This mind may be called the commens. It consists of all that is, and must be, 
well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in order that 
the sign in question should fulfill its function. This I proceed to explain. 
(EP p.478)

 

When the sharing is effective, the Cominterpretant has validated it, the 
commens comes out strengthened. If the discrepancies accumulate over time, the 
question of the evolution of the commens will be asked to the society that is 
the guarantor since the commens is consisting above all of signs of law.

 

Areas of the same commens (or almost) for all communicators there are many. For 
example, the word "tree" or a tree drawing in our societies, including among 
the most remote peoples, must benefit from this status.

 

On the reality of knowledge this is a question that seems to me quite far from 
the current debates except to say that knowledge about well-defined 
mathematical objects is indisputable.

 

Le lun. 18 mai 2020 à 17:19, mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> > 
a écrit :

Robert, is it your intention to argue that communication cannot “succeed” at 
all unless the interpretant of the sign is completely determinate, and 
identically so for all communicants?

Would you likewise say that knowledge is not actual, or real, unless it is 
absolute and unquestionable?

 

Gary f.

 

From: robert marty mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com> 
> 
Sent: 18-May-20 03:25
To: Jon 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parts of Propositions (was qualisigns)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon: 

Thank you for your comments, which I found to be curious.

The curiosity response arises from a CSP text that made a lot of sense to me 
from a grammatical perspective, a scientific (chemical causality) perspective 
and a philosophical perspective.  I am referring to MS 229 from Spring 1873, 
W3, 90-92. Chap.VIII Of the Copula.
Is your rhetorical response justified?   Some comments are inserted below.

> On May 11, 2020, at 8:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> JLRC:  I suggest that CSP was consistent in his deployment of the triadic 
> grammatical relatives (subject, copula, predicate).
> 
> On my reading, Peirce did not consider the copula to be an essential part of 
> a proposition in the same sense as the subjects and predicate.

Is this assertion anything more than a tautology? 
“The term that precedes the copula is called the subject of the proposition and 
that which follows it the predicate.” [W3,90-92]
The gloss of the “copula” includes the logical notation " —<  “ which some find 
to be a critical aspect of CSP’s originality as a logician.
> 
> CSP:  I have said that the subjects and predicate are the two parts of an 
> assertion. (Abelard reckoned the copula as a third part; and in a certain 
> sense, it is a part of an assertion, but not in the sense in which the 
> subject and predicate are parts. It is nothing but a mark that the predicate 
> is to be understood predicatively, that is, as conveying information, and not 
> as limiting the denotation of the grammatical subject.) (R 339:492, 1908)

How else is a predicate to be understood? 
Historically, this perspective was offered by Leibniz more than a century 
earlier.
> 
> That is why joining the copula with a term creates a rheme, which can be 
> treated as the entire predicate of an incomplete proposition.  However, this 
> is an accidental property of certain languages; in others, syntax is 
> sufficient to signify predication.

This sentence makes no sense at all to me. 
It is my understanding that the logical usage of the word “term” is merely a 
shortening of the word “terminal”, that is the beginning and ending words of a 
simple sentence.  (Bill marries Rita.)

I find the notion of “of an incomplete proposition” to be novel. Do you happen 
to recall the origin of it?  Would this notion
> 
> CSP:  Finally, our conclusions require that the proposition should have an 
> actual Syntax, which is represented to be the Index of those elements of the 
> fact represented that correspond to the Subject and Predicate. This is 
> apparent in all propositions. Since Abelard it has been usual to make this 
> Syntax a third part of the proposition, under the name of the Copula. The 
> historical cause of the emergence of this conception in the twelfth century 
> was, of course, that the Latin of that day did not permit the omission of the 
> verb est, which was familiarly, though not invariably, omitted in Greek, and 
> not very uncommonly in classical Latin. In most languages there is no such 
> verb. But it is plain that one does not escape the need of a Syntax by 
> regarding the Copula as a third part of the proposition; and it is simpler to 
> say that it is merely the accidental form that Syntax may take. (CP 2.319, EP 
> 2:292, 1903)
> 
A copula, whether stated or unstated, is necessary to couple the qualisign and 
sin-sign to the index. Not only rhetorically, but chemically. A sin-sign, as a 
singular chemical entity, a pure chemical compound, is indexed by data of 
analysis.  These indices are termed molecular weight and molecular formula. CSP 
was professionally familiar with the critical role of these terms in chemical 
logic and the formation of the “Rheme"

> That is why existential graphs do not include any distinct component that 
> corresponds to the copula--only spots (labeled by words) for general concepts 
> and lines (of identity) for the indefinite individuals of which they are 
> being predicated. 

Huh?
A graphic line of identity is connector between terms / Symbols.  Are you 
mixing Apples and Oranges?

> These are abstractive and concretive subjects, respectively, while the 
> predicate itself is signified by the syntax of their arrangement and 
> connections.

Huh?
This rational is only a rhetoric stance. 

It appears to me that one ought to always bear in mind that CSP was a practical 
scientist and as such, would implicitly / intrinsically associate logic with 
causality.  Indeed, from a scientific perspective, the three-fold trichotomies 
function explicitly to associate scientific metrics (qualisigns, indices, 
symbols) with linguistic terminologies (legisigns.)

Cheers

Jerry 


> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Mon, May 11, 2020 at 3:07 PM 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parts of Propositions (was qualisigns)

[John F. Sowa]

Jerry and Jon,
In mathematics -- including mathematical logic -- the
notation is absolutely precise.  Two different notations that are
isomorphic (one-to-one mappings in both directions) have identical
semantics, independent of any words used to describe them.

JLRC> I suggest that CSP was consistent in his deployment of the
triadic grammatical relatives (subject, copula, predicate).

JAS> On my reading, Peirce did not consider the copula to be
an essential part of a proposition in the same sense as the subjects and
predicate.
For Peirce (as for every mathematician), the notation is
primary, and the words are useful only for explaining the notation to
students.  The first-order subset of Peirce's algebra of 1885 and the
first-order subset of EGs  (Alpha + Beta) have identical semantics.  To
understand exactly what Peirce intended, ignore the English words.  Just
translate his explanations to the algebra or the EGs.   The words are
useful only for teaching students.
Mathematicians  (as well as
scientists and engineers who use mathematics) never talk about charity --
except for human charity in being sympathetic with students who are dong
their best..  
John

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