Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)
Helmut, Jeff, List: HR: I am wondering about the difference between Telos and Purpose ... *Telos *is simply the Greek word for "end," and when I use it, I am often just trying to avoid confusion with that which comes last in a temporal sequence. I mentioned *telos *twice in my previous post in this thread, and both times I appended "ideal end or final cause" because I think that these are roughly synonymous with it. Every purpose is a *telos *or ideal end or final cause, but not every *telos *or ideal end or final cause is a purpose. In our everyday language, a purpose is usually the intention of an agent, but a *telos *or ideal end or final cause need not be. Accordingly, stating that Peirce's evolutionary theory is *teleological *is merely saying that he *affirms *the reality of final causes, as he explicitly does in the quotes that I already provided, as well as elsewhere in his writings. Likewise, stating that one's own evolutionary theory is *not *teleological is merely saying that one *denies *the reality of final causes. However, claiming that *Peirce's *evolutionary theory is *not *teleological is a blatant misrepresentation since it is directly contradicted by his own words. JD: The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing metaphysical claims into the discussion of the normative theory of semiotics. I strongly agree. While the scope of semeiosis is by no means limited to human thinking and communication, our study of it must be properly grounded in those familiar manifestations of it. Otherwise we risk the mistake of reversing the specific relationship that Peirce consistently affirms between metaphysics and the normative science of logic as semeiotic--"Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" (CP 1.487, c. 1896). We properly come to understand the nature of reality in accordance with how we have first come to understand the nature of reasoning, not the other way around. After all, "the entire universe--not merely the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth'--that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 1905). In addition, "the Universe is a vast representamen, a great symbol ... an argument ... a great work of art, a great poem" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194, 1903). Moreover, "There is a science of semeiotics ... and one of its theorems ... is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the resulting system constitutes one sign" (R 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). And since "matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293, 1891), even dyadic physical (i.e., dynamical) processes are degenerate forms of triadic mental (i.e., semeiosic) processes. In other words, the study of the universe is the study of a *single *sign that involves an immense *plurality *of signs. There is nothing inconsistent or contradictory about this--such is the nature of *every *symbolic sign, which involves indexical signs and iconic signs; and such is the nature of *every* argument, which involves propositions and terms. In fact, I maintain that the minimum of *real* semeiosis is a continuous argument, which we can (and often do) *artificially* parse into discrete propositions and terms only in retrospect, for the purpose of analysis. "It is more than doubtful whether what we can state as an argument or inference represents any part of the thinking except in the logical relation of the truth of the premiss to the truth of the conclusion" (CP 2.27, 1902). JD: Does Peirce formulate explanations that are teleological in character when he explains the evolution of law? Yes, I think he does. Does Peirce appeal to teleological explanations in explaining self-controlled processes of reasoning. Yes. Again, I strongly agree. In fact, "The character which distinguishes [anancasm] from agapasm is its purposelessness" (CP 6.312, EP 1:367, 1893) because "[t]he agapastic development of thought should, if it exists, be distinguished by its purposive character, this purpose being the development of an idea" (CP 6.315, EP 1:369). Hence the rejection of teleology, ideal ends, final causes, and even purposes in evolution is a rejection of agapasm as Peirce clearly defines it. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 2:45 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List, > > The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good > methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing >
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants
Auke, List: AvB: I do not even need to read te second and third alinea of your post ... And to be frank I think it is better to leave your 'explanation' in the 2nd and 3th alinea undiscussed in all detail. Okay, but those two paragraphs are quite relevant to my overall theory of semeiosis and forthcoming analysis of an example for comparison with Robert Marty's parable. JAS: The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type *possibly could* signify within the system of signs to which it belongs ... AvB: Do you claim this (within, etc) to be Peirce's addition? As I have repeatedly stated, my speculative grammar is not *identical *to Peirce's, but I believe that it is still recognizably *Peircean*. In this case, I have in mind the following passage. CSP: I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is *not *COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) The immediate interpretant is "the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily called the *meaning *of the sign" (CP 4.536, 1906). For a term, this is simply its definition, and someone who is not acquainted with the system of signs to which the term belongs will be unable to get any idea signified by it. Since propositions and arguments *involve *terms, the same is true for those classes of signs, as well. Even knowledge of definitions may not be adequate by itself to understand terms as they are being employed in a particular context, something that I have personally experienced when reading explanations in the peculiar lingo of mathematical category theory. AvB: How do you delineate this system for any given sign? Since "there can be no isolated sign" (CP 4.551, 1906), every sign is part of *some *system of signs. The most obvious examples are human languages, such as English and French. One difference that I have with Peirce is that I consider the written and spoken versions of the same language to be two distinct systems of signs. A type is "a definitely significant Form" (CP 4.537, 1906), and the form of the type "man" as written is very different from the form of the type "man" as spoken, even though they are equivalent in meaning and isomorphic in the sense that each written letter corresponds to a certain spoken sound. "Homme" is yet another type of the same sign, although it presumably has slightly different connotations within French; and in this case, the written form has three letters (h, extra m, e) that have no spoken counterparts. AvB: The dynamical interpretant that eventually follows a sign, is this one of the possibilities contained in the immediate interpretant, or can it be altogether different? Any *actual *interpretant is obviously a *possible *interpretant, but in my view the immediate interpretant pertains to a general sign *type *while each dynamical interpretant pertains to an individual sign *token*. One reason why misinterpretations happen is because a token can determine someone to a dynamical interpretant that is *not *within the corresponding type's immediate interpretant. For example, if I say out loud in German, "Hier ist ein Gift," the English translation is, "Here is a poison"; but an English-speaker who does not know German might think that I am saying, "Here is a gift." The potentially deadly error is misidentifying the system of signs to which the utterance belongs, and thus the type that the token embodies. The final interpretant of the proposition is the true belief (habit of conduct) regarding what I am really holding, which involves the correct association (habit of feeling) of "Gift" in German with what "poison" means in English. This is one reason why I find it problematic to claim that the immediate interpretant *logically *determines the dynamical interpretant, even though there is a sense in which the immediate interpretant of a type *temporally *precedes each dynamical interpretant of one of its tokens. Moreover, systems of signs are not static; they are constantly evolving, such that the forms (e.g., spellings or pronunciations) and definitions of terms change over time, with archaic ones dropping out and new ones being introduced. Dictionary definitions tell us how each word (as a type) is being used (as tokens) and understood (as dynamical interpretants) within a particular system of signs at a particular time in history, so in *that *sense it seems to be a collection of dynamical interpretants that *both *logically determines and temporally precedes the immediate interpretant. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 4:15 AM wrote: > Jon Alen, > > I do not even need to read te second and third alinea of your post. Of > course Short is right in this view. But that is trivial and not in conflict > with my statement. It simply follows from the difference in viewpoint: type > vs process. >
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)
Jeff, list
I'm not here to defend or promote Monod - but I think that your
description of him differs greatly from my own interpretation and use
of him in my own work in semiotics.
1] You write:
JEFF: "Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting
forward: "The universe is not pregnant with life nor the
biosphere with man...Man at last knows that he is alone in the
unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he emerged only by
chance." (180)
It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can
see, Peirce entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and
rejects each as implausible. "
EDWINA: I don't see that Peirce promoted any of these views, ie,
'that life is predetermined in the universe ' nor that the existence
of man is predetermined...and after all, Peirce's cosmology does
begin with chance'. 1.412.. I think it's fairly obvious that Monod is
rejecting predetermined morphologies, ie, the predetermined
actualities of life. Instead, he posits self-organized evolution
based on chance, freedom, choice and collaboration [ie, agapistic
evolution].
...which means...that the laws are evolving and self-organized
rather than predetermined. That is, he includes chance within his
notion of evolutionary freedom where a regulatory molecule "need bear
no resemblance to the substrates or products of the enzyme {Kauffamn;
, S. The Origins of Order. 1993; 11]. He includes functional
self-regulation which produces novel molecules which, however, fit
into the current infrastructure and permit functional rather than
deviant adaptation.
It seems to me, from my reading and use of Monod - that he's quite
similar to Peirce's agapasm! You are reducing him to tychism and
anacasm but I disagree.
Edwina
On Sun 24/05/20 3:44 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List,
The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good
methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing
metaphysical claims into the discussion of the normative theory of
semiotics.
Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are
hard to make out based on what he says in Chance and Necessity. He
does a lot of hand waving and gesturing towards various sorts of
positions as he tries to locate his view within the larger conceptual
landscape. I find it difficult to bridge the many gaps in what he
says about the larger philosophical questions in metaphysics, logic
and ethics because he is covering so much ground so quickly.
Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is
interested in looking more closely his monograph:
https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf
Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward:
"The universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with
man...Man at last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity
of the universe, out of which he emerged only by chance." (180)
It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can
see, Peirce entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and
rejects each as implausible.
Teleological explanations and causes involve pretty broad
conceptions that have a long history. As a person who regularly
teaches Plato and Aristotle, I tend to start there in my discussion
of the nest of questions that typically surface in discussions of
these large ideas. Setting aside all of the details that would be
needed to make sense of how Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses fit into
the larger historical story, my sense is that one central question
that Monod seems largely to be ignoring is the following: what kind
of explanation can be given for the laws of physics, chemistry and
biology? Why do the laws that appear to govern these natural systems
take the shape that they do at this point in the evolution of the
cosmos? Peirce's answer, of course, is that the laws of nature are
themselves evolving.
Is the evolution of these natural laws adequately explained by
saying they came about as a matter of chance? No. Is the evolution of
these laws adequately explained by saying that they are the result of
mechanical and necessary processes? No. Is the evolution of these
natural laws adequately explained by saying they came about in
virtue of a combination of the operation of chance and natural
necessity? No, not according to Peirce. I agree with him on these
questions.
As far as I can tell, Monod is not asserting the third kind of
explanation. Rather, he does not offer much if any explanation of the
evolution of the laws of nature themselves. Rather, he thinks it is
enough to explain the evolution of the populations of the individuals
that comprise the systems that are governed by such laws. He attempts
to explain the evolution of
Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)
Edwina, Helmut, Robert, Jon, List, The primary purpose of my post was to point out that there are good methodological reasons for avoiding the temptation of importing metaphysical claims into the discussion of the normative theory of semiotics. Monod's philosophical views in metaphysics, logic and ethics are hard to make out based on what he says in Chance and Necessity. He does a lot of hand waving and gesturing towards various sorts of positions as he tries to locate his view within the larger conceptual landscape. I find it difficult to bridge the many gaps in what he says about the larger philosophical questions in metaphysics, logic and ethics because he is covering so much ground so quickly. Here is a link to a digital version of the text in case anyone is interested in looking more closely his monograph: https://monoskop.org/images/9/99/Monod_Jacques_Chance_and_Necessity.pdf Here is an example of the kind of position Monod is putting forward: "The universe is not pregnant with life nor the biosphere with man...Man at last knows that he is alone in the unfeeling immensity of the universe, out of which he emerged only by chance." (180) It is hard to pin down what Monod is really saying. As far as I can see, Peirce entertains each of the assertions as hypotheses and rejects each as implausible. Teleological explanations and causes involve pretty broad conceptions that have a long history. As a person who regularly teaches Plato and Aristotle, I tend to start there in my discussion of the nest of questions that typically surface in discussions of these large ideas. Setting aside all of the details that would be needed to make sense of how Peirce's metaphysical hypotheses fit into the larger historical story, my sense is that one central question that Monod seems largely to be ignoring is the following: what kind of explanation can be given for the laws of physics, chemistry and biology? Why do the laws that appear to govern these natural systems take the shape that they do at this point in the evolution of the cosmos? Peirce's answer, of course, is that the laws of nature are themselves evolving. Is the evolution of these natural laws adequately explained by saying they came about as a matter of chance? No. Is the evolution of these laws adequately explained by saying that they are the result of mechanical and necessary processes? No. Is the evolution of these natural laws adequately explained by saying they came about in virtue of a combination of the operation of chance and natural necessity? No, not according to Peirce. I agree with him on these questions. As far as I can tell, Monod is not asserting the third kind of explanation. Rather, he does not offer much if any explanation of the evolution of the laws of nature themselves. Rather, he thinks it is enough to explain the evolution of the populations of the individuals that comprise the systems that are governed by such laws. He attempts to explain the evolution of physical, chemical and biological systems by appealing to a combination of chance and natural necessity. How might we classify Monod's explanatory strategy? Here are five types of positions that Peirce considers: Possible relations between law and chance in explaining the cosmos. A holds that every feature of all facts conforms to some law. A 's being the persons who admit the least arbitrariness. Most everything is governed by law. Nothing happens by chance. Does A also hold that every feature of every law is governed by some further law of B holds that the law fully determines every fact, but thinks that some relations of facts are accidental. C holds that uniformity within its jurisdiction is perfect, but confines its application to certain elements of phenomena. D holds that uniformities are never absolutely exact, so that the variety of the universe is forever increasing. At the same time we hold that even these departures from law are subject to a certain law of probability, and that in the present state of the universe they are far too small to be detected by our observations. E's being those who admit the most arbitrariness (most everything happens by chance. Nothing is governed by law. (Variety and Uniformity, CP 6.90) The position that Peirce is developing fits the mold of D. The position that Monod is developing seems to fit somewhere between B and C. Does Peirce formulate explanations that are teleological in character when he explains the evolution of law? Yes, I think he does. Does Peirce appeal to teleological explanations in explaining self-controlled processes of reasoning. Yes. Do I agree with Peirce on these matters? Broadly speaking, yes. I tend to think that his hypotheses concerning the evolution of the laws of nature and the systems that are governed by these laws are more plausible than those that fit the models of A-C and F. Hope that helps. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard
Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)
Edwina, Jon, Robert, Jeff, List, I am wondering about the difference between Telos and Purpose: Is it so, that Telos is a Purpose, but not one of the individual´s mind, but of a mind of a system on another classificational level, or, speaking with Salthe, at another subsumption level? Then the individual is acting according to this telos or purpose of the mind of e.g. its culture, species, genus, life as a whole, or universe as a whole, and the telos is inherited. A super-telos of evolution is individuation, meaning, that instructions for acting shall not only come from such super-systems´ minds , but from the individual´s mind, meaning, that telos is more and more substituted by purpose, and evolution provides the means therefore, like brain, thinking-in-symbols-capacity, language-capacity, etc.? Best, Helmut Sonntag, 24. Mai 2020 um 15:10 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Jeff, list I'm going to quibble with you that Peirce and Monod have entirely different views - on metaphysics or otherwise. I consider them compatible. I've used Monod in my own work in semiosis and for a reason - I felt he supported Peirce's agapistic view of the development of not merely biological evolution but also the development of thought and knowledge. . I no longer have a copy of Monod's work in my library - but - my recollection and quotes from old papers is that Monod most certainly was not what one might term a 'neo-Darwinist', ie, anancastic or mechanical necessity that is without thought - with 'thought' understood as the operation of Mind. That was exactly his point - that 'thought' was an integral part of evolution. And as Peirce said, these actions are based on 'what is reasonable'. This means that interactions - as Monod suggests - are not mechanical or haphazard but chosen for their positive functionality I strongly disagree that Peirce's evolutionary theory is teleological; there is no predetermined agenda or identity; all that we find is Mind-as-Matter, moving into ever more complex and varied morphologies. This is indeed 'purposive' "the purpose being the development of an idea' 6.315 - but - this idea is not akin to an ideal [ie, as is a Platonic Form] but is an open-to-variation-and-adaptation-and-interaction morphology. ie, the 'rationalization of the universe' 1.590 and 'reasonable 5.433. And above all, the maintenance of 'Mind-as-Matter'. This is compatible with Monod's rejection of teleology and to permit both chance and transformation. .."nature is objective and not projective' [1971;3] and self-regulating. Edwina On Sun 24/05/20 3:55 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent: Robert, Jon, List, It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of metaphysical hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution proceeds, in some sense, from random variations. From this common starting point, the positions differ on a number of points, including the following: Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed of potency for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the dough of creation. By the time living organisms evolve in the history of the cosmos, the seed has been sprouting as the laws of physics, inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry have evolved. One considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over those of Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves. On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of formulating hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical validity while in the grips of a metaphysical theory. Instead, common sense tells us that the normative requirements for the conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct that is self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological in orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of inquiry involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed, criticized, and reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings of Camus and Sartre, seems to agree with these common-sense ideas concerning the purpose-driven character of the conduct of inquiry. Having said that, Monod seems to go further. Drawing on the kinds of assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold that the deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be consciously selected by each individual in a radically free act of choice. Otherwise, the purposes and principles are not authentic. Drawing on a critical common sense perspective, Peirce disagrees with these radical (i.e., existential and humanist) assertions about the origins of meaning for human life. The wisdom behind our logical and moral principles has been evolving for many centuries. What is more, this wisdom is possessed by the larger human community and not by any one
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)
Jeff, list I'm going to quibble with you that Peirce and Monod have entirely different views - on metaphysics or otherwise. I consider them compatible. I've used Monod in my own work in semiosis and for a reason - I felt he supported Peirce's agapistic view of the development of not merely biological evolution but also the development of thought and knowledge. . I no longer have a copy of Monod's work in my library - but - my recollection and quotes from old papers is that Monod most certainly was not what one might term a 'neo-Darwinist', ie, anancastic or mechanical necessity that is without thought - with 'thought' understood as the operation of Mind. That was exactly his point - that 'thought' was an integral part of evolution. And as Peirce said, these actions are based on 'what is reasonable'. This means that interactions - as Monod suggests - are not mechanical or haphazard but chosen for their positive functionality I strongly disagree that Peirce's evolutionary theory is teleological; there is no predetermined agenda or identity; all that we find is Mind-as-Matter, moving into ever more complex and varied morphologies. This is indeed 'purposive' "the purpose being the development of an idea' 6.315 - but - this idea is not akin to an ideal [ie, as is a Platonic Form] but is an open-to-variation-and-adaptation-and-interaction morphology. ie, the 'rationalization of the universe' 1.590 and 'reasonable 5.433. And above all, the maintenance of 'Mind-as-Matter'. This is compatible with Monod's rejection of teleology and to permit both chance and transformation. .."nature is objective and not projective' [1971;3] and self-regulating. Edwina On Sun 24/05/20 3:55 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent: Robert, Jon, List, It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of metaphysical hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution proceeds, in some sense, from random variations. From this common starting point, the positions differ on a number of points, including the following: Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed of potency for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the dough of creation. By the time living organisms evolve in the history of the cosmos, the seed has been sprouting as the laws of physics, inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry have evolved. One considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over those of Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves. On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of formulating hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical validity while in the grips of a metaphysical theory. Instead, common sense tells us that the normative requirements for the conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct that is self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological in orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of inquiry involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed, criticized, and reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings of Camus and Sartre, seems to agree with these common-sense ideas concerning the purpose-driven character of the conduct of inquiry. Having said that, Monod seems to go further. Drawing on the kinds of assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold that the deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be consciously selected by each individual in a radically free act of choice. Otherwise, the purposes and principles are not authentic. Drawing on a critical common sense perspective, Peirce disagrees with these radical (i.e., existential and humanist) assertions about the origins of meaning for human life. The wisdom behind our logical and moral principles has been evolving for many centuries. What is more, this wisdom is possessed by the larger human community and not by any one individual. The contrast between Peirce's and Monod's positions in ethics can help us see some of the reasons for thinking that a normative theory logic rests on principles drawn from a theory of ethics. For my part, I think that Peirce is on a more fruitful track when it comes to the question of what should be taken as the data for a normative theory of logic. The data should be arguments that the larger community holds to be valid--especially those that have stood the test of time. It would be a mistake, I think, to take as our data a set of arguments that some select individual takes to be valid--even if the evaluation of those arguments is taken to be "authentic" because the underlying purposes and principles are based on a radically free act of choice by that individual. As such, I think there are good
Fwd: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The plethora of Interpretants
Jon Alen, I do not even need to read te second and third alinea of your post. Of course Short is right in this view. But that is trivial and not in conflict with my statement. It simply follows from the difference in viewpoint: type vs process. And to be frank I think it is better to leave your 'explanation' in the 2nd and 3th alinea undiscussed in all detail. I restrict myself to the first sentence, look at the boldened text. The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, Question 1: Do you claim this (within, etc) to be Peirces addition? Question 2: How do you delineate this system for any given sign? Question 3: The dynamical interpretant that eventually follows a sign, is this one of the possibilities contained in the immediate interpretant, or can it be altogether different? Best, Auke Op 24 mei 2020 om 2:49 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt : Auke, List: I agree that the relationship between the immediate/dynamical/final interpretants and emotional/energetic/logical interpretants has been the subject of considerable and ongoing debate. As we discussed recently, I subscribe to the view that the two sets of terms are orthogonal to each other, as follows. The immediate interpretant is whatever a sign type possibly could signify within the system of signs to which it belongs, the dynamical interpretant is whatever a sign token actually does signify on an individual occasion, and the final interpretant is whatever a sign itself necessarily would signify under ideal circumstances. An emotional interpretant is one that is in the universe of possibles as a feeling, an energetic interpretant is one that is in the universe of existents as an exertion, and a logical interpretant is one that is in the universe of necessitants as a further sign (cf. CP 4.536, 1906). Hence the immediate interpretant is a range of possible feelings, exertions, or signs; the dynamical interpretant is an actual feeling, exertion, or sign; and the final interpretant is a habit of feeling (association), a habit of conduct (belief), or a habit-change (persuasion). Every energetic interpretant (2ns) involves an emotional interpretant (1ns), and every logical interpretant (3ns) involves both an energetic interpretant (2ns) and an emotional interpretant (1ns). An iconic sign (1ns) can only determine an emotional interpretant (1ns) , while only a symbolic sign (3ns) can determine a logical interpretant (3ns), although it might determine merely an energetic interpretant (2ns) and/or an emotional interpretant (1ns). Likewise, an indexical sign (2ns) can determine an energetic interpretant (2ns) but might determine merely an emotional interpretant (1ns). A sign that determines merely an emotional interpretant (1ns) can only be a term (1ns), while a proposition (2ns) always determines at least an energetic interpretant (2ns) and an argument (3ns) always determines a logical interpretant (3ns). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 12:51 PM < a.bree...@chello.nl mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote: Edwina, list, That is a debated issue. Bergman did summarize the main positions: Fitzgerald, Short and Zeman. In my opinion the logical interpretant of the emotional, energetic, logical sequence is a placeholder for the other triplet. Van Driel was the first to write this, but without argumentation and alas in a Dutch language dissertation. The energetic in my opinion must also be looked at as a placeholder for the icon (mental interpretant) and sinsign (the here and now of the icon) aspect respectively. i didn't however find direct evidence for this. Auke Op 23 mei 2020 om 19:27 schreef Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca >: As a side note - there's an interesting paper, by Lucia Santaella-Braga, on 'Methodeutics; the liveliest branch of semiotics'. in Semiotica 124[-3/4]. 1999. p 377-395, in which, among other things [she's reviewing a book by Liszka] she outlines the full nature of the Interpretants, moving into an examination of 8.344-76, where she rejects that the terms of ' immediate, dynamical and logical/final are synonymous with 'emotional, energetic and logical. See also 'Semiotica' 1996, 'Semiotics in times of maturity. Semiotica 108 [1/2]; 129-155 where she discusses them in detail. Edwina _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by The PEIRCE
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...)
Robert, Jon, List, It is clear that Monod and Peirce are offering competing sets of metaphysical hypotheses. They seem to agree that biological evolution proceeds, in some sense, from random variations. From this common starting point, the positions differ on a number of points, including the following: Peirce holds that, in addition to chance variation, there is a seed of potency for order to grow that is leaven, so to speak, in the dough of creation. By the time living organisms evolve in the history of the cosmos, the seed has been sprouting as the laws of physics, inorganic chemistry and organic chemistry have evolved. One considerable advantage of Peirce's set of hypotheses over those of Monod is that he offers an explanation of the origin and of the ongoing evolution of the laws of nature themselves. On a pragmaticist view, we should resist the temptation of formulating hypotheses in semiotics about the grounds of logical validity while in the grips of a metaphysical theory. Instead, common sense tells us that the normative requirements for the conduct of inquiry involve the idea of conduct that is self-controlled. If such conduct did not have a purpose, then it would not be self-controlled. Peirce's normative theory of logic is teleological in orientation because it is based on the idea that the conduct of inquiry involves purposes and principles that may be reviewed, criticized, and reformed. Monod, drawing on the existential writings of Camus and Sartre, seems to agree with these common-sense ideas concerning the purpose-driven character of the conduct of inquiry. Having said that, Monod seems to go further. Drawing on the kinds of assertions that are found in Sartre's writings, he seems to hold that the deepest human purposes and principles must ultimately be consciously selected by each individual in a radically free act of choice. Otherwise, the purposes and principles are not authentic. Drawing on a critical common sense perspective, Peirce disagrees with these radical (i.e., existential and humanist) assertions about the origins of meaning for human life. The wisdom behind our logical and moral principles has been evolving for many centuries. What is more, this wisdom is possessed by the larger human community and not by any one individual. The contrast between Peirce's and Monod's positions in ethics can help us see some of the reasons for thinking that a normative theory logic rests on principles drawn from a theory of ethics. For my part, I think that Peirce is on a more fruitful track when it comes to the question of what should be taken as the data for a normative theory of logic. The data should be arguments that the larger community holds to be valid--especially those that have stood the test of time. It would be a mistake, I think, to take as our data a set of arguments that some select individual takes to be valid--even if the evaluation of those arguments is taken to be "authentic" because the underlying purposes and principles are based on a radically free act of choice by that individual. As such, I think there are good methodological reasons for rejecting the sorts of data that existentialists like Sartre and Monod seem to offer for the sake of developing a philosophical theory of ethics or a theory of logic as semiotics. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: Jon Alan Schmidt Sent: Saturday, May 23, 2020 6:45:57 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Destinate Interpretant and Predestinate Opinion (was To put an end ...) Robert, Helmut, List: RM: In this response, after acknowledging our differences, you use CSP's statements as an argument of authority. HR: Peirce is not necessarily always right, is he? This comment and question both indicate a misunderstanding of my intent. I am not suggesting that there must be final causes in nature because Peirce says so, which would indeed be a fallacious appeal to authority--as would suggesting that there cannot be final causes in nature merely because Democritus and Monod say so. I am simply pointing out that Peirce explicitly (and repeatedly) affirms that there are final causes in nature, such that denying the reality of final causes is straightforwardly disagreeing with Peirce. I trust that no one disputes this. HR: "For evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite end", is theism and speculation, isn´t it? No, why suggest that? Again, a final cause is not necessarily the purpose of an agent, that is just its most familiar manifestation. The reality of final causes would not, by itself, entail the reality of God; and atheism does not, by itself, entail the rejection of final causation. RM: Indeed, the quotation CP 1.204 states a proposal according to without a final cause there would
