Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[John F. Sowa]

Jon AS, Gary F, List,

We must always distinguish the subject
matter of any science from the
people who (a) develop the science or
(b) apply the science.

The dependencies among the sciences,
which Comte noted and Peirce
adopted after reading Comte's
classification, show how each science
depends on principles from the
sciences that precede it.

But most people who develop or use
any science are not aware of the
Comte-Peirce classification.  I
recall that Gary F said that the
dependencies in the development
seemed to be circular.  And I
agree.  In their daily work, everybody,
including professional
mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge
they acquired in any
way from any source.  Remember Archimedes'
Eureka moment, when
he discovered a new mathematical principle while
taking a bath.

But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted
from its original
discovery, is independent of any features from its
origin.  Its
principles then become available for any science of any
kind.

JAS:  I will only add that unlike the mathematician,
the
phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given
hypothesis
agrees with the actual facts or not.

But we
must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and
phenomenology
from the people who develop and use them.  All people
have all their
knowledge available at all times.  Peirce was a
polymath.  At one
moment, he could apply pure mathematics while
analyzing experience. 
But in the next moment, he could use normative
principles to evaluate
the results.  Then he could apply those results to
a problem in
physics.  For a case study, see his Photometric
Researches, or the
excerpts I posted at
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf

JAS:  I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience
in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by
the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of
imagination and the logical world of mathematics.

Yes. 
Experience includes sensations from external sources as well as
anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception.
Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination.  A chess expert can
play a good game blindfold.  And mathematicians can do the algebra or
the geometry in their heads.

GF:  John says, “The special
sciences depend on phenomenology for the
raw data and on mathematics
for forming hypotheses.” But we have
previously agreed that in
Peirce’s hierarchy of sciences, each science
depends on those above
it for principles, while the higher levels can
and often do get their
raw data from those below.

Please see pages 1 to 3 of
PRexcerpts.pdf.  Peirce published that book
in 1878, more than 20
years before his classification of the sciences.
On page 1, he begins
with a discussion of principles that could be
called informal
phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the distinction
between
phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light
(as it
really is).  On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton
and
Maxwell.

In citing results by other physicists, he is
practicing methodeutic in
evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy
with the results that other
scientists had derived by their
observations.

Summary:  All our knowledge about anything is
ultimately derived from
our experience (by formal or informal
methods).  Much of that
experience includes communications from other
people who derived their
knowledge from their own experience or from
their experience in
communications with other people who ,,,

When you trace all the sources of your knowledge of any kind from any
source, it all comes directly or indirectly from somebody analyzing
experience.
John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John, Edwina, List:

JFS: JAS highlighted Peirce's distinction, which applies to both
mathematics and phenomenology:

JAS: It is incontrovertible that according to Peirce in CP 3.559 (and
elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis without inquiring or
caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not.

JFS: Yes, of course.


I am glad that we agree about this. I will only add that unlike the
mathematician, the phenomenologist *does *inquire and care whether a given
hypothesis agrees with the actual facts or not. That is why, unlike
mathematics, Peirce considers phenomenology to be a *positive *science;
but what distinguishes phenomenology from the *other* positive sciences in
his classification, especially metaphysics and the special sciences, is the
*kind *of facts that are of interest. The phenomenologist frames a
hypothesis without inquiring or caring whether it agrees with *reality *or
not, only whether it agrees with the "seemings" that are or could be
present to the mind in any way.

ET: BUT, my point is that such an imaginary realm is not self-sustaining
and must, at some time, connect to reality, where it will examine whether
or not its Forms have any functionality.


I am happy to say that we agree about this, as well. In fact, I see it as
consistent with André's remark on slide 26 that many of the possibilities
explored by mathematicians "are not merely artificial fictions of the
imagination but the direct suggestions of evocative forms encountered in
experience" (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00181.html).
Here I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience in the
*strict* sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by the
*outer *world
of existence, it also encompasses the *inner *world of imagination and
the *logical
*world of mathematics. Again, ascertaining which idealized forms "connect
to reality" and thus "have any functionality" is a task for metaphysics and
the special sciences, which--as John rightly observes--depend on the
normative science of logic as semeiotic for the requisite principles,
including methodeutic as its third branch.

ET: And I'd also like to add that Gary F's very nice post on the
relationship between mathematics and phenomenology is exactly what I have
been arguing about for several weeks on this List ...


Likewise, I agree with Gary F.'s post today (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00382.html), including
"the one point where I think John’s description below needs to be modified."

JFS: The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on
mathematics for forming hypotheses.


The basis for Peirce's classification is such that instead, the special
sciences depend on phenomenology for *principles*, while phenomenology
depends on the special sciences for *data*. Even so, since the *purpose *of
phenomenology is very different from the *purpose *of the special sciences,
as Gary F. said, each involves a different kind of attention to that same
data. Moreover, *all *the positive sciences depend on mathematics for
principles, but someone is engaged in *pure *mathematics only when framing
hypotheses and drawing necessary conclusions from them *without *inquiring
or caring whether they agree with the actual facts or not. Someone who *does
*inquire and care about this is engaged in *applied *mathematics within one
of the positive sciences.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Aug 29, 2021 at 8:40 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> John, List
>
> I'm not convinced of the isolationist purity of mathematics. I acknowledge
> that 'pure' mathematics focuses on a hypothesis without acknowledgment of
> whether or not it corresponds to reality or not. That can be said
> about many hypothetical formations. As John said - this gives our
> system the full freedom of imagination...aka..Firstness.
>
>   BUT, my point is that such an imaginary realm is not self-sustaining and
> must, at some time, connect to reality, where it will examine whether or
> not its Forms have any functionality. This step might not be immediate; it
> might even take years.
>
> But - without it, the imaginary realm would actually be hollow...Firstness
> is fleeting..
>
> And I'd also like to add that Gary F's very nice post on the relationship
> between mathematics and phenomenology is exactly what I have been arguing
> about for several weeks on this List - and have been continuously chastised
> for doing so - I have rejected De Tienne's 'Move On' exhortations to us, to
> Move On from Mathematics and have instead opted for the synechistic
> interrelationship of these two realms-of-science.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sat 28/08/21 8:27 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
>
> Ediwina, Jon AS, Jeff JBD, List
>
> I changed the subject line to clarify and emphasize the distinction.

[PEIRCE-L] The Will to Learn, was, Debate on the List

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, List,

I arrived home late last evening after my four day R holiday away from
NYC. While away, having only my phone, I pretty much only skimmed my emails as
I intended to "get away from 'all that'" for a few days with friends on
Fire Island off Long Island in the Atlantic. As my company included a
philosophically and ethically searching married couple around our ages,
unquestionably endowed with the "Will to Learn," the conversations were as
stimulating to fresh thinking on my part as the discussions once were on
Peirce-L.

Then I returned to NYC and perused all the Peirce-L posts I'd merely
glanced over while away. I must admit that I was again deeply distressed by
what I read (and, in truth, what I've been reading for all too long on the
List, reaching a kind of nadir in the past few years, esp. the last few
months). As you may know, the leadership of TPG has been questioning
whether, given the decline in the quality of List discussion, continuing it
is worthwhile, esp. given its quasi-necessary support by IUPUI, certain
financial considerations, etc. Indeed, one of the members of TPG's
Board, specifically charged with guiding the operation of Peirce-L, finally
stopped reading posts altogether several years ago when the rancor seemed
to accelerate.

Yet, because of the List's unique history and my deep and abiding respect
for the work of that extraordinary Peirce scholar and, in my view, equally
extraordinary human being, Joseph Ransdell, since the Peirce International
Centennial Conference of 2014 where the question was put to me by Nathan
Houser as to the viability of the List, I have argued for its continuation,
hoping that *something* or *someone(s)* would change which might tend to
improve the quality of List discussion. As I've occasionally remarked on
the List, Peirce-L, as conceived of by Ransdell, is conceived of as a
*discussion* forum and should not be seen as a place for "debates" where
one team -- or person -- wins and the other loses based on 'entrenched
opinions' and the like.

I went to bed last night thinking that my hope -- for the revival of the
spirit and practice of scholarly discussion which the List once had -- was,
perhaps, a "hope against hope." Therefore, I would make one last appeal to
the List for a reflection by all on the principles of scholarly discussion
which Joe had so well articulated on the Peirce-l page of the Arisbe site.
If no substantial change towards the improvement of the quality of List
discussion happened in the weeks following, I'd give TPG my opinion of the
current viability and value of Peirce-L and they could decide to act as
they thought best (and from occasional discussions with Nathan Houser over
the past six years, I had a strong sense of what their decision might be).

Then I awakened to this post of yours which, arguing not exactly along the
lines I might have, but in its approach far better than I could have given
the biographical context of how you drew from List discussions to develop
your own thinking about Peirce as well as develop your book, *Turning Signs*,
it serves as an invitation for List members -- all of us -- to rethink how
we, individually and in discussion, might find a way forward, to re-engage
the "Will to Learn."

As I read your other good post related to the slow read discussion, the one
which Edwina called 'fine' I believe, re-read John's recent thoughtful
post, saw how there perhaps were beginning to appear expressions of ideas
and concepts upon which there seemed to be some substantial agreement, I
wondered if this might prove to be a turning point for Peirce-L. If it
proves to be, I would imagine that your post challenging us to better
scholarship and, especially, improved collegiality will be remembered as
the beginning of that change for the better.

Certainly Edwina is quite right to say that all participants on the List,
and not just me as moderator, ought to -- need to -- take responsibility
for the ethical health of the List, so to speak, for scholarly discussions
wherein we both challenge and learn from each other rather than the
acrimonious debates which seem to have almost become the new normal here.

So, thank you very much for your thoughtful post. Should it begin to bring
about the positive changes which I'm hoping that it will, Peirce-L, and I
as moderator, will be eternally grateful to you. Meanwhile, I too will try
to ignore the complaints of the complainers unless they sink to the
viciousness that has from time to time surfaced here and required my
intervention as List moderator. But should the animosity and lack of
collegiality continue to be expressed on the List, I have little
expectation that neither Nathan House, the TPG, nor I will want to support
the continuation of Peirce-L. As Abraham Lincoln said in an entirely
different context, "A house divided against itself cannot stand."

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as List Moderator)

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Riffs and Rotes

[Jon Awbrey]

Cf: Riffs and Rotes • 2
https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2013/03/03/riffs-and-rotes-2/

Re: Peter Cameron • Addition and Multiplication of Natural Numbers
https://cameroncounts.wordpress.com/2013/03/03/two-lectures/

All,

The interaction between addition and multiplication in the natural numbers
has long been an interest of mine, leading to broader questions about the
relationship between algebra and combinatorics.  My gropings with these
enigmas led me to the structures of Riffs and Rotes, extracting what
we might think of as the “purely combinatorial” properties of primes
factorizations.  Thinking of the additive structure of the positive
integers as embodied in their total linear ordering, the following
two questions arise.

• How much of the natural ordering of the natural numbers
  is purely combinatorial?

• What additional axioms on the partial orders of Riffs and Rotes
  would restore their natural order?

Reference
=

• Riffs and Rotes ( https://oeis.org/wiki/Riffs_and_Rotes )

Regards,

Jon

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Debate on the List

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list

That's an interesting analysis of 'problems with the List'.

1] I don't think that Bernard Morand's critique of the emphasis on
quotations on the List can be diverted to gratitude for having these
quotations at hand. I think his criticism was their being used
instead of analysis and argumentation.

As for your view that we should be grateful for these quotations
since online resources were not always available - I think that's
another red herring. I, myself, and I suspect many others on this
list, have been reading Peirce, in hard copy, for many years before
we even had a computer.

I admit to having photocopied all 8 volumes of the CP collection and
the 2 of the EP collection many, many years ago - a violation probably
of a zillion copyright laws - and have been reading and re-reading
them for over 20 plus years.

So I don't think that 'lack of access to Peirce writings' justifies
the use of many quotations. Instead, some of us feel that the heavy
use of quotations prevents discussion and debate. 

2] As for your differentiation of Peirce Listers into 'Learners' and
'Complainers' [another tribalism?] - I don't see the justification for
this. I myself joined the List because I was interested in exploring 
the use of the Peircean framework in analyzing societal systems and
biological systems. So- I was interested in whether other people were
also involved in these areas and how they use Peirce to do so. 

3] As for 'Learners' - I don't see that this exists as a reality.
How often have I been chastised, not merely for a 'different
interpretation' but even for using terms that 'Peirce never used';
for interpretations that were deemed 'non-Peircean'. How often have I
been faced, not with a comment such as: 'In my view, I think
differently from you - but instead - with the authoritative
assertion: 'NO, That is not what Peirce meant'. How can this other
person be so sure of this? That's not a comment from a Learner!!

 Haven't you told me that my comments aren't worthy of response?
Didn't you inform the List that Robert Marty was 'post-Peirce'?

Those types of assertions, authoritative and final, don't seem to me
to come from a Learner.

I do admit, however, that I have learned a LOT from other posters on
this list - but I note these are people who have not rejected debate
or insisted on their own authority but have instead, posted both
their analysis and use of Peirce, fascinating and exploratory
outlines; and who have examined alternate views and enabled the
expansion of Peircean analysis. To me - that's what I hoped this List
would be all about!

4] What do I see as problems with the List? Exactly as others have
said - and these are not 'emotional rants' dismissed as a tribal
anger. They are from serious scholars - and if you consider yourself
a Learner - perhaps you should take them seriously. 

Edwina
 On Sun 29/08/21 11:24 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
List,

Rather than take a side in this recurring “debate”, I’d like
to take a long view of how the list has changed over the two decades
that I’ve been subscribed to it. I will try to keep it relevant,
but those who are inclined to dismiss it as the mere reminiscences of
an old man, or as a statement representing some “tribe” or other,
are welcome to do so. 

My first impression of the list, all those years ago, was that its
contributors were a group of people from diverse backgrounds, most of
whom were there for the purpose of learning from Peirce, or learning
about Peirce, or in many cases both. These people evidently had what
Peirce called “the Will to Learn. The first thing that the Will to
Learn supposes is a dissatisfaction with one's present state of
opinion” (CP 5.583, EP2:47, 1898). I certainly had good reason to
be dissatisfied with  my opinions of what Peirce was saying, as I was
still working my way through the two volumes of The Essential Peirce,
and finding that every Peirce text I read was forcing me to modify my
rather crude understanding of those I had read previously. I was
gradually building up a mental context which guided my interpretation
of whatever Peirce text I read next. At the same time I was
incorporating this developing understanding, along with many texts
from Peirce, into the philosophical book I was working on, which
eventually became  Turning Signs [1]. So I was simultaneously
learning from and learning about Peirce.

I got a lot of help in those days from other learners on the list,
especially those who took the trouble to post entire long excerpts
from Peirce’s work. It’s probably hard for more recent
subscribers to realize how limited online access to Peirce’s work
was back then, even on the  Arisbe website; the situation has changed
radically since then. Very early on, I started making my own
collection (in an HTML file) of many of the Peirce texts I had read,
arranged 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Debate on the List

[gnox]

List,

Rather than take a side in this recurring “debate”, I’d like to take a long 
view of how the list has changed over the two decades that I’ve been subscribed 
to it. I will try to keep it relevant, but those who are inclined to dismiss it 
as the mere reminiscences of an old man, or as a statement representing some 
“tribe” or other, are welcome to do so.

My first impression of the list, all those years ago, was that its contributors 
were a group of people from diverse backgrounds, most of whom were there for 
the purpose of learning from Peirce, or learning about Peirce, or in many cases 
both. These people evidently had what Peirce called “the Will to Learn. The 
first thing that the Will to Learn supposes is a dissatisfaction with one's 
present state of opinion” (CP 5.583, EP2:47, 1898). I certainly had good reason 
to be dissatisfied with my opinions of what Peirce was saying, as I was still 
working my way through the two volumes of The Essential Peirce, and finding 
that every Peirce text I read was forcing me to modify my rather crude 
understanding of those I had read previously. I was gradually building up a 
mental context which guided my interpretation of whatever Peirce text I read 
next. At the same time I was incorporating this developing understanding, along 
with many texts from Peirce, into the philosophical book I was working on, 
which eventually became Turning Signs  . 
So I was simultaneously learning from and learning about Peirce.

I got a lot of help in those days from other learners on the list, especially 
those who took the trouble to post entire long excerpts from Peirce’s work. 
It’s probably hard for more recent subscribers to realize how limited online 
access to Peirce’s work was back then, even on the Arisbe website; the 
situation has changed radically since then. Very early on, I started making my 
own collection (in an HTML file) of many of the Peirce texts I had read, 
arranged in chronological order, so that I could easily revisit them in search 
of statements by Peirce that I recalled, and recover the immediate context. By 
now, this searchable collection of mine amounts to over 5MB and includes, 
besides the entire contents of EP1 and EP2, many texts gleaned from CP, W, many 
anthologies, secondary sources, and manuscript images I found online. (For help 
with finding those manuscripts I must thank especially Jeff Downard and Jon 
Alan Schmidt.) 

I included every one of these texts in my collection because they were parts of 
my learning process, and in most cases it was peirce-l posts by other learners 
that directed my attention to Peirce texts I had been unaware of or unable to 
find. So I am eternally grateful to those other learners; and soon I was able 
to “give back” to the list by posting relevant quotations myself (always citing 
the source so that others could find the original context if they took the 
trouble to do so). I’m still doing that; so I plead guilty to the crime 
(according to a recent Bernard Morand post) of posting Peirce quotations to the 
list.

Over the early years of my participation in peirce-l, however, I began to 
notice that not all the participants were demonstrating “the first thing that 
the Will to Learn supposes.” Some were so satisfied with their own opinions of 
what Peirce meant that they adamantly refused to modify them when they were 
questioned or criticized by others. Some of them, who had evidently based their 
notions of Peirce’s work on a relatively limited stock of familiar quotations, 
began to complain when others posted quotations from Peirce that were 
incompatible with their opinions about Peirce’s system of philosophy or 
semiotics. 

In the past few years these complaints have grown louder, accompanied by 
accusations of “cherry-picking” (as if the complainer’s own favorite quotes 
were not cherry-picked out of context), and accusations of claiming some sort 
of authority (as if the complainers were not asserting their own expertise and 
authority as interpreters of Peirce). The complainers also accuse the quoters 
of Peirce of misunderstanding Peirce’s work — not seeing the beam in their own 
eye, the limitations of their own opinions about Peirce. Hence the “debate” 
which has degenerated into an series of personal attacks, with the attackers 
claiming to defend their right to an opinion, or even claiming to defend 
Peirce, against the learners who insist on posting what Peirce wrote. A genuine 
learner would not behave this way, but would welcome opportunities to 
reconsider and perhaps modify their entrenched opinions, especially when they 
are manifestly at odds with what Peirce wrote (not with anyone’s interpretation 
of what Peirce wrote).

These complaints and accusations directed against those who post Peirce 
quotations to the list —especially those who point out their incompatibility 
with interpretations expressed by the complainers — is in my opinion 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, List

I'm not convinced of the isolationist purity of mathematics. I
acknowledge that 'pure' mathematics focuses on a hypothesis without
acknowledgment of whether or not it corresponds to reality or not.
That can be said about many hypothetical formations. As John said -
this gives our system the full freedom of
imagination...aka..Firstness.

  BUT, my point is that such an imaginary realm is not
self-sustaining and must, at some time, connect to reality, where it
will examine whether or not its Forms have any functionality. This
step might not be immediate; it might even take years.

But - without it, the imaginary realm would actually be
hollow...Firstness is fleeting..

And I'd also like to add that Gary F's very nice post on the
relationship between mathematics and phenomenology is exactly what I
have been arguing about for several weeks on this List - and have
been continuously chastised for doing so - I have rejected De
Tienne's 'Move On' exhortations to us, to Move On from Mathematics
and have instead opted for the synechistic interrelationship of these
two realms-of-science.

Edwina
 On Sat 28/08/21  8:27 PM , "John F. Sowa" s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Ediwina, Jon AS, Jeff JBD, List
 I changed the subject line to clarify and emphasize the distinction.
 ET:  the distinction between pure and applied mathematics is very
 fuzzy.  I'd suspect it's the same in phenomenology.  But I do
support
 and agree with [Jeff's] agenda of using both mathematics and
 phenomenology to function within a pragmatic interaction with the
 world.
 For both subjects, the distinction is precise.   JAS highlighted
 Peirce's distinction, which applies to both mathematics and
 phenomenology:
 JAS:  It is incontrovertible that according to Peirce in CP 3.559
 (and elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis without
 inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not.
 Yes, of course.  That distinction is the greatest power of
 mathematics:  it is independent of whatever may exist in our
universe
 or any other.  It gives us the freedom to create new things that
never
 existed before.  The only constraints are physical, not mental.
 That point is also true of phenomenology.  For both fields, there is
 no limitation on what anyone may imagine -- or on what anyone may
 invent.
 As an example, consider the game of chess.  Before anyone carved
 the wooden pieces, the rules of chess were the axioms of a pure
 mathematical theory, for which there were no applicable facts.
 But then, somebody (or perhaps a group of people) imagined a kind
 of game that did not yet exist.  They discussed the possibilities,
 debated various options, and finally agreed to the axioms (rules)
and
 the designs for physical boards and pieces.  Before they played the
 game, there were no facts that corresponded to the mathematical
theory
 or to anybody's perceptions.
 The tests of existence and accuracy are determined by the normative
 sciences, especially methodeutic.  For inventions, the only
 limitations are the available physical resources to construct them.
 JBD:  For my part, I'd like to get clearer on how the pure
 phenomenological theory is supposed to support and guide the applied
 activities--such as the activities of identifying possible sources
of
 observational error, correcting for those errors, framing productive
 questions, exploring informal diagrammatic representations of the
 problems, measuring the phenomena, formulating plausible hypotheses,
 and generating formal mathematical models of the hypothetical
 explanations.
 Those issues depend on the normative sciences, especially
methodeutic.
 The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on
 mathematics for forming hypotheses.  Then they require the normative
 sciences for testing and evaluating the hypotheses.  In pure math,
the
 variables do not refer to anything in actuality.  In applied math,
one
 or more of the variables are linked (via indexes) to something that
 exists or may exist in actuality.  Those indexes are derived and
 tested by methodeutic.
 John 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[gnox]

John, Jeff, List,

We seem to have consensus that Peirce's phenomenology makes observations
based on direct experience and draws upon mathematical principles to analyze
whatever appears into its elements, to arrive at a very general theory which
he calls the "Doctrine of Categories." Without mathematics, it could
accomplish nothing; without experience, it would have nothing to apply
mathematical principles to, and again would accomplish nothing. 

Logic as semiotics inherits this characteristic form from phenomenology in
the form of the Dicisign, as Frederik Stjernfelt has shown in Natural
Propositions: iconic signs, often diagrammatic, must be combined with
indexical signs in order to convey information - the icons signify the form,
and the indices the subject matter of the informational sign, i.e. the
identity of its object.

I think John's account below is one expression of this consensus. But there
is one point in it that I must take issue with. John says, "The special
sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on mathematics for
forming hypotheses." But we have previously agreed that in Peirce's
hierarchy of sciences, each science depends on those above it for
principles, while the higher levels can and often do get their raw data from
those below. Since phenomenology is above the special sciences in the
hierarchy, they should be drawing theoretical principles from it, not "raw
data." I believe that this is indeed the case, and gave an example above of
how semiotics "inherits" categorial principles from phenomenology.

On the other hand, since phenomenology/phaneroscopy observes anything that
can appear "to the mind," it can draw some "raw data" from special sciences.
But what makes phaneroscopy distinctive, and places it before everything in
the hierarchy of sciences except mathematics, is the kind of attention it
deploys in its observations. "Its task requires and exercises a singular
sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost
service throughout the study of logic" (CP2.197). As Peirce says to James in
the 1904 letter previously quoted, "Psychology, you may say, observes the
same facts as phenomenology does. No. It does not observe the same facts. It
looks upon the same world; - the same world that the astronomer looks at.
But what it observes in that world is different."

Phenomenological observation is, we might say, looking for the mathematical
essence of experiencing itself. It can do this because it does not draw upon
any theoretical framework developed by the later sciences such as semiotic
or astronomy. D.S. Kothari says "The simple fact is that no measurement, no
experiment or observation is possible without a relevant theoretical
framework." What sets phenomenology apart from (and above) all other
positive sciences is that the only theoretical framework it employs is from
mathematics, and a very pure kind of mathematics which is free of any prior
application to normative or special sciences. For instance, it employs
"dichotomic mathematics," (which Peirce referred to as "the simplest
mathematics") to arrive at the concept of Secondness, which is the basis of
the subject/object distinction in philosophy of mind; and Peirce was clear
that phenomenology does not assume this distinction but reveals its
experiential basis by applying that mathematical framework.

If any scientific observation could be called "phenomenology" - which seems
to be John's idea in what he has said up to now about
phenomenology/phaneroscopy - there would be no need to practice it as the
"primal positive science", as Peirce called it. This is the one point where
I think John's description below needs to be modified.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of John F. Sowa
Sent: 28-Aug-21 20:28
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

 

Ediwina, Jon AS, Jeff JBD, List

I changed the subject line to clarify and emphasize the distinction.

ET:  the distinction between pure and applied mathematics is very
fuzzy.  I'd suspect it's the same in phenomenology.  But I do support
and agree with [Jeff's] agenda of using both mathematics and
phenomenology to function within a pragmatic interaction with the
world.

For both subjects, the distinction is precise.   JAS highlighted
Peirce's distinction, which applies to both mathematics and
phenomenology:

JAS:  It is incontrovertible that according to Peirce in CP 3.559
(and elsewhere), the mathematician frames a pure hypothesis without
inquiring or caring whether it agrees with the actual facts or not.

Yes, of course.  That distinction is the greatest power of
mathematics:  it is independent of whatever may exist in our universe
or any other.  It gives us the freedom to create new things that never
existed before.  The only constraints are physical, not mental.

That point is also true of phenomenology.  For both fields, there is
no limitation on what anyone may