Jon AS, Gary F, List,

We must always distinguish the subject
matter of any science from the
people who (a) develop the science or
(b) apply the science.

The dependencies among the sciences,
which Comte noted and Peirce
adopted after reading Comte's
classification, show how each science
depends on principles from the
sciences that precede it.

But most people who develop or use
any science are not aware of the
Comte-Peirce classification.  I
recall that Gary F said that the
dependencies in the development
seemed to be circular.  And I
agree.  In their daily work, everybody,
including professional
mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge
they acquired in any
way from any source.  Remember Archimedes'
Eureka moment, when
he discovered a new mathematical principle while
taking a bath.

But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted
from its original
discovery, is independent of any features from its
origin.  Its
principles then become available for any science of any
kind.

JAS:  I will only add that unlike the mathematician,
the
phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given
hypothesis
agrees with the actual facts or not.

But we
must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and
phenomenology
from the people who develop and use them.  All people
have all their
knowledge available at all times.  Peirce was a
polymath.  At one
moment, he could apply pure mathematics while
analyzing experience. 
But in the next moment, he could use normative
principles to evaluate
the results.  Then he could apply those results to
a problem in
physics.  For a case study, see his Photometric
Researches, or the
excerpts I posted at
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf

JAS:  I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience
in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by
the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of
imagination and the logical world of mathematics.

Yes. 
Experience includes sensations from external sources as well as
anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception.
Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination.  A chess expert can
play a good game blindfold.  And mathematicians can do the algebra or
the geometry in their heads.

GF:  John says, “The special
sciences depend on phenomenology for the
raw data and on mathematics
for forming hypotheses.” But we have
previously agreed that in
Peirce’s hierarchy of sciences, each science
depends on those above
it for principles, while the higher levels can
and often do get their
raw data from those below.

Please see pages 1 to 3 of
PRexcerpts.pdf.  Peirce published that book
in 1878, more than 20
years before his classification of the sciences.
On page 1, he begins
with a discussion of principles that could be
called informal
phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the distinction
between
phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light
(as it
really is).  On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton
and
Maxwell.

In citing results by other physicists, he is
practicing methodeutic in
evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy
with the results that other
scientists had derived by their
observations.

Summary:  All our knowledge about anything is
ultimately derived from
our experience (by formal or informal
methods).  Much of that
experience includes communications from other
people who derived their
knowledge from their own experience or from
their experience in
communications with other people who ,,,

When you trace all the sources of your knowledge of any kind from any
source, it all comes directly or indirectly from somebody analyzing
experience.
John
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