Jon AS, Gary F, List, We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science. The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science depends on principles from the sciences that precede it. But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the Comte-Peirce classification. I recall that Gary F said that the dependencies in the development seemed to be circular. And I agree. In their daily work, everybody, including professional mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any way from any source. Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, when he discovered a new mathematical principle while taking a bath. But a pure mathematical theory, as abstracted from its original discovery, is independent of any features from its origin. Its principles then become available for any science of any kind. JAS: I will only add that unlike the mathematician, the phenomenologist does inquire and care whether a given hypothesis agrees with the actual facts or not. But we must distinguish the subject matter of mathematics and phenomenology from the people who develop and use them. All people have all their knowledge available at all times. Peirce was a polymath. At one moment, he could apply pure mathematics while analyzing experience. But in the next moment, he could use normative principles to evaluate the results. Then he could apply those results to a problem in physics. For a case study, see his Photometric Researches, or the excerpts I posted at http://jfsowa.com/peirce/PRexcerpts.pdf JAS: I will only add that phenomenology is not limited to experience in the strict sense of that in cognition which is forced upon us by the outer world of existence, it also encompasses the inner world of imagination and the logical world of mathematics. Yes. Experience includes sensations from external sources as well as anything from memories, imagination, or internal proprioception. Mathematical experience is a kind of imagination. A chess expert can play a good game blindfold. And mathematicians can do the algebra or the geometry in their heads. GF: John says, The special sciences depend on phenomenology for the raw data and on mathematics for forming hypotheses. But we have previously agreed that in Peirces hierarchy of sciences, each science depends on those above it for principles, while the higher levels can and often do get their raw data from those below. Please see pages 1 to 3 of PRexcerpts.pdf. Peirce published that book in 1878, more than 20 years before his classification of the sciences. On page 1, he begins with a discussion of principles that could be called informal phenomenology. on page 2, he introduces the distinction between phenomenal light (as it is experienced) from noumenal light (as it really is). On page 3, he cites results by physicists Newton and Maxwell. In citing results by other physicists, he is practicing methodeutic in evaluating the results of his phaneroscopy with the results that other scientists had derived by their observations. Summary: All our knowledge about anything is ultimately derived from our experience (by formal or informal methods). Much of that experience includes communications from other people who derived their knowledge from their own experience or from their experience in communications with other people who ,,, When you trace all the sources of your knowledge of any kind from any source, it all comes directly or indirectly from somebody analyzing experience. John
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