date:20211007

Jack, List:

As it turns out, in the same manuscript where Peirce states that any system
of connected signs "constitutes one sign" and refers to this as one of the
theorems of "the science of semeiotics," he also discusses how signs are
efficient (without using that word) in the sense of having external effects.

CSP: Every mental representation, in the strictest sense, everything of a
cognitive character, is of the nature of a sign. 'Representation' and
'sign' are synonyms. Now the purpose of a sign is that it shall be
interpreted. The interpretation of it is again a sign. So that the whole
purpose of a sign, as such, is to determine a new sign; and the whole
purport of a sign lies in the character of its intended interpretation. But
in order that a sign should produce another sign, it is necessary that it
should in some sense (not necessarily in this or that technical sense, but
in *some* sense,) influence or act upon something external to itself. It is
only in doing so that it can get itself interpreted. Consequently, the
whole purport of any sign lies in the intended character of its external
action or influence. This external influence is of different kinds in
different cases. Some signs are interpreted or reproduced by a physical
force or something analogous to such a force, simply by causing an event;
as, sounds spoken into a telephone effect variations of the rate of
alternation of an electric current along the wire, as a first
interpretation, and these variations again produce new sound-vibrations by
reinterpretation. Another case is where a sign excites a certain quality of
feeling, simple or complex, which quality of feeling is a sign of anything
that partakes of it, as the sound of the word 'red' may make us imagine the
color red. (R 1476:34-35, c. 1904)


The external effect of a sign can be "another sign," "a physical force" or
"an event," or "a certain quality of feeling." These seem to match up
respectively with what Peirce would later call the "logical meaning" or
"logical interpretant," the "existential meaning" or "energetic
interpretant," and the "emotional meaning" or "emotional interpretant" (R
321&318, 1907).

CSP: Of course, there is no exhaustion of energy as if work were done. The
process rather reminds one of the reproduction of a
population,--sufficiently so, indeed, to furnish a convenient store of
metaphors requisite for the expression of its relations. Naturally, such
metaphors, greatly serviceable though they are, are like edge-tools, not to
be entrusted to babies or to fools or to the immature. There is a science
of semeiotics whose results no more afford room for differences of opinion
than do those of mathematics, and one of its theorems increases the aptness
of that simile. It is that if any signs are connected, no matter how, the
resulting system constitutes one sign; so that, most connections resulting
from successive pairings, a sign frequently interprets a second in so far
as this is "married" to a third. Thus, the conclusion of a syllogism is the
interpretation of either premiss as married to the other; and of this sort
are all the principal translation-processes of thought. In the light of the
above theorem, we see that the entire thought-life of any one person is a
sign; and a considerable part of its interpretation will result from
marriages with the thoughts of other persons. So the thought-life of a
social group is a sign; and the entire body of all thought is a sign,
supposing all thought to be more or less connected. The entire
interpretation of thought must consist in the results of thought's action
outside of thought; either in all these results or in some of them. What,
then, does thought affect outside itself? (R 1476:36)


Peirce suggests "reproduction of a population" as a metaphor for the
process of semiosis and asserts that the results of the "science of
semeiotics" are not matters of differing opinion any more than those of
mathematics, including the theorem about connected signs. Accordingly, "the
entire thought-life of any one person is a sign," "the thought-life of a
social group is a sign," and even "the entire body of all thought is a
sign."

CSP: Let us consider first its effects in the physical universe. The theory
that thought has no outward effects is too impossibly absurd to be
considered. Nobody can really believe it. We must avoid also the error of
the absolute idealists who, in their endeavor to account for everything by
a single principle, make thought to be everything; whence it would follow
that all human products are effects of thought. This theory will not do. (R
1476:37)


Peirce affirms that thought has "effects in the physical universe" and
denies "the error of the absolute idealists who ... make thought to be
everything." In other words, unlike Hegel's *absolute* idealism (as well as
Berkeley's *subjective *idealism), his *objective *idealism maintains the
reality of matter while nevertheless conceiving it as a peculiar sort of

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Argument and metaphors (Was Peirce & Popper)

2021-10-07 Thread gnox

Margaretha, when you speak of “argumentative dynamics,” are you referring to an 
“argument” as a verbal conflict between people, or as an attempt to persuade 
someone of the truth of some assertion, or as the type of sign that represents 
a process of reasoning from premisses to conclusion?

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
Sent: 7-Oct-21 16:09
To: Helmut Raulien 
Cc: tabor...@primus.ca; mkettel...@msn.com; Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Argument and metaphors (Was Peirce & Popper)

 

Helmut, list.

 

I would love to hear how other people see/experience the various argument-as 
metaphors and how these metaphors might explain argumentative dynamics.  

 

My best, Margaretha H.

 

I myself wrote some comments below.

 

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 2:14 PM Helmut Raulien mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de> > wrote:

Edwina, Margaretha, List,

 

HR: I want to get back to Margaretha´s argument-metaphors, a bit late, now the 
topic is Popper, but anyway, Popper wrote about the open society and its 
enemies, and I think that Margaretha´s metaphors can help us to be an open 
society, and not become its enemies:

-

- argument as war:

 

HR: Who arguments with the intention of leading a war, is an enemy, makes 
someone other an enemy, then the society is not open, even split, so he:she is 
an enemy of its too. 

 

Margaret: only two outcomes winning or losing; very existential; argument as a 
zero sum game.  truth is subordinate to winning the argument. 

 

- argument as a tennis tournament:

 

HR: A tennis tournament is not lethal like a war, but people are meant to be 
excluded too, though merely from the discussion, not from their own lives.

 

Margaret: also about winning and losing, but now according to some prespecified 
rules and in front of an audience whom one would like to impress by scoring 
points.  Truth is subordinate to winning the argument.

 

- argument as constructing a cathedral:

 

HR: It depends, whether the common goal is a cathedral, or only the utterer 
wants to build one, and the others rather want to build other premises. If the 
cathedral is gaining insight in general, it is good,

 

Margaret: as masons your reputation is at stake; also whether you will get 
future work.  Furthermore, you could be inside the cathedral/apartment complex 
when it falls down.  Truth is important insofar that you are directly linked to 
that cathedral.

 

- argument as dance:

 

HR: This is art-pour -l´-art. It merely has esthetical value, but doesn´t cause 
much harm, except occupation of time.

 

Margaret: yes, all about the sport itself; with limited attention to the larger 
implications.  truth is a secondary issue

 

- argument as repairing a ship in the middle of the sea:

 

HR: Do all agree, that the ship should be repaired? That it can be repaired? 
That it can be repaired in the middle of the sea, or better should be hauled to 
a dock?

 

Margaret:  Let us assume that the ship is falling apart in the middle of the 
ocean, with no other ships in sight.  Truth matters

 

- argument as computer programming:

 

HR: Finding algorithms that abbreviate or laminate turbulent streams of 
thoughts seems not bad to me.

 

Margaret: is it sensible to think of argumentation as the art of programming 
someone else according to whatever the algorithm du jour is?  What is the 
net-benefit value of arguing?  Is it to find the absolute indubitable truth and 
then share it with others the path to truth?  Or is its purpose to find the 
cognitive blind spot in one another's worldview so that less time and energy 
will be wasted on fixing/repairing errors and mistakes ?

 

 

--

 

HR: All in all, I think it is good, before uttering an argument, to always 
think: "Why do I want to utter this argument?". And: "Is my intention the same 
the others have?", e.g. the gain of insight. And not to fight against, or 
compete with, the others, but to think: "We are all on the same side, we want 
to gain insight, and reflect, keep our society open, be solidaric with others, 
and even if we assume, that one or the other is falling into a war- or 
competition- mode, not regard him:her as enemy, but try to nudge her:him back 
into a cooperative mode, because the cathedral still is not finished, and the 
ship is still badly damaged". In between dance a bit.

Margaret: 🙏🙏🙏  

 

 

Best, Helmut

  

  

07. Oktober 2021 um 19:39 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky" mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> >
wrote:

Martin, List

Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.  I've 
always considered him to be against a certain type of realism, in particular, 
the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to speak, of such as Plato . 
But his Third World, to my understanding, was not nominalism but realism - an 
evolving, natural 'sets of laws'. I understood him to describe himself as a 
metaphysical realist

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Existential Graphs for Triadic Relations (was Peirce & Popper)

2021-10-07 Thread JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY

Robert, Edwina, Jon, List:

I'll just thank all three of you simultaneously for your responses, each of 
which is valuable to me in their own ways.


Also, would like to thank Jon Awbrey as his diagram here has put me in mind of 
something. Not sure if you'll read this, Jon, but in the process of reading 
your Conceptual Barriers article at present and was wondering if you could 
comment on the significance of Buhler and Jakobson in your 
construction/conception of said schema? I.e., I am speaking of the Organon 
model which Buhler conceived as bears a slight resemblance to your own work.


https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/63/Organon-Modell_Workaround.svg

Buhler conceives of "Expressive/Representive/Conative" as a triad which 
Jakobson later doubles, or else enlarges, to encompass the following:

  1.  referential (contextual information)
  2.  aesthetic/poetic (auto-reflection)
  3.  emotive (self-expression)
  4.  conative (vocative or imperative addressing of receiver)
  5.  phatic (checking channel working)
  6.  metalingual (checking code working)

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3e/Roma_jakobson_theory.png
[https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3e/Roma_jakobson_theory.png]
I.e., your idea that "The connotative aspect includes the references that a 
sign has to ideas, concepts, intentions, affects, and to the whole realm of an 
agent’s mental states, broadly encompassing intellectual associations, 
emotional impressions, and motivational impulses. The connotative dimension of 
the sign relation embodies the possibility of multiple perspectives" would seem 
commensurate, if only superficially so, with much of what is contained in 
Buhler and Jakobson's respective ideas (Awbrey, Susan, and Awbrey Jon 2001: 
277-8).

Interesting stuff either way.

Best

Jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Edwina Taborsky 
Sent: Thursday, October 7, 2021 8:27 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu ; jonalanschm...@gmail.com 

Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs for Triadic Relations 
(was Peirce & Popper)

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

JAS, list

I wasn't outlining Peirce's EGs [existential graphs] - so there is no need to 
rush into their defense and point out what you consider my errors.  I wasn't 
dealing with the EGs! I was answering Jack's comment on the Peirce and Popper 
thread [not an Existential Graph thread].

I was trying to explain to someone who doesn't have an 'image' of the semiosic 
triad, how to imagize it  and see it as a dynamic interactive process - and I 
consider that  my example, which I've used for years [but with a blackboard and 
lots of chalk] - helps portray what is going on within the semiosic triadic 
process.

And there are indeed three relations - see 8.335 and on , where he indeed talks 
about 'relations'. Your insistence on the term of 'correlate' doesn't, as I see 
it,  help explain the very active process of information development that is 
going on. And that is what has to be explained - the active semiosic process 
that is developing information that is going on at these three sites.

My opinion is that the term of 'Representamen' is extremely useful, to separate 
that mediative process from the WHOLE triad, of O-R-I, which I [and others have 
as well] term the Sign. And I think that these two - the full triad and the 
mediating node - have to be clearly differentiated. It's difficult to do that 
if you use the same term for them!!

This thread is not about an insistence on 'I am right' but just 'This is my 
analysis of Peirce'. You may disagree with me - and you usually do- but, you 
are, as am I, equal in being 'interpreters' and not Final Authorities of Peirce.

Edwina



On Thu 07/10/21 2:55 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:

Jack, Edwina, List:

ET: Put the dot right at the intersection of the three lines of the Y.

In Peirce's EGs, there is no "dot" at the intersection, there is the name of a 
triadic relation. In his generic examples (CP 1.347, 1903), this is simply a 
letter--"a," "b," "c," or "d." In semiosis, it is "representing" or "mediating."

ET: Now - think of this dot, as the ground site, the attractor site, for THREE 
Relations.

In Peirce's EGs, there are not three relations, there is only one triadic 
relation that has three correlates. In semiosis, those three correlates are the 
sign, its object, and its interpretant.

ET: Think of a Relation as a kind of connection link between one node and 
another node.

Again, the only relation in each of Peirce's EGs is the one whose name is in 
the middle. The three lines are not relations, they denote the three correlates 
of the one triadic relation. A genuine triadic relation, such as representing 
or mediating, involves the three dy

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

 

Martin, List

I think his Objective Knowledge is a good text to see his arguments
against induction [which he also calls the Bucket Theory of the Mind]
as a means of developing scientific knowledge. 

The methodological nominalism, which, as you point out, is an
argument against Plato's essentialism of Pure Forms, is rather
similar, I think, to Peirce's pragmatism. That is, Popper is against
focusing on some kind of a priori Pure Truth...which is also why, I
think, he is against historicism with its determinism and is instead,
supporting the Open Society. 

And Peirce was also against beginning inquiry with 'pure doubt' [an
impossible state] and relying only on inductive data [which is also
why phaneroscopy is not a primary science but rests within the
hypothetical constructs of mathematics]. 

With Peirce - his abduction was the development of hypotheses about
the world - and of course, these had to be accepted as fallible. With
Popper - his 'logic of discovery' [Ch 3 in Objective Knowledge] has
similarities since this Three World theory sets up that Third World
as the site of universal concepts [p 156] and mathematical truths and
other propositions or theories. Rather similar to Peirce's Thirdness.
And he suggests that this third world has its own realitiy/autonomy
and also..'man-made' p 159. This has similarities with Peirce's
abduction - but I think Peirce explains it better. And, as we know,
Peirce's Thirdness was universal and found within the
physico-chemical and biological realms, not simply human.

So, induction, which is merely data-gathering without hypothesis
construction, does not get science anywhere.

As for fallibility, I see it as an acknowledgement of openness to
data, rather than a modus tollens - though I see your point.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  3:38 PM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com
sent:
  Thank you, Edwina. 
 I haven’t read "Object Knowledge." Even in "The Open Society and
it’s Enemies” there is a slipperiness in the way Popper defends
“methodological nominalism,” which (in his words)
  “Instead of aiming at finding out what a thing really is, and at
defining its true nature…aims at describing how a thing behaves in
various circumstances, and especially, whether there are any
regularities in its behavior. In other words, methodological
nominalism sees the aim of science in the description of the thing
and events our experience, and in an ‘explanation’ of these
events, i.e. their description with the help of universal laws. And
it sees in our language, and especially in those of its rules which
distinguish properly constructed sentences and inferences for a mere
heap of words, the great instrument of scientific description; words
it considers rather as subsidiary tools for this task, and not as
names of essences.” 
 Of course here we see his plaidoyer against Plato, but one wonders
how universal laws are to be recognized and used to ‘help explain
events’ if (as Popper continues)
 “The methodological nominalist will never think that a question
like ‘What is energy?’ or ‘What is movement?’ or ‘What is
an atom?’ is an important question for physics; but he will attach
importance to a question like ‘How can the energy of the sun be
made useful?’ or ‘How does a planet move? or “Under what
conditions does an atom radiate light?’ And to those philosophers
who tell him that before having answered the ‘what is’ question
he cannot hope to give any exact answers to any of the ‘how’
questions, he will reply, if at all, by pointing out that he much
prefers that modest degree of exactness which he can achieve by his
methods to the pretentious muddle which they have achieved by
theirs.” (p 32) 
 The slipperiness is around induction, meaning how we get from
individual observations to laws of science. In "Logik der
Forschung,” (1935) Popper said that the problem of induction is
insurmountable, and that science is not in fact based on inductive
inferences at all. Popper said that science proceeds by making bold
conjectures, and then attempting to falsify those conjectures. So,
induction gets accounted for by deduction, i.e.: the hypothesis is
falsified by modus tollens.  Popper is desperately trying to avoid
Hume’s problem within the same individualist logic; whereas Peirce
accounts for the validity of induction by his “social theory of
logic.” (“Four Incapacities…,’ “Fixation of Belief,” and
“How to Make Our Ideas Clear”)
  Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD ListeningIsTheKey.com [1]303 747 4449 
 On 7 Oct 2021, at 11:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Martin, List

Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.
 I've always considered him to be against a certain type of realism,
in particular, the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to
speak, of such as Plato . But his Third World, to my understanding,
was not nominalism but realism - an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'.
I understood him

[PEIRCE-L] Argument and metaphors (Was Peirce & Popper)

Helmut, list.

I would love to hear how other people see/experience the various
argument-as metaphors and how these metaphors might explain argumentative
dynamics.

My best, Margaretha H.

I myself wrote some comments below.

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 2:14 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina, Margaretha, List,
>
> HR: I want to get back to Margaretha´s argument-metaphors, a bit late, now
> the topic is Popper, but anyway, Popper wrote about the open society and
> its enemies, and I think that Margaretha´s metaphors can help us to be an
> open society, and not become its enemies:
> -
> *- argument as war:*
>
> HR: Who arguments with the intention of leading a war, is an enemy, makes
> someone other an enemy, then the society is not open, even split, so he:she
> is an enemy of its too.
>


> Margaret: only two outcomes winning or losing; very existential; argument
> as a zero sum game.  truth is subordinate to winning the argument.
>


> *- argument as a tennis tournament:*
>
> HR: A tennis tournament is not lethal like a war, but people are meant to
> be excluded too, though merely from the discussion, not from their own
> lives.
>
>
Margaret: also about winning and losing, but now according to some
prespecified rules and in front of an audience whom one would like to
impress by scoring points.  Truth is subordinate to winning the argument.


> *- argument as constructing a cathedral:*
>
> HR: It depends, whether the common goal is a cathedral, or only the
> utterer wants to build one, and the others rather want to build other
> premises. If the cathedral is gaining insight in general, it is good,
>
>
Margaret: as masons your reputation is at stake; also whether you will get
future work.  Furthermore, you could be inside the cathedral/apartment
complex when it falls down.  Truth is important insofar that you are
directly linked to that cathedral.

*- argument as dance:*
>
> HR: This is art-pour -l´-art. It merely has esthetical value, but doesn´t
> cause much harm, except occupation of time.
>

Margaret: yes, all about the sport itself; with limited attention to the
larger implications.  truth is a secondary issue

>
> *- argument as repairing a ship in the middle of the sea:*
>
> HR: Do all agree, that the ship should be repaired? That it can be
> repaired? That it can be repaired in the middle of the sea, or better
> should be hauled to a dock?
>
>
Margaret:  Let us assume that the ship is falling apart in the middle of
the ocean, with no other ships in sight.  Truth matters


> - *argument as computer programming:*
>
> HR: Finding algorithms that abbreviate or laminate turbulent streams of
> thoughts seems not bad to me.
>

Margaret: is it sensible to think of argumentation as the art of
programming someone else according to whatever the algorithm du jour is?
What is the net-benefit value of arguing?  Is it to find the absolute
indubitable truth and then share it with others the path to truth?  Or is
its purpose to find the cognitive blind spot in one another's worldview so
that less time and energy will be wasted on fixing/repairing errors and
mistakes ?



> --
>
> HR: All in all, I think it is good, before uttering an argument, to always
> think: "Why do I want to utter this argument?". And: "Is my intention the
> same the others have?", e.g. the gain of insight. And not to fight against,
> or compete with, the others, but to think: "We are all on the same side, we
> want to gain insight, and reflect, keep our society open, be solidaric with
> others, and even if we assume, that one or the other is falling into a war-
> or competition- mode, not regard him:her as enemy, but try to nudge her:him
> back into a cooperative mode, because the cathedral still is not finished,
> and the ship is still badly damaged". In between dance a bit.
>
Margaret: 🙏🙏🙏

>
>


> Best, Helmut
>
>
> 07. Oktober 2021 um 19:39 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky" 
> wrote:
>
> Martin, List
>
> Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.  I've
> always considered him to be against a certain type of realism, in
> particular, the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to speak, of
> such as Plato . But his Third World, to my understanding, was not
> nominalism but realism - an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'. I understood
> him to describe himself as a metaphysical realist [Objective Knowledge, p
> 40, footnote. And "I propose to accept realism as the only sensible
> hypothesis [p 42].
>
> One has to consider what he means by this 'realism'. It's, again,
> certainly not Plato's external-to-the-universe Forms, which was, according
> to Popper, essentially a religious world [153-4]. I'd say it's comparable
> to Peirce's Thirdness, the realm of developed and developing
> habits/laws.This is a rational, logical realm, the realm of 'intelligibles,
> or of ideas in the objective sense'. [p 154]
>
> The first world is the physical world; the second

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread Martin W. Kettelhut

Thank you, Edwina. 

I haven’t read "Object Knowledge." Even in "The Open Society and it’s Enemies” 
there is a slipperiness in the way Popper defends “methodological nominalism,” 
which (in his words)

“Instead of aiming at finding out what a thing really is, and at defining its 
true nature…aims at describing how a thing behaves in various circumstances, 
and especially, whether there are any regularities in its behavior. In other 
words, methodological nominalism sees the aim of science in the description of 
the thing and events our experience, and in an ‘explanation’ of these events, 
i.e. their description with the help of universal laws. And it sees in our 
language, and especially in those of its rules which distinguish properly 
constructed sentences and inferences for a mere heap of words, the great 
instrument of scientific description; words it considers rather as subsidiary 
tools for this task, and not as names of essences.”

Of course here we see his plaidoyer against Plato, but one wonders how 
universal laws are to be recognized and used to ‘help explain events’ if (as 
Popper continues)

“The methodological nominalist will never think that a question like ‘What is 
energy?’ or ‘What is movement?’ or ‘What is an atom?’ is an important question 
for physics; but he will attach importance to a question like ‘How can the 
energy of the sun be made useful?’ or ‘How does a planet move? or “Under what 
conditions does an atom radiate light?’ And to those philosophers who tell him 
that before having answered the ‘what is’ question he cannot hope to give any 
exact answers to any of the ‘how’ questions, he will reply, if at all, by 
pointing out that he much prefers that modest degree of exactness which he can 
achieve by his methods to the pretentious muddle which they have achieved by 
theirs.” (p 32)

The slipperiness is around induction, meaning how we get from individual 
observations to laws of science. In "Logik der Forschung,” (1935) Popper said 
that the problem of induction is insurmountable, and that science is not in 
fact based on inductive inferences at all. Popper said that science proceeds by 
making bold conjectures, and then attempting to falsify those conjectures. So, 
induction gets accounted for by deduction, i.e.: the hypothesis is falsified by 
modus tollens. Popper is desperately trying to avoid Hume’s problem within the 
same individualist logic; whereas Peirce accounts for the validity of induction 
by his “social theory of logic.” (“Four Incapacities…,’ “Fixation of Belief,” 
and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”)

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
ListeningIsTheKey.com
303 747 4449

> On 7 Oct 2021, at 11:39 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Martin, List
> 
> Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.  I've 
> always considered him to be against a certain type of realism, in particular, 
> the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to speak, of such as Plato 
> . But his Third World, to my understanding, was not nominalism but realism - 
> an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'. I understood him to describe himself as 
> a metaphysical realist [Objective Knowledge, p 40, footnote. And "I propose 
> to accept realism as the only sensible hypothesis [p 42].
> 
> One has to consider what he means by this 'realism'. It's, again, certainly 
> not Plato's external-to-the-universe Forms, which was, according to Popper, 
> essentially a religious world [153-4]. I'd say it's comparable to Peirce's 
> Thirdness, the realm of developed and developing habits/laws.This is a 
> rational, logical realm, the realm of 'intelligibles, or of ideas in the 
> objective sense'. [p 154]
> 
> The first world is the physical world; the second world is the subjective 
> world, of subjective or personal experiences..and the third world is the 
> realm of 'arguments, logical relations' etc.
> 
> So- my reading of Popper is that I wouldn't really describe him as a 
> nominalist - because of this third world he focuses on.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Thu 07/10/21 11:54 AM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com sent:
> 
> Dear Edwina and Margaretha,
> 
> Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must reckon 
> with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas Peirce is a 
> thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not the least of which 
> is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he says that all we’ve got is 
> truth in a certain context (like a chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). 
> Popper is afraid that a realist commitment to truth = closedness, or 
> truth-with-an-agenda. Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or 
> continuity.
> 
> Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
> 
>> On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote:
>> 
>> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's Third 
>> World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets it up as 
>> analogous with the biologica

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs for Triadic Relations (was Peirce & Popper)

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

I wasn't outlining Peirce's EGs [existential graphs] - so there is
no need to rush into their defense and point out what you consider my
errors.  I wasn't dealing with the EGs! I was answering Jack's comment
on the Peirce and Popper thread [not an Existential Graph thread]. 

I was trying to explain to someone who doesn't have an 'image' of
the semiosic triad, how to imagize it  and see it as a dynamic
interactive process - and I consider that  my example, which I've
used for years [but with a blackboard and lots of chalk] - helps
portray what is going on within the semiosic triadic process. 

And there are indeed three relations - see 8.335 and on , where he
indeed talks about 'relations'. Your insistence on the term of
'correlate' doesn't, as I see it,  help explain the very active
process of information development that is going on. And that is what
has to be explained - the active semiosic process that is developing
information that is going on at these three sites.

My opinion is that the term of 'Representamen' is extremely useful,
to separate that mediative process from the WHOLE triad, of O-R-I,
which I [and others have as well] term the Sign. And I think that
these two - the full triad and the mediating node - have to be
clearly differentiated. It's difficult to do that if you use the same
term for them!!

This thread is not about an insistence on 'I am right' but just
'This is my analysis of Peirce'. You may disagree with me - and you
usually do- but, you are, as am I, equal in being 'interpreters' and
not Final Authorities of Peirce. 

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  2:55 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Jack, Edwina, List:
 ET: Put the dot right at the intersection of the three lines of the
Y.
 In Peirce's EGs, there is no "dot" at the intersection, there is the
name of a triadic relation. In his generic examples (CP 1.347, 1903),
this is simply a letter--"a," "b," "c," or "d." In semiosis, it is
"representing" or "mediating." 
 ET: Now - think of this dot, as the ground site, the attractor site,
for THREE Relations.
 In Peirce's EGs, there are not three relations, there is only one
triadic relation that has three correlates. In semiosis, those three
correlates are the sign, its object, and its interpretant.
  ET: Think of a Relation as a kind of connection link between one
node and another node.
 Again, the only relation in each of Peirce's EGs is the one whose
name is in the middle. The three lines are not relations, they denote
the three correlates of the one triadic relation. A genuine triadic
relation, such as representing or mediating, involves the three
dyadic relations between its correlates but is not  reducible to
them. In fact, Peirce's 1903 taxonomy classifies a sign according to
the nature of its dyadic relations with its object
(icon/index/symbol) and with its interpretant
(rheme/dicisign/argument), although there is no separate division for
the dyadic relation between the interpretant and the object because it
is the same as the dyadic relation between the sign and the object.
  CSP: A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation,
the Second Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation
the possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of
the same triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible
Interpretant.A Sign is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is
a cognition of a mind. Signs are the only representamens that have
been much studied. (CP 2.242, EP 2:290-291, 1903)
 Peirce later abandons the term "representamen," having decided that
"there was no need of this horrid long word" because the term "sign"
is "a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in
almost the exact sense of the scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905).
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 12:57 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca
[3]> wrote:
Jack, list

Good heavens - A cutting board example!
1] No, the Y shaped format of the Semiosic Sign is irreducible. It's
hard to, on a computer, show this.
2] But - take a DOT .  Put the dot right at the intersection of the
three lines of the Y.
Now - think of this dot,  as the ground site, the attractor site,
for THREE Relations.
3] a Relation is an informational interaction; it carries data.
Think of a Relation as a kind of connection link between one node and
another node.
4] Now ..look at the Y shape.  Right at the centre of those three
spokes/Relationsthat's the GROUND, that big Dot. [even though I
can't show it on this computer].
Notice -

[PEIRCE-L] Existential Graphs for Triadic Relations (was Peirce & Popper)

Jack, Edwina, List:

ET: Put the dot right at the intersection of the three lines of the Y.

In Peirce's EGs, there is no "dot" at the intersection, there is the name
of a triadic relation. In his generic examples (CP 1.347, 1903), this is
simply a letter--"a," "b," "c," or "d." In semiosis, it is "representing"
or "mediating."

ET: Now - think of this dot, as the ground site, the attractor site, for
THREE Relations.

In Peirce's EGs, there are not three relations, there is only one triadic
relation that has three correlates. In semiosis, those three correlates are
the sign, its object, and its interpretant.

ET: Think of a Relation as a kind of connection link between one node and
another node.

Again, the only relation in each of Peirce's EGs is the one whose name is
in the middle. The three lines are not relations, they denote the three
correlates of the one triadic relation. A *genuine *triadic relation, such
as representing or mediating, *involves *the three dyadic relations between
its correlates but is not *reducible to* them. In fact, Peirce's 1903
taxonomy classifies a sign according to the nature of its dyadic relations
with its object (icon/index/symbol) and with its interpretant
(rheme/dicisign/argument), although there is no separate division for the
dyadic relation between the interpretant and the object because it is the
same as the dyadic relation between the sign and the object.

CSP: A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same
triadic relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant.
A *Sign *is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is a cognition of a
mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied. (CP
2.242, EP 2:290-291, 1903)

Peirce later abandons the term "representamen," having decided that "there
was no need of this horrid long word" because the term "sign" is "a
wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the
exact sense of the scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 12:57 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jack, list
>
> Good heavens - A cutting board example!
>
> 1] No, the Y shaped format of the Semiosic Sign is irreducible. It's hard
> to, on a computer, show this.
>
> 2] But - take a DOT .  Put the dot right at the intersection of the three
> lines of the Y.
>
> Now - think of this dot,  as the ground site, the attractor site, for
> THREE Relations.
>
> 3] a Relation is an informational interaction; it carries data. Think of a
> Relation as a kind of connection link between one node and another node.
>
> 4] Now ..look at the Y shape.  Right at the centre of those three
> spokes/Relationsthat's the GROUND, that big Dot. [even though I can't
> show it on this computer].
>
> Notice - there are THREE lines/Relations coming out of that Centre 'dot'.
> You cannot reduce these three; otherwise, it's not a semiosic sign.
>
> 5] The first Relation we'll consider is the vertical one. That's the
> Representamen in itself. That's a mediating relation; it only functions
> within the triad. It will be in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. Its function is to
> receive the input data, 'mediate it' according to its stored laws,
> transform it'...and pass it on to the Interpretant Relation.
>
> 6] The next Relation is that between the Representamen and the Dynamic
> Object.  That brings in the input data to that Representamen. Also could be
> in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.  [icon, index, symbol]
>
> 7] the next Relation is that between the Representamen and the
> Interpretant node. That relation is the result of the Representamen's
> mediative actions on the input data. Also could be in a mode of 1ns, 2ns,
> 3ns.
>
> Hope this helps a bit.
>
> Edwina
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread robert marty

Jack, List,

> JACK : "Does the preference of the Y (over a triangle) essentially have
to do with the fact that if we remove one tail we have something which
resembles an index and if we remove all three tails, but leave the point of
the intersection (which I know would logically be contained within each
line, but am just speculating) then we have a dot of sorts which
corresponds to icon?"

> RM First, two remarks:
1- first it is not a preference, since there is no choice!
2- I answer yes to your question but on the condition that this resemblance
that you perceive is explained. For that, rather than speaking of an index,
we must speak of an indexical sign and for an icon, we must speak of an
iconic sign. This implies referring to the ten classes of signs (see CP
2.254 to 2.263 ) and what you have perceived is that in every indexical
sign (there are 4) the object is in a real (dyadic) relation with the sign
it determines, whereas in every iconic sign (there are 3), the relation of
the sign with the object that determines it is a mere possibility (monadic:
at least one quality in common).  Finally, you had the intuition that index
and icon correspond to distinctions in the classes according to the
relations (seen as "tails") that the object and the sign have.
Best regards,
Robert Marty



Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 19:56, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Jack, list
>
>
> Good heavens - A cutting board example!
>
>
> 1] No, the Y shaped format of the Semiosic Sign is irreducible. It's hard
> to, on a computer, show this.
>
>
> 2] But - take a DOT .  Put the dot right at the intersection of the three
> lines of the Y.
>
>
> Now - think of this dot,  as the ground site, the attractor site, for
> THREE Relations.
>
>
> 3] a Relation is an informational interaction; it carries data. Think of a
> Relation as a kind of connection link between one node and another node.
>
>
> 4] Now ..look at the Y shape.  Right at the centre of those three
> spokes/Relationsthat's the GROUND, that big Dot. [even though I can't
> show it on this computer].
>
>
> Notice - there are THREE lines/Relations coming out of that Centre 'dot'.
> You cannot reduce these three; otherwise, it's not a semiosic sign.
>
>
> 5] The first Relation we'll consider is the vertical one. That's the
> Representamen in itself. That's a mediating relation; it only functions
> within the triad. It will be in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns. Its function is to
> receive the input data, 'mediate it' according to its stored laws,
> transform it'...and pass it on to the Interpretant Relation.
>
>
> 6] The next Relation is that between the Representamen and the Dynamic
> Object.  That brings in the input data to that Representamen. Also could be
> in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.  [icon, index, symbol]
>
>
> 7] the next Relation is that between the Representamen and the
> Interpretant node. That relation is the result of the Representamen's
> mediative actions on the input data. Also could be in a mode of 1ns, 2ns,
> 3ns.
>
>
> Hope this helps a bit.
>
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu 07/10/21 1:05 PM , JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie
> sent:
>
> Marty, Edwina, List,
>
> Does the preference of the Y (over a triangle) essentially have to do with
> the fact that if we remove one tail we have something which resembles an
> index and if we remove all three tails, but leave the point of the
> intersection (which I know would logically be contained within each line,
> but am just speculating) then we have a dot of sorts which corresponds to
> icon?
>
> I have never really been able to make much headway with the graphs... Also
> really good to see some discussions in past couple of days.
>
> Best
>
> Jack
>
> --
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu on behalf of robert marty
> Sent: Thursday, October 7, 2021 4:00 PM
> To: tabor...@primus.ca
> Cc: Peirce-L ; mahe3...@gmail.com
> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper
>
> *Warning*
>
> This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System.
> Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the
> sender and know the content is safe.
> Margaretha, Edwina, List
>
> Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
> is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...
>
>   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
> that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
> of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail
> -- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic
> relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But
> you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails. You may
> think that a node connecting three lines of identity

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread Helmut Raulien

Edwina, Margaretha, List,

I want to get back to Margaretha´s argument-metaphors, a bit late, now the topic is Popper, but anyway, Popper wrote about the open society and its enemies, and I think that Margaretha´s metaphors can help us to be an open society, and not become its enemies:

- argument as war:

Who arguments with the intention of leading a war, is an enemy, makes someone other an enemy, then the society is not open, even split, so he:she is an enemy of its too.

- argument as a tennis tournament:

A tennis tournament is not lethal like a war, but people are meant to be excluded too, though merely from the discussion, not from their own lives.

- argument as constructing a cathedral:

It depends, whether the common goal is a cathedral, or only the utterer wants to build one, and the others rather want to build other premises. If the cathedral is gaining insight in general, it is good,

- argument as dance:

This is art-pour -l´-art. It merely has esthetical value, but doesn´t cause much harm, except occupation of time.

- argument as repairing a ship in the middle of the sea:

Do all agree, that the ship should be repaired? That it can be repaired? That it can be repaired in the middle of the sea, or better should be hauled to a dock?

- argument as computer programming:

Finding algorithms that abbreviate or laminate turbulent streams of thoughts seems not bad to me.

All in all, I think it is good, before uttering an argument, to always think: "Why do I want to utter this argument?". And: "Is my intention the same the others have?", e.g. the gain of insight. And not to fight against, or compete with, the others, but to think: "We are all on the same side, we want to gain insight, and reflect, keep our society open, be solidaric with others, and even if we assume, that one or the other is falling into a war- or competition- mode, not regard him:her as enemy, but try to nudge her:him back into a cooperative mode, because the cathedral still is not finished, and the ship is still badly damaged". In between dance a bit.

Best, Helmut

07. Oktober 2021 um 19:39 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Martin, List

Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper. I've always considered him to be against a certain type of realism, in particular, the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to speak, of such as Plato . But his Third World, to my understanding, was not nominalism but realism - an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'. I understood him to describe himself as a metaphysical realist [Objective Knowledge, p 40, footnote. And "I propose to accept realism as the only sensible hypothesis [p 42].

One has to consider what he means by this 'realism'. It's, again, certainly not Plato's external-to-the-universe Forms, which was, according to Popper, essentially a religious world [153-4]. I'd say it's comparable to Peirce's Thirdness, the realm of developed and developing habits/laws.This is a rational, logical realm, the realm of 'intelligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense'. [p 154]

The first world is the physical world; the second world is the subjective world, of subjective or personal experiences..and the third world is the realm of 'arguments, logical relations' etc.

So- my reading of Popper is that I wouldn't really describe him as a nominalist - because of this third world he focuses on.

Edwina

On Thu 07/10/21 11:54 AM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com sent:

Dear Edwina and Margaretha,

Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must reckon with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas Peirce is a thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not the least of which is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he says that all we’ve got is truth in a certain context (like a chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). Popper is afraid that a realist commitment to truth = closedness, or truth-with-an-agenda. Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or continuity.

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD

On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

2] I have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's Third World has strong comparisons with Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in the development of a society.

Responding to

On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:

List,

How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread E Valentine Daniel

Still better than calumny
EVD

> On Oct 7, 2021, at 8:08 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> It was not a joke... I myself committed a lapsus calami by writing "calmi"! 
> Excuse me ...
> RM
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> 
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ 
> 
> 
> 
> Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 17:00, robert marty  > a écrit :
> Margaretha, Edwina, List
> 
> Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it is 
> not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too... 
> 
>   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument that 
> genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of 
> qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail -- X 
> represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic relation.†1 
> Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But you can never by 
> such joining make a graph with three tails. You may think that a node 
> connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic idea. But analysis will 
> show that it is so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I 
> exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may say, with 
> sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On Wednesday I 
> see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently 
> is the same I saw on Monday." There is a recognition of triadic identity; but 
> it is only brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is itself 
> a triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I cannot by any such direct 
> experience identify both of them with a man I saw before. I can only identify 
> them if I regard them, not as the very same, but as two different 
> manifestations of the same man. But the idea of manifestation is the idea of 
> a sign. Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to 
> some interpretant thought, [emphasize mine]
> 
>  C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that while 
> a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two or one 
> tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to build 
> graphs with every higher number of tails. 
> 
> 
>   And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic, or 
> of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic 
> relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three 
> elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to be 
> found in the phenomenon "
> 
> Best regards,
> Robert Marty
> 
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> 
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ 
> 
> 
> 
> Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  > a écrit :
> Margaretha
> 
> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this list, 
> with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle but in 
> a Y shape.
> 
> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign - Interpretant do 
> not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is closed, but 
> within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and enable 
> networking with other triads.
> 
> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y 
> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
> 
> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that 
> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his 
> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance, 
> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex 
> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
> 
> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's Third 
> World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets it up as 
> analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his Objective 
> Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open 
> Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and 
> unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper 
> accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in the 
> development of a society.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com 
>  sent:
> 
> List,
> 
> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection 
> between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
> 
> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Peirce & Popper

 

Jack, list
Good heavens - A cutting board example! 
1] No, the Y shaped format of the Semiosic Sign is irreducible. It's
hard to, on a computer, show this. 
2] But - take a DOT .  Put the dot right at the intersection of the
three lines of the Y. 
Now - think of this dot,  as the ground site, the attractor site,
for THREE Relations.
3] a Relation is an informational interaction; it carries data.
Think of a Relation as a kind of connection link between one node and
another node.
4] Now ..look at the Y shape.  Right at the centre of those three
spokes/Relationsthat's the GROUND, that big Dot. [even though I
can't show it on this computer]. 
Notice - there are THREE lines/Relations coming out of that Centre
'dot'. You cannot reduce these three; otherwise, it's not a semiosic
sign.
5] The first Relation we'll consider is the vertical one. That's the
Representamen in itself. That's a mediating relation; it only
functions within the triad. It will be in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.
Its function is to receive the input data, 'mediate it' according to
its stored laws, transform it'...and pass it on to the Interpretant
Relation. 
6] The next Relation is that between the Representamen and the
Dynamic Object.  That brings in the input data to that Representamen.
Also could be in a mode of 1ns, 2ns, 3ns.  [icon, index, symbol] 
7] the next Relation is that between the Representamen and the
Interpretant node. That relation is the result of the Representamen's
mediative actions on the input data. Also could be in a mode of 1ns,
2ns, 3ns. 
Hope this helps a bit. 
Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  1:05 PM , JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie sent:
P {margin-top:0;margin-bottom:0;}Marty, Edwina, List, 
   Does the preference of the Y (over a triangle) essentially have to
do with the fact that if we remove one tail we have something which
resembles an index and if we remove all three tails, but leave the
point of the intersection (which I know would logically  be contained
within each line, but am just speculating) then we have a dot of sorts
which corresponds to icon? 
   I have never really been able to make much headway with the
graphs... Also really good to see some discussions in past couple of
days. 
   Best  
   Jack
-
 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 on behalf of robert marty 
 Sent: Thursday, October 7, 2021 4:00 PM
 To: tabor...@primus.ca 
 Cc: Peirce-L 

; mahe3...@gmail.com 
 Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper   

 *WARNING*
This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail
System. Do not reply, click links or open attachments unless you
recognise the sender and know the content is safe.Margaretha,
Edwina, List 
 Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami
 it is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346
too... 
"Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the
argument that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic
relations and of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a
spot with one tail -- X represents a quality, a spot  with two tails
-- R -- a dyadic relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also
a dyadic relation. But you can never by such joining make a graph
with three tails. You may think that a node connecting three lines of
identity Y is not a triadic idea. But  analysis will show that it is
so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim,
"Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may say, with
sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On
Wednesday I see a man and I  say, "That is the same man I saw on
Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a
recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If
I see two men at  once, I cannot by any such direct experience
identify both of them with a man I saw before. I can only identify
them if I regard them, not as the very same, but as two different
manifestations of the same man. But the idea of manifestation is the
idea of a  sign. Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact
or object, B, to some interpretant thought, [emphasize mine] 
   C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to
remark that while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of
graphs each with two or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three
tails each will suffice to build graphs with every higher  number of
tails.  
And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic,
pentadic, or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a
compound of triadic relations. It is therefore not surprising to find
that beyond the three elements of Firstness, Secondness,  and
Thirdness, there is nothing else to be found in

[PEIRCE-L] Deadline extended Workshop "Logic(s) in Defective Science"

2021-10-07 Thread Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre

Apologies for cross posting.


*===CfA: Workshop "Logic(s) in Defective Science"===*
*When: *6-11 April, 2022  (the workshop will take place at some point
during the UNILOG congress)
*Where: *Orthodox Academy of Crete, Crete, Greece.
*Workshop website: *
https://sites.google.com/view/unilog-2022/workshops/logics-in-defective-science

*Keynote speakers:  *Gerhard Schurz (Universität Düsseldorf), Michèle
Friend (Université Lille Nord-Europe/The George Washington University) and
Diderik Batens (Universiteit Gent).

*Deadline extended:* October 10, 2021


*===Description===*This workshop is devoted to exploring connections
between non-classical logics and the rational use of defective information
in the sciences, as well as the inferential practices in the
sciences—particularly, those which make use of defective information.

The workshop welcomes formal and informal contributions on the different
ways to explain and understand defective information in the sciences.
Topics of interest include, but are not limited to the following:
● The problem of defective science from a logical standpoint.
● Rational reconstructions of non-classical scientific inference.
● Proposals for scientific inference from non-classical approaches.
● The role of logic(s) in scientific explanation.
● Applications of non-classical probability to scientific research.
● Studies on the pros and cons of classical vs non-classical approaches to
science.
● Logical pluralistic vs monistic approaches to scientific reasoning.
● Non-classical approaches to epistemic paradoxes.
● Non-classical approaches in the understanding or reconstruction of
scientific theories and laws.
● Non-classical forms of reasoning (e.g. non-monotonic) in scientific
inference.
● The meaning or use of logical connectives (e.g. conditional, conjunction)
in science.
● Classical and non-classical approaches for analyzing defective databases.
● Revisiting classical approaches in the handling of defective science.



*===Abstract submission===*One-page abstracts (plus references) prepared
for blind review should be sent to defective.scie...@gmail.com with the
subject line: "Submission for LDS" no later than October 10, 2021.
Notifications of acceptance will be sent by October 22, 2021.



*===Scientific committee===*
Diderik Batens (Gent University), Otavio Bueno (University of Miami),
Walter Carnielli (UNICAMP), Itala Maria Loffredo D'Ottaviano (UNICAMP),
Graham Priest (CUNY).


*+info: *defective.scie...@gmail.com
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

 

Martin, List

Now, that's a surprising comment - with regard to my view of Popper.
 I've always considered him to be against a certain type of realism,
in particular, the external to the universe of 'divine forms', so to
speak, of such as Plato . But his Third World, to my understanding,
was not nominalism but realism - an evolving, natural 'sets of laws'.
I understood him to describe himself as a metaphysical realist
[Objective Knowledge, p 40, footnote. And "I propose to accept
realism as the only sensible hypothesis [p 42]. 

One has to consider what he means by this 'realism'. It's, again,
certainly not Plato's external-to-the-universe Forms, which was,
according to Popper, essentially a religious world [153-4]. I'd say
it's comparable to Peirce's Thirdness, the realm of developed and
developing habits/laws.This is a rational, logical realm, the realm
of 'intelligibles, or of ideas in the objective sense'. [p 154] 

The first world is the physical world; the second world is the
subjective world, of subjective or personal experiences..and the
third world is the realm of 'arguments, logical relations' etc.

So- my reading of Popper is that I wouldn't really describe him as a
nominalist - because of this third world he focuses on.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21 11:54 AM , "Martin W. Kettelhut" mkettel...@msn.com
sent:
  Dear Edwina and Margaretha,
 Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must
reckon with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas
Peirce is a thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not
the least of which is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he
says that all we’ve got is truth in a certain context (like a
chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). Popper is afraid that a
realist commitment to truth = closedness, or truth-with-an-agenda.
Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or continuity. 
  Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
 On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that
Popper's Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's
Thirdness….he even sets it up as analogous with the biological
realm of knowledge. [See his Objective Knowledge]. And I think that
Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open Society, where he
rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and unknown
complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper
accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in
the development of a society. 
 Responding to 
On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
  List,
 How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'mahe3...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Peirce & Popper

Jack, List:

Again, the Y as shown in CP 1.347 is an existential graph (EG) of a triadic
relation with its name in the middle and its three correlates denoted by
the three lines of identity. If we put the name "representing" or
"mediating" in the middle, then the three lines denote the sign, the
object, and the interpretant. If we put the name "giving" in the middle,
then the three lines denote the giver, the gift, and the recipient.

An EG with only two lines is for a dyadic relation, such as "killing" where
the lines denote the killer and the victim. An EG with only one line is for
a monadic relation, such as "redness" where the line denotes the item that
is red. EGs have no lines only in the Alpha system rather than the Beta
system, where the labels stand for complete propositions (medads) rather
than relations.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 12:07 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:

> Marty, Edwina, List,
>
> Does the preference of the Y (over a triangle) essentially have to do with
> the fact that if we remove one tail we have something which resembles an
> index and if we remove all three tails, but leave the point of the
> intersection (which I know would logically be contained within each line,
> but am just speculating) then we have a dot of sorts which corresponds to
> icon?
>
> I have never really been able to make much headway with the graphs... Also
> really good to see some discussions in past couple of days.
>
> Best
>
> Jack
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] Improving the quality of discussions (was Abracadabra

2021-10-07 Thread sowa @bestweb.net

Gary R,

 When people make statements on Peirce-L, they usually have a good reason for 
making them.  If one happens to disagree with them, it's far better (more 
fruitful and more likely to lead to a deeper understanding) to ask a question 
than to contradict what they said.
 I agree with the three quotations in your reply to my note.  But I want to 
emphasize the issues in my  note.   See below for a copy of those quotations 
followed by a copy of my note.

 John

 -

 "Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt that 
this is largely illusory . . . because their reasonings are prominent in their 
consciousness, and are attended to, while their instincts [and emotions] they 
are hardly aware of. . . .   - Charles S. Peirce

 "To think is easy. To act is difficult. To act as one thinks is the most 
difficult." - Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

 "Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. The first principle is that 
you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool." - Richard 
Feynman

 On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 12:50 AM sowa @bestweb.net  wrote

 I agree that those suggestions are helpful:

 GR:  [Margaretha's] ideas and suggestive metaphors about how List discussion 
might be improved -- along with the suggestions by John Sowa and Gary Furhman 
which Jon Alan Schmidt just quoted -- if taken up in the spirit of 
collegiality, could help improve communication here considerably.


 I would like to add a few more suggestions.

 The first one is that the method of asking questions, as in Plato's dialogues 
with Socrates as the discussion leader, is one of the best ways to promote 
fruitful discussions.  People may be offended by a direct contradiction of what 
they just said, but nobody is offended by an honest question.  (A loaded 
question can be offensive. e.g. "Have you stopped beating your wife?")

 The so-called "Socratic method" can also be annoying when pushed to an 
extreme.  But  an honest question is more likely to generate a fruitful 
discussion.

 For Peirce, it's especially important to recognize that he had a very fertile 
imagination, and his ideas were constantly growing .and developing over the 
years.  His comment "symbols grow"  indicates that the same words on different 
occasions may have very different meanings and implications:

 1903:  For every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that
is no mere figure of speech.  The body of the symbol changes slowly, but
the meaning inevitably grows, incorporates new elements and throws off
old ones.  (CP 2.222).

 The only statements by Peirce that remain constant are the ones in mathematics 
and formal logic  A statement in math or logic has a fixed meaning forever.  
But Peirce's comments about then may change, as we have noted in various 
discussions.

 The following point is significant:

 CSP:  The little that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that
matter, to any other department of philosophy), has been entirely the
fruit of this outgrowth from formal logic, and is worth much more than
the small sum total of the rest of my work, as time will show.
(CP 5.469, R318, 1907)

 The categories of 1-ness, 2-ness, and 3-ness are based on logic, and they have 
been central to his thought throughout.  But his applications of those ideas 
continued to grow.  Even in his late writings of 1913, his ideas continued to 
grow, and he had hopes of writing more.  Nobody on planet earth can be certain 
that any ideas outside of mathematics and logic would remain unchanged.

 The recent discussions of comments by De Tienne and Atkins about phaneroscopy 
were interesting, but nobody can be certain that their opinions about the 
"science egg" are what Peirce intended.  On these issues, good questions are 
more valuable than definitive answers.

 In summary, a good way to improve the level of discourse on Peirce-L is to ask 
more questions and to avoid making definitive pronouncements about what Peirce 
meant.  De Tienne read as much or more than anybody else, and even he doesn't 
know.  We can state our own opinions, but nobody can claim that their opinions 
are what Peirce intended.


_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}List

In my view, I don't think that it is a valid comparison in this
discussion of the image of the triadic sign,  to suggest that the use
of the Y-shape vs the triangle depends on what is being diagrammed.
That's a very different issue.

I think that the diagram of the triadic sign - is what we are
talking about. That's all. We aren't talking about diagrams for the
classification of triads as in EP 2.491. We are talking about the
actual operational image of the triadic semiosic Sign, made up of
those three Relations: O-R-I.

And that, from my reading of 1.347 and EP2 /364 is most definitely
diagrammed as a Y shape. Why? To show how the nodal sites of O-R-I
not only interact within the triad but also connect to other triads.
As Peirce noted, "No sign can function as such except so far as it is
interpreted in another sign...Consequently, it is absolutely essential
to a sign that it should affect another sign". 8.225 and footnote.

The diagram of a closed triangle does not, in my view, show us this
constant open networking, whereas Peirce's own diagrams of the Y
shape clearly show us how networking is functional.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21 11:34 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Margaretha, Edwina, Robert, List:
 Whether a triangle or a Y-shape is more appropriate depends on what
exactly is being diagrammed. Peirce uses triangles for sign
classification (EP 2:491, 1908), and Gary R. uses triangles to
illustrate the different "vectors" by which various phenomena are
related with respect to the three universal/formal categories (
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm
[1]). For example, in semiosis, the "vector of determination" is from
the object (2ns) through the sign (1ns) to the interpretant (3ns).
 As Robert indicated, what Peirce shows with the Y-shapes in CP
1.346-347 (1903) are existential graphs of triadic relations (names
a, b, c, d) that each have three correlates (attached lines of
identity) and how they can be arranged to demonstrate "that every
relation which is  tetradic, pentadic, or of any greater number of
correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic relations." He
provides even more examples of this at EP 2:364 (1906). In semiosis,
the sign, the object, and the interpretant are the three correlates
of the irreducible triadic relation of representing or mediating.
 Regards,
 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer,
Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran
Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [2] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [3]
 On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 10:01 AM robert marty  wrote:
 Margaretha, Edwina, List
 Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami
 it is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346
too... 
   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the
argument that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic
relations and of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a
spot with one tail -- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails
-- R -- a dyadic relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also
a dyadic relation. But you can never by such joining make a graph
with three tails. You may think that a node connecting three lines of
identity Y is not a triadic idea. But analysis will show that it is
so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim,
"Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may say, with
sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On
Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on
Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a
recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If
I see two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify
both of them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I
regard them, not as the very same, but as two different
manifestations of the same man. But the idea of manifestation is the
idea of a sign. Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact
or object, B, to some interpretant thought, [emphasize mine]
  C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to
remark that while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of
graphs each with two or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three
tails each will suffice to build graphs with every higher number of
tails. 
   And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic,
pentadic, or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a
compound of triadic relations. It is therefore not surprising to find
that beyond the three elements of Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness, there is nothing else to be found in the phenomenon "
 Best regards,Robert Marty
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
 fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY

Marty, Edwina, List,

Does the preference of the Y (over a triangle) essentially have to do with the 
fact that if we remove one tail we have something which resembles an index and 
if we remove all three tails, but leave the point of the intersection (which I 
know would logically be contained within each line, but am just speculating) 
then we have a dot of sorts which corresponds to icon?

I have never really been able to make much headway with the graphs... Also 
really good to see some discussions in past couple of days.

Best

Jack


From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of robert marty 
Sent: Thursday, October 7, 2021 4:00 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca 
Cc: Peirce-L ; mahe3...@gmail.com 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

Margaretha, Edwina, List

Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it is 
not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...

  "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument that 
genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of 
qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail -- X 
represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic relation.†1 
Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But you can never by 
such joining make a graph with three tails. You may think that a node 
connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic idea. But analysis will 
show that it is so. I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see a man, and I 
exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may say, with 
sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On Wednesday I 
see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on Tuesday, and consequently 
is the same I saw on Monday." There is a recognition of triadic identity; but 
it is only brought about as a conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a 
triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I cannot by any such direct 
experience identify both of them with a man I saw before. I can only identify 
them if I regard them, not as the very same, but as two different 
manifestations of the same man. But the idea of manifestation is the idea of a 
sign. Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some 
interpretant thought, [emphasize mine]

 C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that while a 
graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two or one tail, 
yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to build graphs 
with every higher number of tails.
[image.png]

  And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic, or of 
any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic 
relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three 
elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to be 
found in the phenomenon "

Best regards,
Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
https://martyrobert.academia.edu/



Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky 
mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> a écrit :

Margaretha

1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this list, 
with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle but in a 
Y shape.

That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign - Interpretant do 
not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is closed, but within 
that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and enable networking with 
other triads.

I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y 
shapes connecting with each other [1.327].

The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that triadic 
Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his three modal 
categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance, immediate physical 
connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex adaptive system that 
has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.

2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's Third 
World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets it up as 
analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his Objective 
Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open 
Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and 
unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper 
accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in the 
development of a society.

Edwina



On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendr

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

Thank you for all your feedback and suggested readings.  I will take a look
over the week-end and get back to you.

My very best, Margaretha H.

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 11:54 AM Martin W. Kettelhut 
wrote:

> Dear Edwina and Margaretha,
>
> Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must reckon
> with the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas Peirce is a
> thorough-going realist. There are many implications, not the least of which
> is that Popper dismisses truth in the long run; he says that all we’ve got
> is truth in a certain context (like a chemistry lab, or an atomic
> accelerator). Popper is afraid that a realist commitment to truth =
> closedness, or truth-with-an-agenda. Unlike Peirce, Popper could not
> negotiate generality or continuity.
>
> Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
>
> On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets
> it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his
> Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in
> The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an
> essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to
> Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness
> and Thirdness] in the development of a society.
>
>
> Responding to
>
> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List,
>
> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
> connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
>
>
>
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread Martin W. Kettelhut

Dear Edwina and Margaretha,

Having acknowledged similarities between Popper and Peirce, we must reckon with 
the fact that Popper is a proud nominalist, whereas Peirce is a thorough-going 
realist. There are many implications, not the least of which is that Popper 
dismisses truth in the long run; he says that all we’ve got is truth in a 
certain context (like a chemistry lab, or an atomic accelerator). Popper is 
afraid that a realist commitment to truth = closedness, or 
truth-with-an-agenda. Unlike Peirce, Popper could not negotiate generality or 
continuity.

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD

> On 7 Oct 2021, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's Third 
> World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets it up as 
> analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his Objective 
> Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open 
> Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and 
> unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper 
> accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in the 
> development of a society.

Responding to 

On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com 
 sent:

List,

How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection 
between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

Margaretha, Edwina, Robert, List:

Whether a triangle or a Y-shape is more appropriate depends on what exactly
is being diagrammed. Peirce uses triangles for sign classification (EP
2:491, 1908), and Gary R. uses triangles to illustrate the different
"vectors" by which various phenomena are related with respect to the three
universal/formal categories (
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm).
For example, in semiosis, the "vector of determination" is from the object
(2ns) through the sign (1ns) to the interpretant (3ns).

As Robert indicated, what Peirce shows with the Y-shapes in CP 1.346-347
(1903) are existential graphs of triadic relations (names a, b, c, d) that
each have three correlates (attached lines of identity) and how they can be
arranged to demonstrate "that every relation which is *tetradic*, *pentadic*,
or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
relations." He provides even more examples of this at EP 2:364 (1906). In
semiosis, the sign, the object, and the interpretant are the three
correlates of the irreducible triadic relation of representing or mediating.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 10:01 AM robert marty 
wrote:

> Margaretha, Edwina, List
>
> Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
> is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...
>
>   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
> that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
> of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail
> -- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic
> relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But
> you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails.* You may
> think that a node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic
> idea. But analysis will show that it is so.* I see a man on Monday. On
> Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on
> Monday." We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced
> the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I
> saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a
> recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
> conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see
> two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify both of
> them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I regard them,
> not as the very same, but as two different manifestations of the same man.
> But the idea of manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is
> something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant
> thought, [emphasize mine]
>
>  C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that
> while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two
> or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to
> build graphs with every higher number of tails.
> [image: image.png]
>   And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic,
> or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
> relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three
> elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to
> be found in the phenomenon "
>
> Best regards,
> Robert Marty
>
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
> Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  a
> écrit :
>
>> Margaretha
>>
>> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this
>> list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle
>> but in a Y shape.
>>
>> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign -
>> Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is
>> closed, but within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and
>> enable networking with other triads.
>>
>> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y
>> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
>>
>> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that
>> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his
>> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance,
>> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex
>> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
>>
>> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
>> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thir

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread robert marty

It was not a joke... I myself committed a lapsus calami by writing "calmi"!
Excuse me ...
RM
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 17:00, robert marty  a
écrit :

> Margaretha, Edwina, List
>
> Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
> is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...
>
>   "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
> that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
> of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail
> -- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic
> relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But
> you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails.* You may
> think that a node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic
> idea. But analysis will show that it is so.* I see a man on Monday. On
> Tuesday I see a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on
> Monday." We may say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced
> the identity. On Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I
> saw on Tuesday, and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a
> recognition of triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a
> conclusion from two premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see
> two men at once, I cannot by any such direct experience identify both of
> them with a man I saw before. I can only identify them if I regard them,
> not as the very same, but as two different manifestations of the same man.
> But the idea of manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is
> something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant
> thought, [emphasize mine]
>
>  C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that
> while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two
> or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to
> build graphs with every higher number of tails.
> [image: image.png]
>
>   And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic,
> or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
> relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three
> elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to
> be found in the phenomenon "
>
> Best regards,
> Robert Marty
>
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *
>
>
>
> Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  a
> écrit :
>
>> Margaretha
>>
>> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this
>> list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle
>> but in a Y shape.
>>
>> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign -
>> Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is
>> closed, but within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and
>> enable networking with other triads.
>>
>> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y
>> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
>>
>> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that
>> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his
>> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance,
>> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex
>> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
>>
>> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
>> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets
>> it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his
>> Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in
>> The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an
>> essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to
>> Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness
>> and Thirdness] in the development of a society.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:
>>
>> List,
>>
>> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
>> connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
>>
>> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this
>> intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must
>> be others.
>>
>> As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not
>> in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his
>> work on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread Ben Udell


"Popper" site:arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/
https://www.google.com/search?q=%22Popper%22+site%3Aarisbe.sitehost.iu.edu%2F

"Popper" "Peirce"
https://www.google.com/search?q=%22Popper%22+%22Peirce%22

- Best, Ben

On 10/7/2021 9:48 AM, Margaretha Hendrickx wrote:


List,

How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?

So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection,
the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must be others.

As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not
in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his
work on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key
answers to epistemological problems in management research.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread robert marty

Margaretha, Edwina, List

Edwina is absolutely right but she committed a small lapsus clami  it
is not 1.327 but 1.347 that should be read and even 1.346 too...

  "Peirce: CP 1.346 Cross-Ref:†† 346. The other premiss of the argument
that genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and
of qualities is easily shown. In existential graphs, a spot with one tail
-- X represents a quality, a spot with two tails -- R -- a dyadic
relation.†1 Joining the ends of two tails is also a dyadic relation. But
you can never by such joining make a graph with three tails.* You may think
that a node connecting three lines of identity Y is not a triadic idea. But
analysis will show that it is so.* I see a man on Monday. On Tuesday I see
a man, and I exclaim, "Why, that is the very man I saw on Monday." We may
say, with sufficient accuracy, that I directly experienced the identity. On
Wednesday I see a man and I say, "That is the same man I saw on Tuesday,
and consequently is the same I saw on Monday." There is a recognition of
triadic identity; but it is only brought about as a conclusion from two
premisses, which is itself a triadic relation. If I see two men at once, I
cannot by any such direct experience identify both of them with a man I saw
before. I can only identify them if I regard them, not as the very same,
but as two different manifestations of the same man. But the idea of
manifestation is the idea of a sign. Now a sign is something, A, which
denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, [emphasize
mine]

 C. Peirce: CP 1.347 Cross-Ref:†† 347. It is interesting to remark that
while a graph with three tails cannot be made out of graphs each with two
or one tail, yet combinations of graphs of three tails each will suffice to
build graphs with every higher number of tails.
[image: image.png]

  And analysis will show that every relation which is tetradic, pentadic,
or of any greater number of correlates is nothing but a compound of triadic
relations. It is therefore not surprising to find that beyond the three
elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, there is nothing else to
be found in the phenomenon "

Best regards,
Robert Marty

Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le jeu. 7 oct. 2021 à 16:11, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Margaretha
>
> 1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to this
> list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as a triangle
> but in a Y shape.
>
> That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign - Interpretant
> do not interact with each other in a triangle format, which is closed, but
> within that Y shape, where the three interactions are OPEN and enable
> networking with other triads.
>
> I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of these Y
> shapes connecting with each other [1.327].
>
> The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of that
> triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other 'Y's...plus his
> three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness [chance,
> immediate physical connection and reason-habits] together enable a complex
> adaptive system that has the capacity to self-organize and evolve.
>
> 2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that Popper's
> Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's Thirdness….he even sets
> it up as analogous with the biological realm of knowledge. [See his
> Objective Knowledge]. And I think that Popper's emphasis on openness, as in
> The Open Society, where he rejects historicism and destiny for an
> essentially open and unknown complexity of interactions -- is similar to
> Peirce. That is, Popper accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness
> and Thirdness] in the development of a society.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 07/10/21 9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com sent:
>
> List,
>
> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
> connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
>
> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this
> intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must
> be others.
>
> As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not
> in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his
> work on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key
> answers to epistemological problems in management research.
>
>
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu .
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to
> l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the
> message and nothing in the body.  More at
> https://l

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Immune System Metaphor (ISM)

2021-10-07 Thread Jon Awbrey

Gary, Margaretha, all ...

One of Joe Ransdell's observations I do remember is what he said about
meta-communication: The more time we spend talking about talk the less
time we spend in the way of actual communication about Peirce matters.
I guess there are times when it's unavoidable but I'll try to cut this
short as I can and get back to the main attraction as soon as possible.

Now, I was not saying I never see people changing their positions or views —
I have seen examples of that happening — but it always seems to come about
through a natural process of internal development over extended periods of
time — not through the impact of any one argument, debate, or dialogue and
hardly ever by way of epiphany or sudden conversion experience. Much more
frequently it's the nagging awareness of anomalies piling up over time and
the gradual nudging of contrary evidence accumulating in one's experience.
It's almost as if Leibniz was right about us being windowless monads where
whatever consensus or coordination we do achieve is due to pre-established
harmony — though I rechnen that would be using “harmony” very ironically.

Incidentally, here's a notable and very instructive case of a person
changing her theory based on the mounting weight of data and experience.
Susan Awbrey's long career in education, from middle school science teacher
to grad school dean has kept me up-to-date on a wide range of education issues
over the years and one mover and shaker we have followed since the early 90s
when there was a lot of conversation and controversy about “canon” and “reform”
is Diane Ravitch. Much more recently I started to follow her blog on current
issues in public education, which these days can hardly be detached from the
“business” of politics.

Blog Page : https://dianeravitch.net/
Home Page : https://dianeravitch.com/

Here is how she describes her update from Diane Ravitch 1.0 to Diane Ravitch
2.0.
https://dianeravitch.com/about-diane/

During the 1980s and 1990s and into the early years of the twenty-first
century—as a writer, professor, assistant
secretary of education under George H.W. Bush, and member of prestigious
conservative think tanks, such as the Thomas
B. Fordham Foundation and the Koret task force at the hoover institution—Diane
Ravitch was a leading advocate of
conservative ideas for fixing America’s education system, including charter
schools, standards, accountability, and
high-stakes standardized testing. But about 2006-07, she began to realize that
these policies were not working. She
began to criticize them and to criticize the federal law called “No Child Left
Behind”. With the publication of “The
Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice Are
Undermining Education” (2010), she
became one of the most outspoken critics of ideas she once championed.

Regards,

Jon

On 10/6/2021 11:46 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

Jon A, Margaretha, List,

Jon, you described the workings of what you termed the "Immune System Metaphor
(ISM)" as

people just naturally try[ing] to preserve a state of intellectual homeostasis, reacting to foreign ideas as
psychological antigens and generating antibodies to combat them. . . Another term I've used for this phenomenon is:
Information Resistance.

GR: I believe that some research I learned of quite recently would appear to support your ISM metaphor. A friend of
mine has of late been exploring some of the latest findings in social psychology. One of those findings is that
offering more factual information to climate deniers, for example, does not result in them changing their minds,

but often causes them to cling even more tightly to their beliefs.

Furthermore, it would appear that those deniers who are well-educated and have access to information are even *more*
likely than the uninformed to strengthen their beliefs if you try to reason with them. It is suggested that this may
be because they have become quite skilled at rationalizing their emotionally-based beliefs, i.e.. they appear to be
more skilled at self-deception. I've seen ample evidence of that kind of behavior in many facets of our society, so
that I am glad that you added this remark:

JA: To be honest, it's far worse most other places in social media, not to mention society at large, of course, but
this body is, despite its best intentions, hardly immune (haha) from immune reactions.

I would hope that all here would reflect on and, indeed, concentrate their reflections on *their own participation*
on Peirce-L. For I agree with what Margaretha wrote earlier today that "It is all a manner of deliberate and critical

self-reflection on what one gets from being and participating on this ListServ."

A short while back Gary Fuhrman directed us to this quotation:

CSP: Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt that this is largely illusory: they are
much less guided by reason, much more guided by instinct, than they seem to t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread Peter Skagestad

Margaretha,

Several philosophers have written about Peirce and Popper, including Eugene 
Freeman, myself, and others. You will find references in my paper ‘Thinking 
With Machines’. I do not have it ready to hand, but it is available on the 
Arisbe website. I would be delighted to hear your thoughts about my discussion 
there, although I must warn that the paper is somewhat dated - published in 
1993.

Best,
Peter Skagestad 

Sent from my iPhone

> On Oct 7, 2021, at 10:39 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> 
> Margaretha, I haven’t studied the Peirce/Popper connection systematically, 
> but one point in my book Turning Signs about a metaphor they both used, 
> science as a “conversation with nature”:
> Natural Dialogic (TS ·2) (gnusystems.ca).
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
> Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
> Sent: 7-Oct-21 09:49
> To: Peirce-L 
> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper
>  
> List,
> 
>  
> 
> How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection 
> between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
> 
>  
> 
> So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection, 
> the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must be others.
> 
>  
> 
> As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not in 
> philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his work 
> on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key answers to 
> epistemological problems in management research.  
> 
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . 
> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in 
> the body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
> co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

2021-10-07 Thread gnox

Margaretha, I haven’t studied the Peirce/Popper connection systematically, but 
one point in my book Turning Signs about a metaphor they both used, science as 
a “conversation with nature”:

Natural Dialogic (TS ·2) (gnusystems.ca) 
 .

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Margaretha Hendrickx
Sent: 7-Oct-21 09:49
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

 

List,

 

How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the connection 
between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?

 

So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection, the 
French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must be others.

 

As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not in 
philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his work on 
semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key answers to 
epistemological problems in management research.  

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Margaretha

1] I believe I sent you a post, just after your original post to
this list, with a comment that the Peircean triad doesn't function as
a triangle but in a Y shape.

That is, the three nodal sites of Object-Representamen/Sign -
Interpretant do not interact with each other in a triangle format,
which is closed, but within that Y shape, where the three
interactions are OPEN and enable networking with other triads.

I think this is a vital point. Peirce himself showed the graph of
these Y shapes connecting with each other [1.327]. 

The thing about Peirce is that his analytic framework, made up of
that triadic Y interaction, which enables connections with other
'Y's...plus his three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness and
Thirdness [chance, immediate physical connection and reason-habits]
together enable a complex adaptive system that has the capacity to
self-organize and evolve. 

2] I  have used Popper to compare with Peirce - I think that
Popper's Third World has strong comparisons with  Peirce's
Thirdness….he even sets it up as analogous with the biological
realm of knowledge. [See his Objective Knowledge]. And I think that
Popper's emphasis on openness, as in The Open Society, where he
rejects historicism and destiny for an essentially open and unknown
complexity of interactions -- is similar to Peirce. That is, Popper
accepts chance and reason as correlates [Firstness and Thirdness] in
the development of a society.

Edwina
 On Thu 07/10/21  9:48 AM , Margaretha Hendrickx mahe3...@gmail.com
sent:
 List,
 How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?
 So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this
intersection, the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there
must be others.
 As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic
management, not in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean
philosophy, and especially his work on semiotic triangles, given that
I believe it provides some key answers to epistemological problems in
management research.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

[PEIRCE-L] Peirce & Popper

List,

How many of you are working on -- or interested in -- studying the
connection between the philosophy of Karl Popper and Charles Peirce?

So far, I know of only one philosopher who has worked on this intersection,
the French philosopher, Christiane Chauvire.  But there must be others.

As a footnote, my professional background is in strategic management, not
in philosophy.  I am interested in Peircean philosophy, and especially his
work on semiotic triangles, given that I believe it provides some key
answers to epistemological problems in management research.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .
► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case ofPeirce's Semiotics (part B1))

List,

Edwina's email provides an opportunity to point out the role that metaphors
play in mediating our relation with linguistic signs:

The text as
- a digital photograph of the universe as it exists (21st version of
Descartes)
- a mirror allowing us to see the content of the mind of the author
- a lens of pair of glasses (or infrared goggles) helping us better "focus"
on what is in front of us
- a weapon to hurt someone
- a filter to purify something (and discard other things)
As Stephen Pepper (1942)  tells us, when working with metaphors, we always
must work with two-three metaphors among which we switch while making sense
of what is communicated via a text.  if we use just one metaphor, we
eventually become a prisoner of that metaphor.

So, I read Edwina's post as telling us that she believes that we need to
discuss and explore that mirror metaphor and the role that it plays in
Peircean scholarship.  Or more generally, what are the dominant textual
metaphors with which people on this list are working?  Do people engage
with texts as if they are perfectly mirroring the content of Peirce's
mind?  Do they think of text as digital photographs of the universe and
everything in it?  Which other metaphors are in use on this list?

Note that an engagement with the topic of metaphors opens up a new realm to
work through disagreement.  Disagreement is now set up as the result of a
lack of attention to the metaphors with which one and one's interlocutors
are tacitly working.

My very best, Margaretha H.

On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 9:17 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List - I don't think that all these quotations can really deal with
> problems on the list.
>
> After all - the quotation below could be read as supporting a perspective
> of someone who 'blows with the wind', I.e, an a priori mode of 'Fixation of
> Belief'just as much as it can show a situation where a scientist
> acknowledges that 'the facts aren't there' and the hypothesis must be
> dropped.
>
> I still think that many of the problems on this list can be viewed as
> based on a sense by some that their reading of Peirce is the 'correct' one
> - and they belittle other readings, openly defining them as 'your personal
> view and not what Peirce meant'. It's this two-step action that silences
> discussion. Why bother posting when one is met with such an arrogant and
> dismissive attitude?
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 07/10/21 8:26 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> “Perfect readiness to assimilate new associations implies perfect
> readiness to drop old ones.… To be a philosopher, or a scientific man, you
> must be as a little child, with all the sincerity and simple-mindedness of
> the child's vision, with all the plasticity of the child's mental habits.”
> — C.S. Peirce, RLT 192 (1898)
>
>
>
>
>
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of Gary Richmond
> Sent: 7-Oct-21 05:18
> To: Peirce-L
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case
> ofPeirce's Semiotics (part B1))
>
>
>
> John, List,
>
>
>
> "Men seem to themselves to be guided by reason. There is little doubt that
> this is largely illusory . . . because their reasonings are prominent in
> their consciousness, and are attended to, while their instincts [and
> emotions] they are hardly aware of. . . .   —  Charles S. Peirce
>
>
>
> "To think is easy. To act is difficult. To  act as one thinks is the most
> difficult.” — Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
>
>
>
> “Science is a way of trying not to fool yourself. The first principle is
> that you must not fool yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool.” —
> Richard Feynman
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
>
> Gary R
>
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
>
>
> Gary Richmond
>
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
>
> Communication Studies
>
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Thu, Oct 7, 2021 at 12:50 AM sowa @bestweb.net 
> wrote:
>
> Gary R,
>
>
>
> I agree that those suggestions are helpful:
>
>
>
> GR:  [Margaretha's] ideas and suggestive metaphors about how List
> discussion might be improved -- along with the suggestions by John Sowa and
> Gary Furhman which Jon Alan Schmidt just quoted -- if taken up in the
> spirit of collegiality, could help improve communication here considerably.
>
>
>
> I would like to add a few more suggestions.
>
>
>
> The first one is that the method of asking questions, as in Plato's
> dialogues with Socrates as the discussion leader, is one of the best ways
> to promote fruitful discussions.  People may be offended by a direct
> contradiction of what they just said, but nobody is offended by an honest
> question.  (A loaded question can be offensive. e.g. "Have you stopped
> beating your wife?")
>
>
>
> The so-called "Socratic method" can also be annoying when pushed to an
> extreme.  But  an honest question is more likely to generate a fruitful
> discussion.
>
>
>
> For Peirce

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case ofPeirce's Semiotics (part B1))