Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[John F Sowa]

Jon,

Your note of April 20 (copied below) is indeed a serious question for 
pragmatists.  It contains claims and assumptions that Peirce would not accept.  
I'll start with an issue we had discussed some time ago.

I wrote that the Christians who translated the Greek New Testament to Chinese 
chose 'Dao' to represent 'Logos'.  I also wrote that many philosophers of 
comparative religion consider the Buddhist Dharma to be the equivalent of both 
Logos and Dao.

But you strongly objected to my claim that  Peirce would accept any such 
equivalence.  Since I did not have citations at the moment, I did not continue 
that discussion.  But as I was continuing my research on related issues, I 
studied Peirce's correspondence with William James and Lady Welby.

His letters showed that his faith in God was strong, but his beliefs were quite 
different from the Episcopal creed. and from what you call "revealed truth".  
That phrase directly contradicts the First Rule of Reason:  Do not block the 
way of inquiry.  Peirce would not deny the possibility of revelation, but the 
FFR would treat revealed truths as revealed hypotheses, waiting to be tested.

>From a letter by CSP to LW, 23 Dec. 1908:  "I say the creed in church with the 
>rest.  By doing so, I only signify... my willingness to put aside, most 
>heartily, anything that tends to separate me from my fellow Christians... I 
>think probably Christianity was a higher development out of Buddhism, modified 
>by Jewish belief in a living God."

A year later, from a letter CSP to WJ, 25 Dec. 1909:  "I think there is too 
much about deserve in the New Testament. Buddhism is superior to our own 
religion.  That is what one of my selves, my intellectual self says.  But 
enough, I will keep my own religion to myself and to One that does not scoff at 
it."

That quotation comes from NEM 3.872, which contains a more complete copy of the 
letter than EP.  Perhaps the EP editors omitted that section because they did 
not want readers to scoff at Peirce.  Since he wrote those letters to two of 
his most trusted confidants at a time when he knew that the end was near, they 
must be considered sincere statements of his beliefs.

The letter below contains claims that Peirce never made.

1. Concrete reasonableness implies the FFR:  question everything, while 
recognizing that commonsense assumptions usually have a considerable amount of 
justification -- as far as they have been tested.   Beyond that region more 
tests are required.

2. Each instance of continuity has "a special kind of generality" that explains 
that instance of continuity.  But there are an uncountable infinity of 
continuities, each of which has its own explanation.  The idea of continuity 
does not imply a unique summum bonum.

3. Peirce never doubted that nominalists can do good work in science.  He 
admitted that he himself had begun his career as a nominalist.  But he learned 
that there were laws of science that governed those principles.  Rudolf Carnap, 
for example, was a confirmed nominalist all his life:  he claimed that the laws 
of science were nothing but observed regularities.  Although Carnap insisted 
that there was no such thing as a law, his research was useful in helping other 
scientists to discover laws.

Peirce recognized that nominalists can indeed do important work in science.  He 
would certainly accept all the firmly tested and verified results of modern 
science -- including the Big Bang.  However, he would be critical of some of 
the claims that nominalists have made to explain some of those results.  This 
is a very rich and important issue to explore.  A total rejection of the 
results of modern science would be a huge violation of the FFR.

I don't know what you mean by the following phrase "the complete revelation of 
God is the overall final interpretant of the entire universe as a sign", but 
Peirce never made any claims about revelation.  Accepting revelation as a 
useful issue to study would be reasonable.  But accepting it without further 
tests would be a violation of the FFR.

I don't believe that Peirce would agree with the following note.

John


From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
Sent: 4/20/23 6:50 PM

The challenge that we face as Peirceans today is advocating not only scholastic 
realism and objective idealism in an intellectual climate of widespread (and 
often uncritical) nominalism and materialism, but also value monism in an 
intellectual climate of widespread pluralism. As I recently learned from some 
interactions with self-described pragmatists on Twitter who are much more 
partial to James and Rorty than Peirce, there is considerable resistance to the 
notion of a single summum bonum. I did not have time to touch on esthetics and 
ethics in my 10-minute presentation, but as I see it, applying synechism in 
those normative sciences involves recognizing that concrete reasonableness is 
itself a manifestation of continuity as "a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

List,

Peirce-L subscriber, Atila Bayat, meant to send this post to the entire
forum, but posted it to me. He's asked me to resend it for him. See
directly below. GR

Gary, I wanted to answer an earlier thread, of yours but lost the cue.

Much or all of our public media has our intellectuals in a strangle hold .
We often discourse about our institutions using these Francophone prefixes
such  as super or extra or whatnot, instead of viewing social institutions
as matters of reform. These are matters for Deweyan pragmatists in that
forum, not sure about it in Peirce though.

Pragmatism has for many a newer meaning - (AB) institutional change,
effected by intelligent reform of social institutions. That is pragmatism,
as it’s meaningful to me. I think we lost that Deweyan definition. Bring it
back.

Atila





On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 1:04 AM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Martin, List,
>
> Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday
> and for your post to Peirce-L today.
>
> I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent
> question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a
> nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task
> for pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe.
>
> Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to *how
> we ought conduct ourselves*, not only in conferences and discussion
> forums and the like but, perhaps especially, in our quotidian lives. On
> Peirce's esthetic theory, this would represent the employment of a form of
> the* summum bonum*, this in conjunction with his ethical theory which
> includes making a decision to make *that* a habit of one's life. If we
> can do *that,* then perhaps we can hope to begin to personally model that
> kind of behavior in our scientific and philosophic work, as well as in our
> collegial, familial and work lives.
>
> The goal would seem to involve our coming to live more and more by faith,
> hope, and love, a trio of values Peirce saw as essentially logical.  See,
> for example, the chapter "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and
> vice versa)" by Ben Udell and myself in Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own
> Words .
>
> While it doesn't seem at all clear to me *how* this can be brought about
> very generally in our philosophical and scientific communities in
> their current nominalistic/individualistic state, it is certainly something
> which we as pragmatists likely need to reflect on and attempt to work
> together toward.
>
> Jon has consistently tried to address some related issues in his papers on
> the ethics of engineering, and Gary Fuhrman in his e-book, *Turning Signs*,
> as well as in the electronic discussions he's created around it.
>
> Perhaps it would be helpful for us to reflect deeply on this question
> you posed in your post.
>
> MWK: How are we serving the needs of a world engendered by reductionism in
> politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism in social media
> platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of the law, the
> conundrums of individualism for economics, and rampant nihilism in every
> sector?
>
>
>
> Best,
>
>
> Gary R
>
>
>
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 5:50 PM Martin W. Kettelhut 
> wrote:
>
>> Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary.
>>
>>
>>
>> What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint
>> representations of Peirce’s trichotomies, synechism, and Kaina Stoichea!
>>
>>
>> I supposed it was seeing each other, and hearing each other’s voices,
>> that spark my wanting to inquire into our participation (as pragmatist
>> philosophers) in our world currently—given what we learn from Peirce about
>> science, the long and synechistic view, and the power of signs.
>>
>>
>>
>> You all chose these topics wisely; they capture crucial aspects of what’s
>> irreducibly original in Peirce’s work. I submit that many of the questions
>> raised by participants in this conference (not unlike many of the
>> discussions here on the Peirce-list) reflect the challenge it is to
>> communicate what’s fresh, relevant, and pragmati*cistic* in Peirce. I
>> appreciate the patience, good will, and insight you three—in
>> particular—bring.
>>
>>
>>
>> In the background of the question I’m going to propose for discussion
>> here is a recognition that, although I did write a dissertation on Peirce's
>> semeiotic/metaphysics and receive a PhD from Temple U, I immediately left
>> academic life and became a "philosopher of the marketplace,” meaning--in my
>> case--business coach. I apply synechism everyday in my work, partnering
>> with business people to build and sustain meaningful, successful, and
>> ethical businesses.
>>
>>
>>
>> My question is, given (as Gary Fuhrman points out) that it is legisigns
>> that have pragmatic power to get things done; and assuming that the purpose
>> of a zoom 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon S, Gary F, all,

Jon, I've read your paper on time, although it was some time ago, so my memory 
is not fresh.

The diagram of the lines and the circles in figure3 do not appear to show three 
different types of conic sections. Rather, they show three circles intersecting 
with a line at two, one and no places. One can give the same sort of diagram 
for an ellipse, parabola or hyperbola.

In order to use the diagrams to clarify points about the relationships between 
conic sections and a line at infinity in projective space, it would be helpful 
to supply more than is shown in Figures 3 or 4. In fact, I think a lot more 
needs to be shown about the character of the absolute in projective geometry 
for the key points to be made clearer.

The points I was emphasizing the passage at CP 6.210 appear to support Gary F's 
suggestions about the general principle govern the passage from the ideal 
starting point of inquiry to its ideal ending point. The same holds for the 
metaphysical hypothesis offered as an explanation of the cosmological evolution 
of the universe.

Yours,

Jeff

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2023 5:19 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

Jeff, List:

You and I seem to be more or less on the same page here, along with Martin in 
light of his helpful clarification that avoiding "originalism" and "endism" 
simply means recognizing that inquiry has no definite beginning or end--just 
like the universe in Peirce's cosmology, and consistent with his thoroughgoing 
synechism that precludes any singularities within a true continuum such as time 
(CP 1.498, c. 1896; CP 6.210, 1898; CP 1.274-275, 1902). Attached are two 
relevant diagrams that I included in my "Temporal Synechism" paper--the first 
(Figure3.tiff) showing the relations between the three different conic sections 
and the line at infinity in projective geometry, and the second (Figure5.tiff) 
showing how a hyperbolic continuum is mapped to two parallel lines of infinite 
length. As Peirce explains ...

CSP: I may mention that my chief avocation in the last 10 years has been to 
develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is 
hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, to 
a different state of things in the infinite future. The state of things in the 
infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the 
total absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is 
death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and 
absence of all spontaneity. Between these, we have on our side a state of 
things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some 
degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the 
growth of habit. ... As to the part of time on the further side of eternity 
which leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently 
proceeds by contraries. (CP 8.317, 1891)

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 4:10 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> wrote:
Gary F., Jon S, all,

I take Peirce's argument for the triad of ideals—aesthetic, ethical and 
logical--to start with an analysis of our ordinary conception of having an end 
and then asking:  what is necessary for an end to be ultimate? In his 
discussion of the topological character of the relationship between the 
starting and ending points of inquiry, he appears to be exploring an analogy 
between the cognitive evolution of intelligent beings like us and the 
cosmological evolution of the universe. As such, there is an analogy between 
the logical conceptions of the starting and ending points inquiry and the 
starting and ending points of the cosmos.

How should we understand the conception of what is ultimate as an end? Consider 
what Peirce is trying to articulate when when offers the topological model at 
CP 6.581

Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the assumption 
that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the process of 
reason are one. Its explanation must be derivation. Explanation, derivation, 
involve suggestion of a starting-point--starting-point in its own nature not 
requiring explanation nor admitting of derivation. Also, there is suggestion of 
goal or stopping-point, where the process of reason and nature is perfected. A 
principle of movement must be assumed to be universal. It cannot be supposed 
that things ever actually reached the stopping-point, for there movement would 
stop and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

You and I seem to be more or less on the same page here, along with Martin
in light of his helpful clarification that avoiding "originalism" and
"endism" simply means recognizing that inquiry has no definite beginning or
end--just like the universe in Peirce's cosmology, and consistent with his
thoroughgoing synechism that precludes *any *singularities within a true
continuum such as time (CP 1.498, c. 1896; CP 6.210, 1898; CP 1.274-275,
1902). Attached are two relevant diagrams that I included in my "Temporal
Synechism" paper--the first (Figure3.tiff) showing the relations between
the three different conic sections and the line at infinity in projective
geometry, and the second (Figure5.tiff) showing how a hyperbolic continuum
is mapped to two parallel lines of infinite length. As Peirce explains ...

CSP: I may mention that my chief avocation in the last 10 years has been to
develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is
*hyperbolic*, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite
past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. The state of
things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which
consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the
infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete
triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity. Between these, we have on *our
*side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter
to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on
the increase owing to the growth of *habit*. ... As to the part of time on
the further side of eternity which leads back from the infinite future to
the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries. (CP 8.317, 1891)


Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 25, 2023 at 4:10 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> wrote:

> Gary F., Jon S, all,
>
> I take Peirce's argument for the triad of ideals—aesthetic, ethical and
> logical--to start with an analysis of our ordinary conception of having an
> end and then asking:  what is necessary for an end to be ultimate? In his
> discussion of the topological character of the relationship between the
> starting and ending points of inquiry, he appears to be exploring an
> analogy between the cognitive evolution of intelligent beings like us and
> the cosmological evolution of the universe. As such, there is an analogy
> between the logical conceptions of the starting and ending points inquiry
> and the starting and ending points of the cosmos.
>
> How should we understand the conception of what is ultimate as an end?
> Consider what Peirce is trying to articulate when when offers the
> topological model at CP 6.581
>
> Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the
> assumption that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the
> process of reason are one. Its explanation must be derivation. Explanation,
> derivation, involve suggestion of a starting-point--starting-point in its
> own nature not requiring explanation nor admitting of derivation. Also,
> there is suggestion of goal or stopping-point, where the process of reason
> and nature is perfected. A principle of movement must be assumed to be
> universal. It cannot be supposed that things ever actually reached the
> stopping-point, for there movement would stop and the principle of movement
> would not be universal; and similarly with the starting-point.
> Starting-point and stopping-point can only be ideal, like the two points
> where the hyperbola leaves one asymptote and where it joins the other.
>
> In regard to the principle of movement, three philosophies are possible.
>
> 1. Elliptic philosophy. Starting-point and stopping-point are not even
> ideal. Movement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no point,
> has no definite tendency, but only flits from position to position.
>
> 2. Parabolic philosophy. Reason or nature develops itself according to one
> universal formula; but the point toward which that development tends is the
> very same nothingness from which it advances.
>
> 3. Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion;
> nature has ideal end different from its origin.
> The aim, I think, is fairly clearly stated. He is using the topological
> model in an effort to clarify the conception of a principle of movement.
> Our conception of growth in our understanding—such that progress is really
> possible--stands in need of clarification both because it is vague and
> because we are prone to doubt its legitimacy for our *logica utens*. As
> such, the aim is to frame a clearer hypothesis about the principle of
> movement in the philosophical theory of logic (i.e., our *logica docens*).
> As Gary F. is pointing out, the ideal 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Gary F., Jon S, all,

I take Peirce's argument for the triad of ideals—aesthetic, ethical and 
logical--to start with an analysis of our ordinary conception of having an end 
and then asking:  what is necessary for an end to be ultimate? In his 
discussion of the topological character of the relationship between the 
starting and ending points of inquiry, he appears to be exploring an analogy 
between the cognitive evolution of intelligent beings like us and the 
cosmological evolution of the universe. As such, there is an analogy between 
the logical conceptions of the starting and ending points inquiry and the 
starting and ending points of the cosmos.

How should we understand the conception of what is ultimate as an end? Consider 
what Peirce is trying to articulate when when offers the topological model at 
CP 6.581


Philosophy tries to understand. In so doing, it is committed to the assumption 
that things are intelligible, that the process of nature and the process of 
reason are one. Its explanation must be derivation. Explanation, derivation, 
involve suggestion of a starting-point--starting-point in its own nature not 
requiring explanation nor admitting of derivation. Also, there is suggestion of 
goal or stopping-point, where the process of reason and nature is perfected. A 
principle of movement must be assumed to be universal. It cannot be supposed 
that things ever actually reached the stopping-point, for there movement would 
stop and the principle of movement would not be universal; and similarly with 
the starting-point. Starting-point and stopping-point can only be ideal, like 
the two points where the hyperbola leaves one asymptote and where it joins the 
other.



In regard to the principle of movement, three philosophies are possible.

1. Elliptic philosophy. Starting-point and stopping-point are not even ideal. 
Movement of nature recedes from no point, advances towards no point, has no 
definite tendency, but only flits from position to position.

2. Parabolic philosophy. Reason or nature develops itself according to one 
universal formula; but the point toward which that development tends is the 
very same nothingness from which it advances.

3. Hyperbolic philosophy. Reason marches from premisses to conclusion; nature 
has ideal end different from its origin.

The aim, I think, is fairly clearly stated. He is using the topological model 
in an effort to clarify the conception of a principle of movement. Our 
conception of growth in our understanding—such that progress is really 
possible--stands in need of clarification both because it is vague and because 
we are prone to doubt its legitimacy for our logica utens. As such, the aim is 
to frame a clearer hypothesis about the principle of movement in the 
philosophical theory of logic (i.e., our logica docens). As Gary F. is pointing 
out, the ideal stopping point can "only be ideal." At that ideal limit, the 
"movement would stop and the principle of movement would not be universal." (my 
emphasis) The same holds for the ideal starting point.

My hunch is that Peirce is using the topological model for the theory of logic 
to help establish the sorts of proportions that are important for the sake of 
inductively ascertaining the likelihood that a given hypothesis is true or 
false--within some margin of error. As such, the topological model serves as 
the basis of a measure of degrees of error for our inquiries generally. Drawing 
out the connections between the topological, projective (i.e., proportion) and 
metrical conceptions would take some work.

Yours,

Jeff








From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of g...@gnusystems.ca 
Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2023 6:44 AM
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists


Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage of his 
life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else should share 
the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal summum bonum, or is better than 
a less determinate state of things, or that the universe really tends to move 
in that direction.

The choice of utter determinacy as the highest esthetic value is utterly 
arbitrary. It would also entail the death of semiosis (along with everything 
that has any life in it), and since all thought and all knowledge is in signs, 
it would be the end of knowledge. If that is what you mean by “perfect 
knowledge,” why would it be esthetically preferable to the “perfect sign” as 
Peirce describes it<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mns.htm#onesign>? If the perfect 
sign is a “quasi-mind,” then an increasingly determinate universe would be 
increasingly mindless. Is that really an optimistic outlook?

Besides, if the laws of nature are evolving, as Peirce held, why wouldn’t the 
ideal summum bonum also be evolving?

The “cheerful hope” of the pure scientist that her investigations will lead the

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[gnox]

Jon, I think that’s a fair description of Peirce’s views (at that stage of his 
life anyway). But you’ve given no reason why you or anyone else should share 
the view that absolute determinacy is the ideal summum bonum, or is better than 
a less determinate state of things, or that the universe really tends to move 
in that direction. 

The choice of utter determinacy as the highest esthetic value is utterly 
arbitrary. It would also entail the death of semiosis (along with everything 
that has any life in it), and since all thought and all knowledge is in signs, 
it would be the end of knowledge. If that is what you mean by “perfect 
knowledge,” why would it be esthetically preferable to the “perfect sign” as 
Peirce describes it <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/mns.htm#onesign> ? If the perfect 
sign is a “quasi-mind,” then an increasingly determinate universe would be 
increasingly mindless. Is that really an optimistic outlook?

Besides, if the laws of nature are evolving, as Peirce held, why wouldn’t the 
ideal summum bonum also be evolving?

The “cheerful hope” of the pure scientist that her investigations will lead the 
greater community closer to the whole truth is a psychological characteristic 
that can’t be reasonably extrapolated to the ultimate purpose of the universe — 
or even to the esthetic ideal of pragmatism, in my opinion. It’s a concession 
by Peirce to linear thinking. And I think his reduction to three of the 
possible sentiments toward the whole of the universe one instance where he 
“forces divisions to a Procrustean bed of trichotomy” (CP1.568).

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Now we never can know precisely what we mean by any description whatever. 
[Peirce, CP 7.119] {

 <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Monday, April 24, 2023 9:05 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

 

Gary F., List:

 

I doubt that Peirce's use of "sentiments" in R 953 in exactly the same as when 
he says elsewhere that reasoning is subordinate to sentiment in matters of 
vital importance. On my reading, he is simply anticipating his later 
recognition of esthetics as the normative science that "considers those things 
whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling" (CP 5.129, EP 2:200, 1903), 
aligning meliorism with the identification of concrete reasonableness as the 
summum bonum and its constant growth as the ongoing process of creation. The 
beginning and the end are ideal limits, not actual events, and the latter state 
is "better than" the former in the specific sense that it is utterly 
determinate instead of utterly indeterminate, corresponding to perfect 
knowledge instead of blank ignorance.

 

CSP: The Meliorist view is that there are in the first place certain real 
facts, which are as they are quite independently of what you or I or any man 
many think about them. Secondly, truth, being the agreement of our assertions 
with those facts, is something definitely one way, and not otherwise. Thirdly, 
observation and reflection, stimulated by an eager desire to ascertain that 
truth, gradually lead minds toward it, so that, though ignorance and error 
always remain in reference to each question, yet they become gradually 
dispelled. (R 953:7-8[6-7], c. 1899)

 

By contrast, pessimism identifies "eternal nothingness" as the summum bonum, 
and epicureanism effectively denies that there is any summum bonum at all. My 
James/Rorty interlocuters seem to fall into the latter camp, embracing "tragic 
pluralism" as inevitable because they believe that some value conflicts are 
genuinely unresolvable in principle.

 

Thanks,

 

Jon

 

On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 6:50 PM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

Jon and other folks in this thread,

[Sorry about the disappearing text in my previous send of this, I copied some 
text from PDF and forgot I had to change the color manually.]

Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our 
sentiments toward things in general should be,” when he usually argues that 
“sentiments” are less fallible than our reasoning, precisely because they are 
products of evolution rather than logic?

Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of 
change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things” different from any past state of things. (In 
other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason to believe that 
it has either beginning or end, or that some future state of things will be 
better than any past state. And that applies not only to the observable 
universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far as I can see. I’m 
inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was jus

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

I doubt that Peirce's use of "sentiments" in R 953 in exactly the same as
when he says elsewhere that reasoning is subordinate to sentiment in
matters of vital importance. On my reading, he is simply anticipating his
later recognition of esthetics as the normative science that "considers
those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling" (CP 5.129, EP
2:200, 1903), aligning meliorism with the identification of concrete
reasonableness as the *summum bonum* and its constant growth as the ongoing
process of creation. The beginning and the end are ideal limits, not actual
events, and the latter state is "better than" the former in the specific
sense that it is utterly determinate instead of utterly indeterminate,
corresponding to perfect knowledge instead of blank ignorance.

CSP: The Meliorist view is that there are in the first place certain real
facts, which are as they are quite independently of what you or I or any
man many think about them. Secondly, truth, being the agreement of our
assertions with those facts, is something definitely one way, and not
otherwise. Thirdly, observation and reflection, stimulated by an eager
desire to ascertain that truth, gradually lead minds toward it, so that,
though ignorance and error always remain in reference to each question, yet
they become gradually dispelled. (R 953:7-8[6-7], c. 1899)


By contrast, pessimism identifies "eternal nothingness" as the *summum
bonum*, and epicureanism effectively denies that there is any *summum bonum* at
all. My James/Rorty interlocuters seem to fall into the latter camp,
embracing "tragic pluralism" as inevitable because they believe that some
value conflicts are genuinely unresolvable in principle.

Thanks,

Jon

On Mon, Apr 24, 2023 at 6:50 PM  wrote:

> Jon and other folks in this thread,
>
> [Sorry about the disappearing text in my previous send of this, I copied
> some text from PDF and forgot I had to change the color manually.]
>
> Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our
> sentiments toward things in general *should* be,” when he usually argues
> that “sentiments” are *less* fallible than our reasoning, precisely
> because they are products of evolution rather than logic?
>
> Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of
> change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite
> tendency toward a state of things” *different* from any past state of
> things. (In other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason
> to believe that it has either beginning or end, or that some future state
> of things will be *better* than any past state. And that applies not only
> to the observable universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far
> as I can see. I’m inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was just a
> symptom of that overconfident 19th-century European-American optimism
> that landed us in the Anthropocene!
>
> Love, gary
>
> Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg
>
> } Open your mouth, always be busy, and life is beyond hope. [*Daodejing*
> 52 (Feng/English)] {
>
> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs <https://gnusystems.ca/TS/>
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Jon Alan Schmidt
> *Sent:* Friday, April 21, 2023 5:57 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L 
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists
>
>
>
> List:
>
> For anyone interested, attached is my complete transcription of R 953. I
> am now suggesting a date of c. 1899 based on it mentioning "my unpublished
> Principles of Philosophy," for which Peirce unsuccessfully advertised
> subscriptions (1894) and later apparently wrote CP 1.176-179 (c. 1896) as a
> forward, and saying that the first volume "is devoted to the consideration
> of the question of where we are at this end of the Nineteenth Century."
> Moreover, the text references Büchner, whom Peirce also invokes in CP 1.192
> (c. 1893), and begins to discuss the three grades of clearness that he
> introduced in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878)--which he updated to
> serve as chapter 16 of *How to Reason: A Critick of Arguments* (1894)--and
> presented again in "The Logic of Relatives" (1897). Presumably, he would
> have been keen to revisit them once more after William James started
> popularizing pragmatism (1898).
>
> Peirce's definition of epicureanism in this context, contrasted with
> pessimism and meliorism, is admittedly idiosyncratic. Here is how he
> summarizes all three with respect to cosmology and knowledge.
>
> CSP: These three opinions about the universe, are then
>
> 1st, that of the pessimist, that the infinitely distant future comes to
> that sam

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[gnox]

Jon and other folks in this thread,

[Sorry about the disappearing text in my previous send of this, I copied some 
text from PDF and forgot I had to change the color manually.]

Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our 
sentiments toward things in general should be,” when he usually argues that 
“sentiments” are less fallible than our reasoning, precisely because they are 
products of evolution rather than logic?

Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of 
change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things” different from any past state of things. (In 
other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason to believe that 
it has either beginning or end, or that some future state of things will be 
better than any past state. And that applies not only to the observable 
universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far as I can see. I’m 
inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was just a symptom of that 
overconfident 19th-century European-American optimism that landed us in the 
Anthropocene!

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Open your mouth, always be busy, and life is beyond hope. [Daodejing 52 
(Feng/English)] {

 <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>  
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2023 5:57 PM
To: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> >
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

 

List:

 

For anyone interested, attached is my complete transcription of R 953. I am now 
suggesting a date of c. 1899 based on it mentioning "my unpublished Principles 
of Philosophy," for which Peirce unsuccessfully advertised subscriptions (1894) 
and later apparently wrote CP 1.176-179 (c. 1896) as a forward, and saying that 
the first volume "is devoted to the consideration of the question of where we 
are at this end of the Nineteenth Century." Moreover, the text references 
Büchner, whom Peirce also invokes in CP 1.192 (c. 1893), and begins to discuss 
the three grades of clearness that he introduced in "How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear" (1878)--which he updated to serve as chapter 16 of How to Reason: A 
Critick of Arguments (1894)--and presented again in "The Logic of Relatives" 
(1897). Presumably, he would have been keen to revisit them once more after 
William James started popularizing pragmatism (1898).

 

Peirce's definition of epicureanism in this context, contrasted with pessimism 
and meliorism, is admittedly idiosyncratic. Here is how he summarizes all three 
with respect to cosmology and knowledge.

 

CSP: These three opinions about the universe, are then

1st, that of the pessimist, that the infinitely distant future comes to that 
same nothingness that was in the infinitely distant past;

2nd, that of the Epicurean, that the universe has no general character or 
tendency whatever, and that nothing at all can be alleged of it as a whole;

3rd, that of the Meliorist, that the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things in the infinitely distant future different 
from that in the infinitely distant past.

These opinions about the universe, in general, are capable [of] various special 
applications. Among other things, they can be applied to human knowledge. ...

Here, then, are three opinions about science and philosophy. Each has much to 
support it.

The first is that opinion advances by a regular course of development toward a 
destined goal; but that goal is the very state of complete doubt from which it 
first set out.

The second is that opinion does not advance at all, but only shifts about, 
appearing for a time to be reaching something but soon passing into disputes.

The third is that opinion progresses toward a certain predestinate settlement, 
which must be called the truth.

Each of these views of human knowledge harmonizes with a corresponding view of 
the constitution of the universe.

 

In light of previous comments in this thread, it also seems noteworthy that 
Peirce treats Büchner as a stand-in for what today we call scientism, including 
materialism/physicalism and necessitarianism/determinism--additional 
characteristics of our intellectual climate that are contrary to 
synechism/pragmaticism.

 

CSP: When I speak of Büchner and Büchnerism, I do not mean an exact adherence 
to Dr. Büchner's personal opinions, but I use that name to designate a general 
type of opinion, namely, the opinion that physics has discovered that the 
universe consists of molecules moving about under the governance of inflexible 
law, the law of energy; that that is all there is to it; and that consequently 
the idea

RE: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[gnox]

Jon and other folks in this thread,

Doesn’t it seem a bit inconsistent for Peirce to argue about “what our 
sentiments toward things in general should be,” when he usually argues that 
“sentiments” are less fallible than our reasoning, precisely because they are 
products of evolution rather than logic?

Personally i have no doubt that the universe is in a continuous state of 
change, or in Peirce’s terms, “the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things” different from any past state of things. (In 
other words I believe that time is real.) But I see no reason to believe that 
it has either beginning or end, or that some future state of things will be 
better than any past state. And that applies not only to the observable 
universe but to the universe of “human knowledge,” as far as I can see. I’m 
inclined to think that Peirce’s view on that was just a symptom of that 
overconfident 19th-century European-American optimism that landed us in the 
Anthropocene!

Love, gary

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} Open your mouth, always be busy, and life is beyond hope. [Daodejing 52 
(Feng/English)] {

 <https://gnusystems.ca/wp/> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{  
<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/> Turning Signs

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: Friday, April 21, 2023 5:57 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

 

List:

 

For anyone interested, attached is my complete transcription of R 953. I am now 
suggesting a date of c. 1899 based on it mentioning "my unpublished Principles 
of Philosophy," for which Peirce unsuccessfully advertised subscriptions (1894) 
and later apparently wrote CP 1.176-179 (c. 1896) as a forward, and saying that 
the first volume "is devoted to the consideration of the question of where we 
are at this end of the Nineteenth Century." Moreover, the text references 
Büchner, whom Peirce also invokes in CP 1.192 (c. 1893), and begins to discuss 
the three grades of clearness that he introduced in "How to Make Our Ideas 
Clear" (1878)--which he updated to serve as chapter 16 of How to Reason: A 
Critick of Arguments (1894)--and presented again in "The Logic of Relatives" 
(1897). Presumably, he would have been keen to revisit them once more after 
William James started popularizing pragmatism (1898).

 

Peirce's definition of epicureanism in this context, contrasted with pessimism 
and meliorism, is admittedly idiosyncratic. Here is how he summarizes all three 
with respect to cosmology and knowledge.

 

CSP: These three opinions about the universe, are then

1st, that of the pessimist, that the infinitely distant future comes to that 
same nothingness that was in the infinitely distant past;

2nd, that of the Epicurean, that the universe has no general character or 
tendency whatever, and that nothing at all can be alleged of it as a whole;

3rd, that of the Meliorist, that the universe has on the whole a definite 
tendency toward a state of things in the infinitely distant future different 
from that in the infinitely distant past.

These opinions about the universe, in general, are capable [of] various special 
applications. Among other things, they can be applied to human knowledge. ...

Here, then, are three opinions about science and philosophy. Each has much to 
support it.

The first is that opinion advances by a regular course of development toward a 
destined goal; but that goal is the very state of complete doubt from which it 
first set out.

The second is that opinion does not advance at all, but only shifts about, 
appearing for a time to be reaching something but soon passing into disputes.

The third is that opinion progresses toward a certain predestinate settlement, 
which must be called the truth.

Each of these views of human knowledge harmonizes with a corresponding view of 
the constitution of the universe.

 

In light of previous comments in this thread, it also seems noteworthy that 
Peirce treats Büchner as a stand-in for what today we call scientism, including 
materialism/physicalism and necessitarianism/determinism--additional 
characteristics of our intellectual climate that are contrary to 
synechism/pragmaticism.

 

CSP: When I speak of Büchner and Büchnerism, I do not mean an exact adherence 
to Dr. Büchner's personal opinions, but I use that name to designate a general 
type of opinion, namely, the opinion that physics has discovered that the 
universe consists of molecules moving about under the governance of inflexible 
law, the law of energy; that that is all there is to it; and that consequently 
the ideas of God, Freedom of the Soul, and Immortality are silly superstitions. 
That whole type of opinion I think superficial. ...

If the Büchnerite cared to pause to listen to my answer to his question of 
whether I am not in favor of Büchner and a philosophy based on facts i

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Martin W. Kettelhut]

Dear Jon & everyone following this string,

You ask what I mean by originalism and endism in the context of practical 
deliberation.

Quick review of where we’re at...Science is an open system, based on 
probabilities. And, according to Peirce, the evolving practice of science is 
guided by three sentiments. As experimenters share their results, they must 
first have a genuine interest—call it charity--toward the community of 
experimenters.  Secondly, to establish her theory, a scientist must exhibit a 
kind of faith or devotion to having her results corroborated by other 
scientists. And thirdly, if those results continue to hold ad infinitum, as the 
scientist hopes, we say her theory is true. 
 
One of the things that stirred me most when I first started reading Peirce’s 
account of the scientific method was not only that the practice of science 
extends infinitely into the future as hypotheses continue to be (dis)confirmed, 
but that it also has no beginning. 

“This ideal first is the particular thing-in-itself, the absolute and 
unchanging truth of the matter. It does not exist as such. That is, there is no 
thing or fact which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to mind, 
though things which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that 
relation.” (I apologize I don’t have the paragraph number--I’m away from my 
materials at the moment—but it’s CP5.3teens)

Not only does the practice of science extend infinitely into the future as 
hypotheses continue to be (dis)confirmed, but it also has no beginning. 
 
Even the most primitive of first conceptions have prototypes, precedents, and 
histories; there are bundles of shared interests, habits and commitments that 
inform them. And by dint of these factors upon it, the hopeful initiative with 
which anyone might endeavor to reiterate an action or thought she takes as 
primeval—however pure her method of practical deliberation--can only serve to 
vary it, and thereby bury aboriginality. It’s by weighing the relevance of past 
precedents and others’ interests to our needs that we can create our best 
choices.
 
It seems to me crucial to pragmatism to grok not only that there is no 
scientific practice independent of charitable, devoted, and hopeful theory, but 
there is also no theory independent of the practices that inform it.

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
ListeningIsTheKey.com
303 747 4449



> On 21 Apr 2023, at 7:49 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Martin, List:
> 
> Indeed, I have argued in publications about structural engineering 
> (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373) and cognitive mathematics 
> (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44982-7_25-1) that the logic of inquiry as 
> explicated by Peirce can be adapted to outline the logic of ingenuity that 
> engineers use rigorously and everyone uses informally for practical 
> deliberation--imagining possibilities, assessing alternatives, and choosing 
> one of them to actualize.
> 
> Could you please elaborate on your last statement below? I am not sure 
> exactly what you mean by "originalism" and "endism" in this context.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 8:34 PM Martin W. Kettelhut  > wrote:
>> Thank you, Jon. You nailed the essence of the inquiry in leadership I’m 
>> conducting.
>> 
>> Which leads me to say, more generally that whether we’re looking at life as 
>> consumers or voters, family- or community members, and we want to go about 
>> it pragmatically, then we want to about it as inquirers, i.e. employing the 
>> scientific method, and for Peirce:
>>  
>> To inquire into the true nature of reality, you’ve got to have genuine 
>> (charitable) interest in the results others get running the same experiments 
>> you do. If your findings are unique, then they cannot be considered 
>> generally true. A business, too, is an experiment of sorts, and as business 
>> people we must ask, “What is the impact my work makes on the community?"
>>  
>> We must also have faith that our discoveries will be corroborated by others. 
>> This means that, e.g. in disputes, it’s more productive to focus on seeking 
>> to understand, rather than being quarrelsome.
>>  
>> And it is in the nature of pragmatist inquiry to hope that our findings will 
>> continue to be (dis)confirmed ad infinitum, i.e. that they are real. So we 
>> need to watch our tendency to both originalism and endism.
>> 
>> With respect,
>> 
>> Martin
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Martin W. Kettelhut]

Gary, and Peirce-list;

To your two questions, Gary…(and keep in mind that I’m still working all of 
this out)

1) What does the “pulling" in a leadership relationship is the future (vs the 
leader or the follower) that leader and follower are committed to. They are 
pulled forward together by the enticement of a reason or cause they’ve created 
together. I take this to be much like the interpretant’s (the 
effect/representamen's) relation to the subject (for which the interpretant 
stands) and the quality (which, in the leadership relationship, is qua leading) 
in the sign. 

E.g., I might be coaching you at swimming, but it’s the prospect of your 
winning the meet that pulls us both out of bed at 5 a.m. to practice. This is 
important, because it’s not the push-pull between leader and follower that 
actually does the work of moving things forward; it’s the potential future in 
which you win the meet. And it’s not just leading by example either; the coach 
might very well not be in shape for a meet, or even get in the water.

2) Expanding on the notion of leadership as triadic, since leadership brings 
out the summum bonum (the good, reasonable, beautiful) in a person, team, 
project, government or community, it requires these three elements:

a) someone or something that is BEING leader and hence causing movement/change. 
Who/what embodies this quality can shift in course of the partnership. The 
coach brings out the best in the student-swimmer, and then the student allows 
the coach to be expert swimmer. Or in a group or team, say, the fullback sees 
the opening in the defense’s configuration on the field, and then the forward 
moves into scoring position. Some corporate teams use software to embody this 
quality (Agile, e.g.); but this raises other questions, since a piece of 
software is ultimately a binary system. 

I’m pointing to the spontaneous element in the leadership relation, which 
nevertheless gives the leadership relation its definite tendency. Remember how 
Peirce deepens Aristotle’s conception of causation by distinguishing the 
element of chance in every act of causation. (See his 1902 paper “On Science 
and Natural Classes” CP1.203-37)

b) someone or something that is being led or effected; that which undergoes 
change (which, even if who’s leading and who's led doesn’t vary, means that 
"we’re all in this together")

c) the Future that leader and led have created together, and to which they are 
mutually committed and hope to bring about the potentiality in virtual of which 
leader and led interpret their relationship.

I’d like to also comment briefly on the leadership relation within oneself when 
one commits to embody "the reasonable in itself,” i.e. be God(-like), since 
this is what—in this string--we’ve been saying is the key to living 
pragmaticistically in this world. In this case, one has to see herself as 
innumerable community, both cause and effect, real creator.

Martin Kettelhut

> On 20 Apr 2023, at 8:35 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Martin, Jon, List,
> 
> If we agree that 'logic is rooted in the social impulse' and that pursuing  
> -- in our daily thought and actions -- Peirce's summum bonum of directing 
> these impulses to 'the reasonable in itself', that leadership is yet 
> necessary, then Jon's notion of a leadership style of 'pulling' rather than 
> 'pushing' is certainly desirable. One question immediately arises: how is 
> such 'pulling' different from leading by example or, as you put it, Martin, 
> 'leading our lives as expressions of this summum bonum?  
> 
> Martin, I will be eager to learn more about your understanding of 'leadership 
> as triadically relational'. So if you would expand on this notion as you 
> outlined it earlier -- "Leader (qua essential way of being) - Follower(s)/Led 
> (qua actual object) - Future (qua indeterminate interpretant)" -- that would 
> most certainly be helpful. 
> 
> Yet having asked if there is a distinction between 'modeling as example' and 
> 'pulling as a mode of leadership', I agree with you, Jon, that, if the 
> latter, it makes considerable sense that reframing the matter of leadership 
> as pulling and not pushing would seem to allow for "appropriate flexibility 
> in the means that [members of the community in question] can employ to reach 
> the specified end. . " But while the 'specified end' in, say, structural 
> engineering, may be clear enough, other vital human goals are often much less 
> so.
> 
> Martin, I am humbled, honored, and pleased that you found Ben and my short 
> book chapter, "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and vice versa)," an 
> inspiration for your own book, "Listening for Leadership:  Three Essential 
> Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]." I will be most eager to read it, perhaps 
> even chapters in draft form as you develop it. We can certainly look into 
> opportunities to present it to an interested audience.
> 
> Jon, I believe that you are correct in advocating countering 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Daniel L Everett]

Thanks Jon. The Cog Math paper looks great. (Will see if my computer will get the first link better than my iphone). DanOn Apr 21, 2023, at 11:53, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:Dan, List:Sorry, the first link seems to be working fine for me, but the second one is indeed broken. Please try https://rd.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-030-44982-7_25-1 instead.Thanks,JonOn Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 10:36 AM Daniel L Everett  wrote:Perhaps it is my iphone but I did not have any luck with those links Jon. DanOn Apr 21, 2023, at 09:49, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:Martin, List:Indeed, I have argued in publications about structural engineering (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373) and cognitive mathematics (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44982-7_25-1) that the logic of inquiry as explicated by Peirce can be adapted to outline the logic of ingenuity that engineers use rigorously and everyone uses informally for practical deliberation--imagining possibilities, assessing alternatives, and choosing one of them to actualize.Could you please elaborate on your last statement below? I am not sure exactly what you mean by "originalism" and "endism" in this context.Thanks,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidtOn Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 8:34 PM Martin W. Kettelhut  wrote:
Thank you, Jon. You nailed the essence of the inquiry in leadership I’m conducting.Which leads me to say, more generally that whether we’re looking at life as consumers or voters, family- or community members, and we want to go about it pragmatically, then we want to about it as inquirers, i.e. employing the scientific method, and for Peirce: To inquire into the true nature of reality, you’ve got to have genuine (charitable) interest in the results others get running the same experiments you do. If your findings are unique, then they cannot be considered generally true. A business, too, is an experiment of sorts, and as business people we must ask, “What is the impact my work makes on the community?" We must also have faith that our discoveries will be corroborated by others. This means that, e.g. in disputes, it’s more productive to focus on seeking to understand, rather than being quarrelsome. And it is in the nature of pragmatist inquiry to hope that our findings will continue to be (dis)confirmed ad infinitum, i.e. that they are real. So we need to watch our tendency to both originalism and endism.With respect,
Martin
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., Harris, List:

For the record, I deliberately chose "drawing" as the verb for my
description of leading in accordance with 3ns rather than 2ns, because
"pulling" strikes me as having the same efficient-causal forcefulness as
"pushing." Genuine followers, whom we might call "disciples," adopt that
relationship to the leader *voluntarily*, not compulsively. They are *drawn
*into it, ideally by the concrete reasonableness of the leader's direction.
Replicating his/her example is surely one aspect of it, but there must also
be a sense in which his/her identification of the goal is both explicit and
(especially) *attractive*.

The contrast between value pluralism (James/Rorty) and value monism
(Peirce) within pragmatism became evident to me last fall in Twitter
exchanges related to Nick Gall's two-part essay (
https://erraticus.co/2022/10/27/what-can-pragmatists-hope-for-in-a-boundless-world/
and
https://erraticus.co/2022/11/03/dewey-and-rorty-sending-pragmatist-hopes-in-new-directions/),
Jeffrey Farmer's favorable response (
https://erraticus.co/2022/11/15/what-do-i-hope-from-pragmatism/), and my
rebuttal (https://erraticus.co/2022/11/28/truth-as-pragmatisms-only-hope/).
Accordingly, notwithstanding the subject line of this thread but consistent
with my e-mail signature, I am inclined to advocate thoroughgoing
*synechism*, which includes but is not limited to Peircean *pragmatism *
(pragmaticism).

I am not very familiar with the thought of Spinoza or Epicurus, but I
suspect that Peirce did not actually have the latter *himself *in mind when
associating elliptical philosophy with "Epicureans." Here is how he
describes them elsewhere in that same unpublished manuscript.

CSP: I do not mean anything like epicures. They say it is absurd to have
any sentiment at all toward things in general. You might as well ask how
you like weather,--not the weather of today, or any particular
weather,--but just weather. The world no more *results *in anything, than
weather does. It is checkered with good and ill. But those who do not like
it can always resort to suicide and certainly will do so; so that on the
whole those who live must find the world rather amusing, at least--a
kaleidoscope which turns unceasingly, and gives rise to combination after
combination with no rhyme nor reason, but mostly rather pleasing. (R 953,
no date)


The idea seems to be that the universe is happily going round and round
without ever actually getting anywhere, while the parabolic/pessimistic
philosophy holds that it ultimately returns to the same nothingness with
which it began, and the hyperbolic/meliorist philosophy maintains that its
final state will be different from and better than its initial state. I am
in the process of transcribing the whole text and might gain some further
insights along the way.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 9:44 PM Harris Bolus  wrote:

> Gary, Jon, All:
>
> Jon left us with some very interesting quotes that I, like Gary, would
> love more discussion about! Maybe this can spur some of the discussion.
>
> 1) *"the theory of logic, in so far as we attain to it, is the vision and
> the attainment of that Reasonableness for the sake of which the Heavens and
> the Earth have been created."* This strikes me as the same mode of
> speaking Spinoza used to assert that power, wisdom, deductive consequence,
> causal efficacy, and Blessedness are all essentially the same. From what
> I've read, Peirce has a complicated relationship with the Principle of
> Sufficient Reason, but he also seems to have attended to it with a
> dedication that would make Spinoza proud.
>
> 2) *"**These thinkers consequently prescribe for us what they consider as
> an infallible recipe for being happy, if one only has the strength of mind
> to take the medicine, namely, to bring your desires into conformity with
> the general course of nature. [...] the maxim of happiness is to recognize
> and accept the truth [...]"* This actually sounds very Epicurean to me,
> although I may be biased as a fan of Epicurus and Lucretius. I think they
> supply just such a recipe, striving to bring our desires into conformity
> with nature. Although they may not put as much emphasis on "love for the
> community of soul," it would certainly be in the mix. I wonder if you noted
> exactly how Peirce discussed Epicurus in that unpublished manuscript - he
> was quite the historian of philosophy, but Epicurus has been unjustly
> maligned for millenia. And I personally think Peirce fell prey to a similar
> PR campaign against Hume. They could have been good friends.
>
> I'm not a huge fan of Confucius, but a quote of his is worth mentioning
> here too:
>
> “At fifteen I set my heart upon learning.
> At thirty, I had planted my feet firm upon the ground.
> At forty, I no longer suffered from 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Dan, List:

Sorry, the first link seems to be working fine for me, but the second one
is indeed broken. Please try
https://rd.springer.com/referenceworkentry/10.1007/978-3-030-44982-7_25-1
instead.

Thanks,

Jon

On Fri, Apr 21, 2023 at 10:36 AM Daniel L Everett 
wrote:

> Perhaps it is my iphone but I did not have any luck with those links Jon.
>
> Dan
>
> On Apr 21, 2023, at 09:49, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Martin, List:
>
> Indeed, I have argued in publications about structural engineering (
> https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373) and cognitive mathematics (
> https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44982-7_25-1) that the logic of *inquiry
> *as explicated by Peirce can be adapted to outline the logic of *ingenuity
> *that engineers use rigorously and everyone uses informally for practical
> deliberation--imagining possibilities, assessing alternatives, and choosing
> one of them to actualize.
>
> Could you please elaborate on your last statement below? I am not sure
> exactly what you mean by "originalism" and "endism" in this context.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 8:34 PM Martin W. Kettelhut 
> wrote:
>
>> Thank you, Jon. You nailed the essence of the inquiry in leadership I’m
>> conducting.
>>
>> Which leads me to say, more generally that whether we’re looking at life
>> as consumers or voters, family- or community members, and we want to go
>> about it pragmatically, then we want to about it as inquirers, i.e.
>> employing the scientific method, and for Peirce:
>>
>>
>>
>> To inquire into the true nature of reality, you’ve got to have *genuine*
>> * (charitable) **interest* in the results others get running the same
>> experiments you do. If your findings are unique, then they cannot be
>> considered generally true. A business, too, is an experiment of sorts, and
>> as business people we must ask, “What is the impact my work makes on the
>> community?"
>>
>>
>>
>> We must also have* f**aith* that our discoveries will be corroborated by
>> others. This means that, e.g. in disputes, it’s more productive to focus
>> on seeking to understand, rather than being quarrelsome.
>>
>>
>>
>> And it is in the nature of pragmatist inquiry to *hope* that our findings
>> will continue to be (dis)confirmed *ad infinitum*, i.e. that they are
>> real. So we need to watch our tendency to both originalism and endism.
>>
>>
>> With respect,
>>
>>
>> Martin
>>
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Daniel L Everett]

Perhaps it is my iphone but I did not have any luck with those links Jon. DanOn Apr 21, 2023, at 09:49, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:Martin, List:Indeed, I have argued in publications about structural engineering (https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373) and cognitive mathematics (https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44982-7_25-1) that the logic of inquiry as explicated by Peirce can be adapted to outline the logic of ingenuity that engineers use rigorously and everyone uses informally for practical deliberation--imagining possibilities, assessing alternatives, and choosing one of them to actualize.Could you please elaborate on your last statement below? I am not sure exactly what you mean by "originalism" and "endism" in this context.Thanks,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidtOn Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 8:34 PM Martin W. Kettelhut  wrote:
Thank you, Jon. You nailed the essence of the inquiry in leadership I’m conducting.Which leads me to say, more generally that whether we’re looking at life as consumers or voters, family- or community members, and we want to go about it pragmatically, then we want to about it as inquirers, i.e. employing the scientific method, and for Peirce: To inquire into the true nature of reality, you’ve got to have genuine (charitable) interest in the results others get running the same experiments you do. If your findings are unique, then they cannot be considered generally true. A business, too, is an experiment of sorts, and as business people we must ask, “What is the impact my work makes on the community?" We must also have faith that our discoveries will be corroborated by others. This means that, e.g. in disputes, it’s more productive to focus on seeking to understand, rather than being quarrelsome. And it is in the nature of pragmatist inquiry to hope that our findings will continue to be (dis)confirmed ad infinitum, i.e. that they are real. So we need to watch our tendency to both originalism and endism.With respect,
Martin
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body.  More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and co-managed by him and Ben Udell._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Martin, List:

Indeed, I have argued in publications about structural engineering (
https://www.structuremag.org/?p=10373) and cognitive mathematics (
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-44982-7_25-1) that the logic of *inquiry *as
explicated by Peirce can be adapted to outline the logic of *ingenuity *that
engineers use rigorously and everyone uses informally for practical
deliberation--imagining possibilities, assessing alternatives, and choosing
one of them to actualize.

Could you please elaborate on your last statement below? I am not sure
exactly what you mean by "originalism" and "endism" in this context.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 8:34 PM Martin W. Kettelhut 
wrote:

> Thank you, Jon. You nailed the essence of the inquiry in leadership I’m
> conducting.
>
> Which leads me to say, more generally that whether we’re looking at life
> as consumers or voters, family- or community members, and we want to go
> about it pragmatically, then we want to about it as inquirers, i.e.
> employing the scientific method, and for Peirce:
>
>
>
> To inquire into the true nature of reality, you’ve got to have *genuine*
> * (charitable) **interest* in the results others get running the same
> experiments you do. If your findings are unique, then they cannot be
> considered generally true. A business, too, is an experiment of sorts, and
> as business people we must ask, “What is the impact my work makes on the
> community?"
>
>
>
> We must also have* f**aith* that our discoveries will be corroborated by
> others. This means that, e.g. in disputes, it’s more productive to focus
> on seeking to understand, rather than being quarrelsome.
>
>
>
> And it is in the nature of pragmatist inquiry to *hope* that our findings
> will continue to be (dis)confirmed *ad infinitum*, i.e. that they are
> real. So we need to watch our tendency to both originalism and endism.
>
>
> With respect,
>
>
> Martin
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Harris Bolus]

Gary, Jon, All:

Jon left us with some very interesting quotes that I, like Gary, would love
more discussion about! Maybe this can spur some of the discussion.

1) *"the theory of logic, in so far as we attain to it, is the vision and
the attainment of that Reasonableness for the sake of which the Heavens and
the Earth have been created."* This strikes me as the same mode of speaking
Spinoza used to assert that power, wisdom, deductive consequence, causal
efficacy, and Blessedness are all essentially the same. From what I've
read, Peirce has a complicated relationship with the Principle of
Sufficient Reason, but he also seems to have attended to it with a
dedication that would make Spinoza proud.

2) *"**These thinkers consequently prescribe for us what they consider as
an infallible recipe for being happy, if one only has the strength of mind
to take the medicine, namely, to bring your desires into conformity with
the general course of nature. [...] the maxim of happiness is to recognize
and accept the truth [...]"* This actually sounds very Epicurean to me,
although I may be biased as a fan of Epicurus and Lucretius. I think they
supply just such a recipe, striving to bring our desires into conformity
with nature. Although they may not put as much emphasis on "love for the
community of soul," it would certainly be in the mix. I wonder if you noted
exactly how Peirce discussed Epicurus in that unpublished manuscript - he
was quite the historian of philosophy, but Epicurus has been unjustly
maligned for millenia. And I personally think Peirce fell prey to a similar
PR campaign against Hume. They could have been good friends.

I'm not a huge fan of Confucius, but a quote of his is worth mentioning
here too:

“At fifteen I set my heart upon learning.
At thirty, I had planted my feet firm upon the ground.
At forty, I no longer suffered from perplexities.
At fifty, I knew what were the biddings of Heaven.
At sixty, I heard them with docile ear.

*At seventy, I could follow the dictates of my own heart; for what I
desired no longer overstepped the boundaries of right.” *

Thank you for the advocacy you've done for all those positions you
mentioned, Jon, Gary, Gary, et al. I find it hard enough to understand
Peirce's thought, let alone to do a thorough comparison of his logic,
metaphysics, philosophy of science, and ethics to the other philosophical
positions I'm familiar with and have an appreciation for. For what it's
worth, IMO, synechism, monism, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason are
some of the topics I find most intriguing in Peirce and most neglected
elsewhere.

On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 9:36 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Martin, Jon, List,
>
> If we agree that 'logic is rooted in the social impulse' and that
> pursuing  -- in our daily thought and actions -- Peirce's summum bonum of
> directing these impulses to 'the reasonable in itself', that leadership is
> yet necessary, then Jon's notion of a leadership style of 'pulling' rather
> than 'pushing' is certainly desirable. One question immediately arises: how
> is such 'pulling' different from leading by example or, as you put it,
> Martin, 'leading our lives as expressions of this summum bonum?
>
> Martin, I will be eager to learn more about your understanding of
> 'leadership as triadically relational'. So if you would expand on this
> notion as you outlined it earlier -- "Leader (qua essential way of being)
> - Follower(s)/Led (qua actual object) - Future (qua indeterminate
> interpretant)" -- that would most certainly be helpful.
>
> Yet having asked if there is a distinction between 'modeling as example'
> and 'pulling as a mode of leadership', I agree with you, Jon, that, if the
> latter, it makes considerable sense that reframing the matter of leadership
> as pulling and not pushing would seem to allow for "appropriate
> flexibility in the *means *that [members of the community in question]
> can employ to reach the specified end. . " But while the 'specified end'
> in, say, structural engineering, may be clear enough, other vital human
> goals are often much less so.
>
> Martin, I am humbled, honored, and pleased that you found Ben and my short
> book chapter, "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and vice versa),"
> an inspiration for your own book, "Listening for Leadership:  Three
> Essential Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]." I will be most eager to read
> it, perhaps even chapters in draft form as you develop it. We can certainly
> look into opportunities to present it to an interested audience.
>
> Jon, I believe that you are correct in advocating countering 'value
> monism in an intellectual climate of widespread pluralism' to Peirce's
> *realism* and *objective idealism* as a challenge Peircean pragmatists
> ought expect -- need! -- to take up.It appears to me to be as important as
> the other two. For in what I consider to be something of a paradox, it is
> through *value monism* that we are most likely to better create
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Gary Richmond]

Martin, Jon, List,

If we agree that 'logic is rooted in the social impulse' and that pursuing
-- in our daily thought and actions -- Peirce's summum bonum of directing
these impulses to 'the reasonable in itself', that leadership is yet
necessary, then Jon's notion of a leadership style of 'pulling' rather than
'pushing' is certainly desirable. One question immediately arises: how is
such 'pulling' different from leading by example or, as you put it, Martin,
'leading our lives as expressions of this summum bonum?

Martin, I will be eager to learn more about your understanding of
'leadership as triadically relational'. So if you would expand on this
notion as you outlined it earlier -- "Leader (qua essential way of being) -
Follower(s)/Led (qua actual object) - Future (qua indeterminate
interpretant)" -- that would most certainly be helpful.

Yet having asked if there is a distinction between 'modeling as example'
and 'pulling as a mode of leadership', I agree with you, Jon, that, if the
latter, it makes considerable sense that reframing the matter of leadership
as pulling and not pushing would seem to allow for "appropriate flexibility
in the *means *that [members of the community in question] can employ to
reach the specified end. . " But while the 'specified end' in, say,
structural engineering, may be clear enough, other vital human goals are
often much less so.

Martin, I am humbled, honored, and pleased that you found Ben and my short
book chapter, "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and vice versa),"
an inspiration for your own book, "Listening for Leadership:  Three
Essential Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]." I will be most eager to read it,
perhaps even chapters in draft form as you develop it. We can certainly
look into opportunities to present it to an interested audience.

Jon, I believe that you are correct in advocating countering 'value monism
in an intellectual climate of widespread pluralism' to Peirce's *realism*
and *objective idealism* as a challenge Peircean pragmatists ought expect
-- need! -- to take up.It appears to me to be as important as the other
two. For in what I consider to be something of a paradox, it is through *value
monism* that we are most likely to better create *community*, exactly
because the monad in question is the *summum bonum* -- exactly 'the
reasonable in itself'. I'd be interested to hear what sort of arguments, if
any, were *reasonably *offered against this form of ethical monism in you
exchanges with other pragmatists, Jon.

Finally, I have begun to ask myself how Peirce's notion of bringing one's
desires "into conformity with the general course of nature" might bear
nourishing fruit for our further reflections on the task of Peircean
pragmatism in the 21st century. This seems to me not at all obvious, and
its connection to God and religion even more obscure.

Best,

Gary R





On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 6:50 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Martin, Gary R., List:
>
> The challenge that we face as Peirceans today is advocating not only
> scholastic realism and objective idealism in an intellectual climate of
> widespread (and often uncritical) nominalism and materialism, but also
> value monism in an intellectual climate of widespread pluralism. As I
> recently learned from some interactions with self-described pragmatists on
> Twitter who are much more partial to James and Rorty than Peirce, there is
> considerable resistance to the notion of a single *summum bonum*. I did
> not have time to touch on esthetics and ethics in my 10-minute
> presentation, but as I see it, applying synechism in those normative
> sciences involves recognizing that concrete reasonableness is itself a
> manifestation of continuity as "a special kind of *generality*, or
> conformity to one idea" (CP 7.535n6, 1908).
>
> CSP: Such is the place of logic among the sciences; and such is its
> utility. Yet the reader will find that the aggregate value of all such
> applications will not compare with the treasure of the pure theory itself.
> For when he has surveyed the whole subject, he will see that the theory of
> logic, in so far as we attain to it, is the vision and the attainment of
> that Reasonableness for the sake of which the Heavens and the Earth have
> been created. (CP 2.122, 1902)
>
>
> The resulting ethical imperative is for each of us to exercise
> self-control over our future actions by deliberately cultivating habits of
> conduct accordingly.
>
> CSP: This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in
> embodiment, that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which
> did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but
> is going on today and never will be done, is this very development of
> Reason. I do not see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the
> admirable than the development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose
> admirableness is not due to an ulterior reason is Reason itself
> comprehended in all its 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Martin W. Kettelhut]

Thank you, Jon. You nailed the essence of the inquiry in leadership I’m 
conducting.

Which leads me to say, more generally that whether we’re looking at life as 
consumers or voters, family- or community members, and we want to go about it 
pragmatically, then we want to about it as inquirers, i.e. employing the 
scientific method, and for Peirce:
 
To inquire into the true nature of reality, you’ve got to have genuine 
(charitable) interest in the results others get running the same experiments 
you do. If your findings are unique, then they cannot be considered generally 
true. A business, too, is an experiment of sorts, and as business people we 
must ask, “What is the impact my work makes on the community?"
 
We must also have faith that our discoveries will be corroborated by others. 
This means that, e.g. in disputes, it’s more productive to focus on seeking to 
understand, rather than being quarrelsome.
 
And it is in the nature of pragmatist inquiry to hope that our findings will 
continue to be (dis)confirmed ad infinitum, i.e. that they are real. So we need 
to watch our tendency to both originalism and endism.

With respect,

Martin

> On 20 Apr 2023, at 4:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Martin, Gary R., List:
> 
> The challenge that we face as Peirceans today is advocating not only 
> scholastic realism and objective idealism in an intellectual climate of 
> widespread (and often uncritical) nominalism and materialism, but also value 
> monism in an intellectual climate of widespread pluralism. As I recently 
> learned from some interactions with self-described pragmatists on Twitter who 
> are much more partial to James and Rorty than Peirce, there is considerable 
> resistance to the notion of a single summum bonum. I did not have time to 
> touch on esthetics and ethics in my 10-minute presentation, but as I see it, 
> applying synechism in those normative sciences involves recognizing that 
> concrete reasonableness is itself a manifestation of continuity as "a special 
> kind of generality, or conformity to one idea" (CP 7.535n6, 1908).
> 
> CSP: Such is the place of logic among the sciences; and such is its utility. 
> Yet the reader will find that the aggregate value of all such applications 
> will not compare with the treasure of the pure theory itself. For when he has 
> surveyed the whole subject, he will see that the theory of logic, in so far 
> as we attain to it, is the vision and the attainment of that Reasonableness 
> for the sake of which the Heavens and the Earth have been created. (CP 2.122, 
> 1902)
> 
> The resulting ethical imperative is for each of us to exercise self-control 
> over our future actions by deliberately cultivating habits of conduct 
> accordingly.
> 
> CSP: This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, 
> that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take 
> place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on 
> today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason. I do not 
> see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the admirable than the 
> development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose admirableness is not 
> due to an ulterior reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, 
> so far as we can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct 
> will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by 
> giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the 
> slang is, it is "up to us" to do so. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255, 1903)
> 
> I recently came across the following in an unpublished manuscript where 
> Peirce aligns elliptical philosophy (no starting/stopping point) with 
> epicureanism, parabolic philosophy (same starting/stopping point) with 
> pessimism, and his own hyperbolic philosophy (different starting/stopping 
> points) with meliorism.
> 
> CSP: [Meliorists] think that throughout the universe as a whole, the good has 
> a decided tendency to prevail. If you ask what they mean by the good, they 
> will tell you they mean the ultimate end of the universe. Accordingly, when 
> they say the good tends to prevail, they mean there is a general tendency 
> throughout the universe toward some describable condition of things. These 
> thinkers consequently prescribe for us what they consider as an infallible 
> recipe for being happy, if one only has the strength of mind to take the 
> medicine, namely, to bring your desires into conformity with the general 
> course of nature. ... Since the maxim of happiness is to recognize and accept 
> the truth, they declare that contempt for the ego and love for the community 
> of soul is the truest and happiest sentiment. (R 953, no date)
> 
> This might be the closest that Peirce ever comes to endorsing a version of 
> natural law theory, especially in conjunction with my suggestion that the 
> complete revelation of God is the overall final 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Martin, Gary R., List:

The challenge that we face as Peirceans today is advocating not only
scholastic realism and objective idealism in an intellectual climate of
widespread (and often uncritical) nominalism and materialism, but also
value monism in an intellectual climate of widespread pluralism. As I
recently learned from some interactions with self-described pragmatists on
Twitter who are much more partial to James and Rorty than Peirce, there is
considerable resistance to the notion of a single *summum bonum*. I did not
have time to touch on esthetics and ethics in my 10-minute presentation,
but as I see it, applying synechism in those normative sciences involves
recognizing that concrete reasonableness is itself a manifestation of
continuity as "a special kind of *generality*, or conformity to one idea"
(CP 7.535n6, 1908).

CSP: Such is the place of logic among the sciences; and such is its
utility. Yet the reader will find that the aggregate value of all such
applications will not compare with the treasure of the pure theory itself.
For when he has surveyed the whole subject, he will see that the theory of
logic, in so far as we attain to it, is the vision and the attainment of
that Reasonableness for the sake of which the Heavens and the Earth have
been created. (CP 2.122, 1902)


The resulting ethical imperative is for each of us to exercise self-control
over our future actions by deliberately cultivating habits of conduct
accordingly.

CSP: This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment,
that is, in manifestation. The creation of the universe, which did not take
place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on
today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason. I do not
see how one can have a more satisfying ideal of the admirable than the
development of Reason so understood. The one thing whose admirableness is
not due to an ulterior reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its
fullness, so far as we can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal
of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the
creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable
whenever, as the slang is, it is "up to us" to do so. (CP 1.615, EP 2:255,
1903)


I recently came across the following in an unpublished manuscript where
Peirce aligns elliptical philosophy (no starting/stopping point) with
epicureanism, parabolic philosophy (same starting/stopping point) with
pessimism, and his own hyperbolic philosophy (different starting/stopping
points) with meliorism.

CSP: [Meliorists] think that throughout the universe as a whole, the good
has a decided tendency to prevail. If you ask what they mean by the good,
they will tell you they mean the *ultimate end* of the universe.
Accordingly, when they say the good tends to prevail, they mean there is a
general tendency throughout the universe toward some describable condition
of things. These thinkers consequently prescribe for us what they consider
as an infallible recipe for being happy, if one only has the strength of
mind to take the medicine, namely, to bring your desires into conformity
with the general course of nature. ... Since the maxim of happiness is to
recognize and accept the truth, they declare that contempt for the *ego *and
love for the community of soul is the truest and happiest sentiment. (R
953, no date)


This might be the closest that Peirce ever comes to endorsing a version of
natural law theory, especially in conjunction with my suggestion that the
complete revelation of God is the overall final interpretant of the entire
universe as a sign, i.e., the "describable condition of things" toward
which "there is a general tendency throughout the universe." Accordingly,
"to bring your desires into conformity with the general course of nature"
would then amount to bringing your desires into conformity with the
revealed character of God Himself, along with your actions and beliefs.

Regarding leadership, I think that it makes a lot of sense to frame it as
*drawing* followers toward a designated goal as a *final* cause (3ns),
instead of the all-too-common approach of *pushing* them toward it as an
*efficient* cause (2ns). This allows appropriate flexibility in the
*means *that they
can employ to reach the specified end, as opposed to dictating every step
along the way.

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 20, 2023 at 10:14 AM Martin W. Kettelhut 
wrote:

> I appreciate your response, Gary.
>
> Yes, serving our world as pragmatists is fundamentally about leading our
> lives as expressions of the *summum bonum*, and the passages from
> Peirce’s papers rooting the logic of probability in the "social impulse”
> are at the core of the book I’m writing on leadership as triadically
> relational (vs leadership as 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Martin W. Kettelhut]

I appreciate your response, Gary.

Yes, serving our world as pragmatists is fundamentally about leading our lives 
as expressions of the summum bonum, and the passages from Peirce’s papers 
rooting the logic of probability in the "social impulse” are at the core of the 
book I’m writing on leadership as triadically relational (vs leadership as 
traditionally conceived, namely as characteristics of an individual): 

Leader (qua essential way of being) - Follower(s)/Led (qua actual object) - 
Future (qua indeterminate interpretant).

I’m a big fan of your and Ben’s chapter in "Peirce in His Own Words" on this 
topic. It’s an inspiration for my book, in fact.

I’d be honored if given the opportunity at some point to offer a presentation 
on the book I’m writing, working title:  "Listening for Leadership:  Three 
Essential Sentiments [Love, Faith, Hope]."

Yours sincerely,

Martin W. Kettelhut, PhD
ListeningIsTheKey.com
303 747 4449



> On 19 Apr 2023, at 11:04 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> Martin, List,
> 
> Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday and 
> for your post to Peirce-L today.
> 
> I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent 
> question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a 
> nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task for 
> pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe. 
> 
> Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to how 
> we ought conduct ourselves, not only in conferences and discussion forums and 
> the like but, perhaps especially, in our quotidian lives. On Peirce's 
> esthetic theory, this would represent the employment of a form of the summum 
> bonum, this in conjunction with his ethical theory which includes making a 
> decision to make that a habit of one's life. If we can do that, then perhaps 
> we can hope to begin to personally model that kind of behavior in our 
> scientific and philosophic work, as well as in our collegial, familial and 
> work lives. 
> 
> The goal would seem to involve our coming to live more and more by faith, 
> hope, and love, a trio of values Peirce saw as essentially logical.  See, for 
> example, the chapter "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and vice 
> versa)" by Ben Udell and myself in Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words 
> .
> 
> While it doesn't seem at all clear to me how this can be brought about very 
> generally in our philosophical and scientific communities in their current 
> nominalistic/individualistic state, it is certainly something which we as 
> pragmatists likely need to reflect on and attempt to work together toward. 
> 
> Jon has consistently tried to address some related issues in his papers on 
> the ethics of engineering, and Gary Fuhrman in his e-book, Turning Signs, as 
> well as in the electronic discussions he's created around it. 
> 
> Perhaps it would be helpful for us to reflect deeply on this question you 
> posed in your post.
> 
> MWK: How are we serving the needs of a world engendered by reductionism in 
> politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism in social media 
> platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of the law, the 
> conundrums of individualism for economics, and rampant nihilism in every 
> sector? 
>  
> Best,
> 
> Gary R
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 5:50 PM Martin W. Kettelhut  > wrote:
>> Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary.
>>  
>> What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint 
>> representations of Peirce’s trichotomies, synechism, and Kaina Stoichea!
>> 
>> I supposed it was seeing each other, and hearing each other’s voices, that 
>> spark my wanting to inquire into our participation (as pragmatist 
>> philosophers) in our world currently—given what we learn from Peirce about 
>> science, the long and synechistic view, and the power of signs.
>>  
>> You all chose these topics wisely; they capture crucial aspects of what’s 
>> irreducibly original in Peirce’s work. I submit that many of the questions 
>> raised by participants in this conference (not unlike many of the 
>> discussions here on the Peirce-list) reflect the challenge it is to 
>> communicate what’s fresh, relevant, and pragmaticistic in Peirce. I 
>> appreciate the patience, good will, and insight you three—in 
>> particular—bring.
>>  
>> In the background of the question I’m going to propose for discussion here 
>> is a recognition that, although I did write a dissertation on Peirce's 
>> semeiotic/metaphysics and receive a PhD from Temple U, I immediately left 
>> academic life and became a "philosopher of the marketplace,” meaning--in my 
>> case--business coach. I apply synechism everyday in my work, partnering with 
>> business people to build and sustain meaningful, successful, and ethical 
>> 

[PEIRCE-L] A question for pragmatists, was, Comments on the nature and purpose of Peirce-L, was, The Basis of Synechism in Phaneroscopy

[Gary Richmond]

Martin, List,

Thanks for joining our 10 minute thesis presentation this past Saturday and
for your post to Peirce-L today.

I think that your suggestion that "there’s a. . . fundamental and urgent
question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate realism in a
nominalist/individualist world" points to perhaps the most urgent task for
pragmatists, most certainly for those of a Peircean stripe.

Your question seems to point to a kind of decision we need to make as to *how
we ought conduct ourselves*, not only in conferences and discussion forums
and the like but, perhaps especially, in our quotidian lives. On Peirce's
esthetic theory, this would represent the employment of a form of the*
summum bonum*, this in conjunction with his ethical theory which
includes making a decision to make *that* a habit of one's life. If we can
do *that,* then perhaps we can hope to begin to personally model that kind
of behavior in our scientific and philosophic work, as well as in our
collegial, familial and work lives.

The goal would seem to involve our coming to live more and more by faith,
hope, and love, a trio of values Peirce saw as essentially logical.  See,
for example, the chapter "Logic is Rooted in the Social Principle (and vice
versa)" by Ben Udell and myself in Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words
.

While it doesn't seem at all clear to me *how* this can be brought about
very generally in our philosophical and scientific communities in
their current nominalistic/individualistic state, it is certainly something
which we as pragmatists likely need to reflect on and attempt to work
together toward.

Jon has consistently tried to address some related issues in his papers on
the ethics of engineering, and Gary Fuhrman in his e-book, *Turning Signs*,
as well as in the electronic discussions he's created around it.

Perhaps it would be helpful for us to reflect deeply on this question
you posed in your post.

MWK: How are we serving the needs of a world engendered by reductionism in
politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism in social media
platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of the law, the
conundrums of individualism for economics, and rampant nihilism in every
sector?



Best,


Gary R



On Wed, Apr 19, 2023 at 5:50 PM Martin W. Kettelhut 
wrote:

> Thank you for your 10-minute presentations Gary, Jon and Gary.
>
>
>
> What a fascinating phenomenon, a zoom conference with Powerpoint
> representations of Peirce’s trichotomies, synechism, and Kaina Stoichea!
>
>
> I supposed it was seeing each other, and hearing each other’s voices, that
> spark my wanting to inquire into our participation (as pragmatist
> philosophers) in our world currently—given what we learn from Peirce about
> science, the long and synechistic view, and the power of signs.
>
>
>
> You all chose these topics wisely; they capture crucial aspects of what’s
> irreducibly original in Peirce’s work. I submit that many of the questions
> raised by participants in this conference (not unlike many of the
> discussions here on the Peirce-list) reflect the challenge it is to
> communicate what’s fresh, relevant, and pragmati*cistic* in Peirce. I
> appreciate the patience, good will, and insight you three—in
> particular—bring.
>
>
>
> In the background of the question I’m going to propose for discussion here
> is a recognition that, although I did write a dissertation on Peirce's
> semeiotic/metaphysics and receive a PhD from Temple U, I immediately left
> academic life and became a "philosopher of the marketplace,” meaning--in my
> case--business coach. I apply synechism everyday in my work, partnering
> with business people to build and sustain meaningful, successful, and
> ethical businesses.
>
>
>
> My question is, given (as Gary Fuhrman points out) that it is legisigns
> that have pragmatic power to get things done; and assuming that the purpose
> of a zoom conference on Peirce is to “combat nominalism”--as Ian MacDonald
> so actualistically put it--or rather embody the discovery-process that
> pragmaticism/synechism is:  What’s the best approach? What symbols should
> we use? How do we represent the scientific endeavor anew, holistically (in
> a Peircean sense, i.e. in terms of what’s possible what’s actual, and
> what’s potential)?
>
>
>
> Diagrams and bullet-points certain help; but I think there’s a more
> fundamental and urgent question to ask ourselves about how to insinuate
> realism in a nominalist/individualist world. On the one hand, this is a
> question about how to embody realism in an academic conference, but it’s
> also a question about how we (pragmatist philosophers) might embody realism
> in the world generally. How are we serving the needs of a world engendered
> by reductionism in politics and the media, the over-extension of pluralism
> in social media platforms, relativism gone wild in the interpretation of
> the law, the