Aw: Re: : [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Thank you, Jon and Edwina. I don´t understand it, except I have a hunch that he is saying: A thing´s form is unique, and its matter is not, because other things are also made of the same material. I guess I rather want to keep my concept of form and matter, which I think is more naiive: In a piece of clay the clay is the matter, and its shape is the form. If the clay is red, this redness is a function of its matter, not of the form. Aristotle´s and Peirce´s views are too complicated for me in the moment. I am reluctant to adopt complicated concepts and give up clear enough (I think) concepts.

Best,

Helmut

 

 12. Februar 2018 um 23:29 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 


Edwina, Helmut, List:

 

The nearly 40 different types of "form" that Peirce cataloged in CP 6.360-361 (from Baldwin's Dictionary, 1902) highlight the importance of being clear about what we mean by "Form" when we talk about it; likewise "Matter."  In NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?), Peirce stated the following.

 


... Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The peculiar suchness of the feeling, wherein is that? It is wholly in itself. The quality or form is whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else. No embodiment of it in this or that object or feeling in any degree modifies the suchness. It is something positive in itself. ... The suchness does not exist, but it is something definite. Neither does it consist in being represented. The being represented is one thing; the being represented such as red is represented, is another definite thing. It is general. It is an element of existing things; but it is not and has nothing to do with the element of existence. The suchness of red is such as it is in its own suchness, and in nothing else.

 

Matter, that something which is the subject of a fact, is, in every respect the contrary of form, except that both are elements of the world that are independent of how they are represented to be. Form is not an existent. Matter is precisely that which exists. (Remember, that whether corporeal, or physical matter is, or is not, the only matter is beyond my present scope.) Form is definite. Whatever red is, it is of its very essence, and is nothing else. Matter is an element of something definite. But it is in itself, as the subject of that determination, vague ... Form, as we have seen, is all that it is in itself. Matter being the subject of fact, and being nothing but the subject of a fact, is all that it is in reference to something else than itself ... (293-294)


 

The next paragraph includes what I quoted previously (294-295), and then comes the following.

 



This Entelechy, the third element which it is requisite to acknowledge besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together. It is the element which is prominent in such ideas as Plan, Cause, and Law. The philosopher who recognizes only Form, will do best to insist that Form fulfills this uniting function by virtue of its generality. But it is not so; since Form remains entirely within its own self. (295-296)



 

Hence in this particular manuscript, it is clear that Form is 1ns, Matter is 2ns, and Entelechy is 3ns.  Similarly, in EP 2:304 (1904), Peirce stated the following.

 



But so far as the "Truth" is merely the object of a sign, it is merely the Aristotelian Matter of it that is so. In addition however to denoting objects, every sign sufficiently complete signifies characters, or qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the Aristotelian Form of the universe that it signifies ... What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the perfect Truth, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or entelechy, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as a sign may have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe qua fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign.



 

Here it is equally clear that Aristotelian Form corresponds to the characters (1ns) that a Sign signifies, Aristotelian Matter corresponds to the object (2ns) that a Sign denotes, and Aristotelian Entelechy corresponds to the unity of these (3ns) that a Sign expresses.

 

Of course, whether or how these two texts have bearing on our interpretation of Peirce's other writings is another question.

 

Regards,

Re: : [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



The word ‘reality’, which in the concept of the thing sounds other than the
word ‘existence’ in the concept of the predicate, is of no avail in meeting
this objection.  For if all positing (no matter what it may be that is
posited) is entitled reality, the thing with all its predicates is already
posited in the concept of the subject, and is assumed as actual; and in the
predicate this is merely repeated.  But if on the other hand, we admit, as
every reasonable person must, that all existential propositions are
synthetic, how can we profess to maintain that the predicate of existence
cannot be rejected without contradiction?  This is a feature which is found
only in analytic propositions, and is indeed precisely what constitutes
their analytic character.



*I should have hoped to put an end to these idle and fruitless disputations
in a direct manner*, by an accurate determination of the concept of
existence, had I not found that the illusion which is caused by the
confusion of a logical with a real predicate (that is, with a predicate
which determines a thing) is almost beyond correction.  Anything we please
can be made to serve as a logical predicate; the subject can even be
predicated of itself; for logic abstracts from all content.



*If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come
to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow*;



*if we find them, after the most elaborate preparations, invariably brought
to a stand before the goal is reached*, and compelled to retrace their
steps and strike into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they
are far from having attained to the certainty of scientific progress and
may rather be said to be merely groping about in the dark.



*In these circumstances we shall render an important service to reason if
we succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must travel*, in
order to arrive at any results — even if it should be found necessary to
abandon many of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed
for its attainment.



*Socrates *

It is, then, in the nature of the good man to do injustice voluntarily, and
of the bad man to do it involuntarily, that is, if the good man has a good
soul.



*Hippias *

But surely he has.



*Socrates *

Then he who voluntarily errs and does disgraceful and unjust acts, Hippias,
if there be such a man, would be no other than the good man.



*Hippias *

I cannot agree with you, Socrates, in that.



*Socrates *

Nor I with myself, Hippias ; but that appears at the moment to be the
inevitable result of our argument ; however, as I was saying all along, in
respect to these matters I go astray, up and down, and never hold the same
opinion ;



and that* I, or any other ordinary man, go astray is not surprising ; *

*but** if you wise men likewise go astray, that is a terrible thing for us
also*, *if even when we have come to you we are not to cease from our
straying.*



Hth and with best wishes,

Jerry R


On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 4:29 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Edwina, Helmut, List:
>
> The nearly 40 different types of "form" that Peirce cataloged in CP
> 6.360-361 (from Baldwin's *Dictionary*, 1902) highlight the importance of
> being clear about *what we mean* by "Form" when we talk about it;
> likewise "Matter."  In NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?), Peirce stated the
> following.
>
> ... Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The peculiar suchness
> of the feeling, wherein is that? It is wholly in itself. The quality or
> form is whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else. No
> embodiment of it in this or that object or feeling in any degree modifies
> the suchness. It is something positive in itself. ... The suchness does not
> exist, but it is something definite. Neither does it consist in being
> represented. The being represented is one thing; the being represented such
> as red is represented, is another definite thing. It is general. It is an
> element of existing things; but it is not and has nothing to do with the
> element of existence. The suchness of *red *is such as it is in its own
> suchness, and in nothing else.
>
> *Matter*, that something which is the subject of a fact, is, in every
> respect the contrary of form, except that both are elements of the world
> that are independent of how they are represented to be. Form is not an
> existent. Matter is precisely that which exists. (Remember, that whether
> corporeal, or physical matter is, or is not, the only matter is beyond my
> present scope.) Form is definite. Whatever *red *is, it is of its very
> essence, and is nothing else. Matter is an element of something definite.
> But it is in itself, as the subject of that determination, vague ... Form,
> as we have seen, is all that it is in itself. Matter being the subject of
> fact, and being nothing but the subject of a fact, is all that it is in
> reference to something else than 

Re: : [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 Edwina, Helmut, List:

The nearly 40 different types of "form" that Peirce cataloged in CP
6.360-361 (from Baldwin's *Dictionary*, 1902) highlight the importance of
being clear about *what we mean* by "Form" when we talk about it; likewise
"Matter."  In NEM 4:292-300 (c. 1903?), Peirce stated the following.

... Form is quality, suchness,--red, for example ... The peculiar suchness
of the feeling, wherein is that? It is wholly in itself. The quality or
form is whatever it is in itself, irrespective of anything else. No
embodiment of it in this or that object or feeling in any degree modifies
the suchness. It is something positive in itself. ... The suchness does not
exist, but it is something definite. Neither does it consist in being
represented. The being represented is one thing; the being represented such
as red is represented, is another definite thing. It is general. It is an
element of existing things; but it is not and has nothing to do with the
element of existence. The suchness of *red *is such as it is in its own
suchness, and in nothing else.

*Matter*, that something which is the subject of a fact, is, in every
respect the contrary of form, except that both are elements of the world
that are independent of how they are represented to be. Form is not an
existent. Matter is precisely that which exists. (Remember, that whether
corporeal, or physical matter is, or is not, the only matter is beyond my
present scope.) Form is definite. Whatever *red *is, it is of its very
essence, and is nothing else. Matter is an element of something definite.
But it is in itself, as the subject of that determination, vague ... Form,
as we have seen, is all that it is in itself. Matter being the subject of
fact, and being nothing but the subject of a fact, is all that it is in
reference to something else than itself ... (293-294)


The next paragraph includes what I quoted previously (294-295), and then
comes the following.

This *Entelechy*, the third element which it is requisite to acknowledge
besides Matter and Form, is that which brings things together. It is the
element which is prominent in such ideas as Plan, Cause, and Law. The
philosopher who recognizes only Form, will do best to insist that Form
fulfills this uniting function by virtue of its generality. But it is not
so; since Form remains entirely within its own self. (295-296)


Hence in this *particular *manuscript, it is clear that Form is 1ns, Matter
is 2ns, and Entelechy is 3ns.  Similarly, in EP 2:304 (1904), Peirce stated
the following.

But so far as the "Truth" is merely the *object *of a sign, it is merely
the Aristotelian *Matter *of it that is so. In addition however to *denoting
*objects, every sign sufficiently complete *signifies characters*, or
qualities ... Every sign signifies the "Truth." But it is only the
Aristotelian *Form *of the universe that it signifies ... What we call a
"fact" is something having the structure of a proposition, but supposed to
be an element of the very universe itself. The purpose of every sign is to
express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly
as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect
Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this
language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of
perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may
adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should
be quite perfect, and so identical,—in such identity as a sign may
have,—with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by
it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact,
will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The
"Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate
interpretant of every sign.


Here it is equally clear that Aristotelian *Form *corresponds to the
*characters
*(1ns) that a Sign *signifies*, Aristotelian *Matter *corresponds to the
*object *(2ns) that a Sign *denotes*, and Aristotelian *Entelechy *corresponds
to the *unity *of these (3ns) that a Sign *expresses*.

Of course, whether or how these two texts have bearing on our
interpretation of Peirce's *other *writings is another question.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 3:05 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list
>
> My view of Peirce's Form and Matter is quite different from that of JAS. I
> refer you to Vol 6, 354-364, which has an extensive outline of different
> types of form. Indeed, he associates Form with 'forma corpus' and 'morphe'
> {Note: I am transliterating from the Greek]. Whereas, he associates
> Firstness with chance, quality, vagueness - none of which have spatial
> extension or a 'body' [corpus/morphe].
>
> I don't 

: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list

My view of Peirce's Form and Matter is quite different from that of
JAS. I refer you to Vol 6, 354-364, which has an extensive outline of
different types of form. Indeed, he associates Form with 'forma
corpus' and 'morphe' {Note: I am transliterating from the Greek].
Whereas, he associates Firstness with chance, quality, vagueness -
none of which have spatial extension or a 'body' [corpus/morphe]. 

I don't see how one can assign only ONE category to matter - whether
that one category be 1stness or 2ndness or 3rdness.. The point of
anything in 'thisness',[haecceity]  is that it is made up of three
categories. 

Therefore, something discrete and individual, would be made up of a
mode of 'potentiality' [1stness]; as well as 'thisness' [haecceity;
2ndness] as well as habits and even 'esse in futuro' 2.148 of these
habits continuing on [3rdness] 

Edwina
 On Mon 12/02/18  3:22 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Dear All, I wonder why Peirce associated the categories like that.
To me it rather seems like matter would be 1ns, form 2ns, and
entelechy 3ns. That is because I cannot see more than one mode in
matter, but 2 in form: Reason for it, and aim (telos) of it.
Aristotle said, that form consists of energy and entelechy, so two
parts (modes?). 2.1. might be said like: material reason of the form,
or the form´s sustenance by matter, potential energies keeping the
form together, and 2.2. the form of the form, or the form´s formal
reason, which is it´s aim. Also, I see "quality" rather associated
with matter than with form. As the form of a thing is more likely to
change due to circumstances than its matter is, I see "actuality"
rather suiting with "form" than with "matter". Does "entelechy"
contain "telos"? Does it mean quite the similar?  Best, Helmut  12.
Februar 2018 um 18:42 Uhr
  "Ben Novak" 

 wrote:  Dear All:   A quarter of a century ago (December 1993),
several of the subjects of this discussion thread (either explicit,
implied, or merely mentioned) were rather eloquently addressed in an
article in First Things, "Discovering the American Aristotle," by
Edward T. Oakes:  
https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-aristotle
[1]   Ben Novak 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702 Mobile: (814) 424-8501   
 "All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the
arts themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last
bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored
canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—because the last eye and the
last ear accessible to their message will have gone." Oswald Spengler 
   On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen
C. Rose  wrote:  Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the
rather over the top dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own
work maintained initially that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for
the ethical problems of our first two millennia and I laid that at the
feet of his reliance on virtues which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle
reads almost modern and cannot be superseded by Peirce unless others
see his work as seismic in the same sense that A's work became seen.
I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a marvelous antidote to
virtues ethics. S   amazon.com/author/stephenrose [3]
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
List:   As the chief culprit for the recent glut of
messages--apparently I was the sender of more than one-third of the
200+ over the first 11 days of February--I offer my sincere apology,
and my promise to try to temper my enthusiasm for the current
discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as the saying goes) in
responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me directly off-List
if you think that I am getting out of hand again.   I am replying in
this thread only because I believe that the following excerpt
provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.CSP:  Aristotle held
that Matter and Form were the only elements of experience. But he had
an obscure conception of what he calls entelechy, which I take to be a
groping for the recognition of a third element which I find clearly in
experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the three. It was
this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so far as he
is a nominalist, and he may, I think, be described as a nominalist
with vague intimations of realism , endeavors to express the universe
in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if, as I
hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then
there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which
recognizes Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone,
that which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of
nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Awbrey]

On a related note ...

That Aristotling Town
=

The man’s reputation for dualing exceeds him.
It’s a mode more the eyebeam of the beholden.
Western wayfarers will claim him their founder,
But they founder on the way his meta*physick
Straddles the narrow straits of their harbor.

Jon Awbrey
30 Oct 2012

https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/11/01/that-aristotling-town/

--

inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Dear All,

I wonder why Peirce associated the categories like that. To me it rather seems like matter would be 1ns, form 2ns, and entelechy 3ns. That is because I cannot see more than one mode in matter, but 2 in form: Reason for it, and aim (telos) of it. Aristotle said, that form consists of energy and entelechy, so two parts (modes?). 2.1. might be said like: material reason of the form, or the form´s sustenance by matter, potential energies keeping the form together, and 2.2. the form of the form, or the form´s formal reason, which is it´s aim.

Also, I see "quality" rather associated with matter than with form. As the form of a thing is more likely to change due to circumstances than its matter is, I see "actuality" rather suiting with "form" than with "matter".

Does "entelechy" contain "telos"? Does it mean quite the similar?


Best,

Helmut


12. Februar 2018 um 18:42 Uhr
 "Ben Novak" 
wrote:


Dear All:
 

A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of this discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were rather eloquently addressed in an article in First Things, "Discovering the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:

 

https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-aristotle


 









 
Ben Novak

5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142

Telephone: (814) 808-5702

Mobile: (814) 424-8501




"All art is mortal, not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts themselves. One day the last portrait of Rembrandt and the last bar of Mozart will have ceased to be—though possibly a colored canvas and a sheet of notes may remain—because the last eye and the last ear accessible to their message will have gone." Oswald Spengler

 

 

 

 

 

 

 












 

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:


Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S

 








amazon.com/author/stephenrose








 



On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:





List:

 

As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.

 

I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.

 


CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls entelechy, which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so far as he is a nominalist, and he may, I think, be described as a nominalist with vague intimations of realism, endeavors to express the universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if, as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c. 1903?, emphasis added)


 

This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns (that which brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 
On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



As regards the 200 emails,



It is obvious why we don’t appreciate that.

It is not so obvious that we appreciate *Gorgias* and Peirce’s sense of
humor for a similar reason.



On the topic of Discovering the American Aristotle, Peirce also said *of it*,
remember:



Aristotle was not much of a Greek.

That he was not altogether a Greek-minded man is manifest.



..like the Aristotelianism which is this gentleman's particular *bête noire*,


it will be as Shakespeare said (*of it*, remember):



"Not harsh and crabbed, as dull fools suppose,

But musical as is Apollo's lute,” etc*.*



For philosophic readers he would do almost more than enough by drawing
their attention to the fact that he did not object to telling lies which
were noble, or tales which were merely similar to truth.



For the burden of proof rests with the censor.



..he must show that certain literary deficiencies of the work are not due
to chance, but that the author used a given ambiguous expression
deliberately, or that he constructed a certain sentence badly on purpose.



To argue this, however, is to presuppose that the esoteric writer had a
phenomenal control over his text; indeed, it is to presuppose that his text
is constructed like a living animal, in which each and every part, no
matter how accidental it seems, functions to create the overall meaning.



I do not doubt that you are wiser than I; but it is always my custom to pay
attention when anyone is speaking, especially when the speaker seems to me
to be wise; and because I desire to learn what he means..



Ἰδέα is here used in its Platonic sense, as a synonym for εἶδος,
class-form, to denote the permanent immaterial reality that underlies any
group of things classed together in virtue of possessing a common quality.
An ἰδέα is perceptible only by the mind, but the word does not denote the
content of a mental perception, as does the derivative 'idea' in ordinary
English.



With best wishes,
Jerry R


On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 11:51 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Excellent piece. And excellent quote which I think I had better paste in.
> I created the triad Reality Ethics Aesthetics as a suggested post-Peirce
> basis for philosophy. It fits in with previous quotes in this thread and
> explicitly so with the following:
> “Esthetics and logic seem at first blush to belong to different universes
> . . . . [But] that seeming is illusory; on the contrary, logic needs the
> help of esthetics.” Just as it needs the help of ethics: “Logical goodness
> and badness, which we shall find is simply the distinction of *Truth *and
> *Falsity*in general, amounts in the last analysis to nothing but a
> peculiar application of the more general distinction of Moral Goodness and
> Badness, or Righteousness and Wickedness.” Peirce does not mean to equate
> these three realms, of course, for that would lead to the conclusion that
> every fallacy is a sin, which is absurd. But he does insist, in a manner
> reminiscent of Cardinal Newman, that “good morals and good reasoning are
> closely allied.”
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:42 PM, Ben Novak  wrote:
>
>> Dear All:
>>
>> A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of
>> this discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were
>> rather eloquently addressed in an article in *First Things*,
>> "Discovering the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:
>>
>> https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-
>> the-american-aristotle
>>
>>
>> *Ben Novak*
>> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
>> 
>> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
>> Mobile: (814) 424-8501
>>
>> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
>> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
>> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and
>> a sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
>> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
>>> dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
>>> that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
>>> first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
>>> which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
>>> superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
>>> sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
>>> marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S
>>>
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>
>>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 List:

 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Excellent piece. And excellent quote which I think I had better paste in. I
created the triad Reality Ethics Aesthetics as a suggested post-Peirce
basis for philosophy. It fits in with previous quotes in this thread and
explicitly so with the following:
“Esthetics and logic seem at first blush to belong to different universes .
. . . [But] that seeming is illusory; on the contrary, logic needs the help
of esthetics.” Just as it needs the help of ethics: “Logical goodness and
badness, which we shall find is simply the distinction of *Truth *and
*Falsity*in general, amounts in the last analysis to nothing but a peculiar
application of the more general distinction of Moral Goodness and Badness,
or Righteousness and Wickedness.” Peirce does not mean to equate these
three realms, of course, for that would lead to the conclusion that every
fallacy is a sin, which is absurd. But he does insist, in a manner
reminiscent of Cardinal Newman, that “good morals and good reasoning are
closely allied.”

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:42 PM, Ben Novak  wrote:

> Dear All:
>
> A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of
> this discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were
> rather eloquently addressed in an article in *First Things*, "Discovering
> the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:
>
> https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-
> aristotle
>
>
> *Ben Novak*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> 
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
> Mobile: (814) 424-8501
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
>> dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
>> that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
>> first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
>> which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
>> superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
>> sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
>> marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> List:
>>>
>>> As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was
>>> the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
>>> February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
>>> enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
>>> the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
>>> directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.
>>>
>>> I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
>>> excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
>>> Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.
>>>
>>> CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
>>> experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls
>>> *entelechy*, which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a
>>> third element which I find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the
>>> most overt of the three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it
>>> ... Aristotle, so far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be
>>> described as a nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors
>>> to express the universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be
>>> remarked that if, as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and
>>> Entelechy, then there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that
>>> which recognizes Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone,
>>> that which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of
>>> nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which
>>> recognizes Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent
>>> Hegelianism would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these
>>>  last three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true
>>> philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c.
>>> 1903?, emphasis added)
>>>
>>>
>>> This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other
>>> recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or
>>> suchness), 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Ben Novak]

Dear All:

A quarter of a century ago (December 1993), several of the subjects of this
discussion thread (either explicit, implied, or merely mentioned) were
rather eloquently addressed in an article in *First Things*, "Discovering
the American Aristotle," by Edward T. Oakes:

https://www.firstthings.com/article/1993/12/003-discovering-the-american-aristotle


*Ben Novak*
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702
Mobile: (814) 424-8501

*"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of
Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:24 PM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
> dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
> that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
> first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
> which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
> superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
> sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
> marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> List:
>>
>> As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was
>> the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
>> February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
>> enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
>> the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
>> directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.
>>
>> I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
>> excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
>> Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.
>>
>> CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
>> experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls *entelechy*,
>> which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I
>> find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the
>> three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so
>> far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be described as a
>> nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors to express the
>> universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if,
>> as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then
>> there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes
>> Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which
>> recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that
>> which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes
>> Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism
>> would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last
>> three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true
>> philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c.
>> 1903?, emphasis added)
>>
>>
>> This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other
>> recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or
>> suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns
>> (that which brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
>> wrote:
>>
>>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>>> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
>>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
>>> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
>>> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
>>> evolutionism.
>>>
>>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>>
>>>
>>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what
>>> did Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an
>>> old book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist
>>> or nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>>
>>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>>
>>
>>
>> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Thanks Jon. That is a direct confirmation of the rather over the top
dispatch of Aristotle in the quote I sent. My own work maintained initially
that Aristotle's ethics were responsible for the ethical problems of our
first two millennia and I laid that at the feet of his reliance on virtues
which is indisputable. OTH Aristotle reads almost modern and cannot be
superseded by Peirce unless others see his work as seismic in the same
sense that A's work became seen. I see Shakespeare as a pre-Percean and a
marvelous antidote to virtues ethics. S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 12:00 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> List:
>
> As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was the
> sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
> February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
> enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
> the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
> directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.
>
> I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
> excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
> Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.
>
> CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
> experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls *entelechy*,
> which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I
> find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the
> three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so
> far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be described as a
> nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors to express the
> universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if,
> as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then
> there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes
> Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which
> recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that
> which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes
> Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism
> would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last
> three being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true
> philosophy which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c.
> 1903?, emphasis added)
>
>
> This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other
> recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or
> suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns
> (that which brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
>> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
>> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
>> evolutionism.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>>
>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
>> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
>> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
>> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Mike Bergman]

  
  
Hi Jon,
Excellent quote; thanks, Jon. I had not seen (recalled?) it
before, and it offers another example of Peirce's universal
categories, plus is the clearest statement I have seen yet of
Peirce's definition of nominalism v realism.
Mike


On 2/12/2018 11:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt
  wrote:


  
List:


As
  the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently
  I was the sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the
  first 11 days of February--I offer my sincere apology, and my
  promise to try to temper my enthusiasm for the current
  discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as the saying
  goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
  directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand
  again.


I
  am replying in this thread only because I believe that the
  following excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s
  question about whether Peirce classified Aristotle as a
  nominalist.



  CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were
the only elements of experience. But he had an obscure
conception of what he calls entelechy, which I take to be
a groping for the recognition of a third element which I
find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most
overt of the three. It was this that caused Aristotle to
overlook it ... Aristotle, so far as he is a nominalist, and
  he may, I think, be described as a nominalist with vague
  intimations of realism, endeavors to express the
universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be
remarked that if, as I hold, there are three categories,
Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then there will naturally be
seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes Form
alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that
which recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds
of nominalism); that which recognizes Matter and Entelechy
alone; that which recognizes Entelechy alone (which seems to
me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism would be); that
which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last three being the kinds
of imperfect realism); and finally the true philosophy which
recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c.
1903?, emphasis added)



This
  is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in
  other recent threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with
  1ns (quality or suchness), Matter with 2ns (the subject of a
  fact), and Entelechy with 3ns (that which brings together
  Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).


Regards,

  

  

  
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher,
  Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
  

  

  
  
  On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM,
Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

  
173. But fallibilism cannot be
  appreciated in anything like its true significancy
  until evolution has been considered. This is what the
  world has been most thinking of for the last forty
  years -- though old enough is the general idea itself.
  Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world for
  so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes
  over the thoughts of butchers and bakers that never
  heard of him -- is but a metaphysical evolutionism.
Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††


Interesting. Has anyone done a
  study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did Peirce's
  alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found
  in an old book I have but it is also in CP. Did
  classify Aristotle as a dualist or nominalist? Or more
  narrowly as here?  


  

  

  

  

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 List:

As the chief culprit for the recent glut of messages--apparently I was the
sender of more than one-third of the 200+ over the first 11 days of
February--I offer my sincere apology, and my promise to try to temper my
enthusiasm for the current discussion topics, or at least "pace myself" (as
the saying goes) in responding.  Please do not hesitate to contact me
directly off-List if you think that I am getting out of hand again.

I am replying in this thread only because I believe that the following
excerpt provides a direct answer to Stephen R.'s question about whether
Peirce classified Aristotle as a nominalist.

CSP:  Aristotle held that Matter and Form were the only elements of
experience. But he had an obscure conception of what he calls *entelechy*,
which I take to be a groping for the recognition of a third element which I
find clearly in experience. Indeed it is by far the most overt of the
three. It was this that caused Aristotle to overlook it ... Aristotle, so
far as he is a nominalist, and* he may, I think, be described as a
nominalist with vague intimations of realism*, endeavors to express the
universe in terms of Matter and Form alone ... It may be remarked that if,
as I hold, there are three categories, Form, Matter, and Entelechy, then
there will naturally be seven schools of philosophy; that which recognizes
Form alone, that which recognizes Form and Matter alone, that which
recognizes Matter alone (these being the three kinds of nominalism); that
which recognizes Matter and Entelechy alone; that which recognizes
Entelechy alone (which seems to me what a perfectly consistent Hegelianism
would be); that which recognizes Entelechy and Form alone (these last three
being the kinds of imperfect realism); and finally the true philosophy
which recognizes Form, Matter, and Entelechy. (NEM 4:294-295; c. 1903?,
emphasis added)


This is part of a lengthy passage where, as I have remarked in other recent
threads, Peirce explicitly associated Form with 1ns (quality or suchness),
Matter with 2ns (the subject of a fact), and Entelechy with 3ns (that which
brings together Matter and Form; i.e., Signs).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 9:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
> evolutionism.
>
> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>
>
> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

Yes, I had that in mind in sending the CP quote and it seems relevant to
recent discussions. Then there is this: "IN an article published in The
Monist for January 1891, I endeavored to show what ideas ought to form the
warp of a system of philosophy, and particularly emphasised that of absolute
chance." Is that an exaggeration? Or is it God's notion of correcting
errors that would otherwise occur? Or?


amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 11:20 AM, Ben Novak  wrote:

> Dear Stephen:
>
> As I have read, Peirce desired nothing more than to accede to the title of
> "Second Aristotle"
>
> From the first paragraph of  first volume of CP:
>
> "[I intend] to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say,
> to outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the
> entire work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in
> mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology,
> and in whatever other departments may be, shall appear as the filling up of
> its details."
> http://paulhague.net/kindred-spirits/peirce/
>
>
>
>
> *Ben Novak*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> 
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
> Mobile: (814) 424-8501
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
> On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
> wrote:
>
>> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
>> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
>> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
>> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
>> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
>> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
>> evolutionism.
>>
>> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>>
>>
>> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
>> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
>> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
>> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>>
>> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce
>> -l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Stephen - Peirce was 'Aristotelian' in issues about Matter and Form;
and the primacy of sensate data in our experience - and the nature of
Reality vs the individual Existence. But - Aristotle's evolution
theory was  - as he points out - metaphysical, in that it has nothing
to do with material or mental interaction, i.e., with semiosics. The
Platonic and Aristotelian theory of evolution was that each species
was 'fixed' and did not adapt/evolve into another species. This of
course fit into the Christian view of Creationism and also, of the
societal view that 'you were born into your class [i.e., as a peasant
vs lord]. 

Aristotle's view was almost a beautiful architecture - all species
had their allotted space and role in this 'great chain of being' from
the simple to the complex. 

The concept that change was within the life-forms rather than a
priori, and self-organized, and developed within individual organisms
- by the random mutations of Darwinism [Note: this randomness is
challenged in modern biology] - went against the stable architecture
of Aristotle.

And of course - this Darwinian-Wallace idea, that change was
natural, was self-organized - crept into the sociopolitical ideology
as well...and the old static, stable class hierarchy began to
collapse.

Edwina
 On Mon 12/02/18 10:22 AM , "Stephen C. Rose" stever...@gmail.com
sent:
173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the
world has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though
old enough is the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that
dominated the world for so many ages and still in great measure
tyrannizes over the thoughts of butchers and bakers that never heard
of him -- is but a metaphysical evolutionism.  

Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In
what did Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I
found in an old book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify
Aristotle as a dualist or nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?   
amazon.com/author/stephenrose [1]


Links:
--
[1] http://amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Ben Novak]

Dear Stephen:

As I have read, Peirce desired nothing more than to accede to the title of
"Second Aristotle"

From the first paragraph of  first volume of CP:

"[I intend] to make a philosophy like that of Aristotle, that is to say, to
outline a theory so comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire
work of human reason, in philosophy of every school and kind, in
mathematics, in psychology, in physical science, in history, in sociology,
and in whatever other departments may be, shall appear as the filling up of
its details."
http://paulhague.net/kindred-spirits/peirce/




*Ben Novak*
5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
Telephone: (814) 808-5702
Mobile: (814) 424-8501

*"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar of
Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler

On Mon, Feb 12, 2018 at 10:22 AM, Stephen C. Rose 
wrote:

> 173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
> significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
> has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
> the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
> for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
> butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
> evolutionism.
>
> Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††
>
>
> Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
> Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
> book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
> nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?
>
> amazon.com/author/stephenrose
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm
> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Aristotle and Peirce

[Stephen C. Rose]

173. But fallibilism cannot be appreciated in anything like its true
significancy until evolution has been considered. This is what the world
has been most thinking of for the last forty years -- though old enough is
the general idea itself. Aristotle's philosophy, that dominated the world
for so many ages and still in great measure tyrannizes over the thoughts of
butchers and bakers that never heard of him -- is but a metaphysical
evolutionism.

Peirce: CP 1.174 Cross-Ref:††


Interesting. Has anyone done a study of Peirce and Aristotle. In what did
Peirce's alleged tyranny consist?  This is in something I found in an old
book I have but it is also in CP. Did classify Aristotle as a dualist or
nominalist? Or more narrowly as here?

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

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to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .