Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[kirstima]

John,

For the first time, there seems to be a deep disagreement of views. 
Resorting to Quine cannot be taken as any starter.


Existence means something very different to Quine than to CSP. Which I 
have taken to be one of the points in your most valuable mails. I must 
say I feel confused.


Lets rather take Aristotle as a starting point. We all know Peirce took 
Aristotle as his starting point, developed those ideas in his work. Into 
something new.


True, the logic Quine presents takes up the existential quantifier: 
there is one (or some) (this or that). Thus he (amongst others), but he 
takes it (amogst others) as a single fact (true or untrue as such). 
Then, in addition, there are propositions (understood as sentences, a 
major fault), which claim: "All x "(etc), or "no x" (etc).


Seems ok, but te the true fact is that no fact stands alone. No 
individual stands alone, about possibilities we do not know. Will they 
remain open? - We do not know.


Aristotle bended into thinking tha all possibilities will be actualized 
sometime. - There is no way any of us can explore and decide for certain 
whether this is true OR not. - The end of time was not decided, or even 
taken up by Aristotle.


What is real in Peircean way of thougt lies in the future. As it 
unfolds, in everyday life as well as in experiments.


One steam engine proves the possibility of steam engines. No need for 
two. That would be twice. Which, of cource is needed. - Two and twice 
are not logically identical. The first is about cardinal numbersystem, 
the second about ordinal numbersystem.


Very few mathematicians, since Peirce, have given serious thought on 
this basic issue.


Kirsti










John F Sowa kirjoitti 18.10.2017 19:06:

Kirsti and Gary R,

If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since
Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either
(a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely.

Kirsti,

Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
become actual.


In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues:  'real',
'exist', and 'actual'.  To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's
dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."

(And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'.  I wrote 'Kirsti'
in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many letters.)


But claiming existence to possibilities just does not hold.


In Peirce's article of 1885, he introduced the algebraic notation
for predicate calculus.  For "first intentions", he used quantified
variables to range over individuals.  For "second intentions", he
used quantified variables to range over relations among individuals.

Every possibility or general that we talk about in ordinary language
can be represented by a relation in logic.

For first intentions, the domain may be the physical world or the
domain of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and
geometrical shapes.

For second intentions, the domain is relations, which may represent
generals of any kind.  Those generals include possibilities, among
which are sign types.

If we restrict the word 'actual' to physical, Generals and possibles
aren't actual, but they exist in a domain of second intentions.

For example, let's consider a relation TallerThan.  As a general,
it doesn't exist in the first-intentional world of actual entities.
But there could be a particular instance TallerThan(Bob,Bill)
which does exist in the physical world.

However, we could use second-intentional logic to say that the
relation ShorterThan is the inverse of the relation TallerThan.
We can use quantified variables to refer to those relations
in the domain of second intentions.

Gary (quoting excerpts from CP 5.503)

[Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists
are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that
all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic
realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist."
[But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that
time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so opine.


In the excerpt that precedes that quotation, Peirce wrote about
what "many a logician" would consider:

reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so
is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the
environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two
meanings, he would say, are clearly not the same.


Since Peirce was talking about logicians, he would expect them to use
logic to represent both reality and existence.  But the domains would
be different.  Logic about physical existence is first intentional;
it refers to things that react with the environment. Logic about
reality is second intentional; it has a "cognitionary character"
that does not react with the environment.  But both first intentional
logic and second intentional logic use quantified variables.

Summary:  For actual 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Oct 18, 2017, at 11:06 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Kirsti,
>> Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
>> become actual. 
> 
> In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues:  'real',
> 'exist', and 'actual'.  To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's
> dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."

To analyze the issues (raised by John), I suggest that Quine’s dictum is a red 
herring

“To be is to be the value of a quantified variable” .
In that sentence, four words raise debatable issues:
“to be”, “value”, “quantified” and “variable”.

I suggest that John’s reliance on Quine’s sentence to relate metaphysical terms 
is highly problematic.
The sentence is merely a rhetoric trick to divert the reader’s attention from 
the distinction between logical propositions (inferred from the terms 
“quantified” and “variable” (also mathematica propositions!) and individual 
meanings of terms in constructing propositions in languages and metalanguages.  

Consider the word “Love” for example.  Or, almost any human feeling. 

Of course, Quine’s sentence also effectively excludes the logics of molecular 
biology and medicine. which require recursive compositions of terms to operate 
in multiple metalanguages. 

Cheers

Jerry


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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}John, thanks for a great post. I think that we don't pay enough
attention to relations.

Edwina
 On Wed 18/10/17 12:06 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 Kirsti and Gary R, 
 If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since 
 Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either 
 (a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely. 
 Kirsti, 
 > Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they 
 > become actual.  
 In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues:  'real', 
 'exist', and 'actual'.  To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's 
 dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable." 
 (And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'.  I wrote
'Kirsti' 
 in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many
letters.) 
 > But claiming existence to possibilities just does not hold.  
 In Peirce's article of 1885, he introduced the algebraic notation 
 for predicate calculus.  For "first intentions", he used quantified 
 variables to range over individuals.  For "second intentions", he 
 used quantified variables to range over relations among individuals.

 Every possibility or general that we talk about in ordinary language

 can be represented by a relation in logic. 
 For first intentions, the domain may be the physical world or the 
 domain of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and 
 geometrical shapes. 
 For second intentions, the domain is relations, which may represent 
 generals of any kind.  Those generals include possibilities, among 
 which are sign types. 
 If we restrict the word 'actual' to physical, Generals and possibles

 aren't actual, but they exist in a domain of second intentions. 
 For example, let's consider a relation TallerThan.  As a general, 
 it doesn't exist in the first-intentional world of actual entities. 
 But there could be a particular instance TallerThan(Bob,Bill) 
 which does exist in the physical world. 
 However, we could use second-intentional logic to say that the 
 relation ShorterThan is the inverse of the relation TallerThan. 
 We can use quantified variables to refer to those relations 
 in the domain of second intentions. 
 Gary (quoting excerpts from CP 5.503) 
 > [Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists 
 > are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that 
 > all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic 
 > realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist." 
 > [But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that 
 > time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so
opine. 
 In the excerpt that precedes that quotation, Peirce wrote about 
 what "many a logician" would consider: 
 > reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and
so 
 > is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with
the 
 > environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the
two 
 > meanings, he would say, are clearly not the same. 
 Since Peirce was talking about logicians, he would expect them to
use 
 logic to represent both reality and existence.  But the domains
would 
 be different.  Logic about physical existence is first intentional; 
 it refers to things that react with the environment. Logic about 
 reality is second intentional; it has a "cognitionary character" 
 that does not react with the environment.  But both first
intentional 
 logic and second intentional logic use quantified variables. 
 Summary:  For actual things that interact with the environment, 
 Peirce used first-intentional logic.  For relations that represent 
 generals and possibilities, he used second intentional logic, 
 which may refer to anything that has a "cognitionary character" 
 in thought.  By Quine's dictum, the verb 'be' may be use to 
 talk about either domain. 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[John F Sowa]

Kirsti and Gary R,

If a debate doesn't converge, the traditional solution (since
Socrates) is to find which words are causing confusion and either
(a) avoid using them or (b) define them more precisely.

Kirsti,

Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist until they
become actual. 


In that sentence, three words raise debatable issues:  'real',
'exist', and 'actual'.  To analyze the issues, I suggested Quine's
dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."

(And by the way, I apologize for typing 'Kirstima'.  I wrote 'Kirsti'
in my previous notes. I blame my fingers for typing too many letters.)

But claiming existence to possibilities just does not hold. 


In Peirce's article of 1885, he introduced the algebraic notation
for predicate calculus.  For "first intentions", he used quantified
variables to range over individuals.  For "second intentions", he
used quantified variables to range over relations among individuals.

Every possibility or general that we talk about in ordinary language
can be represented by a relation in logic.

For first intentions, the domain may be the physical world or the
domain of mathematical entities, such as numbers, sets, and
geometrical shapes.

For second intentions, the domain is relations, which may represent
generals of any kind.  Those generals include possibilities, among
which are sign types.

If we restrict the word 'actual' to physical, Generals and possibles
aren't actual, but they exist in a domain of second intentions.

For example, let's consider a relation TallerThan.  As a general,
it doesn't exist in the first-intentional world of actual entities.
But there could be a particular instance TallerThan(Bob,Bill)
which does exist in the physical world.

However, we could use second-intentional logic to say that the
relation ShorterThan is the inverse of the relation TallerThan.
We can use quantified variables to refer to those relations
in the domain of second intentions.

Gary (quoting excerpts from CP 5.503)

[Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists
are apt to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that
all other men are individualists, too -- even the scholastic
realists, who, they suppose, thought that "universals exist."
[But] can any such person believe that the great doctors of that
time believed that generals exist? They certainly did not so opine.


In the excerpt that precedes that quotation, Peirce wrote about
what "many a logician" would consider:

reality means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so
is a cognitionary character, while existence means reaction with the
environment, and so is a dynamic character; and accordingly the two
meanings, he would say, are clearly not the same.


Since Peirce was talking about logicians, he would expect them to use
logic to represent both reality and existence.  But the domains would
be different.  Logic about physical existence is first intentional;
it refers to things that react with the environment. Logic about
reality is second intentional; it has a "cognitionary character"
that does not react with the environment.  But both first intentional
logic and second intentional logic use quantified variables.

Summary:  For actual things that interact with the environment,
Peirce used first-intentional logic.  For relations that represent
generals and possibilities, he used second intentional logic,
which may refer to anything that has a "cognitionary character"
in thought.  By Quine's dictum, the verb 'be' may be use to
talk about either domain.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[kirstima]

John,

Possibilities may be real, but they do not exist untill they become 
actual. Thus a token.


There always is the Scylla and Charybnis between understandability and 
logic. But claiming existance to possibilities just does not hold.


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 17.10.2017 05:48:

This thread is getting hung up on words.  I recommend Peirce's
advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow
from any options that anyone is debating.

Let's consider the two  words 'real' and 'existence'.

Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his
dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."

Consider the following sentence from a recent note:

I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential,
but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal
nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or 
habits.


My recommendation is to translate that sentence (or any other sentence
that is under consideration) to logic (pick whichever version you
like).  That process of translation is a purposive action.

Then look at which words in that sentence get mapped to quantified
variables.  Each of them refers to something that the speaker would
be committed to say exists.

By that test, many sentences that talk about possibilities and
generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables.
Therefore, they refer to something that exists.  But that existence
might not be in the physical world.  However, Peirce talked about
"real possibilities".  So they might exist in some possible realm.

Next problem:  Do signs exist?  In the real world or in some
realm of possibilities?

To answer that question, I'd look at Peirce's simplest triad:
Mark, Token, Type.

To analyze that triad, I would use the sentence "Every mark is
something perceptible that is classified as a token by some type."

By Quine's dictum, a translation of that sentence to logic would
assign quantified variables to 'mark', 'token', and 'type'.

Therefore, all three refer to something that exists.  Mark and
token refer to something perceptible.   Therefore, they exist
in the physical world.  But type would refer to a possibility.
Therefore, it exists in some realm of possibilities.

I don't know whether the people who used those sentences would
agree with me.  But unless I hear some very persuasive arguments,
I'll assume the above answers.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Gary Richmond]

John, list,

The snippet you quoted from this recent discussion of "existence" and
"reality" wasn't mine, so I'll confine myself to your conclusion. You wrote:


. . . many sentences that talk about possibilities and
generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables.
Therefore, they refer to something that exists.  But that existence
might not be in the physical world.  However, Peirce talked about
"real possibilities".  So they might exist in some possible realm.

Next problem:  Do signs exist?  In the real world or in some
realm of possibilities?

To analyze that triad, I would use the sentence "Every mark is
something perceptible that is classified as a token by some type."

By Quine's dictum, a translation of that sentence to logic would
assign quantified variables to 'mark', 'token', and 'type'.

Therefore, all three refer to something that exists.  Mark and
token refer to something perceptible.   Therefore, they exist
in the physical world.  But type would refer to a possibility.
Therefore, it exists in some realm of possibilities.

I don't know whether the people who used those sentences would
agree with me.  But unless I hear some very persuasive arguments,
I'll assume the above answers.


Mapping possibilities and generals (laws and habits) to "quantified
variables" may be fine for critical logic (logic as logic, as Peirce
sometimes puts it), but I don't think it's what he had in mind in positing
"may-bes" and "would-bes."

To say that "real possibilities" "*exist *in some realm of possibility"
erases the clear distinction which Peirce makes between existence and
reality in any number of places, one of which I recently quoted from in
this thread:

 [Reality and existence] are clearly not the same. Individualists are apt
to fall into the almost incredible misunderstanding that all other men are
individualists, too -- even the scholastic realists, who, they suppose,
thought that "universals exist." [But] can any such person believe that the
great doctors of that time believed that generals *exist*? They certainly
did not so opine (CP 5.503).


Peirce clearly and often states that 'generals' do *not exist**, that **law*
== lawfulness (3ns) is *not* the same as *force* == a law acting in some
existential situation or state of affairs (2ns).

Similarly, when Peirce speaks of "real possibilities" he is not confining
himself to the domain of speculative grammar in consideration of the mark
token, type distinction. There is no existential 'mark' (as would, granted,
appear in a sentence logically analyzed) in a real possibility seen as a
*may-be* (1ns). The same holds for a *would-be* (3ns), for both require a
future unfolding of their possibility or necessity: they *may *come to
exist *in futuro* as Peirce often phrases it.

Consider any *would-be*. This is described by Peirce as something that
would *necessarily* come to be *if *such and such conditions for its
happening were to eventually come about. In the biological realm, for
example, an evolutionary structural change in an organism might occur were
certain highly complex conditions (internal and external) to effectively
come into being. I am fairly certain that Peirce would not call such a
'would-be' an existence--even though it *may* come to exist *in futuro
(*and even
if it might possibly--although I have my doubts--be "mapped to quantified
variables")

Such a strictly logical slight of hand seems to me to attempt to do away
with the important distinction which Peirce repeatedly makes between
existence and reality, so I don't buy it.

Best,

Gary R
.

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 10:48 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> This thread is getting hung up on words.  I recommend Peirce's
> advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow
> from any options that anyone is debating.
>
> Let's consider the two  words 'real' and 'existence'.
>
> Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his
> dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."
>
> Consider the following sentence from a recent note:
>
>> I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential,
>> but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal
>> nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or habits.
>>
>
> My recommendation is to translate that sentence (or any other sentence
> that is under consideration) to logic (pick whichever version you
> like).  That process of translation is a purposive action.
>
> Then look at which words in that sentence get mapped to quantified
> variables.  Each of them refers to something that the speaker would
> be committed to say exists.
>
> By that test, many sentences that talk about possibilities and
> generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables.
> 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Helmut Raulien]

ve been over your rejection of the Sign as a triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant and your confining of the term 'Sign' to refer only to the mediate Representamen. Again, read 4.551 to its end.

There is no positive point in continuing this discussion since it's been done to exhaustion before.

Edwina 

On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:




Edwina, List:
 

I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some following along now who were not on the List back then.

 

Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former.  Everything that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may never be) actualized.

 

Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular.  If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals.

 

Regards,

 

Jon






 




 

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.

You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a mode of Thirdness.

But you know all of that anyway.

Edwina 

On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:




Edwina, List:
 

I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.

 

I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time."  On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general.

 

Regards,
 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


Gary, list:

I presume you are being sarcastic.

 I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently,  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.

So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.

Edwina

On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:



Edwina, List,  

 

It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.  

 

As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard 


Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview




Jeff, list

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 'reality

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[John F Sowa]

On 10/17/2017 8:31 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

I would rather see as Mark Type Token, using Type as mediation...


I agree that the type is the mediator, but changing the order would
conflict with the names Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.  It's
better to draw them in a triangle with Type at the top.

Major advantage of triangles:  They are ideal for a kind of
"diagrammatic reasoning" in which the triangles can be linked
in various combinations.


Thirdness only functions within a triad... Its 'purposive action'
is to organize, mediate, confine etc... the individualities of the
Mark and Token operating in modes of Firstness and Secondness. 


I agree.

John

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 John - yes, I agree that we are getting hung up on words,  - I have
some thoughts on why - but won't go into them.

With regard to the Mark Token Type - which I would rather see as
Mark Type Token, using Type as mediation...

My point is that the Type - when in a mode of Thirdness; i.e, acting
as a General, does not function outside of this triad. It doesn't have
any 'per se' isolate existentiality - even if we define that nature as
'reality'. My understanding of Peirce is that Thirdness only functions
within a triad and thus, linked with correlates operating in the other
modal categories. Its 'purposive action' is to organize, mediate,
confine etc...the individualities of the Mark and Token operating in
modes of Firstness and Secondness. 

Edwina
 On Mon 16/10/17 10:48 PM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:
 This thread is getting hung up on words.  I recommend Peirce's 
 advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow 
 from any options that anyone is debating. 
 Let's consider the two  words 'real' and 'existence'. 
 Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his 
 dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable." 
 Consider the following sentence from a recent note: 
 > I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential,

 > but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal 
 > nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or
habits. 
 My recommendation is to translate that sentence (or any other
sentence 
 that is under consideration) to logic (pick whichever version you 
 like).  That process of translation is a purposive action. 
 Then look at which words in that sentence get mapped to quantified 
 variables.  Each of them refers to something that the speaker would 
 be committed to say exists. 
 By that test, many sentences that talk about possibilities and 
 generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified
variables. 
 Therefore, they refer to something that exists.  But that existence 
 might not be in the physical world.  However, Peirce talked about 
 "real possibilities".  So they might exist in some possible realm. 
 Next problem:  Do signs exist?  In the real world or in some 
 realm of possibilities? 
 To answer that question, I'd look at Peirce's simplest triad: 
 Mark, Token, Type. 
 To analyze that triad, I would use the sentence "Every mark is 
 something perceptible that is classified as a token by some type." 
 By Quine's dictum, a translation of that sentence to logic would 
 assign quantified variables to 'mark', 'token', and 'type'. 
 Therefore, all three refer to something that exists.  Mark and 
 token refer to something perceptible.   Therefore, they exist 
 in the physical world.  But type would refer to a possibility. 
 Therefore, it exists in some realm of possibilities. 
 I don't know whether the people who used those sentences would 
 agree with me.  But unless I hear some very persuasive arguments, 
 I'll assume the above answers. 
 John 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Jerry Rhee]

John, list:



I agree with you.  And so do others.



"If we find those who are engaged in metaphysical pursuits, unable to come
to an understanding as to the method which they ought to follow; if we find
them, after the most elaborate preparations, invariably brought to a stand
before the goal is reached, and compelled to retrace their steps and strike
into fresh paths, we may then feel quite sure that they are far from having
attained to the certainty of scientific progress and may rather be said to
be merely groping about in the dark.



In these circumstances we shall render an important service to reason if we
succeed in simply indicating the path along which it must travel, in order
to arrive at any results — even if it should be found necessary to abandon
many of those aims which, without reflection, have been proposed for its
attainment."



"For the knowledge which is present when failure of self-restraint occurs
is not what is held to be Knowledge in the true sense, nor is it true
Knowledge which is dragged about by passion, but knowledge derived from
sense-perception."



"By a “Sign” is meant any Ens which is determined by a single Object or set
of Objects called its Originals, all other than the Sign itself, and in its
turn is capable of determining in a Mind something called its Interpretant,
and that in such a way that the Mind is thereby mediately determined to
some mode of conformity to the Original or Set of Originals. This is
particularly intended to define (very imperfectly as yet) a Complete Sign.
But a Complete Sign has or may have Parts which partake of the nature of
their whole; but often in a truncated fashion."



"And on the basis of that you will consider the question whether knowledge
and perception are the same or different, instead of doing as you did a
while ago, using as your basis the ordinary meaning of names and words,
which most people pervert in haphazard ways and thereby cause all sorts of
perplexity in one another."



From CP 5.402 to CP 5.189

one two three..  Object Sign Interpretant



hth,

Jerry Rhee

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 9:48 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> This thread is getting hung up on words.  I recommend Peirce's
> advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow
> from any options that anyone is debating.
>
> Let's consider the two  words 'real' and 'existence'.
>
> Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his
> dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."
>
> Consider the following sentence from a recent note:
>
>> I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential,
>> but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal
>> nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or habits.
>>
>
> My recommendation is to translate that sentence (or any other sentence
> that is under consideration) to logic (pick whichever version you
> like).  That process of translation is a purposive action.
>
> Then look at which words in that sentence get mapped to quantified
> variables.  Each of them refers to something that the speaker would
> be committed to say exists.
>
> By that test, many sentences that talk about possibilities and
> generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables.
> Therefore, they refer to something that exists.  But that existence
> might not be in the physical world.  However, Peirce talked about
> "real possibilities".  So they might exist in some possible realm.
>
> Next problem:  Do signs exist?  In the real world or in some
> realm of possibilities?
>
> To answer that question, I'd look at Peirce's simplest triad:
> Mark, Token, Type.
>
> To analyze that triad, I would use the sentence "Every mark is
> something perceptible that is classified as a token by some type."
>
> By Quine's dictum, a translation of that sentence to logic would
> assign quantified variables to 'mark', 'token', and 'type'.
>
> Therefore, all three refer to something that exists.  Mark and
> token refer to something perceptible.   Therefore, they exist
> in the physical world.  But type would refer to a possibility.
> Therefore, it exists in some realm of possibilities.
>
> I don't know whether the people who used those sentences would
> agree with me.  But unless I hear some very persuasive arguments,
> I'll assume the above answers.
>
> John
>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
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> .
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[John F Sowa]

This thread is getting hung up on words.  I recommend Peirce's
advice to look for the "purposive actions" that would follow
from any options that anyone is debating.

Let's consider the two  words 'real' and 'existence'.

Quine is not one of my favorite philosophers, but I like his
dictum:  "To be is to be the value of a quantified variable."

Consider the following sentence from a recent note:

I don't think that a 'thing' is real in itself, It is existential,
but its attributes, its modal nature, can be real - if that modal
nature includes Thirdness, which is to say, includes generals or habits.


My recommendation is to translate that sentence (or any other sentence
that is under consideration) to logic (pick whichever version you
like).  That process of translation is a purposive action.

Then look at which words in that sentence get mapped to quantified
variables.  Each of them refers to something that the speaker would
be committed to say exists.

By that test, many sentences that talk about possibilities and
generals will cause those words to be mapped to quantified variables.
Therefore, they refer to something that exists.  But that existence
might not be in the physical world.  However, Peirce talked about
"real possibilities".  So they might exist in some possible realm.

Next problem:  Do signs exist?  In the real world or in some
realm of possibilities?

To answer that question, I'd look at Peirce's simplest triad:
Mark, Token, Type.

To analyze that triad, I would use the sentence "Every mark is
something perceptible that is classified as a token by some type."

By Quine's dictum, a translation of that sentence to logic would
assign quantified variables to 'mark', 'token', and 'type'.

Therefore, all three refer to something that exists.  Mark and
token refer to something perceptible.   Therefore, they exist
in the physical world.  But type would refer to a possibility.
Therefore, it exists in some realm of possibilities.

I don't know whether the people who used those sentences would
agree with me.  But unless I hear some very persuasive arguments,
I'll assume the above answers.

John

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Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

in themselves
(not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have
not been (and may never be) actualized. 
 Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not
particular.  If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no
Signs are generals.
 Regards,
 Jon 
 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see
the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.

You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the
triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is
general when in a mode of Thirdness.

But you know all of that anyway. 

Edwina 
 On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how
you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
 I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view
that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and
time."  On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly
general.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5]   
 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary, list:

I presume you are being sarcastic.

 I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted
frequently,  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential'
within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic
particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or
a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have
any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within
Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of
course, by Peirce. 

So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.

Edwina

On Mon 16/10/17  9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, List,  
 It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as
your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus
on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into
Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all
about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll
need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell
2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we
move ahead.  
As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “
Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his
last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and
their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that
context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to
follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of
them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we
now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. 
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard 
 Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

Jeff, list

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551  

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'.  This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium.   

Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate
seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false
nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into
account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your
outline of th

Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Stephen C. Rose]

 subset of the former.  Everything
>>>>> that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is
>>>>> precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their
>>>>> instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may
>>>>> never be) actualized.
>>>>>
>>>>> Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular.
>>>>> If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see
>>>>>> the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad
>>>>>> of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general
>>>>>> when in a mode of Thirdness.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But you know all of that anyway.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>>>>> sent:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you
>>>>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that 
>>>>>> every
>>>>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time."  On my
>>>>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gary, list:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>  I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
>>>>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted 
>>>>>>> frequently,
>>>>>>>  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 
>>>>>>> 'material'
>>>>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in 
>>>>>>> space
>>>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I
>>>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of
>>>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often
>>>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Edwina, List,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as
>>>>>>> your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on
>>>>>>> logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into
>>>>>>> Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about
>>>>>>> “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to 
>>>>>>> clarify
>>>>>>> those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless
>>>>>>> others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a

Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Gary Richmond]

gt;>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
>>>>
>>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every
>>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time."  On my
>>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Gary, list:
>>>>>
>>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic.
>>>>>
>>>>>  I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
>>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently,
>>>>>  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material'
>>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space
>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I
>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of
>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often
>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina, List,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your
>>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on 
>>>>> logical
>>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s 
>>>>> Lowell
>>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary 
>>>>> reasoning”
>>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m 
>>>>> ready
>>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to
>>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena
>>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most
>>>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his
>>>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in
>>>>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs,
>>>>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell
>>>>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that
>>>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of 
>>>>> resolving
>>>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with
>>>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this 
>>>>> as
>>>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Gary f.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
>>>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
>>>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
>>>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
>>>>>
>>>>> Jeff, list
>>>>>
>>>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical 
>>>>> world"not
>>>>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there
>>>>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot
>>>>> be thought without Signs"...4.551
>>>>>
>>>>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying
>>>>> that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying
>>>>> that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances
>>>>> embodying it'.  This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General,
>>>>> functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his
>>>>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit,
>>>>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word
>>>>> rather than a bacterium.
>>>>>
>>>>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can
>>>>> be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the
>>>>> true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on
>>>>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the
>>>>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account
>>>>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these
>>>>> three forms of argument..
>>>>>
>>>>> And I also agree with your other two points.
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
>>>>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>
>> -
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm>http://www.cspeirce.com/
>> peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>

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Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Gary Richmond]

>
>>>> Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality
>>>> from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former.  Everything
>>>> that exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is
>>>> precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their
>>>> instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may
>>>> never be) actualized.
>>>>
>>>> Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular.
>>>> If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see
>>>>> the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.
>>>>>
>>>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad
>>>>> of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general
>>>>> when in a mode of Thirdness.
>>>>>
>>>>> But you know all of that anyway.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>>>> sent:
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>>
>>>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you
>>>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
>>>>>
>>>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that 
>>>>> every
>>>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time."  On my
>>>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>
>>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Gary, list:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>  I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
>>>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently,
>>>>>>  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 
>>>>>> 'material'
>>>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in 
>>>>>> space
>>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I
>>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of
>>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often
>>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina, List,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your
>>>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on 
>>>>>> logical
>>>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s 
>>>>>> Lowell
>>>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary 
>>>>>> reasoning”
>>>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m 
>>>>>> ready
>>>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to
>>>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena
>>>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most
>>>>

Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Stephen C. Rose]

t;>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of
>>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often
>>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina, List,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your
>>>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on 
>>>>>> logical
>>>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s 
>>>>>> Lowell
>>>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary 
>>>>>> reasoning”
>>>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m 
>>>>>> ready
>>>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to
>>>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena
>>>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most
>>>>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his
>>>>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in
>>>>>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs,
>>>>>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely 
>>>>>> Lowell
>>>>>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that
>>>>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of 
>>>>>> resolving
>>>>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone 
>>>>>> with
>>>>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this 
>>>>>> as
>>>>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gary f.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
>>>>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
>>>>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
>>>>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Jeff, list
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>>>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical 
>>>>>> world"not
>>>>>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there
>>>>>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot
>>>>>> be thought without Signs"...4.551
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
>>>>>> saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am
>>>>>> saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within
>>>>>> 'instances embodying it'.  This means that Mind/thought/reason...which 
>>>>>> is a
>>>>>> General, functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his
>>>>>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit,
>>>>>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a 
>>>>>> word
>>>>>> rather than a bacterium.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can
>>>>>> be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the
>>>>>> true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be 
>>>>>> on
>>>>>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the
>>>>>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account
>>>>>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these
>>>>>> three forms of argument..
>>>>>>
>>>>>> And I also agree with your other two points.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
>>>>>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>
>>> -
>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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>>>
>>>
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Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality
from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. 
Everything that exists is real, but something can be real yet not
exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals in themselves
(not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have
not been (and may never be) actualized. 
 Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not
particular.  If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no
Signs are generals.
 Regards,
 Jon 
 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see
the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.

You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the
triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is
general when in a mode of Thirdness.

But you know all of that anyway. 

Edwina 
 On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how
you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
 I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view
that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and
time."  On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly
general.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [7] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [8]  
 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary, list:

I presume you are being sarcastic.

 I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted
frequently,  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential'
within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic
particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or
a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have
any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within
Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of
course, by Peirce. 

So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.

Edwina

On Mon 16/10/17  9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, List,  
 It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as
your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus
on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into
Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all
about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll
need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell
2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we
move ahead.  
As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “
Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his
last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and
their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that
context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to
follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of
them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we
now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. 
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard 
 Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

Jeff, list

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551  

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'.  This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium.   

Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premisesan

Re: Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

ate in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality
from existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former. 
Everything that exists is real, but something can be real yet not
exist--and this is precisely the case with all generals in themselves
(not their instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have
not been (and may never be) actualized. 
 Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not
particular.  If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no
Signs are generals.
 Regards,
 Jon 
 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see
the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.

You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the
triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is
general when in a mode of Thirdness.

But you know all of that anyway. 

Edwina 
 On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how
you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
 I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view
that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and
time."  On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly
general.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [4] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [5]  
 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary, list:

I presume you are being sarcastic.

 I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted
frequently,  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential'
within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic
particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or
a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have
any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within
Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of
course, by Peirce. 

So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.

Edwina

On Mon 16/10/17  9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, List, 
 It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as
your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus
on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into
Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all
about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll
need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell
2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we
move ahead.  
As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “
Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his
last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and
their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that
context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to
follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of
them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we
now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. 
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard 
 Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

Jeff, list

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551  

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'.  This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium.   

Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premisesan

Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Stephen C. Rose]

gt; Edwina
>>>
>>> On Mon 16/10/17 1:02 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>> sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not
>>> interested in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some
>>> following along now who were not on the List back then.
>>>
>>> Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from
>>> existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former.  Everything that
>>> exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is
>>> precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their
>>> instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may
>>> never be) actualized.
>>>
>>> Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular.
>>> If all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon
>>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the
>>>> triad - and it's elsewhere as well.
>>>>
>>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad
>>>> of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general
>>>> when in a mode of Thirdness.
>>>>
>>>> But you know all of that anyway.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>>> sent:
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, List:
>>>>
>>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you
>>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
>>>>
>>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every
>>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time."  On my
>>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general.
>>>>
>>>> Regards,
>>>>
>>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>>
>>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Gary, list:
>>>>>
>>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic.
>>>>>
>>>>>  I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
>>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently,
>>>>>  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material'
>>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space
>>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I
>>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of
>>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often
>>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina
>>>>>
>>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>>>>
>>>>> Edwina, List,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your
>>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on 
>>>>> logical
>>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s 
>>>>> Lowell
>>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary 
>>>>> reasoning”
>>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m 
>>>>> ready
>>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to
>>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena
>>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most
>>>>> comple

Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Gary Richmond]

a>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the
>>> triad - and it's elsewhere as well.
>>>
>>> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of
>>> Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in
>>> a mode of Thirdness.
>>>
>>> But you know all of that anyway.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
>>> sent:
>>>
>>> Edwina, List:
>>>
>>> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you
>>> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
>>>
>>> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every
>>> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time."  On my
>>> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Gary, list:
>>>>
>>>> I presume you are being sarcastic.
>>>>
>>>>  I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
>>>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently,
>>>>  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material'
>>>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space
>>>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I
>>>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of
>>>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often
>>>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.
>>>>
>>>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
>>>>
>>>> Edwina
>>>>
>>>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>>>
>>>> Edwina, List,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your
>>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical
>>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell
>>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning”
>>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready
>>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to
>>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena
>>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most
>>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his
>>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in
>>>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs,
>>>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell
>>>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that
>>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving
>>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with
>>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as
>>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Gary f.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
>>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
>>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
>>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
>>>>
>>>> Jeff, list
>>>>
>>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not
>>>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there
>>>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot
>&g

Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your
>>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical
>>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell
>>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning”
>>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready
>>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to
>>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena
>>> to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most
>>> complete public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his
>>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in
>>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs,
>>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell
>>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that
>>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving
>>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with
>>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as
>>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
>>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
>>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
>>>
>>> Jeff, list
>>>
>>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not
>>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there
>>> cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot
>>> be thought without Signs"...4.551
>>>
>>> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying
>>> that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying
>>> that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances
>>> embodying it'.  This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General,
>>> functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his
>>> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit,
>>> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word
>>> rather than a bacterium.
>>>
>>> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be
>>> valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the
>>> true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on
>>> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the
>>> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account
>>> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these
>>> three forms of argument..
>>>
>>> And I also agree with your other two points.
>>>
>>> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
>>> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis.
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>>

-
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Re: Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

f Peirce’s whole philosophy. 
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard 
 Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

Jeff, list

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551  

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'.  This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium.   

Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate
seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false
nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into
account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your
outline of these three forms of argument..  

And I also agree with your other two points.

I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. 

Edwina  


Links:
--
[1]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'tabor...@primus.ca\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[2]
http://webmail.primus.ca/javascript:top.opencompose(\'jonalanschm...@gmail.com\',\'\',\'\',\'\')
[3] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[4] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I know that we have been over this ground before, and I am not interested
in repeating our past discussions, but there may be some following along
now who were not on the List back then.

Especially late in his life, Peirce carefully distinguished reality from
existence, treating the latter as a subset of the former.  Everything that
exists is real, but something can be real yet not exist--and this is
precisely the case with all generals in themselves (not their
instantiations), as well as some possibilities that have not been (and may
never be) actualized.

Likewise, anything that is general is (by definition) not particular.  If
all Signs are particulars, then (by definition) no Signs are generals.

Regards,

Jon

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 11:27 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
wrote:

> Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see the
> triad - and it's elsewhere as well.
>
> You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the triad of
> Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is general when in a
> mode of Thirdness.
>
> But you know all of that anyway.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you
> distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
>
> I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that every
> Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time."  On my
> reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly general.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> Gary, list:
>>
>> I presume you are being sarcastic.
>>
>>  I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
>> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently,
>>  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material'
>> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space
>> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I
>> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of
>> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often
>> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.
>>
>> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>
>> Edwina, List,
>>
>>
>>
>> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your
>> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical
>> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell
>> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning”
>> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready
>> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to
>> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.
>>
>>
>>
>> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to
>> an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete
>> public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his
>> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in
>> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs,
>> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell
>> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that
>> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving
>> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with
>> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as
>> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
>>
>>
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
>>
>>
>> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
>> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
>> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
>>
>> Jeff, list
>>
>> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the
>> work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not
>> only is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there
>> cannot be a General without Inst

Re: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon - we've been over these terms before. Read 4.551 and you'll see
the triad - and it's elsewhere as well.

You know perfectly well that by Sign [capital S] I refer to the
triad of Object-Representamen-Interpretant. The Representamen is
general when in a mode of Thirdness.

But you know all of that anyway. 

Edwina
 On Mon 16/10/17 12:22 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how
you distinguish reality from existence in your statements below.
 I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view
that every Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and
time."  On my reading, that would preclude any Sign from being truly
general.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2] 
 On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Gary, list:

I presume you are being sarcastic.

 I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted
frequently,  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential'
within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic
particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or
a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have
any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within
Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of
course, by Peirce. 

So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.

Edwina

On Mon 16/10/17  9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [4] sent:
Edwina, List,
 It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as
your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus
on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into
Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all
about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll
need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell
2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we
move ahead. 
As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “
Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his
last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and
their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that
context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to
follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of
them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we
now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. 
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [5]] 
  Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [6]; Jeffrey Brian Downard 
 Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

Jeff, list

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551  

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'.  This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium.   

Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate
seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false
nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into
account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your
outline of these three forms of argument.. 

And I also agree with your other two points.

I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. 

Edwina 


Links:
--
[1

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I think that it would be helpful if you could clarify exactly how you
distinguish *reality *from *existence *in your statements below.

I am also wondering where in Peirce's writings you find the view that *every
*Sign is "a triadic particular...existent in space and time."  On my
reading, that would preclude *any *Sign from being truly general.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 16, 2017 at 8:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Gary, list:
>
> I presume you are being sarcastic.
>
>  I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
> view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted frequently,
>  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential' within 'material'
> instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic particular...existent in space
> and time, whether as a concept/word or a material entity [bacterium]. I
> don't see that Reality/Generals have any existence 'per se' outside of
> their articulation within Signs...and this view has been stated often
> enough by me - and of course, by Peirce.
>
> So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 16/10/17 9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Edwina, List,
>
>
>
> It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your
> previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical
> issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell
> lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning”
> and the logic of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready
> to start posting from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to
> digest Lowell 1 before we move ahead.
>
>
>
> As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “ Prolegomena to
> an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete
> public statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his
> pragmaticism. In order to understand that context, and its place in
> Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to follow the development of EGs,
> starting with his first presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell
> 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we now have a chance to follow that
> development step by step. Peirce regarded this as the best way of resolving
> the logical issues we have been discussing in this thread. As someone with
> zero formal training in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as
> a way into deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy.
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
> Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard
> Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
>
> Jeff, list
>
> "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work
> of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only
> is thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot
> be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought
> without Signs"...4.551
>
> Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying
> that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying
> that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances
> embodying it'.  This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General,
> functions within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his
> explanation in the rest of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit,
> in that it exists in time and space, even if it is existent only as a word
> rather than a bacterium.
>
> Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be
> valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the
> true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on
> the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the
> premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into account
> [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your outline of these
> three forms of argument..
>
> And I also agree with your other two points.
>
> I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
> outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis.
>
> Edwina
>
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[John F Sowa]

Gary and Dan,

Dan

This is certainly a wonderful service to all.


I agree.

And if you have all of Lowell 2 available, please post it also.
When I get started reading something, I don't want to stop.

But the discussions can focus on the posted parts.

John


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UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Everett, Daniel]

Thanks. Gary. My misunderstanding of where SPIN was with this project.

This is certainly a wonderful service to all.

Dan

On Oct 16, 2017, at 10:27 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
wrote:

Dan,

If there were such a link, we wouldn’t need the SPIN project!
The complete text of Lowell 1 is on my website at 
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm. I can put my whole transcription of Lowell 2 
there also if that would be useful. The rest of the Lowells have not yet been 
transcribed (except the fragments scattered around in CP) — but again, if 
anyone wants to help out with that, just go to 
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts and sign up. The 
manuscripts are MS 447-76 and they’re all there. They do need transcription 
though, because Peirce often edited and rearranged things as he drafted them. 
I’m working on Lowell 3 myself.

If you have questions about SPIN, and the answers aren’t on the website, Jeff 
Downard can probably answer them.

Gary f.

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts }{ SPIN project



From: Everett, Daniel [mailto:dever...@bentley.edu]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 10:05
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

I am wondering if there is a single link available that will give the full, 
non-disjointed transcription of the Lowell Lectures?

Dan



On Oct 16, 2017, at 9:21 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
wrote:

Edwina, List,

It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous 
post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues 
rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. 
For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic 
of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting 
from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before 
we move ahead.

As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “Prolegomena to an 
Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public 
statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In 
order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I 
think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first 
presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN 
project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce 
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been 
discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal 
logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of 
Peirce’s whole philosophy.

Gary f.

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jeffrey Brian 
Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>>
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

Jeff, list

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of 
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is 
thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a 
General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without 
Signs"...4.551

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that 
there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 
'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying 
it'.  This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions 
within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest 
of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and 
space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium.

Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid 
in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false 
nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on the Nature of 
Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. 
Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] 
, I agree with your outline of these three forms of argument..

And I also agree with your other two points.

I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar outlines 
by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis.

Edwina









On Mon 16/10/17 12:17 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard 
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> sent:
Edwina, List,

I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[gnox]

Dan,

 

If there were such a link, we wouldn’t need the SPIN project!

The complete text of Lowell 1 is on my website at 
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm. I can put my whole transcription of Lowell 2 
there also if that would be useful. The rest of the Lowells have not yet been 
transcribed (except the fragments scattered around in CP) — but again, if 
anyone wants to help out with that, just go to 
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts and sign up. The 
manuscripts are MS 447-76 and they’re all there. They do need transcription 
though, because Peirce often edited and rearranged things as he drafted them. 
I’m working on Lowell 3 myself.

 

If you have questions about SPIN, and the answers aren’t on the website, Jeff 
Downard can probably answer them.

 

Gary f.

 

 <http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm> http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ 
Peirce’s Lowell Lectures of 1903

 <https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts> 
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts }{ SPIN project

 

 

 

From: Everett, Daniel [mailto:dever...@bentley.edu] 
Sent: 16-Oct-17 10:05
To: Gary Fuhrman <g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

 

I am wondering if there is a single link available that will give the full, 
non-disjointed transcription of the Lowell Lectures? 

 

Dan

 





On Oct 16, 2017, at 9:21 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>  
wrote:

 

Edwina, List,

 

It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous 
post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues 
rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. 
For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic 
of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting 
from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before 
we move ahead.

 

As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “Prolegomena to an 
Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public 
statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In 
order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I 
think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first 
presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN 
project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce 
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been 
discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal 
logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of 
Peirce’s whole philosophy.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [ <mailto:tabor...@primus.ca> mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To:  <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian 
Downard < <mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

 

Jeff, list

 

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of 
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is 
thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a 
General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without 
Signs"...4.551

 

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that 
there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 
'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying 
it'.  This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions 
within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest 
of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and 
space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. 

 

Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid 
in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false 
nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on the Nature of 
Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. 
Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] 
, I agree with your outline of these three forms of argument..

 

And I also agree with your other two points.

 

I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar outlines 
by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. 

 

Edwina

 

 

 

 

 



 

On Mon 16/10/17 12:17 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard  
<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Edwina, List,

 

I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a number of 
materialist oriented philos

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Everett, Daniel]

I am wondering if there is a single link available that will give the full, 
non-disjointed transcription of the Lowell Lectures?

Dan


On Oct 16, 2017, at 9:21 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
wrote:

Edwina, List,

It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous 
post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues 
rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. 
For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic 
of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting 
from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before 
we move ahead.

As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “Prolegomena to an 
Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public 
statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In 
order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I 
think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first 
presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN 
project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce 
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been 
discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal 
logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of 
Peirce’s whole philosophy.

Gary f.

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>; Jeffrey Brian 
Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>>
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

Jeff, list

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of 
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is 
thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a 
General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without 
Signs"...4.551

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that 
there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 
'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying 
it'.  This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions 
within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest 
of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and 
space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium.

Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid 
in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false 
nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on the Nature of 
Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. 
Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] 
, I agree with your outline of these three forms of argument..

And I also agree with your other two points.

I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar outlines 
by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis.

Edwina









On Mon 16/10/17 12:17 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard 
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> sent:

Edwina, List,



I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a number of 
materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including Hobbes, Boyle and 
others.



On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against such a 
materialist position--even one that take the material realm to be an 
"articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter clause adds, but 
I am willing to be enlightened.  Here are four such lines of argument.



1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal definition 
of the real, where the character of the real is not exhausted by individuals of 
a material character--not even if one brings a conception of individuals like 
us with minds into that realm.



2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a real 
definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the character of 
the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of nature, etc.) that 
govern the relations between what is possible and what is actual.



3. Having developed these two lines of argument within the context of a 
critical logic, Peirce argues for an account of the real as having the 
character of what is truly continuous as a regulative principle within 
methodeutic. Such a principle is necessary for the healthy development and 
robust communication of scientific theories of all sorts, including natural and 
social sciences.



4. With these arguments in han

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary, list:

I presume you are being sarcastic.

 I have always accepted the reality of generals and have posted this
view frequently. What is Thirdness? My point, also posted
frequently,  is that these generals, as real, are only 'existential'
within 'material' instances, i.e., Signs, which are a triadic
particular...existent in space and time, whether as a concept/word or
a material entity [bacterium]. I don't see that Reality/Generals have
any existence 'per se' outside of their articulation within
Signs...and this view has been stated often enough by me - and of
course, by Peirce.

So, sarcasm aside - we await your next posting.

Edwina
 On Mon 16/10/17  9:21 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina, List,
 It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as
your previous post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus
on logical issues rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into
Peirce’s Lowell lectures. For Lowell 2 especially, which is all
about “necessary reasoning” and the logic of mathematics, we’ll
need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting from Lowell
2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before we
move ahead. 
As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “
Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his
last and most complete public statement on Existential Graphs and
their relation to his pragmaticism. In order to understand that
context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I think we need to
follow the development of EGs, starting with his first presentation of
them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN project, we
now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have
been discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training
in formal logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into
deeper understanding of Peirce’s whole philosophy. 
Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard 
 Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Jeff, list
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551 
Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'.  This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium.  
Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate
seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false
nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into
account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your
outline of these three forms of argument.. 
And I also agree with your other two points.
I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. 
Edwina
 On Mon 16/10/17 12:17 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard 
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu [1] sent:

Edwina, List,
 I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a
number of materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including
Hobbes, Boyle and others. 
On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against
such a materialist position--even one that take the material realm to
be an "articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter
clause adds, but I am willing to be enlightened.  Here are four such
lines of argument.  
1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal
definition of the real, where the character of the real is not
exhausted by individuals of a material character--not even if one
brings a conception of individuals like us with minds into that
realm.
2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a
real definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the
character of the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of
nature, etc.) that govern the relations between what is po

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[gnox]

Edwina, List,

 

It’s good to see that you now accept the reality of generals, as your previous 
post appeared to reject it. That said, we need to focus on logical issues 
rather than metaphysical ones, as we dig deeper into Peirce’s Lowell lectures. 
For Lowell 2 especially, which is all about “necessary reasoning” and the logic 
of mathematics, we’ll need to clarify those issues. I’m ready to start posting 
from Lowell 2 tomorrow, unless others need more time to digest Lowell 1 before 
we move ahead.

 

As you are no doubt aware, CP 4.551 is a paragraph from “Prolegomena to an 
Apology for Pragmaticism” (1906), which was his last and most complete public 
statement on Existential Graphs and their relation to his pragmaticism. In 
order to understand that context, and its place in Peirce’s whole system, I 
think we need to follow the development of EGs, starting with his first 
presentation of them to an audience, namely Lowell 2. Thanks to the SPIN 
project, we now have a chance to follow that development step by step. Peirce 
regarded this as the best way of resolving the logical issues we have been 
discussing in this thread. As someone with zero formal training in formal 
logic, I’m really looking forward to this as a way into deeper understanding of 
Peirce’s whole philosophy.

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 16-Oct-17 08:24
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>
Subject: Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

 

Jeff, list

 

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of 
bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"not only is 
thought in the organic world but it develops there. But as there cannot be a 
General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without 
Signs"...4.551

 

Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not saying that 
there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I am saying that 
'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists' within 'instances embodying 
it'.  This means that Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions 
within Signs, and Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest 
of 4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in time and 
space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a bacterium. 

 

Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction, can be valid 
in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking about the true/false 
nature of their premisesand since the debate seems to be on the Nature of 
Truth - then this issue, the truth/false nature of the premises is relevant. 
Taking that use of the terms into account [truth/false nature of the premises] 
, I agree with your outline of these three forms of argument..

 

And I also agree with your other two points.

 

I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar outlines 
by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. 

 

Edwina

 

 

 

 

 



 

On Mon 16/10/17 12:17 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard  
<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Edwina, List,

 

I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a number of 
materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including Hobbes, Boyle and 
others. 

 

On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against such a 
materialist position--even one that take the material realm to be an 
"articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter clause adds, but 
I am willing to be enlightened.  Here are four such lines of argument. 

 

1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal definition 
of the real, where the character of the real is not exhausted by individuals of 
a material character--not even if one brings a conception of individuals like 
us with minds into that realm.

 

2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a real 
definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the character of 
the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of nature, etc.) that 
govern the relations between what is possible and what is actual.

 

3. Having developed these two lines of argument within the context of a 
critical logic, Peirce argues for an account of the real as having the 
character of what is truly continuous as a regulative principle within 
methodeutic. Such a principle is necessary for the healthy development and 
robust communication of scientific theories of all sorts, including natural and 
social sciences.

 

4. With these arguments in hand, Peirce applies the principles of logic to the 
study of questions of metaphysics. Here, he forges a position that unifies 
elements of both realism and objective idealism.

 

These four strands of argument each seem to work against the claim that

Re: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Jeff, list
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical
world"not only is thought in the organic world but it develops
there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying
it, so there cannot be thought without Signs"...4.551
Peirce was not a materialist, nor am I am materialist. I am not
saying that there is nothing 'real' outside of the material world. I
am saying that 'reality' - understood as 'a General' only 'exists'
within 'instances embodying it'.  This means that
Mind/thought/reason...which is a General, functions within Signs, and
Signs are triadic instances [see his explanation in the rest of
4.551]... A triadic Sign is a 'material' unit, in that it exists in
time and space, even if it is existent only as a word rather than a
bacterium. 
Re your first two points - since deduction, induction, abduction,
can be valid in themselves as a format, I presume you are talking
about the true/false nature of their premisesand since the debate
seems to be on the Nature of Truth - then this issue, the truth/false
nature of the premises is relevant. Taking that use of the terms into
account [truth/false nature of the premises] , I agree with your
outline of these three forms of argument..
And I also agree with your other two points.
I don't see that my position, which rests on 4.551 and other similar
outlines by Peirce, rejects or is any different from his analysis. 
Edwina
 On Mon 16/10/17 12:17 AM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:
Edwina, List, 
I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a
number of materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including
Hobbes, Boyle and others.  
On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against
such a materialist position--even one that take the material realm to
be an "articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter
clause adds, but I am willing to be enlightened.   Here are four such
lines of argument.  
1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal
definition of the real, where the character of the real is not
exhausted by individuals of a material character--not even if one
brings a conception of individuals like us with minds into  that
realm. 
2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a
real definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the
character of the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of
nature, etc.) that govern the relations between what  is possible and
what is actual. 
3. Having developed these two lines of argument within the context
of a critical logic, Peirce argues for an account of the real as
having the character of what is truly continuous as a regulative
principle within methodeutic. Such a principle is necessary  for the
healthy development and robust communication of scientific theories
of all sorts, including natural and social sciences. 
4. With these arguments in hand, Peirce applies the principles of
logic to the study of questions of metaphysics. Here, he forges a
position that unifies elements of both realism and objective
idealism. 
These four strands of argument each seem to work against the claim
that there isn't anything 'real' outside of the material world - even
when we take the material world to be an articulation of Mind. One way
of responding  is to say that I'm reading Peirce wrong on one or more
of these lines of argument. Another way to respond is to say that
your position is different from Peirce's, and that he is wrong and
you are right where there is disagreement. Or, there might some third
 way to respond. Let me know if one of these avenues fits with what
you take yourself to be doing. As things stand, it isn't clear to me
what you are doing in making such assertions, but my assumption that
is fits the second option. 
--Jeff 
Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354   
-
 From: Edwina Taborsky 
 Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview 

I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material
world - and I understand the material world to be an articulation of
Mind. [Again, I won't repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as
articulated within/as the material world; Mind doesn't  exist 'per
se' outside of these existential instantiations.  

Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this
reality-as-existential. 

I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without
having gone through the processes of abduction and induction. That
is, since Deduction

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Edwina, List,


I assume you are articulating your own view--which is shared by a number of 
materialist oriented philosophers and scientists including Hobbes, Boyle and 
others.


On my reading of the relevant texts, I believe Peirce argued against such a 
materialist position--even one that take the material realm to be an 
"articulation of Mind." It isn't obvious to me what the latter clause adds, but 
I am willing to be enlightened.  Here are four such lines of argument.


1. Arguments for the validity of deduction require at least a verbal definition 
of the real, where the character of the real is not exhausted by individuals of 
a material character--not even if one brings a conception of individuals like 
us with minds into that realm.


2. Arguments for the validity of induction and abduction require a real 
definition of the real, where that account adds yet more to the character of 
the real as generals (e.g., general properties, laws of nature, etc.) that 
govern the relations between what is possible and what is actual.


3. Having developed these two lines of argument within the context of a 
critical logic, Peirce argues for an account of the real as having the 
character of what is truly continuous as a regulative principle within 
methodeutic. Such a principle is necessary for the healthy development and 
robust communication of scientific theories of all sorts, including natural and 
social sciences.


4. With these arguments in hand, Peirce applies the principles of logic to the 
study of questions of metaphysics. Here, he forges a position that unifies 
elements of both realism and objective idealism.


These four strands of argument each seem to work against the claim that there 
isn't anything 'real' outside of the material world - even when we take the 
material world to be an articulation of Mind. One way of responding is to say 
that I'm reading Peirce wrong on one or more of these lines of argument. 
Another way to respond is to say that your position is different from Peirce's, 
and that he is wrong and you are right where there is disagreement. Or, there 
might some third way to respond. Let me know if one of these avenues fits with 
what you take yourself to be doing. As things stand, it isn't clear to me what 
you are doing in making such assertions, but my assumption that is fits the 
second option.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
Sent: Sunday, October 15, 2017 1:41 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview


I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material world - and 
I understand the material world to be an articulation of Mind. [Again, I won't 
repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as articulated within/as the material 
world; Mind doesn't exist 'per se' outside of these existential instantiations.

Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this reality-as-existential.

I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without having gone 
through the processes of abduction and induction. That is, since Deduction is 
operationally triadic, then, in a Necessary Deduction,  don't its premises have 
to be true?

For example, can I assume that a purely intellectual opinion/conclusion, 'the 
universe was created in one day"" - is a necessary deductive? The premises 
would be: 'the bible says so'...etc.

Or is it "Deduction is an argument whose Interpretant represents that it 
belongs to a general class of possible arguments precisely analogous which are 
such that in the long run of experience the greater part of those whose 
premises are true will have true conclusions" 2.267...Now, a

"Necessary Deductions are those which have nothing to do with any ratio of 
frequency but profess [or their interpretants profess for them] that from true 
premises they must invariably produce true conclusions" 2.267

That is - isn't Peirce's Objective Idealism firmly rooted in phenomenology; 
i.e., in experience- and these experiences have been shown, by repetition, to 
be true, such that one no longer requires further experience?

Edwina



On Sun 15/10/17 4:02 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

Edwina,



Despite the accurate Peirce quotes, your last paragraph still confuses Truth 
with the real law that tends toward the truth. Peirce is clearly saying that 
this real law operates in any and every universe (domain, realm) which can be 
the object of a valid argument — including the purely imaginary realm of 
mathematics. It does not operate only in “the real material world” (as if only 
the material world were real). Actually, insofar as we are talking about the 
real law governing deduction, or “necessary reasoning,” we never know whether a 
conclusion is factual: “Necessary reasoni

Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

I don't think that there is anything 'real' outside of the material
world - and I understand the material world to be an articulation of
Mind. [Again, I won't repeat 4.551]. I see the reality of Mind as
articulated within/as the material world; Mind doesn't exist 'per se'
outside of these existential instantiations. 

Mathematics is an intellectual abstraction of this
reality-as-existential.

I don't think you arrive at necessary reasoning, deduction, without
having gone through the processes of abduction and induction. That
is, since Deduction is operationally triadic, then, in a Necessary
Deduction,  don't its premises have to be true?

For example, can I assume that a purely intellectual
opinion/conclusion, 'the universe was created in one day"" - is a
necessary deductive? The premises would be: 'the bible says
so'...etc. 

Or is it "Deduction is an argument whose Interpretant represents
that it belongs to a general class of possible arguments precisely
analogous which are such that in the long run of experience the
greater part of those whose premises are true will have true
conclusions" 2.267...Now, a 

"Necessary Deductions are those which have nothing to do with any
ratio of frequency but profess [or their interpretants profess for
them] that from true premises they must invariably produce true
conclusions" 2.267

That is - isn't Peirce's Objective Idealism firmly rooted in
phenomenology; i.e., in experience- and these experiences have been
shown, by repetition, to be true, such that one no longer requires
further experience?

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17  4:02 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina,
 Despite the accurate Peirce quotes, your last paragraph still
confuses Truth with the real law that tends toward the truth. Peirce
is clearly saying that this real law operates in any and every
universe (domain, realm) which can be the object of a valid argument
— including the purely imaginary realm of mathematics. It does not
operate only in “the real material world” (as if only the
material world were  real). Actually, insofar as we are talking about
the real law governing deduction, or “necessary reasoning,” we
never know whether a conclusion is factual: “Necessary reasoning
can never answer questions of fact. It has to assume its premisses to
be true.” (That’s a quote from Lowell 2). 
 Gary f.
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 15-Oct-17 13:39
 To:  peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Gary, list:

Peirce wrote: "I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what
makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which
that reasoning more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the
truth." And,  

"The very essence of an argument,— that which distinguishes it
from all other kinds of signs,— is that it professes to be the
representative of a general method of procedure tending toward the
truth. To say that this method tends toward the true is to say that
it is a real law that existences will follow."

An Argument is a semiosic process, and is as valid in the biological
realm as it is in the Seminar Room. The semiosic Argument functions as
a 'real law that existences will follow'. Therefore, the existence
that emerges/exists within this real law is 'the truth of that law'. 

That's how I see it. I don't confine 'Truth' to the Seminar Room of
rhetoric and human mental analysis; I think it operates in the real
material world.

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17 1:27 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca [1] sent: 

Edwina,
 Your first sentence introduces a bit of confusion. Peirce does not
say that truth is a is a real law that existences will follow; he
says that the “general method of procedure tending toward the
truth” is a real law that existences will follow. This method, or
law, is what makes a consequent follow from an antecedent. Every
argument implicitly claims to follow that general method, and if it
really does, then the argument is sound. But the “following” is
independent of the factual truth of the premisses. Peirce is
essentially asking us what it  means to say that one fact or idea
really follows from another, and in Lecture 2 he will give an answer
that analyzes the “following” (the inference process) into as
many small steps as possible. And he will do this for deductive,
mathematical, “necessary” reasoning, where the “facts” are
about mathematical objects which have no empirical existence in the
usual sense of “empirical.” 
In short, this law or method is not itself a fact, nor is it
“truth.” It is general, and its whole mode of being consists in
really governing a reasoning process so that “the conclusions of
that method really will be true, to the extent and in the manner in
which the a

RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[gnox]

Edwina,

 

Despite the accurate Peirce quotes, your last paragraph still confuses Truth 
with the real law that tends toward the truth. Peirce is clearly saying that 
this real law operates in any and every universe (domain, realm) which can be 
the object of a valid argument — including the purely imaginary realm of 
mathematics. It does not operate only in “the real material world” (as if only 
the material world were real). Actually, insofar as we are talking about the 
real law governing deduction, or “necessary reasoning,” we never know whether a 
conclusion is factual: “Necessary reasoning can never answer questions of fact. 
It has to assume its premisses to be true.” (That’s a quote from Lowell 2). 

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 15-Oct-17 13:39
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

 

Gary, list:

Peirce wrote: "I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what makes a 
reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which that reasoning 
more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the truth." And, 

"The very essence of an argument,— that which distinguishes it from all other 
kinds of signs,— is that it professes to be the representative of a general 
method of procedure tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends 
toward the true is to say that it is a real law that existences will follow."

An Argument is a semiosic process, and is as valid in the biological realm as 
it is in the Seminar Room. The semiosic Argument functions as a 'real law that 
existences will follow'. Therefore, the existence that emerges/exists within 
this real law is 'the truth of that law'.

That's how I see it. I don't confine 'Truth' to the Seminar Room of rhetoric 
and human mental analysis; I think it operates in the real material world.

Edwina



 

On Sun 15/10/17 1:27 PM ,  <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

Edwina,

 

Your first sentence introduces a bit of confusion. Peirce does not say that 
truth is a is a real law that existences will follow; he says that the “general 
method of procedure tending toward the truth” is a real law that existences 
will follow. This method, or law, is what makes a consequent follow from an 
antecedent. Every argument implicitly claims to follow that general method, and 
if it really does, then the argument is sound. But the “following” is 
independent of the factual truth of the premisses. Peirce is essentially asking 
us what it means to say that one fact or idea really follows from another, and 
in Lecture 2 he will give an answer that analyzes the “following” (the 
inference process) into as many small steps as possible. And he will do this 
for deductive, mathematical, “necessary” reasoning, where the “facts” are about 
mathematical objects which have no empirical existence in the usual sense of 
“empirical.” 

 

In short, this law or method is not itself a fact, nor is it “truth.” It is 
general, and its whole mode of being consists in really governing a reasoning 
process so that “the conclusions of that method really will be true, to the 
extent and in the manner in which the argument pretends that they will.” 

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 15-Oct-17 10:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> ; 
g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

 

Since truth "  is a real law that existences will follow." and that this is 
achieved via "the soundness of argument to consist in the facts of the case and 
not at all in whether the reasoner feels confidence in the argument or not" 
[this is a comment against subjective opinions] 

AND that this observation of the experienced facts is subject to the 
self-criticism of reasoning..AND that this reasoning operates within the 
reality of the Three Categories, derived from:

"I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of whatever we 
find to have been forced upon our minds,"  

Then, it seems to me that Peirce's analysis is 'rationally phenomenological' 
[objective idealism] - in the above sense, that reason must assure us that our 
opinions conform to the facts. After all, he also asserts that we cannot know 
the unknowable. This, to me, means that our capacity for sensual observation 
and our capacity for reasoning cannot, by us, by surmounted. We can only, 
ourselves, know what we can phenomenologically and rationally experience. There 
may indeed be 'facts' outside of our human capacities - but - we cannot Know 
them. 

Edwina



 

On Sun 15/10/17 6:56 AM ,  
<javascript:top.opencompose('g...@gnusystems.ca','','','')> g...@gnusystems.ca 
sent:

[EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous listener sent 
Peirce the following question: “If no

Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary, list:

Peirce wrote: "I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what
makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which
that reasoning more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the
truth." And, 

"The very essence of an argument,— that which distinguishes it
from all other kinds of signs,— is that it professes to be the
representative of a general method of procedure tending toward the
truth. To say that this method tends toward the true is to say that
it is a real law that existences will follow."

An Argument is a semiosic process, and is as valid in the biological
realm as it is in the Seminar Room. The semiosic Argument functions as
a 'real law that existences will follow'. Therefore, the existence
that emerges/exists within this real law is 'the truth of that law'.

That's how I see it. I don't confine 'Truth' to the Seminar Room of
rhetoric and human mental analysis; I think it operates in the real
material world.

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17  1:27 PM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Edwina,
 Your first sentence introduces a bit of confusion. Peirce does not
say that truth is a is a real law that existences will follow; he
says that the “general method of procedure tending toward the
truth” is a real law that existences will follow. This method, or
law, is what makes a consequent follow from an antecedent. Every
argument implicitly claims to follow that general method, and if it
really does, then the argument is sound. But the “following” is
independent of the factual truth of the premisses. Peirce is
essentially asking us what it  means to say that one fact or idea
really follows from another, and in Lecture 2 he will give an answer
that analyzes the “following” (the inference process) into as
many small steps as possible. And he will do this for deductive,
mathematical, “necessary” reasoning, where the “facts” are
about mathematical objects which have no empirical existence in the
usual sense of “empirical.” 
In short, this law or method is not itself a fact, nor is it
“truth.” It is general, and its whole mode of being consists in
really governing a reasoning process so that “the conclusions of
that method really will be true, to the extent and in the manner in
which the argument pretends that they will.” 
Gary f.
 From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
 Sent: 15-Oct-17 10:30
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview
Since truth "  is a real law that existences will follow." and that
this is achieved via "the soundness of argument to consist in the
facts of the case and not at all in whether the reasoner feels
confidence in the argument or not" [this is a comment against
subjective opinions] 

AND that this observation of the experienced facts is subject to the
self-criticism of reasoning..AND that this reasoning operates within
the reality of the Three Categories, derived from:

"I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of
whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds,"  

Then, it seems to me that Peirce's analysis is 'rationally
phenomenological' [objective idealism] - in the above sense, that
reason must assure us that our opinions conform to the facts. After
all, he also asserts that we cannot know the unknowable. This, to me,
means that our capacity for sensual observation and our capacity for
reasoning cannot, by us, by surmounted. We can only, ourselves, know
what we can phenomenologically and rationally experience. There may
indeed be 'facts' outside of our human capacities - but - we cannot
Know them. 

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17 6:56 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [1] sent:

 [EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous
listener sent Peirce the following question: “If not inconvenient
for you, will you be kind enough to give tonight a summary— however
brief— of your answer to the question ‘What makes a Reasoning
Sound?’” Peirce prepared a response that he read at the beginning
of the third lecture. This response, found in MS 465, is as follows: 
My first duty this evening is to reply to a note which asks me to
give an explanation at my last lecture. The letter did not come to
hand until the following morning. The question asked is what my
answer in the first lecture was to the question “What makes a
Reasoning to be sound?” I had no intention of answering that
question in my first lecture, because I dislike to put forth opinions
until I am ready to prove them; and I had enough to do in the first
lecture to show what does not make reasoning to be sound. Besides in
this short course it seems better to skip such purely theoretical
questions. Yet since I am asked, I have no objection to saying that
in my opinion what makes a reasoning sound is the real law

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[gnox]

Edwina,

 

Your first sentence introduces a bit of confusion. Peirce does not say that 
truth is a is a real law that existences will follow; he says that the “general 
method of procedure tending toward the truth” is a real law that existences 
will follow. This method, or law, is what makes a consequent follow from an 
antecedent. Every argument implicitly claims to follow that general method, and 
if it really does, then the argument is sound. But the “following” is 
independent of the factual truth of the premisses. Peirce is essentially asking 
us what it means to say that one fact or idea really follows from another, and 
in Lecture 2 he will give an answer that analyzes the “following” (the 
inference process) into as many small steps as possible. And he will do this 
for deductive, mathematical, “necessary” reasoning, where the “facts” are about 
mathematical objects which have no empirical existence in the usual sense of 
“empirical.” 

 

In short, this law or method is not itself a fact, nor is it “truth.” It is 
general, and its whole mode of being consists in really governing a reasoning 
process so that “the conclusions of that method really will be true, to the 
extent and in the manner in which the argument pretends that they will.”

 

Gary f.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: 15-Oct-17 10:30
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

 

Since truth "  is a real law that existences will follow." and that this is 
achieved via "the soundness of argument to consist in the facts of the case and 
not at all in whether the reasoner feels confidence in the argument or not" 
[this is a comment against subjective opinions]

AND that this observation of the experienced facts is subject to the 
self-criticism of reasoning..AND that this reasoning operates within the 
reality of the Three Categories, derived from:

"I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of whatever we 
find to have been forced upon our minds," 

Then, it seems to me that Peirce's analysis is 'rationally phenomenological' 
[objective idealism] - in the above sense, that reason must assure us that our 
opinions conform to the facts. After all, he also asserts that we cannot know 
the unknowable. This, to me, means that our capacity for sensual observation 
and our capacity for reasoning cannot, by us, by surmounted. We can only, 
ourselves, know what we can phenomenologically and rationally experience. There 
may indeed be 'facts' outside of our human capacities - but - we cannot Know 
them.

Edwina



 

On Sun 15/10/17 6:56 AM ,  <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

[EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous listener sent 
Peirce the following question: “If not inconvenient for you, will you be kind 
enough to give tonight a summary— however brief— of your answer to the question 
‘What makes a Reasoning Sound?’” Peirce prepared a response that he read at the 
beginning of the third lecture. This response, found in MS 465, is as follows: 

 

My first duty this evening is to reply to a note which asks me to give an 
explanation at my last lecture. The letter did not come to hand until the 
following morning. The question asked is what my answer in the first lecture 
was to the question “What makes a Reasoning to be sound?” I had no intention of 
answering that question in my first lecture, because I dislike to put forth 
opinions until I am ready to prove them; and I had enough to do in the first 
lecture to show what does not make reasoning to be sound. Besides in this short 
course it seems better to skip such purely theoretical questions. Yet since I 
am asked, I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what makes a 
reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which that reasoning 
more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the truth. The very essence 
of an argument,— that which distinguishes it from all other kinds of signs,— is 
that it professes to be the representative of a general method of procedure 
tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends toward the true is to 
say that it is a real law that existences will follow. Now if that profession 
is true, and the conclusions of that method really will be true, to the extent 
and in the manner in which the argument pretends that they will, the argument 
is sound; if not, it is a false pretension and is unsound. I thus make the 
soundness of argument to consist in the facts of the case and not at all in 
whether the reasoner feels confidence in the argument or not. I may further say 
that there are three great classes of argument, Deductions, Inductions, and 
Abductions; and these profess to tend toward the truth in very different 
senses, as we shall see. I suppose this answers the question intended. However, 
it is possible that my correspondent d

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Since truth "  is a real law that existences will follow." and that
this is achieved via "the soundness of argument to consist in the
facts of the case and not at all in whether the reasoner feels
confidence in the argument or not" [this is a comment against
subjective opinions]

AND that this observation of the experienced facts is subject to the
self-criticism of reasoning..AND that this reasoning operates within
the reality of the Three Categories, derived from:

"I undertook to do was to go back to experience, in the sense of
whatever we find to have been forced upon our minds," 

Then, it seems to me that Peirce's analysis is 'rationally
phenomenological' [objective idealism] - in the above sense, that
reason must assure us that our opinions conform to the facts. After
all, he also asserts that we cannot know the unknowable. This, to me,
means that our capacity for sensual observation and our capacity for
reasoning cannot, by us, by surmounted. We can only, ourselves, know
what we can phenomenologically and rationally experience. There may
indeed be 'facts' outside of our human capacities - but - we cannot
Know them.

Edwina
 On Sun 15/10/17  6:56 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
[EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous
listener sent Peirce the following question: “If not inconvenient
for you, will you be kind enough to give tonight a summary— however
brief— of your answer to the question ‘What makes a Reasoning
Sound?’” Peirce prepared a response that he read at the beginning
of the third lecture. This response, found in MS 465, is as follows:  
My first duty this evening is to reply to a note which asks me to
give an explanation at my last lecture. The letter did not come to
hand until the following morning. The question asked is what my
answer in the first lecture was to the question “What makes a
Reasoning to be sound?” I had no intention of answering that
question in my first lecture, because I dislike to put forth opinions
until I am ready to prove them; and I had enough to do in the first
lecture to show what does not make reasoning to be sound. Besides in
this short course it seems better to skip such purely theoretical
questions. Yet since I am asked, I have no objection to saying that
in my opinion what makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the
general method which that reasoning more or less consciously pursues
does tend toward the truth. The very essence of an argument,— that
which distinguishes it from all other kinds of signs,— is that it
professes to be the representative of a general method of procedure
tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends toward the
true is to say that it is a real law that existences will follow. Now
if that profession is true, and the conclusions of that method really
will be true, to the extent and in the manner in which the argument
pretends that they will, the argument is sound; if not, it is a false
pretension and is unsound. I thus make the soundness of argument to
consist in the facts of the case and not at all in whether the
reasoner feels confidence in the argument or not. I may further say
that there are three great classes of argument, Deductions,
Inductions, and Abductions; and these profess to tend toward the
truth in very different senses, as we shall see. I suppose this
answers the question intended. However, it is possible that my
correspondent did not intend to ask in what I think the soundness of
reasoning consists, but by the question “What makes reasoning
sound?” he may mean “What causes men to reason right?” That
question I did substantially answer in my first lecture. Namely, to
begin with, when a boy or girl first begins to criticize his
inferences, and until he does that he does not reason, he finds that
he has already strong prejudices in favor of certain ways of arguing.
Those prejudices, whether they be inherited or acquired, were first
formed under the influence of the environing world, so that it is not
surprising that they are largely right or nearly right. He, thus, has
a basis to go upon. But if he has the habit of calling himself to
account for his reasonings, as all of us do more or less, he will
gradually come to reason much better; and this comes about through
his criticism, in the light of experience, of all the factors that
have entered into reasonings that were performed shortly before the
criticism. Occasionally, he goes back to the criticism of habits of
reasoning which have governed him for many years. That is my answer
to the second question.  
http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm [1] }{ Peirce’s Lowell Lectures
of 1903


Links:
--
[1] http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm

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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to 

[PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 1: overview

[gnox]

[EP2:534] Four days after this lecture (Lowell 1), an anonymous listener
sent Peirce the following question: "If not inconvenient for you, will you
be kind enough to give tonight a summary- however brief- of your answer to
the question 'What makes a Reasoning Sound?'" Peirce prepared a response
that he read at the beginning of the third lecture. This response, found in
MS 465, is as follows: 

 

My first duty this evening is to reply to a note which asks me to give an
explanation at my last lecture. The letter did not come to hand until the
following morning. The question asked is what my answer in the first lecture
was to the question "What makes a Reasoning to be sound?" I had no intention
of answering that question in my first lecture, because I dislike to put
forth opinions until I am ready to prove them; and I had enough to do in the
first lecture to show what does not make reasoning to be sound. Besides in
this short course it seems better to skip such purely theoretical questions.
Yet since I am asked, I have no objection to saying that in my opinion what
makes a reasoning sound is the real law that the general method which that
reasoning more or less consciously pursues does tend toward the truth. The
very essence of an argument,- that which distinguishes it from all other
kinds of signs,- is that it professes to be the representative of a general
method of procedure tending toward the truth. To say that this method tends
toward the true is to say that it is a real law that existences will follow.
Now if that profession is true, and the conclusions of that method really
will be true, to the extent and in the manner in which the argument pretends
that they will, the argument is sound; if not, it is a false pretension and
is unsound. I thus make the soundness of argument to consist in the facts of
the case and not at all in whether the reasoner feels confidence in the
argument or not. I may further say that there are three great classes of
argument, Deductions, Inductions, and Abductions; and these profess to tend
toward the truth in very different senses, as we shall see. I suppose this
answers the question intended. However, it is possible that my correspondent
did not intend to ask in what I think the soundness of reasoning consists,
but by the question "What makes reasoning sound?" he may mean "What causes
men to reason right?" That question I did substantially answer in my first
lecture. Namely, to begin with, when a boy or girl first begins to criticize
his inferences, and until he does that he does not reason, he finds that he
has already strong prejudices in favor of certain ways of arguing. Those
prejudices, whether they be inherited or acquired, were first formed under
the influence of the environing world, so that it is not surprising that
they are largely right or nearly right. He, thus, has a basis to go upon.
But if he has the habit of calling himself to account for his reasonings, as
all of us do more or less, he will gradually come to reason much better; and
this comes about through his criticism, in the light of experience, of all
the factors that have entered into reasonings that were performed shortly
before the criticism. Occasionally, he goes back to the criticism of habits
of reasoning which have governed him for many years. That is my answer to
the second question. 

 

http://gnusystems.ca/Lowells.htm }{ Peirce's Lowell Lectures of 1903

 


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PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
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