RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

Thanks Jon, this does clarify the matter, especially the definitions of 
Firstness where Peirce uses phrases such as “positive suchness” and “positive 
possibility.” It’s yet another reminder of the importance of context in 
determining the meaning of a word. I think it was Comte who first used the term 
“positive science,” and I think Peirce was just following his lead in opposing 
it to hypothetical science; but his other uses of “positive” do not refer to 
actuality as opposed to possibility, or to Secondness as opposed to Firstness. 
Anyway there’s no perfect choices when it comes to naming such things. As long 
as a word is used to denote anything real, its inherent vagueness is 
incorrigible; only a nonverbal index can make a real connection to the dynamic 
object. Nevertheless we try (Peirce certainly tried) to weed out the choices 
most likely to cause confusion, and trust the interpreter to pay close 
attention to the context.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 20-Aug-21 14:21
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Gary F., List:

 

GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English usage, 
“possibility implies a relation to what exists.”

 

I previously highlighted another usage by Peirce in which "possibility implies 
a relation to what exists," namely, in accordance with his pragmaticism 
(https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00228.html). I went on to 
suggest in that post that only possibilities that can become actual are 
relevant to practitioners of the positive sciences, a limitation that does not 
apply to the hypothetical science of pure mathematics. This seems to be 
consistent with how Peirce spells out what he means by "positive" vs. 
"hypothetical" in his classification of the sciences, where he affirms again 
the dependence of phaneroscopy on pure mathematics for principles.

 

CSP: This science of Phenomenology is in my view the most primal of all the 
positive sciences. That is, it is not based, as to its principles, upon any 
other positive science. By a positive science I mean an inquiry which seeks for 
positive knowledge; that is, for such knowledge as may conveniently be 
expressed in a categorical proposition. Logic and the other normative sciences, 
although they ask, not what is but what ought to be, nevertheless are positive 
sciences since it is by asserting positive, categorical truth that they are 
able to show that what they call good really is so; and the right reason, right 
effort, and right being, of which they treat, derive that character from 
positive categorical fact.

Perhaps you will ask me whether it is possible to conceive of a science which 
should not aim to declare that something is positively or categorically true. I 
reply that it is not only possible to conceive of such a science, but that such 
science exists and flourishes, and Phenomenology, which does not depend upon 
any other positive science, nevertheless must, if it is to be properly 
grounded, be made to depend upon the Conditional or Hypothetical Science of 
Pure Mathematics, whose only aim is to discover not how things actually are, 
but how they might be supposed to be, if not in our universe, then in some 
other. A Phenomenology which does not reckon with pure mathematics, a science 
hardly come to years of discretion when Hegel wrote, will be the same pitiful 
club-footed affair that Hegel produced. (CP 5.39-40, EP 2:144, 1903)

 

The knowledge discovered in the positive sciences is properly expressed in 
categorical propositions, while the knowledge discovered in pure mathematics as 
a hypothetical science are properly expressed in conditional propositions. Note 
also that since Peirce considers the normative sciences to be positive 
sciences, he explicitly rejects the modern "is-ought" problem.

 

GF: Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of vagueness in 
order to show that in the language of exact logic (as opposed to ordinary 
English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability of actualization.

 

Indeed, Peirce's first universe encompasses whatever is "capable of being so 
present [to one consciousness] in its entire Being" (EP 2:479, 1908); or as he 
puts it elsewhere, "anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for 
getting fully represented," i.e., "their Being consists in mere capability of 
getting thought, not in anybody's Actually thinking them" (CP 6.452&455, EP 
2:434&435, 1908).

 

GF: I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of positivity with actuality and 
Secondness is more problematic, though.

 

I agree, since phaneroscopy is a positive science and yet is not confined to 
the study of actuality and 2ns. In fact, it is not concerned at all with 
distinguishing actuality from possibility and necessity, and it is where 2ns 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

Getting back to the substantive issue raised in my previous post …

 

In his third Lowell Lecture (1903), Peirce says that the Firstness of Firstness 
can be called “qualitative possibility.” But earlier in the same lecture, he 
says this:

 

CSP: That wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very 
being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility 
implies a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of 
being of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise, 
“possibility” would have answered the purpose.

 

GF: In this context, Peirce acknowledges that in ordinary English usage, 
“possibility implies a relation to what exists.” Since existence involves 
Secondness, that renders the word “possibility” unfit for rendering the concept 
named “Firstness.” In order to consistently use “qualitative possibility” in 
reference to Firstness, it is necessary to explicitly set aside the ordinary 
implication which connects the word to Secondness. This is what Peirce does in 
the bolded words quoted from EP2:479:

 

CSP: One of these [three] Universes embraces whatever has its Being in itself 
alone, except that whatever is in this Universe must be present to one 
consciousness, or be capable of being so present in its entire Being. It 
follows that a member of this universe need not be subject to any law, not even 
to the principle of contradiction. I denominate the objects of this Universe 
Ideas, or Possibles, although the latter designation does not imply capability 
of actualization. 

 

GF: The quote is continued below by Robert (who omitted the first two sentences 
given above).

Peirce invokes the principle of contradiction and the logic of vagueness in 
order to show that in the language of exact logic (as opposed to ordinary 
English usage), “possibility” does not imply capability of actualization. This 
effectively cancels, in the logical context, the objection which prevented him 
(in the Lowell Lecture) from using “possibility” as another name for 
“Firstness,” justifies Peirce’s use of “qualitative possibility” in reference 
to Firstness, and gives us De Tienne (and the rest of us) license to use 
“possibility” in that way. 

 

I think De Tienne’s virtual identification of positivity with actuality and 
Secondness is more problematic, though. Peirce’s statement in a 1904 letter to 
Welby that “Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, 
positively and without reference to anything else” (CP 8.328) suggests that 
Firstness has its own kind of positivity, just as it has its own kind of 
reality. But I haven’t found any firm evidence for this in Peirce’s text, so I 
don’t intend to argue the point.

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: 19-Aug-21 09:51
To: 'Peirce-L' 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

 

Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I 
meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to 
your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) 
practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something 
about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism” 
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the way, I 
regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem with your 
crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what is (to any 
dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what ADT’s text. Your own 
posts have made that motivation pretty clear, so I won’t comment on it here. 

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your 
highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other 
tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in 
Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if 
we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like to 
add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is from one of 
Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the third Lowell 
Lecture of 1903, is online here: https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The 
question about “possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:

 

CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which 
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it 
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you 
have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[robert marty]

Edwina, List
It is very clear ... for Gary F., tribalism is the others!
R M
Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy
fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
*https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ *



Le jeu. 19 août 2021 à 16:06, Edwina Taborsky  a écrit :

> Gary F, list
>
> 1] Your definition of 'tribalism' - which is unique to you, means, as far
> as I can understand it, that tribalism refers to a perspective that is held
> by a number of people. What you are misunderstanding is that this
> perspective might be valid, logical, rational. After all, we, for the most
> part, hold the perspective that some illnesses are caused by germs. Does
> this mean that the scientists who hold this view do so because the
> Conclusion is valid, or because 'they are members of a tribe'?
>
> 2] The quotation you provided, in my view, contradicts De Tienne's
> idealistic outline where he separates Mind and Matter into two 'scientific'
>  realms: Mathematics and Phaneroscopy. The Peircean quote on the other
> hand refers to the categories or 'modes of being' and points out
> that 'life' includes all three - and they are not operationally separate.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Thu 19/08/21 9:50 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of
> what I meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe
> opposed to your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and
> duelistic) practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s
> capitalization) something about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to
> define “tribalism” differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about
> terminology.) By the way, I regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of
> the root problem with your crusade, which lies in the motivation for
> insisting on what is (to any dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading
> of what ADT’s text. Your own posts have made that motivation pretty clear,
> so I won’t comment on it here.
>
> The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your
> highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other
> tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in
> Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look
> if we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d
> like to add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is
> from one of Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the
> third Lowell Lecture of 1903, is online here:
> https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The question about “possibility”
> arises in the second paragraph of this selection:
>
>
>
> CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which
> affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it
> does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where
> you have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you
> have 2 units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not
> of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and
> Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and
> such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as
> the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness
> and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get
> the purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness
> (thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation), what you are striving to
> apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness — that is what
> Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of Thirdness. …
>
> A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is
> perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus
> the tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That
> wherein all such qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of
> Firstness. The word possibility fits it, except that possibility implies
> a relation to what exists, while universal Firstness is the mode of being
> of itself. That is why a new word was required for it. Otherwise,
> “possibility” would have answered the purpose. …
>
> To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of
> mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as
> any, poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three kinds of
> Firstness, qualitative possibility, existence, mentality, resulting from
> applying Firstness to the three categories. We might strike new words for
> them: primity, secundity, tertiality. [end CSP quote]
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu On Behalf Of robert marty
> Sent: 19-Aug-21 05:03
>
>
>
> List,
>
> No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from ADT
> supporters.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27. Needed correction.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwina:

> On Aug 18, 2021, at 12:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
>  I don't see Peircean Firstness as an ideal form, but as an open free 
> force-to-be-actualized ..

Why?

I concur that CSP’s notion of first-ness should not be transitioned into an 
ideal form such as an eager and scientifically illiterate 
mathematically-oriented philosophy could be tempted to contemplate.  Such 
scientifically ignorant philosophers could be further tempted to wander 
helter-skelter over a random dictionary of semantic synonyms in order to 
justify a perverse philosophy of nature, Ladyman-like. 

But, I have no idea how a “force” can be “to be”.

This is a strange bit of physics.

Logically, the norm for the usual literate physical thought is that of force as 
a consequent. (At least, the physical symbols of Newton and Coulomb were / are 
/ will be so deployed.)

I would suggest that the conversations be initiated in the notion of first-ness 
as a logical antecedent. This is formal ground of the logic of graph theory and 
the logical connectivity of nature. 

Such conversations can be modally potentiated to transverse to secondness by 
syndication with the possibility of remaining open to reversing the meaning 
from consequence to the antecedent (retroduction).

For example, Sodium can be transformed in Sodium Chloride by pragmatic 
syntropization without invoking any abstract theories or laws.

Mother Nature does the work spontaneously without any formal theoretical 
mathematical underpinnings of work and energy.

My argument is directly related to CSP’s generative logic of the trichotomy.  
The “one-ness” of a logical term as a unit of meaning and it modality as a 
sin-sign and as independent notation for a syntactical object (icon?) are 
essential to the generalization of the formal logic of the trichotomy. 

Does this rhetorical form (formulation) satisfy essential / critical 
anthropological yearnings?
(I am implying that invoking logical Skolenization would not be welcomed into 
CSP’s notions of relational logics because the semantic name “sodium” is a 
unitary predicate with a fixed position in a predecessor-sucessor sequence of 
natural numbers.)

:-). 

Cheers
Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 JAS, list

"The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will
hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some
form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. then, the question arises
whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the
other are to be taken___ " etc. 6.24 my emphasis]

Hylopathy and hylomorphism are, according to various dictionaries 
related. 

I note -  Peirce believed in MONISM - and his question was how the
two 'laws' relate to each other. 

I'm not going to get into another debate with you about his answer,
since you and I totally disagree in our interpretation of what Peirce
wrote in this section. But to my mind, he rejected neutralism and
also, that one or the other are primordial. He specifically said:
Hylopathy- which is also hylomorphism. 

Edwina
 On Thu 19/08/21 10:12 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET: My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind
and Matter.
 That is not what it means to be an idealist, at least according to
Peirce's definitions. Instead, someone who separates mind and matter
is either a dualist or a neutralist, and someone who treats mind and
matter as continuous is either a materialist or an idealist. 
 CSP: The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will
hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some
form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises
whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the
other are to be taken-- (a) as independent, a doctrine often called
monism, but which I would name neutralism; or,
 (b) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone
as primordial, which is materialism; or,
 (c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone
as primordial, which is idealism. (CP 6.24, 1891)
 An idealist is thus someone who holds that mind is more fundamental 
than matter, such that "matter is a peculiar sort of mind" (R 936:3,
no date).
 ET: This is very different from Peirce's hylomorphism.
 As far as I know, Peirce never describes his own position as
"hylomorphism." Instead, he states the following (bold added). 
 CSP: The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of
objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits
becoming physical laws. (CP 6.25, 1891)
 CSP: ... if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete
mind,--mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act
with almost perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of
forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the more elevating
theory of  idealism. (R 936:3, no date)
 CSP: I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an
evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and
of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a
Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere
specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP 6.102, 1892) 
 If André is an idealist in this sense, then he is in good company
with Peirce himself.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist
Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 6:30 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Robert, list

Thanks for the quotations. 

My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind and
Matter. Each has their own 'scientific method' so to speak, but I've
no idea how they interact. This is very different from Peirce's
hylomorphism.

Edwina  


Links:
--
[1] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[3] mailto:tabor...@primus.ca
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS, list

Thank you for your detailed response about idealism - but- we are
not all undergraduates on this list!

I was specifically asking Helmut why HE - not Peirce - but HELMUT,
differentiated between Platonic idealism and Platonic realism.

As for De Tienne, my interpretation of HIS outline is that it is not
the same as Peirce's; therefore, your quotations from Peirce don't
deal with my concerns. 

Equally - I didn't ask about Peirce's theories of evolution - and he
does agree with evolution. My question concerned PLATO'S views on
evolution. 

With regard to Peirce's 'careful terminology' - I don't see this
followed in De Tienne's outline. 

Edwina
 On Thu 19/08/21  9:59 AM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Helmut, List:
 ET: The problem that I have with this slide of De Tienne, is that it
seems to be operating within a Platonic idealism, where a pre-existent
Form 'exists' [as that form/format/ without matter] and is then
articulated within existential material reality.
 Where does André state or imply that a form  exists prior to and
apart from its actualization? On the contrary, in accordance with
Peirce's careful terminology, existence and actuality are
coextensive--a form does not exist unless and until it is actualized,
but some forms are real by virtue of merely being capable of
actualization. Moreover, everything that does exist is an
instantiation of such forms.
  ET: I'm not sure of the difference between Platonic idealism and
Platonic realism.
 Peirce helpfully explains it.
 CSP: In the usual sense of the word reality, therefore, Berkeley's
doctrine is that the reality of sensible things resides only in their
archetypes in the divine mind. This is Platonistic, but it is not
realistic. On the contrary, since it places reality wholly out of the
mind in the cause of sensations, and since it denies reality (in the
true sense of the word) to sensible things in so far as they are
sensible, it is distinctly nominalistic. Historically there have been
prominent examples of an alliance between nominalism and Platonism.
(CP 8.30, 1871) 
 Berkeley was an idealist, but a nominalist rather than a realist. He
affirmed that mind is more fundamental than matter, but went a step
farther by effectively denying that matter is real at all. That is
why he is properly classified as a subjective idealist, while Peirce
describes himself as an objective idealist, as well as an extreme
scholastic realist.
  HR: Did he [Peirce] say that all abstract forms too are due to
evolution, or only some natural laws?
 ET: And I'm unaware that Platonism includes evolution.
 Peirce's cosmology indeed explicitly includes the evolution of
"Platonic forms," as well as the emergence of our existing universe
as an instantiation of an entire "Platonic world." 
 CSP: From this point of view we must suppose that the existing
universe, with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or
an arbitrary determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world;
not that our superior logic has enabled us to reach up to a world of
forms to which the real universe, with its feebler logic, was
inadequate. (CP 6.192, 1898)
 CSP: The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of
the existing universe, but rather a process by which the very Platonic
forms themselves have become or are becoming developed. (CP 6.194,
1898)
 CSP: In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of
evolution at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe,
that locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the
whole Platonic world, which in itself is equally real, is
evolutionary in its origin, too. (CP 6.200, 1898) 
 CSP: At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the
order of the existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of
which we are, therefore, to conceive that there are many, both
coordinated and subordinated to one another; until finally out of one
of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual
universe of existence in which we happen to be. (CP 6.208, 1898) 
 The positive sciences seek to understand our existing universe,
while the hypothetical science of pure mathematics seeks to
understand those Platonic worlds.
 CSP: True, in the world of real experience, "never" has at least an
approximate meaning. But in the Platonic world of pure forms with
which mathematics is always dealing, "never" can only mean "not
consistently with ___." (CP 4.118, 1893) 
 CSP: All this crowd of creators of forms for which the real world
affords no parallel, each man arbitrarily following his own sweet
will, are, as we now begin to discern, gradually uncovering one great
cosmos of forms, a world of potential being. The pure mathematician
himself feels that this is so. ... But if you enjoy the good fortune
of talking with a number of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET: Your definition of 'tribalism' - which is unique to you, means, as far
as I can understand it, that tribalism refers to a perspective that is held
by a number of people.


As I understand it, tribalism in this context is a sociological phenomenon
in which people affirm or deny statements by others primarily based on
whether or not the person making them is perceived to be a member of the
same "tribe," rather than the substance of the statements themselves.

ET: The quotation you provided, in my view, contradicts De Tienne's
idealistic outline where he separates Mind and Matter into two 'scientific'
 realms: Mathematics and Phaneroscopy.


Where does André *even once* use the terminology of mind and matter in
distinguishing mathematics and phaneroscopy? As I have noted previously (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00144.html), the
modern distinction between *mind *and matter does not even arise in these
sciences, only in metaphysics and the special sciences (psychical and
physical). However, as I have also noted previously (
https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-08/msg00157.html), the
Aristotelian distinction between *form *and matter is relevant because the
phaneroscopist is *applying *mathematics when representing and drawing
necessary conclusions from an idealized form whose matter is supposed to be
something that is present to the mind in some way.

ET: The Peircean quote on the other hand refers to the categories or 'modes
of being' and points out that 'life' includes all three - and they are not
operationally separate.


No one is claiming that Peirce's three universal categories are
"operationally separate," only affirming--as he did in the quoted passage
and elsewhere--that they can be prescinded from each other in just one
direction; namely, 2ns from 3ns, and 1ns from both 2ns and 3ns.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 9:06 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary F, list
>
> 1] Your definition of 'tribalism' - which is unique to you, means, as far
> as I can understand it, that tribalism refers to a perspective that is held
> by a number of people. What you are misunderstanding is that this
> perspective might be valid, logical, rational. After all, we, for the most
> part, hold the perspective that some illnesses are caused by germs. Does
> this mean that the scientists who hold this view do so because the
> Conclusion is valid, or because 'they are members of a tribe'?
>
> 2] The quotation you provided, in my view, contradicts De Tienne's
> idealistic outline where he separates Mind and Matter into two 'scientific'
>  realms: Mathematics and Phaneroscopy. The Peircean quote on the other
> hand refers to the categories or 'modes of being' and points out
> that 'life' includes all three - and they are not operationally separate.
>
> Edwina
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET: My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind and
Matter.


That is not what it means to be an idealist, at least according to Peirce's
definitions. Instead, someone who *separates *mind and matter is either
a dualist or a neutralist, and someone who treats mind and matter as
continuous is either a materialist or an idealist.

CSP: The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly
find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some form of
hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises whether
physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the other are to be
taken--
(a) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I would name
*neutralism*; or,
(b) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law alone as
primordial, which is *materialism*; or,
(c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law alone as
primordial, which is *idealism*. (CP 6.24, 1891)


An idealist is thus someone who holds that mind is *more fundamental* than
matter, such that "*matter *is a peculiar sort of *mind*" (R 936:3, no
date).

ET: This is very different from Peirce's hylomorphism.


As far as I know, Peirce *never *describes his own position as
"hylomorphism." Instead, he states the following (bold added).

CSP: The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective
*idealism*, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical
laws. (CP 6.25, 1891)

CSP: ... if, on the other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so
completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect
regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we
are brought to the more elevating theory of *idealism*. (R 936:3, no date)

CSP: I have begun by showing that *tychism *must give birth to an
evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind
are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned
*idealism *which
holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind. (CP 6.102,
1892)


If André is an idealist in this sense, then he is in good company with
Peirce himself.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 6:30 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Robert, list
>
> Thanks for the quotations.
>
> My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind and
> Matter. Each has their own 'scientific method' so to speak, but I've no
> idea how they interact. This is very different from Peirce's hylomorphism.
>
> Edwina
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Gary F, list

1] Your definition of 'tribalism' - which is unique to you, means,
as far as I can understand it, that tribalism refers to a perspective
that is held by a number of people. What you are misunderstanding is
that this perspective might be valid, logical, rational. After all,
we, for the most part, hold the perspective that some illnesses are
caused by germs. Does this mean that the scientists who hold this
view do so because the Conclusion is valid, or because 'they are
members of a tribe'?

2] The quotation you provided, in my view, contradicts De Tienne's
idealistic outline where he separates Mind and Matter into two
'scientific'  realms: Mathematics and Phaneroscopy. The Peircean
quote on the other hand refers to the categories or 'modes of being'
and points out that 'life' includes all three - and they are not
operationally separate.

Edwina
 On Thu 19/08/21  9:50 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another
example of what I meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group
of people as a tribe opposed to your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I
suppose). This dualistic (and  duelistic) practice overrides the
“Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something about
phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism”
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the
way, I regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem
with your crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what
is (to any dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what
ADT’s text. Your own posts have made that motivation pretty clear,
so I won’t comment on it here.  

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than
your highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons
against the other tribe. Specifically, the relation between
“possibility” and “Firstness” in Peirce’s actual usage of
those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if we want to
learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like
to add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is
from one of Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context,
namely the third Lowell Lecture of 1903, is online here: 
https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 [1] . The question about
“possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:
CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction
which affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness
more than it does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the
circumstance that where you have a triplet  ∴ you have 3 pairs; and
where you have a pair, you have 2 units. Thus, Secondness is an
essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and Firstness is
an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there is
such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness
of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no
Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the
purest conceptions you can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness
(thinking of quality, reaction, and mediation), what you are striving
to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness of Secondness — that
is what Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of Thirdness.
… 

A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It
is perfectly simple and without parts; and everything has its
quality. Thus the tragedy of King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor
sui generis. That wherein all such qualities agree is universal
Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word possibility fits it,
except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, while
universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new
word was required for it. Otherwise, “possibility” would have
answered the purpose. … 

To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color
of mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as
good as any, poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three
kinds of Firstness, qualitative possibility, existence, mentality,
resulting from applying Firstness to the three categories. We might
strike new words for them: primity, secundity, tertiality. [end CSP
quote] 
Gary f.
 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 On Behalf Of robert marty
 Sent: 19-Aug-21 05:03
List,

 No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from
ADT supporters.
  ADT >

•   The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form, which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from positivization.

 •  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of
the classification of the sciences is a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, Helmut, List:

ET: The problem that I have with this slide of De Tienne, is that it seems
to be operating within a Platonic idealism, where a pre-existent Form
'exists' [as that form/format/ without matter] and is then articulated
within existential material reality.


Where does André state or imply that a form *exists *prior to and apart
from its actualization? On the contrary, in accordance with Peirce's
careful terminology, existence and actuality are coextensive--a form does
not *exist *unless and until it is actualized, but some forms are *real *by
virtue of merely being *capable *of actualization. Moreover, everything
that *does *exist is an *instantiation *of such forms.

ET: I'm not sure of the difference between Platonic idealism and Platonic
realism.


Peirce helpfully explains it.

CSP: In the usual sense of the word *reality*, therefore, Berkeley's
doctrine is that the reality of sensible things resides only in their
archetypes in the divine mind. This is Platonistic, but it is not
realistic. On the contrary, since it places reality wholly out of the mind
in the cause of sensations, and since it denies reality (in the true sense
of the word) to sensible things in so far as they are sensible, it is
distinctly nominalistic. Historically there have been prominent examples of
an alliance between nominalism and Platonism. (CP 8.30, 1871)


Berkeley was an idealist, but a nominalist rather than a realist. He
affirmed that mind is more fundamental than matter, but went a step farther
by effectively denying that matter is real at all. That is why he is
properly classified as a *subjective *idealist, while Peirce describes
himself as an *objective *idealist, as well as an extreme scholastic
realist.

HR: Did he [Peirce] say that all abstract forms too are due to evolution,
or only some natural laws?


ET: And I'm unaware that Platonism includes evolution.


Peirce's cosmology indeed explicitly includes the evolution of "Platonic
forms," as well as the emergence of our existing universe as an
instantiation of an entire "Platonic world."

CSP: From this point of view we must suppose that the existing universe,
with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary
determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world; not that our superior
logic has enabled us to reach up to a world of forms to which the real
universe, with its feebler logic, was inadequate. (CP 6.192, 1898)


CSP: The evolutionary process is, therefore, not a mere evolution of
the *existing
universe*, but rather a process by which the very Platonic forms themselves
have become or are becoming developed. (CP 6.194, 1898)

CSP: In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of
evolution at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that
locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole
Platonic world, which in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its
origin, too. (CP 6.200, 1898)

CSP: At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of
the existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are,
therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and
subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic
worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
which we happen to be. (CP 6.208, 1898)


The *positive *sciences seek to understand our existing universe,
while the *hypothetical
*science of pure mathematics seeks to understand those Platonic worlds.

CSP: True, in the world of real experience, "never" has at least an
approximate meaning. But in the Platonic world of pure forms with which
mathematics is always dealing, "never" can only mean "not consistently with
___." (CP 4.118, 1893)

CSP: All this crowd of creators of forms for which the real world affords
no parallel, each man arbitrarily following his own sweet will, are, as we
now begin to discern, gradually uncovering one great cosmos of forms, a
world of potential being. The pure mathematician himself feels that this is
so. ... But if you enjoy the good fortune of talking with a number of
mathematicians of a high order, you will find that the typical pure
mathematician is a sort of Platonist. Only, he is [a] Platonist who
corrects the Heraclitan error that the eternal is not continuous. The
eternal is for him a world, a cosmos, in which the universe of actual
existence is nothing but an arbitrary locus. The end that pure mathematics
is pursuing is to discover that real potential world. (CP 1.646, 1898)


Platonic worlds are *potential*, not *actual*; and some of them are *real*,
but none of them *exist *except as instantiated in our particular universe.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Aug 19, 2021 at 6:24 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list
>
> I'm not sure of the 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[gnox]

Robert, your opening shot at “ADT supporters” is yet another example of what I 
meant by “tribalism”: lumping together a group of people as a tribe opposed to 
your tribe (“ADT opponents”, I suppose). This dualistic (and duelistic) 
practice overrides the “Will to Learn” (Peirce’s capitalization) something 
about phaneroscopy through dialogue. (Attempts to define “tribalism” 
differently are, in my view, mere quibbles about terminology.) By the way, I 
regard this tribalism as merely a symptom of the root problem with your 
crusade, which lies in the motivation for insisting on what is (to any 
dispassionate reader) an egregious misreading of what ADT’s text. Your own 
posts have made that motivation pretty clear, so I won’t comment on it here. 

The quotes you provide could serve a better purpose, though, than your 
highlighting of the parts you think will serve as weapons against the other 
tribe. Specifically, the relation between “possibility” and “Firstness” in 
Peirce’s actual usage of those terms is worth a close and unprejudiced look if 
we want to learn something about his “phaneroscopy.” To that end, I’d like to 
add another quotation, which is especially relevant because it is from one of 
Peirce’s core texts on phenomenology. The context, namely the third Lowell 
Lecture of 1903, is online here: https://gnusystems.ca/Lowell3.htm#1530 . The 
question about “possibility” arises in the second paragraph of this selection:

 

CSP: But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which 
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it 
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you 
have a triplet ∴ you have 3 pairs; and where you have a pair, you have 2 units. 
Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and 
Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and Thirdness. Hence there 
is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness and such a thing as the 
Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing as the Secondness of 
Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure Firstness and no Thirdness of 
pure Firstness or Secondness. When you strive to get the purest conceptions you 
can of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (thinking of quality, reaction, and 
mediation), what you are striving to apprehend is pure Firstness, the Firstness 
of Secondness — that is what Secondness is, of itself — and the Firstness of 
Thirdness. …

A Firstness is exemplified in every quality of a total feeling. It is perfectly 
simple and without parts; and everything has its quality. Thus the tragedy of 
King Lear has its Firstness, its flavor sui generis. That wherein all such 
qualities agree is universal Firstness, the very being of Firstness. The word 
possibility fits it, except that possibility implies a relation to what exists, 
while universal Firstness is the mode of being of itself. That is why a new 
word was required for it. Otherwise, “possibility” would have answered the 
purpose. …

To express the Firstness of Thirdness, the peculiar flavor or color of 
mediation, we have no really good word. Mentality is, perhaps, as good as any, 
poor and inadequate as it is. Here, then, are three kinds of Firstness, 
qualitative possibility, existence, mentality, resulting from applying 
Firstness to the three categories. We might strike new words for them: primity, 
secundity, tertiality. [end CSP quote]

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of robert marty
Sent: 19-Aug-21 05:03



 

List,

No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from ADT supporters.

 

 ADT >

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the actualization 
of a special form, which can be rendered into the term positiveness, an 
abstraction resulting from positivization.

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the 
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will explore that 
resulting positiveness (or secondization).

 CSP >

 "I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or Possibles,although the 
latter designation does not imply capability of actualization. On the contrary 
as a general rule, if not a universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect 
actualization on account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For 
that which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially 
vague. For example, geometrical figures belong to this Universe; now since 
every such figure involves lines which can only be supposed to exist as 
boundaries where three bodies come together, or to be the place common to three 
bodies, and since the boundary of a solid or liquid is merely the place at 
which its forces of cohesion are neither very great nor very small, which is 
essentially vague, it is plain that the idea is essentially vague or 
indefinite. Moreover, suppose the three bodies that come together at a line are 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Robert, list

Thanks for the quotations. 

My view of De Tienne is that he is an idealist, separating Mind and
Matter. Each has their own 'scientific method' so to speak, but I've
no idea how they interact. This is very different from Peirce's
hylomorphism.

Edwina
 On Thu 19/08/21  5:03 AM , robert marty robert.mart...@gmail.com
sent:
List,

 No comment; submitted for all to examine. Expected response from
ADT supporters.
 ADT >
•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form, which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from positivization. 

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will
explore that resulting positiveness (or secondization). 

 CSP >
 "I denominate the objects of this Universe Ideas, or
Possibles,although the latter designation does not imply capability
of actualization. On the contrary as a general rule, if not a
universal one, an Idea is incapable of perfect actualization on
account of its essential vagueness if for no other reason. For that
which is not subject to the principle of contradiction is essentially
vague. For example, geometrical figures belong to this Universe; now
since every such figure involves lines which can only be supposed to
exist as boundaries where three bodies come together, or to be the
place common to three bodies, and since the boundary of a solid or
liquid is merely the place at which its forces of cohesion are
neither very great nor very small, which is essentially vague, it is
plain that the idea is essentially vague or indefinite. Moreover,
suppose the three bodies that come together at a line are wood,
water, and air, then a whole space including this line is at every
point either wood, water, or air; and neither wood and water, nor
wood and air, nor water and air can together occupy any place. Then
plainly the principle of contradiction, were it applicable, would be
violated in the idea of a place where wood, water, and air, come
together. Similar antinomies affect all Ideas. We can only reason
about them in respects which the antinomies do not affect, and often
by arbitrarily assuming what upon closer examination is found to be
absurd. There is this much truth in Hegel's doctrine, although he is
frequently in error in applying the principle." (EP2 479) [emphasize
mine]
  
  
  

 "But, further, although usually appearances are either only
confirmed or merely supplemented by testimony, yet there is a certain
remarkable class of appearances which are continually contradicted by
testimony. These are those predicates which we know to be emotional,
but which he distinguishes by their connection with the movements of
that central person, himself (that the table wants moving, etc.)
These judgments are generally denied by others. Moreover, he has
reason to think that others, also, have such judgments which are
quite denied by all the rest. Thus, he adds to the conception of
appearance as the actualization of fact, the conception of it as
something private and valid only for one body. In short, error
appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is
fallible."(CP 5.234)[ Peirce emphasize italic words; emphasize by
bold mine] 

NB by RM  >  

None of the terms, "positivization" and "secondization" appears in
CP, EP2, NEM III/2, NEM 4.   

 Regards, 

Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; Ph.D. Mathematics ; Ph.D.
Philosophy 
 fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty [1]
 https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ [2]
 Le mer. 18 août 2021 à 16:20,  a écrit :
 Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [4] site. 

Gary f.
 Text:   Toward Positiveness

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form, which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from positivization.

 •  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of
the classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will
explore that resulting positiveness (or secondization).

•  One way of putting it is by wondering very simply
“How do some of the non-arbitrary forms that mathematics has made
out actually  MANIFEST themselves within ‘experience’ in
general?”

•  More fundamentally: how do certain mathematical forms
manage to structure the dough, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut, list

I'm not sure of the difference between Platonic idealism and
Platonic realism.

And I'm unaware that Platonism includes evolution. 

Edwina
 On Wed 18/08/21 11:49 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, List   I think it is not platonic idealism or platonism,
but platonic realism, which suggests abstract forms as preexisting
ideas or universals, but not blueprints for existing objects or
ethical and esthetical matters, which too Platon claimed to be
preexisting ideas.   About the tribalistic question, whether Peirce
was a platonic realist or not: I dont know: Did he say that all
abstract forms too are due to evolution, or only some natural laws?
Anyway, he must have known, that this theory (natural laws being due
to evoluton) is not treatable with the scientific method, is
speculation. Why this speculation? Maybe he wanted to distinguish
himself from the platonic tribe, and start his own tribe?Best,
Helmut   18. August 2021 um 19:27 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

List 

The problem that I have with this slide of De Tienne, is that it
seems to be operating within a Platonic idealism, where a
pre-existent Form 'exists' [as that form/format/ without matter] and
is then articulated within existential material reality. That's not
Peirce's hylomorphism which doesn't separate Mind and Matter --- 

Secondly I don't see Peircean Firstness as an ideal form, but as an
open free force-to-be-actualized but itself lacking the format of
that actualization, because actualization within a stable Form only
materializes within Thirdness. 

What does mathematics do, in my understanding of the Peircean
analysis? It is a rational action where the mathematician, after
observing the phaneron, analyzes 'what's going on' and develops
formulae, diagrams, relational maps...to explain these actualities.
And then, as any good scientist would do, he tests these analyses
within the actualities of the phaneron, to see whether his formulae
do actually explain 'what's going on'. 

De Tienne seems to have a different perspective. As I read or
misunderstand his post, he sees that what I am calling 'formulae' are
actual Forms that exist as some kind of non-material idea per se and
then, 'become positive' or actual. That's Platonic idealism. I don't
see this as Peirce. 

Edwina 
 On Wed 18/08/21 10:19 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site.  

Gary f. 
Text:   Toward Positiveness 

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form , which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from  positivization. 

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will
explore that resulting positiveness (or secondization). 

•  One way of putting it is by wondering very simply
“How do some of the non-arbitrary forms that mathematics has made
out actually MANIFEST themselves within ‘experience’ in
general?” 

•  More fundamentally: how do certain mathematical forms
manage to  structure the dough, not of this or that in experience,
but of “experiencing” itself (the experiencing of experience)?   
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[John F. Sowa]

Gary F, List,

That's a good summary of what ADT wrote.  But
good examples are far
more important than more jargon.  I can't see
any justification for
ADT's jargon.

GF:  But De Tienne
chooses to emphasize the primacy of mathematics,
and thus presents
“positiveness” as a result of a process that started
with mathematics
(form “structures the dough,” as he puts it.  He
calls the process
“secondization” not only because it introduces the
element of
Secondness,

I liked your cedar tree because it enables us to
talk about concrete
experience instead of jargon.

In my
earlier note I showed the huge amount of experience in your
phaneron,
of which the cedar tree was just a part.  And no where did
it show
any need to go beyond mathematics.

Can you or anybody else show
what ADT is talking about in terms of the
cedar tree?
John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

List

The problem that I have with this slide of De Tienne, is that it
seems to be operating within a Platonic idealism, where a
pre-existent Form 'exists' [as that form/format/ without matter] and
is then articulated within existential material reality. That's not
Peirce's hylomorphism which doesn't separate Mind and Matter --- 

Secondly I don't see Peircean Firstness as an ideal form, but as an
open free force-to-be-actualized but itself lacking the format of
that actualization, because actualization within a stable Form only
materializes within Thirdness.

What does mathematics do, in my understanding of the Peircean
analysis? It is a rational action where the mathematician, after
observing the phaneron, analyzes 'what's going on' and develops
formulae, diagrams, relational maps...to explain these actualities.
And then, as any good scientist would do, he tests these analyses
within the actualities of the phaneron, to see whether his formulae
do actually explain 'what's going on'.

De Tienne seems to have a different perspective. As I read or
misunderstand his post, he sees that what I am calling 'formulae' are
actual Forms that exist as some kind of non-material idea per se and
then, 'become positive' or actual. That's Platonic idealism. I don't
see this as Peirce.

Edwina
 On Wed 18/08/21 10:19 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of
André De Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project
(iupui.edu) [1]  site. 

Gary f.
Text:   Toward Positiveness

•  The actualization of firsts or possibilia includes the
actualization of a special form , which can be rendered into the term
positiveness, an abstraction resulting from positivization.

•  THEREFORE, what follows mathematics in the order of the
classification of the sciences is a scientific activity that will
explore that resulting positiveness (or secondization).

 •  One way of putting it is by wondering very simply
“How do some of the non-arbitrary forms that mathematics has made
out actually MANIFEST themselves within ‘experience’ in
general?”

•  More fundamentally: how do certain mathematical forms
manage to  structure the dough, not of this or that in experience,
but of “experiencing” itself (the experiencing of experience)? 


Links:
--
[1] https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations
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