RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[gnox]

List,

I must apologize to the list for introducing the term "dot" into this
discussion, as Peirce actually uses that term not in Lowell 2, but in some
of his other explanations of existential graphs, notably CP 4.438:

"Let a heavy dot or dash be used in place of a noun which has been erased
from a proposition. A blank form of proposition produced by such erasures as
can be filled, each with a proper name, to make a proposition again, is
called a rhema, or, relatively to the proposition of which it is conceived
to be a part, the predicate of that proposition."

In Lowell 2.13, Peirce refers to this heavy dot as a "decidedly marked
point":

"Since the blackboard, or the sheet of assertion, represents the universe of
discourse, and since this universe is a collection of individuals, it seems
reasonable that any decidedly marked point of the sheet should stand for a
single individual; so that . should mean "'something exists'." (The dot
between "that" and "should" may not even be visible in some mail readers,
which could cause even more confusion!)

With this in mind, I will copy 2.14 here again, but with some interpolations
of my own (in a contrasting font) that will try to clear up the confusion
regarding the analysis of propositions as represented in EGs. 

Gary f.

Continuing from Lowell 2.13,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-low
ell-lecture-ii/display/13620

 

You will ask me what use I propose to make of this sign that something
exists, a fact that graphist and interpreter took for granted at the outset.


Gf: The point marked with a dot, . , like a blank in a rheme, represents
some individual which can serve as a subject of a proposition. In that
respect it is equivalent to a demonstrative pronoun, or a proper name the
first time it is heard, in ordinary language. But in this lecture Peirce
introduces this "decidedly marked point" . before introducing the rheme or
spot which represents the predicate. This has the effect of emphasizing the
fact that . denotes an individual subject within the universe of discourse.

 

CSP: I will show you that the sign will be useful as long as we agree that
although different points on the sheet may denote the same individual, yet
different individuals cannot be denoted by the same point on the sheet. 

Gf: This entails that a line made up of . points can denote a single
individual, and this becomes the "line of identity" in EGs.

 

CSP: If we take any proposition, say 

A sinner kills a saint

and if we erase portions of it, so as to leave it a blank form of
proposition, the blanks being such that if every one of them is filled with
a proper name, a proposition will result, such as 

__ kills a saint 
A sinner kills __ 
__ kills __

where Cain and Abel might for example fill the blanks, then such a blank
form, as well as the complete proposition, is called a rheme (provided it be
neither [by] logical necessity true of everything nor true of nothing, but
this limitation may be disregarded). If it has one blank it is called a
monad rheme, if two a dyad, if three a triad, if none a medad (from μηδέν). 

Gf: In the linguistic expression of a proposition, a "proper name" (or a
pronoun) can serve as a subject while the rest of the sentence is the
predicate. In the "blank form" of a proposition, the "blank" occupies the
place of the subject which in EG notation is a "marked point" .. But notice
that a common noun, such as "sinner" or "saint" in Peirce's examples above,
is not a subject but is part of the predicate, or rheme. Thus a complete
proposition which includes only general terms is still a rheme, a medad with
no blanks. The number of blanks is the "valency" or 'adicity' of the rheme,
the number of individual subjects it can take (such as Cain or Abel or ..
Translating this into ordinary language about propositions, common nouns and
verbs together (along with some structure words and modifiers) make up the
predicate, and it can take any number of subjects, but each of these must be
an individual denotable by a proper name or a demonstrative pronoun.

 

CSP: Now such a rheme being neither logically necessary nor logically
impossible, as a part of a graph without being represented as a combination
by any of the signs of the system, is called a lexis and each replica of the
lexis is called a spot. (Lexis is the Greek for a single word and a lexis in
this system corresponds to a single verb in speech. The plural of lexis is
preferably lexeis rather than lexises.) 

Gf: After this, Peirce very rarely used the term "lexis", but consistently
used both "rheme" (or rhema) and "spot" to denote this aspect of the EG
system. (That's why I made my parenthetical remark about not confusing the
"spot" with the "dot", which appears to have caused the very confusion I was
trying to avoid!) 

 

CSP: Such a spot has a particular point on its periphery appropriated to
each and every one of its blanks. Those points, which, you 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[kirstima]

Gary f. wrote:

- “Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness”

and “Thirdness” are all technical terms of Peircean phenomenology...


Many mistakes in this. - Just offer one example where CSP explicitly 
states that these are TECHNICAL TERMS. (If you can.)


Categories concern definitely not only Peircean phenomenology. Which 
present A PART embedded in Peirce's philosphy.


He continues:

..which also have “meanings” (i.e. intensions) in ordinary language.


The question of MEANING cannot be reduced just to intensions, especially 
not into those in ordinary language.


With CSP we are dealing with PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY, not just ordinary 
language.


Then he continues:


"As Peirce said and wrote repeatedly, the last three are concepts which
are extremely difficult to grasp;"


Are you making a claim that Categories and Elements are not concepts? Or 
are claiming that they are easy to understand?


It seems to me you get into difficulties with all of them, not just the 
last three.


To me they have all become quite easy. After harduous work, of cource.

The way you both Gary's are dealing with legitimate questions posed by 
Jerry F. Chandler seems to me just evasive, at best.


Best,

Kirsti

P.S. I am not asking for "detailed explanations". I wish to be saved 
from such.


g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 27.11.2017 00:01:

Jerry, Kirsti, list,

“Spot”, “dot” and “blot” are three of the many technical
terms used by Peirce to explain his system of existential graphs.
Peirce has given both visual examples and definitions of all three in
those parts of Lowell Lecture 2 which I have posted to the list. If
you are confused about their exact role in the EG system, you probably
need to review Lowell 2 by studying the complete text, which is online
at http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm [1] . Secondary sources such as
Roberts are also helpful, but you need to study them carefully in
order to see how the system elucidates Peirce’s logic of relations,
and perhaps set aside your preconceptions about the meanings of key
terms.

“Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness”
and “Thirdness” are all technical terms of Peircean phenomenology
which also have “meanings” (i.e. intensions) in ordinary language.
As Peirce said and wrote repeatedly, the last three are concepts which
are extremely difficult to grasp; sometimes the ordinary-language
meanings of terms listed above are helpful, and sometimes they are
misleading. These concepts are pretty much unique to Peirce, so you
have to pay close attention to Peirce’s usage of them _in context_
if you want to understand what they mean. Lowell Lecture 3 is one of
his most extensive and cogent explanations of his phenomenology, which
is (from 1902 on) foundational to both his logic and his
classification of signs. This will all be discussed in connection with
Lowell Lecture 3, and I don’t have time now for dozens of examples
and detailed explanations of these points, so that’s all I’ll say
about them for now.

My previous commentary on 2.14 consisted mostly of direct quotations
from Peirce and some factual observations about the sources of those
quotations, which I identified in the post. Kirsti, it’s not clear
what you are disagreeing with, or what exactly you think I am
“mistaken” about. If you will quote my words that you disagree
with, I’ll try to resolve the disagreement. But if you don’t
believe that Peirce used both “categories” and “elements” as
terms referring to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, I think you
need to read the Peirce texts (especially the Lowells and the Syllabus
texts given in EP2) and see for yourself. As I said, I don’t have
time right now to search out and paste in dozens of examples to
demonstrate what should be obvious from a careful reading of Peirce.
The question of _why_ Peirce chose the terms that he did is
interesting, but I’ll leave that for the discussion of Lowell 3. If
you want to get a head start on that, there’s a fairly large chunk
from Lowell 3 starting at CP 1.343.

And finally, my comments on the Lowell bits I’m posting are just
that, comments — they are not meant to be a substitute for reading
the actual Peirce texts, and probably don’t make much sense to those
who haven’t read those Peirce texts.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 26-Nov-17 08:29
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

Gary f.,

Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different
meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about
terminonology. They are not synonyms.

But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names
for classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.

If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:


Kirsti, you asked why my post 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[gnox]

Jerry, Kirsti, list,

 

“Spot”, “dot” and “blot” are three of the many technical terms used by Peirce 
to explain his system of existential graphs. Peirce has given both visual 
examples and definitions of all three in those parts of Lowell Lecture 2 which 
I have posted to the list. If you are confused about their exact role in the EG 
system, you probably need to review Lowell 2 by studying the complete text, 
which is online at http://gnusystems.ca/Lowell2.htm . Secondary sources such as 
Roberts are also helpful, but you need to study them carefully in order to see 
how the system elucidates Peirce’s logic of relations, and perhaps set aside 
your preconceptions about the meanings of key terms.

 

“Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness” and “Thirdness” are all 
technical terms of Peircean phenomenology which also have “meanings” (i.e. 
intensions) in ordinary language. As Peirce said and wrote repeatedly, the last 
three are concepts which are extremely difficult to grasp; sometimes the 
ordinary-language meanings of terms listed above are helpful, and sometimes 
they are misleading. These concepts are pretty much unique to Peirce, so you 
have to pay close attention to Peirce’s usage of them in context if you want to 
understand what they mean. Lowell Lecture 3 is one of his most extensive and 
cogent explanations of his phenomenology, which is (from 1902 on) foundational 
to both his logic and his classification of signs. This will all be discussed 
in connection with Lowell Lecture 3, and I don’t have time now for dozens of 
examples and detailed explanations of these points, so that’s all I’ll say 
about them for now.

 

My previous commentary on 2.14 consisted mostly of direct quotations from 
Peirce and some factual observations about the sources of those quotations, 
which I identified in the post. Kirsti, it’s not clear what you are disagreeing 
with, or what exactly you think I am “mistaken” about. If you will quote my 
words that you disagree with, I’ll try to resolve the disagreement. But if you 
don’t believe that Peirce used both “categories” and “elements” as terms 
referring to Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, I think you need to read the 
Peirce texts (especially the Lowells and the Syllabus texts given in EP2) and 
see for yourself. As I said, I don’t have time right now to search out and 
paste in dozens of examples to demonstrate what should be obvious from a 
careful reading of Peirce. The question of why Peirce chose the terms that he 
did is interesting, but I’ll leave that for the discussion of Lowell 3. If you 
want to get a head start on that, there’s a fairly large chunk from Lowell 3 
starting at CP 1.343.

 

And finally, my comments on the Lowell bits I’m posting are just that, comments 
— they are not meant to be a substitute for reading the actual Peirce texts, 
and probably don’t make much sense to those who haven’t read those Peirce texts.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 26-Nov-17 08:29
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

 

Gary f.,

 

Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different meaning. 
It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about terminonology. They are not 
synonyms.

 

But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names for 
classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.

 

If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.

 

Kirsti

 

 <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:

> Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in quotation 

> marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for Firstness, 

> Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898.

> In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the 

> term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for instance. I’m 

> drawing attention to the shift in terminology because I think it 

> reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly evident in 

> Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on.

> 

> As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it should 

> be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I can add 

> anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in the 

> terminology of EGs.

> 

> Gary f.

> 

 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry, list,

JC quoted me:

GR: I have no idea where this peculiar comment  (GF appearing "to avoid the
basic logic of CSP" and his interpretations appearing "to be remote from
other interpreters of CSP writings) might mean, nor where it is coming
from.


Then commented: JC: "H…   “… no idea”???

I had continued in the snippet JC quoted above:

GR: Can you offer support for your comments Jerry? Just a few examples
would do for us to mull over what you might have in mind.


I still have no idea what your point is, Jerry. I think when you make such
really startling comments such as Gary Fuhrman is "avoiding the *basic
logic* of Peirce" and that his interpretations are "remote from other
interpreters" of Peirce that the onus is on *you* to: 1. provide examples
where GF's interpretations 'avoid P's logic' or 2. 'are remote from other
interpreters' take on the Lowell's we'tr considering, and then 3. show us
how these intepretations 'avoid P's logic' and, as well, 4  provide
examples of other interpretations of the same (or at least equivalent)
material that 'are remote' from GF's.

You have so far not even done 1. and 2. let alone 3. and 4. Until you do
that you appear to me to be disparaging Gary's thinking with no solid
support for your opinion. What you have written doesn't--at least
yet--directly relate to Gary's interpretations.

Btw, through my involvement with the SPIN project (and discussing some of
this with NYC based Peirceans), I know Peirce scholars who would tend to
disagree with your assessment of Gary's interpretations because I've
discussed some of them with them.

So, please, offer us some passages from Gary F's interpretations with which
you disagree  (which is what I meant by "examples" in my earlier post),
interpretations which either do *not* employ Peirce's logic, or, are *not
supported* by the community of Peirce scholarship. Then give us evidence of
Gary's illogic and remoteness from other interpreters (as you see it).
There can really be no valuable discussion of your claims until you do
that, nor can Gary F be expected to respond to your alleged claims of his
misinterpretation.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 2:58 PM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:

> Gary R, List:
>
> On Nov 26, 2017, at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
> I have no idea where this peculiar comment  (GF appearing "to avoid the
> basic logic of CSP" and his interpretations appearing "to be remote from
> other interpreters of CSP writings) might mean, nor where it is coming from.
>
>
> H…   “… no idea”???
>
> Puzzling comment to me.
>
> I wrote, in response, not to CSP’s texts, but rather to Gary’s
> interpretations in subsequence correspondence to the questions raised by
> readers of this list.
> "While I deeply appreciate your efforts to stimulate discussions here, I
> am equally deeply concerned that your interpretations are flawed because of
> the absence of associations to the structure of logical propositions.”
> .
> This sentence is about as straight-forward as I can express myself in this
> extremely abstract domain.
> And, I provided several references to CSP and Robert’s book on Existential
> Graphs that cohere with my interpretation of the text.
>
> The essential questions that CSP is attempting to address, in my opinion,
> (see 4.438,Roberts, p. 114-115.)
> 1. What are the relationships between grammar and propositions using
> proper names?
> 2. What are the relationships between propositions and the logic of
> subject - copula - predicate with proper names?
> 3. What are the relationships between mathematical pairings (Kempe’s
> “spots”) and logical propositions with proper names?
>
> I believe that these questions are addressed in Roberts book in the pages
> cited.
>
> At this this point, I am tempted to cite Sherlock Homes, on seeking
> explanations.  "When all else fails...
>
> Is your source of drastic disconnection from CSP’s texts your views on the
> particular logics of Proper Names?
>
> Perhaps, it would be helpful for your understanding to provide a crisp
> re-cap of your logical positions on the role of Proper Names in semiotics
> and syntax and then relate your propositions to Existential Graphs and then
> relate it to the opinions of Roberts (especially on the role of Kempe’s
> logic of “spots” in relation to pairings of objects.)  [Symbolically, does
> A —> B —> C]. If A, B and C are the antecedents, are the consequences
> coherent or nonsense?
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary R, List:
> On Nov 26, 2017, at 12:56 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> I have no idea where this peculiar comment  (GF appearing "to avoid the basic 
> logic of CSP" and his interpretations appearing "to be remote from other 
> interpreters of CSP writings) might mean, nor where it is coming from.

H…   “… no idea”???

Puzzling comment to me.

I wrote, in response, not to CSP’s texts, but rather to Gary’s interpretations 
in subsequence correspondence to the questions raised by readers of this list. 
"While I deeply appreciate your efforts to stimulate discussions here, I am 
equally deeply concerned that your interpretations are flawed because of the 
absence of associations to the structure of logical propositions.”  
.
This sentence is about as straight-forward as I can express myself in this 
extremely abstract domain. 
And, I provided several references to CSP and Robert’s book on Existential 
Graphs that cohere with my interpretation of the text.

The essential questions that CSP is attempting to address, in my opinion, (see 
4.438,Roberts, p. 114-115.)
1. What are the relationships between grammar and propositions using proper 
names?
2. What are the relationships between propositions and the logic of subject - 
copula - predicate with proper names?
3. What are the relationships between mathematical pairings (Kempe’s “spots”) 
and logical propositions with proper names?

I believe that these questions are addressed in Roberts book in the pages cited.

At this this point, I am tempted to cite Sherlock Homes, on seeking 
explanations.  "When all else fails...

Is your source of drastic disconnection from CSP’s texts your views on the 
particular logics of Proper Names?

Perhaps, it would be helpful for your understanding to provide a crisp re-cap 
of your logical positions on the role of Proper Names in semiotics and syntax 
and then relate your propositions to Existential Graphs and then relate it to 
the opinions of Roberts (especially on the role of Kempe’s logic of “spots” in 
relation to pairings of objects.)  [Symbolically, does A —> B —> C]. If A, B 
and C are the antecedents, are the consequences coherent or nonsense?

Cheers

Jerry




 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Gary Richmond]

> term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for
> instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because
> I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly
> evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on.
> As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it
> should be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I
> can add anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in
> the terminology of EGs.
> Gary f.
> -----Original Message-
> From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi
> <kirst...@saunalahti.fi>]
> Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38
> To: g...@gnusystems.ca
> Cc: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14
> Gary f.,
> I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his
> "categories"??? Insted of... his categories???
> Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it
> would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is
> all about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?
> Not about just classification.
> Kirsti
> g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:
>
> List, Mary,
>
> Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with
>
> either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth
>
> comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898
>
> (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before
>
> Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness,
>
> Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more
>
> specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained
>
> "by
>
> means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the
>
> unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll
>
> include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:
>
> Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity
>
> attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion,
>
> I
>
> call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached
>
> to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs
>
> according
>
> to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads,
>
> triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete
>
> assertion,
>
> like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb,
>
> needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as
>
> --obeys mamma
>
> you obey--
>
> A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete
>
> the assertion as
>
> —OBEYS—
>
> or —IS IDENTICAL WITH—
>
> A _triad_ needs just three subjects as
>
> --gives--to--
>
> --obeys both--and--
>
> The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology:
>
> what
>
> Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or
>
> "predicate"
>
> in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the
>
> semiotic
>
> trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus,
>
> EP2:292
>
> or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here
>
> represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy
>
> dot"
>
> in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate"
>
> of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces
>
> well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph,
>
> and
>
> the interpreter of it."
>
> The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT
>
> 155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to
>
> the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold
>
> in
>
> the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of
>
> identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the
>
> line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which
>
> would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb,
>
> though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with,"
>
> its
>
> subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of
>
> the
>
> "spots."
>
> In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very
>
> different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety.
>
> Amon

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gary, Kirsti:

Your responses to the distinctions between spot, dot and blot appear to avoid 
the basic logic of CSP and also appears to be remote from other interpreters of 
CSP writings.

By your usage, Roberts appears to use the term “spot” ambiguously. (p.114-115) 
(CSP, 2003)
“Let a heavy dot or dash be used in place of a noun which has been erased from 
a proposition”
“A blank form of proposition produced by such erasures as can be filled, each 
with a proper name, to make a proposition again, is called a rhema, or, 
relatively to the proposition of which it is conceived, the predicate of that 
proposition.”

I read this passage to mean that the term “spot” is used to represent 
particular nouns (proper names) in the grammar of propositions!  Within this 
context, how can one image that, as logical terms, spot, dot and blot can be 
substituted for one another?

Gary, does CSP usage of the term “spot” in the context of this passage, 
correspond with your assertions?
A “dot” may infer a point on a line.
A blot may infer a particular (irregular) geometric form.
Can you provide examples of how you would substitute the terms “element” and 
“category” in this context?

While I deeply appreciate your efforts to stimulate discussions here, I am 
equally deeply concerned that your interpretations are flawed because of the 
absence of associations to the structure of logical propositions. 

I find Kirsti’s comments to be well poised.  Absolutely nothing is to be gained 
by avoiding CSP’s writings as a whole. 

Can anyone provide resolutions to these conundrums?

Cheers

Jerry



> On Nov 26, 2017, at 7:29 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Gary f.,
> 
> Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different 
> meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about terminonology. 
> They are not synonyms.
> 
> But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names for 
> classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.
> 
> If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.
> 
> Kirsti
> 
> g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:
>> Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in
>> quotation marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for  Firstness, 
>> Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898.
>> In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the
>> term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for
>> instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because
>> I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly
>> evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on.
>> As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it
>> should be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I
>> can add anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in
>> the terminology of EGs.
>> Gary f.
>> -Original Message-
>> From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
>> Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38
>> To: g...@gnusystems.ca
>> Cc: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14
>> Gary f.,
>> I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his
>> "categories"??? Insted of... his categories???
>> Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it
>> would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is
>> all about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?
>> Not about just classification.
>> Kirsti
>> g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:
>>> List, Mary,
>>> Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with
>>> either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth
>>> comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898
>>> (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before
>>> Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness,
>>> Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more
>>> specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained
>> "by
>>> means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the
>>> unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll
>>> include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:
>>> Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity
>>> attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion,
>> I
>>> call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached
>>> to t

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[kirstima]

Gary f.,

Seems to me you are mistaken. Categories and elements have a different 
meaning. It not just giving new names. I.e. not just about 
terminonology. They are not synonyms.


But if anyone uses  Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness  as just names 
for classes of signs, it may appear so. A most grave simplification.


If one is allowed to disagree in this discussion. Perhaps  not.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 26.11.2017 02:47:

Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in
quotation marks. It’s because that is the term Peirce used for  
Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898.

In the Lowell Lectures (and the Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the
term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in Lecture 3, for
instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology because
I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly
evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on.

As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it
should be clear enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I
can add anything to my last two posts that will clarify their usage in
the terminology of EGs.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

Gary f.,

I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his
"categories"??? Insted of... his categories???

Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it
would have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is
all about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?

Not about just classification.

Kirsti

g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:


List, Mary,







Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with



either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth



comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898



(RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before



Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness,




Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more



specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained

"by


means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the



unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll



include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:







Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity



attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion,

I


call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached




to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs

according


to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads,



triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete

assertion,


like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb,



needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as







--obeys mamma



you obey--







A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete




the assertion as







—OBEYS—



or —IS IDENTICAL WITH—







A _triad_ needs just three subjects as







--gives--to--



--obeys both--and--







The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology:

what


Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or

"predicate"


in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the

semiotic


trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus,

EP2:292


or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here



represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy

dot"


in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate"



of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces



well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph,

and


the interpreter of it."







The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT



155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to




the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold

in


the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of




identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the



line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which



would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb,



though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with,"

its


subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of

the


"spots."







In the sys

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[gnox]

Kirsti, you asked why my post about 2.14 put “categories” in quotation marks. 
It’s because that is the term Peirce used for Firstness, Secondness and 
Thirdness in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898. In the Lowell Lectures (and the 
Syllabus) of 1903, he mostly used the term “elements” instead, as we’ll see in 
Lecture 3, for instance. I’m drawing attention to the shift in terminology 
because I think it reflects to a conceptual shift that becomes increasingly 
evident in Peirce’s phenomenology from this point on. 

 

As for SPOT, DOT and BLOT, if you’ve been following Lowell 2 it should be clear 
enough how they are related; anyway, I don’t think I can add anything to my 
last two posts that will clarify their usage in the terminology of EGs.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi] 
Sent: 25-Nov-17 15:38
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

 

Gary f.,

 

I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his 
"categories"??? Insted of... his categories???

 

Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would have 
been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all about 
relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?

 

Not about just classification.

 

Kirsti

 

 

 

 

 

 <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:

> List, Mary,

> 

> Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with 

> either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth 

> comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898 

> (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before 

> Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness, 

> Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more 

> specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained "by 

> means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the 

> unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll 

> include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:

> 

> Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity 

> attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I 

> call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached 

> to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs according 

> to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads, 

> triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete assertion, 

> like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb, 

> needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as

> 

> --obeys mamma

> you obey--

> 

> A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete 

> the assertion as

> 

> —OBEYS—

> or —IS IDENTICAL WITH—

> 

> A _triad_ needs just three subjects as

> 

> --gives--to--

> --obeys both--and--

> 

> The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: what 

> Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or "predicate"

> in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the semiotic 

> trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus, EP2:292 

> or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here 

> represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy dot"

> in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate"

> of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces 

> well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph, and 

> the interpreter of it."

> 

> The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT

> 155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to 

> the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold in 

> the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of 

> identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the 

> line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which 

> would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb, 

> though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with," its 

> subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of the 

> "spots."

> 

> In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very 

> different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety.

> Among these is the

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

g...@gnusystems.ca  kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:
> List, Mary,
> Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with
> either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth
> comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898
> (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46).

> Now such a _rheme_ being neither logically necessary nor logically
> impossible, as a [part of ?] a graph without being represented as a
> combination by any of the signs of the system, is called a _lexis_ and
> each replica of the lexis is called a _spot_. (_Lexis_ is the Greek
> for a single word and a lexis in this system corresponds to a single
> verb in speech. The plural of _lexis_ is preferably _lexeis_ rather
> than _lexises_.)

Thanks, Gary, for posting these important paragraphs.
Historically, CSP’s usage of the term “spot” emerged from the ground-breaking 
paper of Alfred Bray Kempe, 1886, which had a profound effect on CSP’s views on 
the relations between logic and mathematical logic and chemical logic. 
In a crude way, Kempe “Memoir the Theory of Mathematical Forms” and later 
papers, were key to the evolution of mathematical graph theory and hence, 
modern category theory.  
see Roberts, p. 21-25 for a lengthy discussion of massive influence of Kempe’s 
concept of spot on CSP’s thought.
One critical line
“… the lines or bonds connect certain of the spots “one to one” - in ORDER TO 
DIVIDE THE REPRESENTING UNITS UNDER CONSIDERATION INTO TWO SETS: ONE SET WHOSE 
UNITS (OR PLURALITIES OF UNITS) DIFFER FROM EACH OTHER AND THE OTHER SET WHOSE 
WHOSE UNITS (OR PLURALITIES OF UNITS) DO NOT.” (My emphasis in capital letters)

The lines, Kempe claims, are NOT used to represent  “ANY RELATIONSHIP IN THE 
NATURE OF CONNEXION, BUT SIMPLY TO DISTINGUISH CERTAIN PAIRS OF THINGS FROM 
OTHER”  This leads to the separation of verbs and blanks in the sense of 
medads, monads, dyads, triads, etc

CSP appears to have interpreted these concepts in terms of "the difference that 
makes a difference” between atoms and molecules. (3.421) 

Roberts (p. 25) contrasts the propositions:
"John gives John to John."
with the symmetric structure for Ammonia, NH3, with the Nitrogen in the middle, 
connected to all three Hydrogens.
(see Figure 5 and 6, p. 25)

It is critical to observe that the verb, “gives” in the proposition, is 
replaced in the ammonia diagram with the noun, Nitrogen. 

Chemically, this substitution makes NO SENSE because Hydrogen and Nitrogen are 
on equal ontological footing as members of the table of chemical elements.

Does the partial sentence:
> (_Lexis_ is the Greek
> for a single word and a lexis in this system corresponds to a single
> verb in speech.
shed any light on this attempted analogy? 

> On Nov 25, 2017, at 2:38 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote:
> 
> Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would have 
> been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all about 
> relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?

Kirsti’s question is well poised. 

In what sense to the three terms, spot, dot and blot, differ in their 
competences to generate relations among pairs of relatives?  And how do they 
relate to Kempe’s separation of two classes (sets) of kinds of objects?

Cheers
Jerry
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[kirstima]

Gary f.,

I cannot understand your use of quotation marks. Why say: ... his 
"categories"??? Insted of... his categories???


Also, instead or warning against confusing SPOT, DOT and BLOT, it would 
have been most interesting to hear how they are related. This is all 
about relational logic, is it not. In your opinion too?


Not about just classification.

Kirsti





g...@gnusystems.ca kirjoitti 25.11.2017 21:52:

List, Mary,

Lowell 2.14 introduces the SPOT (which must not be confused with
either the DOT or the BLOT!), and in this connection is worth
comparing with MS 439, the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898
(RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In this lecture given five years before
Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of his "categories" (Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to formal logic (more
specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then explained "by
means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for the
unmathematical" (or so he claimed -- RLT 151). In this post I'll
include two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:

Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity
attached to it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I
call a _verb_. The places at which lines of identity can be attached
to the verb I call its _blank subjects_. I distinguish verbs according
to the numbers of their subject blanks, as _medads, monads, dyads,
triads_, etc. A _medad_, or impersonal verb, is a complete assertion,
like "It rains," "you are a good girl." A _monad_, or neuter verb,
needs only one subject to make it a complete assertion, as

--obeys mamma
you obey--

A _dyad_, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete
the assertion as

—OBEYS—
or —IS IDENTICAL WITH—

A _triad_ needs just three subjects as

--gives--to--
--obeys both--and--

The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: what
Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or "predicate"
in the Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the semiotic
trichotomy _rheme/dicisign/argument_ as given in the Syllabus, EP2:292
or CP 2.250.) The "subject blank" or "line of identity" here
represents the individual "subject of force," as does the "heavy dot"
in Lowell 2, where the sheet of assertion represents "the aggregate"
of those "subjects of the complexus of experience-forces
well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes the graph, and
the interpreter of it."

The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT
155-6) relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to
the Peircean "categories" -- and I think these relations also hold in
the Lowell presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the _line of
identity_ is classed among "verbs" here, although the _ends_ of the
line (the "dots" of Lowell 2) represent "individual objects" which
would be the "subjects" of the "verbs" in the graph. As a verb,
though, all the line of identity can mean is "is identical with," its
subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the "hooks" of the
"spots."

In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very
different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety.
Among these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends of
the line of identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as having
such loose ends) are signs of a totally different kind. They are
demonstrative pronouns, indicating existing objects, not necessarily
material things, for they may be _events_, or even _qualities_, but
still objects, merely designated as _this_ or _that_. In the third
place the writing of verbs side by side, and the ovals enclosing
graphs not asserted but subjects of assertion, which last is
continually used in mathematics and makes one of the great
difficulties of mathematics, constitute a third, entirely different
kind of sign. Signs of the first kind represent objects in their
firstness, and give the significations of the terms. Signs of the
second kind represent objects as existing,-- and therefore as
reacting,-- and also in their reactions. They contribute the
_assertive_ character to the graph. Signs of the third kind represent
objects as representative, that is in their Thirdness, and upon them
turn all the inferential processes. In point of fact, it was
considerations about the categories which taught me how to construct
the system of graphs.

One last comment: the usage of the word "individual" in logic can be
confusing, but Peirce's definition of the term in _Baldwin's
Dictionary_ -- http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Individual [1]
--is helpful for understanding Peirce's usage.

Gary f.

SENT: 23-Nov-17 16:38

Continuing from Lowell 2.13,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-lowell-lecture-ii/display/13620
[2]

You will ask me what use I propose to make of this sign that
_something exists_, a fact that graphist and 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 2.14

[gnox]

List, Mary,

 

Lowell 2.14 introduces the spot (which must not be confused with either the
dot or the blot!), and in this connection is worth comparing with MS 439,
the third of the Cambridge Lectures of 1898 (RLT 146-164, NEM4 331-46). In
this lecture given five years before Lowell 2, Peirce began with a sketch of
his "categories" (Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness), then applied them to
formal logic (more specifically to the "Logic of Relatives"), which he then
explained "by means of Existential Graphs, which is the easiest method for
the unmathematical" (or so he claimed - RLT 151). In this post I'll include
two paragraphs from that 1898 lecture. First, from RLT 154:

 

 

Any part of a graph which only needs to have lines of identity attached to
it to become a complete graph, signifying an assertion, I call a verb. The
places at which lines of identity can be attached to the verb I call its
blank subjects. I distinguish verbs according to the numbers of their
subject blanks, as medads, monads, dyads, triads, etc. A medad, or
impersonal verb, is a complete assertion, like "It rains," "you are a good
girl." A monad, or neuter verb, needs only one subject to make it a complete
assertion, as 

-obeys mamma 
you obey-

A dyad, or simple active verb, needs just two subjects to complete the
assertion as 

-obeys- 
or -is identical with-

A triad needs just three subjects as 

-gives-to- 
-obeys both-and-

 

 

The main difference between this and Lowell 2 is the terminology: what
Peirce calls a "verb" here is called a "spot," "rheme" or "predicate" in the
Lowell lectures. (Compare the usage of "rheme" in the semiotic trichotomy
rheme/dicisign/argument as given in the Syllabus, EP2:292 or CP 2.250.) The
"subject blank" or "line of identity" here represents the individual
"subject of force," as does the "heavy dot" in Lowell 2, where the sheet of
assertion represents "the aggregate" of those "subjects of the complexus of
experience-forces well-understood between the graphist, or he who scribes
the graph, and the interpreter of it."

 

The other paragraph which I'll quote from the Cambridge lecture (RLT 155-6)
relates the existential graph system both to semiotics and to the Peircean
"categories" - and I think these relations also hold in the Lowell
presentation of the graphs. Notice here that the line of identity is classed
among "verbs" here, although the ends of the line (the "dots" of Lowell 2)
represent "individual objects" which would be the "subjects" of the "verbs"
in the graph. As a verb, though, all the line of identity can mean is "is
identical with," its subjects being those ends, which in Lowell 2 occupy the
"hooks" of the "spots."

 

 

In the system of graphs may be remarked three kinds of signs of very
different natures. First, there are the verbs, of endless variety. Among
these is the line signifying identity. But, second, the ends of the line of
identity (and every verb ought to [be] conceived as having such loose ends)
are signs of a totally different kind. They are demonstrative pronouns,
indicating existing objects, not necessarily material things, for they may
be events, or even qualities, but still objects, merely designated as this
or that. In the third place the writing of verbs side by side, and the ovals
enclosing graphs not asserted but subjects of assertion, which last is
continually used in mathematics and makes one of the great difficulties of
mathematics, constitute a third, entirely different kind of sign. Signs of
the first kind represent objects in their firstness, and give the
significations of the terms. Signs of the second kind represent objects as
existing,- and therefore as reacting,- and also in their reactions. They
contribute the assertive character to the graph. Signs of the third kind
represent objects as representative, that is in their Thirdness, and upon
them turn all the inferential processes. In point of fact, it was
considerations about the categories which taught me how to construct the
system of graphs. 

 

 

One last comment: the usage of the word "individual" in logic can be
confusing, but Peirce's definition of the term in Baldwin's Dictionary -
http://gnusystems.ca/BaldwinPeirce.htm#Individual -is helpful for
understanding Peirce's usage.

 

Gary f.

 


Sent: 23-Nov-17 16:38



Continuing from Lowell 2.13,

https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-low
ell-lecture-ii/display/13620

 

You will ask me what use I propose to make of this sign that something
exists, a fact that graphist and interpreter took for granted at the outset.
I will show you that the sign will be useful as long as we agree that
although different points on the sheet may denote the same individual, yet
different individuals cannot be denoted by the same point on the sheet. 

 

If we take any proposition, say 

A sinner kills a saint

and if we erase portions of it, so as to leave it a blank form of
proposition, the blanks being such that if