Re: Is this Stalingrad?
Dear Jim I think we both agree the more important question is whether it is Stalingrad now. Today it is clear that US forces cannot go into the centre of Fallujah, and tonight cannot go into the centre of Najaf although 6 US troops have just been killed by mortar fire from within Najaf if the reports are accurate. A year ago, like others, I was watching the news closely, and my arguments at the time about the possibility of a US defeat, were I think balanced and actually cautious. They considered several possibilities. I concede that one of them implied that the US might not be able to go into Baghdad within a matter of weeks. That did not come about, but essentially the argument was about the evidence that peoples patriotic dislike of the invasion was not overcome by their dislike of Saddam Hussein's repression - or at least not sufficiently so for the US strategy to be guaranteed success. As of now, I would not under-estimate the extent to which the resistance among the Sunnis is essentially led by Saddamite elements following well laid plans.Ironically the capture of Saddam makes it easier for them to cooperate with radical Shiite groups. Time will tell and we cannot be right about everything all the time, but the way I wrote about the prospects of US defeat over a year ago, I think are consistent with what has happened. My post of Sunday March 23 12.33 UTC *2003* ended as below. I rest my case Regards Chris Burford But having to change the strategy to a long drawn out war could be potentially fatal for the hegemons. The power of tv could turn against them as badly as it did in the Vietnam war. Every blunder by exhausted troops working 16 hours a day without adequate sleep (there are also rumours that 3 British journalists who are missing for 24 hours were also the victims of allied fire) - every blunder adds to the cost of the war versus the gains. The allies may not be able to risk going into the cities. They may be forced to negotiate, and depend on the contemptuously dismissed United Nations to get them out of their hole. The morale of the fighters is fundamental in a war. Within 24 hours the hegemons are having to stare into the face of the probability that the morale of the Iraqi resistance may be much higher than that of their exhausted troops who are not very sure why they are there. Meanwhile those Iraqi fighter will have been strengthened by their sight of all the battles in the United Nations and all the demonstrations around the world. Saddam, vilified as an admirer of Stalin, may have taken a leaf out of Stalin's book: to play the war as a great patriotic united front against the aggressors. And as (Sir) David Frost let slip in his amiable way in an interview this morning, could Saddam be preparing Baghdad as his Stalingrad? There was no answer but it is a good question. Allied communication lines could suddenly look very extended against televised guerilla warfare. This morning suddenly there is at least a 10% chance that the hegemonic bloc will be defeated. It has been caught by its own impatience. If it does not get quick mass surenders soon, it will get bogged down in longer warfare, which has even greater risks for it. That risk of defeat, under the potential democratic impact of global communications, could rise above 10%.
Re: Is this Stalingrad?
I wrote: you talked about Stalingrad in Iraq a little more than a year ago and that scenario didn't work out. Why was that prediction/understanding wrong? The current Stalingrad seems more plausible, but your overuse of the term pushes me to be skeptical and to wonder it maybe things are better for the US and its junior partner than it seems. Chris B. writes: Thanks for the reminder of the prophetic thread. It was on March 23 2003 I see from our handy archives that I wrote an item with the thread title Baghdad-Stalingrad I ended Since this morning, I put the chances of US defeat up from 10% to 20% As of today, who would put the chances of US victory as high as 80%???... The cases are different. If I read your earlier missive correctly, you predicted that the US/UK was suffering a Stalingrad at the hands of Saddam's army. This was a doubtful proposition at the time and didn't pan out. More likely is the current possibility of a Stalingrad at the hands of the dispersed and diverse resistance forces in Iraq, only a fraction of which are Saddamites. This meshes well, by the way, with pre-war predictions that the invasion could cause severe social disorder and would be extremely expensive (e.g., Nordhaus). [*] In the earlier missive, you wrote: I am saying that it is possible for a regime which some consider to be seriously repressive, to rally a population with a change of political line to one of basic democratic patriotism. But that regime is gone and can't change its political line any more (if it ever could). In the most recent exchange, I wrote: Further, we should remember that the coalition forces in Iraq are by and large working class. They're being exploited just like (or more than) factory workers, though at this point there's no surplus-value directly resulting from their labors. There must be some way to oppose the war while supporting the troops. Chris B writes: You mean, Jim, like saying, lets bring our boys home, and stop them getting killed or sexually abusing their captives, because it's neither safe nor glorious? - and if some peace keeping forces are necessary under the control of the UN, perhaps it might be cheaper if they come from muslim countries? I'd say _bringing them home now_ is the best idea (rather than being glad when they're killed or wounded). My point is that the soldiers are tools in Bush's hands and he's using them. Some of them are bad people, it's true, but he's the one who's mobilizing their the wogs begin at Calais attitudes and giving them scope for exercising them. He (or rather, his junta) is also putting relatively good people into a situation where they are encouraged or even driven to do horrible things. Back during the Viet Nam war, a lot of anti-war people didn't show enough respect for the veterans. The bit about the returnees being spat upon either didn't happen or was grossly exagerrated and then used to falsely represent the entire anti-war movement. But we have to avoid even the appearance of blaming the troops. That is, if we want to form a movement to fundamentally change society... [*] If anyone has a student who wants to do research, how about a comparison between Nordhaus' predictions about the cost of the Iraq war (that appeared in the NY Review of Books) and the actual costs? Jim Devine
Is this Stalingrad?
Well said, nicely put, Chris, Lesser evil , indeed. We do have an American tradition of rooting for the underdog. There's even a play called Damned Yankees where the devil helps the last place baseball team beat the New York Yankees for the championship. Charles From: Chris Burford The hegemonic coalition forces are not going to get encircled and be forced to surrender, but Fallujah is arguably the Stalingrad of this war - the advanced point that the invaders could not take, the point where they found their logistical, and in this case, particularly their political, lines of communication gravely over extended. They have run out of time and space. How to express it? In practice, ever since Sep 11 2002 everyone on any internet list I have seen has been remarkably self disciplined in what they write. Really it amounts to self-censorship. If one believes that ones own country is an aggressor, and aggressors should be punished, it is hard not to rejoice at a defeat for aggression. But how to express it tactically? Logically until the aggressors withdraw, every extra death of a coalition soldier adds to the pressure for withdrawal, but one cannot celebrate this in the middle of Time Square, without being shall we say, misunderstood. Also defeatism for the hegemons will not automatically mean revolution, though it could dent hegemony internationally very substantially over the next decade. So a progressive policy cannot necessarily be called revolutionary defeatism, and it must not come over that it is a good thing for ordinary soldiers to die in an imperialist war, out of some sort of moralistic blood atonement. I believe Lenin suggested that it is in this sort of situation that the term lesser evil is relevant. So to avoid getting outflanked by enemies, how should polticians like George Galloway in Scotland, or Kucinich in the States, comment on the public record about Iraq's Stalingrad? And how should we? Chris Burford London
Re: Is this Stalingrad?
Chris, you talked about Stalingrad in Iraq a little more than a year ago and that scenario didn't work out. Why was that prediction/understanding wrong? The current Stalingrad seems more plausible, but your overuse of the term pushes me to be skeptical and to wonder it maybe things are better for the US and its junior partner than it seems. Further, we should remember that the coalition forces in Iraq are by and large working class. They're being exploited just like (or more than) factory workers, though at this point there's no surplus-value directly resulting from their labors. There must be some way to oppose the war while supporting the troops. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine -Original Message- From: Chris Burford [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 3:02 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [PEN-L] Is this Stalingrad? The hegemonic coalition forces are not going to get encircled and be forced to surrender, but Fallujah is arguably the Stalingrad of this war - the advanced point that the invaders could not take, the point where they found their logistical, and in this case, particularly their political, lines of communication gravely over extended. They have run out of time and space. How to express it? In practice, ever since Sep 11 2002 everyone on any internet list I have seen has been remarkably self disciplined in what they write. Really it amounts to self-censorship. If one believes that ones own country is an aggressor, and aggressors should be punished, it is hard not to rejoice at a defeat for aggression. But how to express it tactically? Logically until the aggressors withdraw, every extra death of a coalition soldier adds to the pressure for withdrawal, but one cannot celebrate this in the middle of Time Square, without being shall we say, misunderstood. Also defeatism for the hegemons will not automatically mean revolution, though it could dent hegemony internationally very substantially over the next decade. So a progressive policy cannot necessarily be called revolutionary defeatism, and it must not come over that it is a good thing for ordinary soldiers to die in an imperialist war, out of some sort of moralistic blood atonement. I believe Lenin suggested that it is in this sort of situation that the term lesser evil is relevant. So to avoid getting outflanked by enemies, how should polticians like George Galloway in Scotland, or Kucinich in the States, comment on the public record about Iraq's Stalingrad? And how should we? Chris Burford London
Re: Is this Stalingrad?
The coalition forces seem to be a mix: there are grunts working for nothing and there are mercenaries working for $1000/day. Or that's the figure I heard. When the fragging starts, it should be interesting. Joanna Devine, James wrote: Chris, you talked about Stalingrad in Iraq a little more than a year ago and that scenario didn't work out. Why was that prediction/understanding wrong? The current Stalingrad seems more plausible, but your overuse of the term pushes me to be skeptical and to wonder it maybe things are better for the US and its junior partner than it seems. Further, we should remember that the coalition forces in Iraq are by and large working class. They're being exploited just like (or more than) factory workers, though at this point there's no surplus-value directly resulting from their labors. There must be some way to oppose the war while supporting the troops. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine -Original Message- From: Chris Burford [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, April 29, 2004 3:02 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [PEN-L] Is this Stalingrad? The hegemonic coalition forces are not going to get encircled and be forced to surrender, but Fallujah is arguably the Stalingrad of this war - the advanced point that the invaders could not take, the point where they found their logistical, and in this case, particularly their political, lines of communication gravely over extended. They have run out of time and space. How to express it? In practice, ever since Sep 11 2002 everyone on any internet list I have seen has been remarkably self disciplined in what they write. Really it amounts to self-censorship. If one believes that ones own country is an aggressor, and aggressors should be punished, it is hard not to rejoice at a defeat for aggression. But how to express it tactically? Logically until the aggressors withdraw, every extra death of a coalition soldier adds to the pressure for withdrawal, but one cannot celebrate this in the middle of Time Square, without being shall we say, misunderstood. Also defeatism for the hegemons will not automatically mean revolution, though it could dent hegemony internationally very substantially over the next decade. So a progressive policy cannot necessarily be called revolutionary defeatism, and it must not come over that it is a good thing for ordinary soldiers to die in an imperialist war, out of some sort of moralistic blood atonement. I believe Lenin suggested that it is in this sort of situation that the term lesser evil is relevant. So to avoid getting outflanked by enemies, how should polticians like George Galloway in Scotland, or Kucinich in the States, comment on the public record about Iraq's Stalingrad? And how should we? Chris Burford London
Re: Is this Stalingrad?
see below - Original Message - From: Devine, James [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Friday, April 30, 2004 9:07 PM Subject: Re: [PEN-L] Is this Stalingrad? Chris, you talked about Stalingrad in Iraq a little more than a year ago and that scenario didn't work out. Why was that prediction/understanding wrong? The current Stalingrad seems more plausible, but your overuse of the term pushes me to be skeptical and to wonder it maybe things are better for the US and its junior partner than it seems. Further, we should remember that the coalition forces in Iraq are by and large working class. They're being exploited just like (or more than) factory workers, though at this point there's no surplus-value directly resulting from their labors. There must be some way to oppose the war while supporting the troops. You mean, Jim, like saying, lets bring our boys home, and stop them getting killed or sexually abusing their captives, because it's neither safe nor glorious? - and if some peace keeping forces are necessary under the control of the UN, perhaps it might be cheaper if they come from muslim countries? Thanks for the reminder of the prophetic thread. It was on March 23 2003 I see from our handy archives that I wrote an item with the thread title Baghdad-Stalingrad I ended Since this morning, I put the chances of US defeat up from 10% to 20% As of today, who would put the chances of US victory as high as 80%??? Would you bet on it? It's less than evens. Events have not only passed the tipping point, collapse is a real possibility. At least they were able to resupply readily from the sea in the case of Vietnam. Is the simile really overused? There is a massively powerful army over-extended in territory that is hostile, with a people that has found a way to resist. Russia - Napoleon, Hitler. Iraq - Bush. Everything that is happening is consistent with the strategy of armed resistance attributed to the Iraqi security services in a document of January 2003. The defeat of a massive invading army does not happen overnight. Of course it can smash oppostion at first. Stalingrad occurred not in 1941 but in 1943. The analysis of the underlying contradictions from sources we could all read a year ago was broadly correct. Thank you for the reminder. http://csf.colorado.edu/mail/pen-l/2003I/msg02442.html Regards Chris
Is this Stalingrad?
The hegemonic coalition forces are not going to get encircled and be forced to surrender, but Fallujah is arguably the Stalingrad of this war - the advanced point that the invaders could not take, the point where they found their logistical, and in this case, particularly their political, lines of communication gravely over extended. They have run out of time and space. How to express it? In practice, ever since Sep 11 2002 everyone on any internet list I have seen has been remarkably self disciplined in what they write. Really it amounts to self-censorship. If one believes that ones own country is an aggressor, and aggressors should be punished, it is hard not to rejoice at a defeat for aggression. But how to express it tactically? Logically until the aggressors withdraw, every extra death of a coalition soldier adds to the pressure for withdrawal, but one cannot celebrate this in the middle of Time Square, without being shall we say, misunderstood. Also defeatism for the hegemons will not automatically mean revolution, though it could dent hegemony internationally very substantially over the next decade. So a progressive policy cannot necessarily be called revolutionary defeatism, and it must not come over that it is a good thing for ordinary soldiers to die in an imperialist war, out of some sort of moralistic blood atonement. I believe Lenin suggested that it is in this sort of situation that the term lesser evil is relevant. So to avoid getting outflanked by enemies, how should polticians like George Galloway in Scotland, or Kucinich in the States, comment on the public record about Iraq's Stalingrad? And how should we? Chris Burford London
Re: Re: The Stalingrad thesis.
I hate to say this -- it's really pretty ugly -- but the reason Baghdad will not be Stalingrad is fairly simple. The US has the power to destroy as much of the city and its inhabitants as it wants. There is no military impediment to this, only the political cost of such slaughter. It comes down to a very cold calculation: how many civilian deaths and visible leveling of the city can they get away with? My guess is that, if Iraqi resistance is stiff, they will aim at the upper end of what they perceive to be the politically feasible range. It sickens me to imagine what this could mean. Peter Michael Perelman wrote: I don't think were talking about Stalingrad here. I suspect it will be more like Jenin, but this means that the US would have a hard time installing a new Karzai. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Stalingrad thesis.
I am getting a number of mails off list in response to my posts, for which thanks, and apologies if I cannot reply to them all. Also a word of warning that no one can agree with anybody else all the time! I am forwarding a link that has been drawn to my attention about the Stalingrad hypothesis. I would caution that I do not claim this hypothesis as mine. I had merely noticed that if Saddam is vilified as an admirer of Stalin, he might have taken some clever as well as some not so attractive features our of Stalin's experience: including an ability to rally a patriotic war after a period of great social divisions and repression. Just as inhabitants of countries like Iraq looked to Germany during the second world war, I do not think it is surprising if many third world peoples looked to Stalin. I had also noticed the word 'Stalingrad' falling lightly out of the mouth of two of the most distinguished BBC political commentators: Sir David Frost and Andrew Marr, this month. It is even possible that this link, going back to February, has provided the intellectual base for discussion among the New Labour background defence briefers, which eventually got through to Frost and Marr. I cannot judge how authoritative it is but the whole Editorial of the Magazine of Future Warfare is interesting about the difficulties of taking a city. http://g2mil.com/Feb2003.htm Extract: The historical similarities between a 2003 Battle of Baghdad and the 1942 Battle of Stalingrad are alarming. The German 6th Army which advanced to Stalingrad was the same size of today's American force, and also attacked over 400 miles inland with powerful air support. They were far better equipped, trained, experienced, and motivated than hastily assembled Russian conscripts (see the movie Enemy at the Gates) Even though Stalin was a brutal dictator, untrained peasants stood and fought against overwhelming odds. A summary at this website includes these eerie comments: At the end of 1941 Hitler wondered what could be holding Russia together. Against the advice of his generals Hitler attacked Stalingrad. Hitler also greatly underestimated the power of the Red Army. The Luftwaffe played key roles including the destruction of the Soviet air force. Also by this point the Russian soldiers heard of the horrible POW camps [Guantanamo Bay, Cuba?] and now preferred to die in battle than be captured. The German army encountered fierce resistance from not only the determined soldiers of the Red Army, but also from the patriotic civilians as well. Chris Burford London
Re: The Stalingrad thesis.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] 03/29/03 04:01 AM I am forwarding a link that has been drawn to my attention about the Stalingrad hypothesis. I would caution that I do not claim this hypothesis as mine. Extract: The historical similarities between a 2003 Battle of Baghdad and the 1942 Battle of Stalingrad are alarming. Chris Burford hey why not, all analogies are suspect, some just more than others... irrespective of above, u.s. assumed 5 day - 7 at most - day war... strategy predicated on 3 circumstances, none of which manifest themselves: en masse open arm welcome from shia in south, en masse iraqi military surrender, en masse flight from baghdad (re. latter, more people were crossing border from jordan early on to take up arms against u.s. than were heading into jordan, 14-15 people in u.n facilities set up for about 300,000)... michael hoover
Re: The Stalingrad thesis.
I don't think were talking about Stalingrad here. I suspect it will be more like Jenin, but this means that the US would have a hard time installing a new Karzai. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Re: The Stalingrad thesis.
Title: RE: [PEN-L:36269] Re: The Stalingrad thesis. right. I've been telling people that I fully expect the US to win the war (especially since Honor is At Stake and we wouldn't want a repeat of Somalia) but then lose the occupation. I think I've been right: the US will be trying to run a Gaza Strip the size of California. Jim -Original Message- From: Michael Perelman To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: 3/29/2003 8:11 AM Subject: [PEN-L:36269] Re: The Stalingrad thesis. I don't think were talking about Stalingrad here. I suspect it will be more like Jenin, but this means that the US would have a hard time installing a new Karzai. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: The Stalingrad thesis.
Jim Devine wrote: right. I've been telling people that I fully expect the US to win the war (especially since Honor is At Stake and we wouldn't want a repeat of Somalia) but then lose the occupation. I think I've been right: the US will be trying to run a Gaza Strip the size of California. Personally, I am cautious on this point - one has to be realistic. To me it IS clear that this will be a massive setback to the region overall, moving it further away from finding a more equitable development path (and in most cases anything that could be called any kind of development path). In the Mid-East overall there will be lots more of the instability you mean. [BTW, I continue to be shocked at how little is written about the rise of fundamentalism as national development was blocked and neo-liberalism was introduced in the Mid-East. Radical Fundamentalism is treated as if it were the Islamic Billy Graham and has been around for hundreds of years, rather than the Islamic Timothy McVeigh - a very contemporary reaction to bitter angers rooted in some specific economic failures.] But when it comes to Iraq itself, I honestly could see things go either way. Maybe the U.S. occupation will end in resistance - especially if the US blunders (never to be ruled out). Still, there is a reason the US picked this particular fight - you would have to be a particularly cruel and insensitive occupier not to have a chance to pull it off. The U.S. will be able to draw on vast Iraqi resources (even after part is taken away) and a sophisticated base to draw on. People are also exhausted after two decades of death, sacrifice and isolation. The left is decimated, the activists of the nationalist right were mostly killed through Bathist purges starting 24 years ago; politics have often been discredited and repressed. There will be an enormous but unspecific sense of nationalism but since Saadam Hussein took power he has gone to great lengths to de-politicize society and reinforce clan (not national) loyalties. How far can the Shia fundamentalism take a rebellion (unless Iran decides to take a big gamble), especially since most Iraqis are proud of their secular 'modernism'. Obviously people will put up this current fight (as did the German people). But afterwards...I wouldn't want to predict.
Stalingrad - it's official
The British correspondent who was the source for concerns that this could turn into another Stalingrad, has turned out to be none other than Andrew Marr, the senior BBC political correspondent, who is at the height of his prestige and communicating ability. It is clear that Alistair Campbell deliberately dropped this word to him, in the plane as Blair flew to meet Bush. This is the highest level evidence there could be, short of being on the record, that Blair has flown to Washington because he fears another Stalingrad. Chris Burford London Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2003 07:50:23 + From: Chris Burford [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Stalingrad That word again! the BBC reporter in the USA (Washington?) this morning ...quoting one of the correspondents on the plane with Blair saying there are concerns this could turn into another Stalingrad. This would have been a briefing deliberately off the record, so that the reporter could not use it directly. He/she might get punished by having fewer minutes of private consultation with Alistair Campbell or Tony Blair on the next flight for leaking this. But then again he or she may have done what was expected - got off the plane, palled up with the BBC reporter in Washington, and chatted. Everything off the record, everything unattributable. But Rumsfeld, cough, cough, is facing Stalingrad.
Stalingrad - it's official
Dear Chris: I really would hope that you are right. But, again I doubt it. The "worried sick" look on Blair's face in the interviews at the War Summit with his leader Bush - certainly indicate that Blair is worried and sick. but what about exactly? Of course the longer the heroic struggle of the Iraqi peoples plays out, the worse is his likely political fate. But.. Stalingrad? I still doubt that - Guerilla warfare with significant casualties on the "Liberators"? YEs. But - no victory to the Iraq peoples in the short term. Again - what is the definition of "defeat"? The USA will be defeated purely by teh monumental exposure of imperial arragant might that this war shows. The exposure of the events to the peoples of the world - including in North America in the UK - is a HUGE victory - in the long term for us. But - in the sort term a different story I suspect. That is what I think anyway. Cheers, Hari
Stalingrad - UK sources
That word again! The official Downing steet statement on the Blair Bush meeting is that it is about the Middle East, post Saddam Iraq, and relations with the Arab nations. BUT The BBC reporter at the invading HQ, in Qatar, has a news story alleging a debate within the Pentagon with retired US generals questioning Rumsfeld's view that it is possible to win this war with many fewer troops than the Gulf War. AND the BBC reporter in the USA (Whashington?) this morning admitted that the talk about post Saddam Iraq is a little premature and quoting one of the correspondents on the plane with Blair saying there are concerns this could turn into another Stalingrad. This would have been a briefing deliberately off the record, so that the reporter could not use it directly. He/she might get punished by having fewer minutes of private consultation with Alistair Campbell or Tony Blair on the next flight for leaking this. But then again he or she may have done what was expected - got off the plane, palled up with the BBC reporter in Washington, and chatted. Everything off the record, everything unattributable. But Rumsfeld, cough, cough, is facing Stalingrad. Meanwhile the suicide columns of tanks heading south from Baghdad and Basra last night have melted away without providing convenient pictures of their massacre. The suggestion that the tanks were breaking out of Basra ahead of a rising (since when did tanks flee an urban insurrection?!) appears to be unconfirmed. The more mellow tones of Sir Tim Garden, former chief of the UK defence staff, on the BBC this morning, (who opposed the outbreak of war) notes that the Iraqi forces have got to do what they have to do, and sending these tanks south forces allied commanders to keep much more of their limited sources back to defend their lines What we do not know for example is how much the British troops in the south are struggling and how much US troops have had to hold back in the Tigris valley. Interesting we have heard nothing of this alleged second prong of the supposed two prong race for Baghdad. It also would explain the mystery of how British troops are supposed to have besieged Basra, when they only have exhausted forces to the west of it, vulnerable to counter attack. The official main BBC story this morning was that US troops have flown into northern Iraq, though Sir Tim queried why they had to be parachuted when they could have flown into an airstrip that was already secured in the hands of the Kurds! It is clear in fact that the northern front will not be able to harrass Saddam very much and the US has at best bought off Saddam's natural allies, the Turks. Meanwhile this morning London time, an anxious British reporter in bed with the US troops in Nasiriyah (so a little more independent than a BBC reporter in bed with the troops near Basra) said of the Nasiriyah flank The situation just seems to get worse. It is a very dangerous situation for US forces. This war is not just an accident waiting to happen (and there are plenty of those). This is a disaster waiting to happen. The image of Stalingrad is not fanciful. When is George going to stop listening to Donald and listen to nice Tony instead? And when is the global peace movement going to issue a coordinated call for a cease fire? Chris Burford London
Baghdad-Stalingrad
At 2003-03-23 09:56 -0500, Hari Kumar wrote: BUT: is there not an element of wishful thinking here? Someone else (?Devine) said leftists get over-wishful. Fair question. Lets check it out. 1) The parallels with Stalingrad are fairly naive. What was ultimately decisive about Stalingrad was that the Soviets were able to bring down troops from the Caucusus and encircle the Germans. But as a city that is enormously difficult to take, Baghdad could just could be like Stalingrad. On this day where all the news went out of the hegemons control, we have to remember that their analysis depends overwhelmingly on this supposition: because Saddam uses propaganda, Iraqi society is a shell. It has only to be decapitated, the Republican Guard only has to be anihilated in its barracks and the population will knife the Baath party activists to death. What this analysis does not allow for is that even in the absence of bourgeois democracy, perhaps especially in the absence of bourgeois democracy, societies have organic ways of perpetuating themselves. Just as we can see the descendants of the SED, have deep roots in the society of the former East Germany, and that other communist parties do in the rest of the soviet bloc, so it will be in Iraq. It may be that some of the worst excesses of the suppression of opponents has been softened in the last ten years. But even if not, the Baath party, which has been the root to social advancement, will be tied to the rest of Iraqi society by numerous ties of marriage, friendship, mutual favours, and recreation, laughter and song. What I meant was that a regime that had gone through dreadful internal repression just a few years before of a most sectarian nature, was rallied with a great patriotic national front. [This is not the place for a detailed discussion of Stalin, who has a different significance in some parts of the world to others, but he did say in 1939 It cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes. I am not trying to be provocative, and have no intention of getting diverted into a thread about Stalin, but I am saying that it is possible for a regime which some consider to be seriously repressive, to rally a population with a change of political line to one of basic democratic patriotism. And that is what the hegemons have no inkling of.] The only thing that is comparable is that Stalin Saddam had a long standing warning and were able to some extent prepare. [We will not here address the ludicrous and historically wrong viewpoints that Stalin ignored/deluded himself re warnings that Hitler was about to invade]. But the distinguishing features are just far too many to make any such comparison meaningful: - geographical penetration of small country vs a huge country; rings of servile states willing to allow invaders to land/refuel/eat and drink etc... Stalin had taken care to knock out the pre-announced landing ase of Finland [under very generous terms to ensure neutrality - we can discuss that another place if needed]; very differing pre-conflict capacities of the country being invaded. Well the invaders will not freeze. But they have chosen a time of year which will only get worse for them. Flustered and irritable they will be prone to fatal errors. Through terrain laced with canals, reeds and a hostile population. Already in 24 hours the hegemons have shown a remarkable capacity to kill themselves, let alone be killed by the Iraqis. 2) 10% chance of defeat? I think the question becomes - How do you define defeat? 3) What is interesting is that France is NOT being passive here. France announced that It was going to send a French force of experts on WMD to assess any claims that might surface that the Liberators found WMD. With the First Pres of Algeria I say Vive La France!. However... 4) I am also with Kelley here - I may not be an economist Like Krugman Devine - but sure as hell - we are looking at an attempted re-division of the world, and the Old Europeans are in it vs the USA the Vilnius 10. Let me take these together. I agree with your comments about France. It is being particularly hard. Chirac gave Blair a very hard time at an EU meeting this week. Chirac is adamant that there will be no help for reconstruction unless the country is handed over to the UN. Aid agencies like Oxfam are saying this too. They are worried about sewage breaking down. The news from inside the cities will get increasingly embarrassing for the invaders if they stay outside. If they go inside unless they are prepared to be as ruthless in front of the television cameras as the Israelis are in Palestinian town, they will be killed repeatedly. Even if only 1 US soldier is killed for every 10 Iraqis then the US has lost. 5) The problem of progressives and leftists - we are fucking disorganised. We have no friggin party. We now know how to network, and that is far more robust. We do
Re: Baghdad-Stalingrad/Hari
5) The problem of progressives and leftists - we are fucking disorganised. We have no friggin party. H Comrade Hari, you tend to write things that I agree with. We had the same emotional and intellectual response to comparing Iraq with the turning point in World War II, the battle of Stalingrad. The bourgeois ruling class of Iraq has driven the workers in that territory to ruin, which by no means justify that which cannot be justified on the part of my imperialist. I do not believe that we are facing a question of "hegemony" on the part of aggressive USNA imperialism, which already gained absolute hegemony with the defeat of the Soviet proletariat, and relative hegemony during the Nixon years and the changes in the mode of accumulation that centered the US dollar as the cornerstone of world wealth accumulation. Nor do I subscribe to the thinking that says that USNA imperialism is being driven to attack Iraq from the standpoint of oil reserves, the "finite nature" of oil as energy source, or a need to protect Israel. None of the parts of the social economic and political equation are being ignored because each part is important and constitutes the whole. I believe strongly that aggressive USNA imperialism is attempting to consolidate a world sector of advance finance capital through the absolute destruction of the last vestiges of territorial and culture barriers that inhibit speculative capital. Everything is involved including monetary policy, the growth and role of the Euro, and the role of China and its currency in the coming years. It is my contention that every local detachment of the Marxist movement must slowly begin the process of preparing to place itself at the head of a wave of social revolution. Our starting point has to be the basics. Revolution comes about as the result of changes in the means of production or what is in fact the material power of the productive forces. I do not believe that the left is "fucking disorganised," or rather we are in fact disorganized or better yet we have entered a new era in world history, where various political grouping and tendencies are compelled to reconstitute themselves on a somewhat new basis. During the last era of reform of USNA capital-imperialism, the anti-war movement went through phases after the conclusion of the Second World Imperial War, the Korean War and then Vietnam. The salient feature of the period of history was of course what is called the Civil Rights Movement, which was the catalyst for what became the Student Movement, sections of the anti-war movement, the so-called New Left and it's momentary step child, "the Young or New Communist Movement." At the conclusion of the Civil Rights Movement, the so-called "left movement" fragmented into identity movements. What constituted the conclusion of the Civil Rights Movement was the successful reforming of social structures in America to accommodate the descendants of Southern slavery into the industrial infrastructure of society. This reforming of social relations was generated on the basis of changes in the material power of the productive forces - the quantitative expansion of the industrial system and the mechanization of agriculture. Without question the existence of Soviet power conditioned this struggle internationally and even domestically. This era of the destruction of the closed colonial system meant the evening up of the world. Not in the sense of injecting identical means of production into every country, but rather every country on earth being integrated into the industrial system on the same basis of commodity production and exchange and a universal mode of capital accumulation. Today no country in the world can operate on the basis of its own national resources and territorial infrastructure. Stated another way every country on earth is drawn into the export and importing of commodities from every corner of the earth as the basis for sustenance. What have to be determined and grasped by the Marxist - in theory, is the essences of the industrial system and if in fact it can be expanded quantitatively and qualitatively. When something fundamental to a process changes, everything that is dependent upon that process must in turn change. There is no other way to explain this to the world workers except by saying it a million times. This must be stated in every booklet and article produced by Marxist - not necessarily the mass movement. What has changed is the technology in society in a similar manner as the mechanization of agriculture. A new technology that grew up within the industrial system was injected into this system of production and demands that the entire system be reconfigured around the new technology. Computers, electronic production, digitalized production processes and also advanced robotics changes everything. These ingredients constitute a fundamental change in the industrial production of go
Re: Baghdad-Stalingrad
In a message dated 3/23/03 11:41:40 AM Pacific Standard Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: At 2003-03-23 09:56 -0500, Hari Kumar wrote: BUT: is there not an element of wishful thinking here? Someone else (?Devine) said leftists get over-wishful. Fair question. Lets check it out. 1) The parallels with Stalingrad are fairly naive. What was ultimately decisive about Stalingrad was that the Soviets were able to bring down troops from the Caucusus and encircle the Germans. But as a city that is enormously difficult to take, Baghdad could just could be like Stalingrad. What was decisive about the battle for Stalingrad was that it was the turning point in preserving public property relations in the socially necessary means of production. Peace. Mevlin P
A Mesopotamian Stalingrad?
NY Times, Aug. 26, 2002 Iraq Said to Plan Tangling the U.S. in Street Fighting By MICHAEL R. GORDON WASHINGTON, Aug. 25 President Saddam Hussein of Iraq will try to compensate for his armed forces' glaring weaknesses by raising the specter of urban warfare if the Bush administration moves to attack the Iraqi government, according to Pentagon officials and former United States government experts. In anticipation of an eventual American attack, Iraq has already started military preparations, they say. Iraqi forces have been digging defensive positions for military equipment around Baghdad. The Iraqi military has also been moving air defense units around the country and dispersing army units in the field to make them less vulnerable to a surprise air attack. During the Persian Gulf war of 1991, the Iraqi troops who captured Kuwait dug themselves into positions in the open desert. That made them vulnerable to allied air strikes and the fast-paced attacks by the United States' better trained and more maneuverable ground forces. But this time Mr. Hussein's goal is not so much to hold ground as to hold power. That means that Iraq can be expected to use the threat of urban warfare to try to deter the United States from attacking in the first place and to raise the political costs if Washington decides to press ahead with an invasion. Iraq has no hope of prevailing in a straight military fight, and after Desert Storm the Iraqis probably realize that, said Kenneth M. Pollack, the director of national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former C.I.A. analyst of the Iraqi military. Their best and most likely strategy will be to try to create the political conditions that would lead the Bush administration to think twice about an attack, Mr. Pollack said. And one way to do that is to make us believe that we are going to face a Mesopotamian Stalingrad. full: http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/26/international/middleeast/26MILI.html === Most people who became radicalized during the 1960s have no trouble understanding the importance of General Giap's victory over the French at Dienbienphu or the defeat of the 'gusanos' at the Bay of Pigs. In both cases victories of the liberation movement over imperialist invasions helped to lay the foundations for further advances in the class struggle. For a previous generation, the Battle of Stalingrad, which began in the summer of 1942 and ended in January 1943, had a similar importance. In this most costly of military engagements, the Nazi army suffered not only its first major defeat, but one that essentially paved the way for the collapse of the Third Reich. The ability of the workers state to defeat the seemingly invincible fascist army lifted the morale of every antifascist and anticapitalist armed movement worldwide, from Mao's Red Army to the French Resistance. Despite the determination of Anglo-American imperialism to pick up where Hitler left off, the mood of resistance continued well into the 1950s as the Soviet Union remained a symbol of working-class power. For those who had lost faith after the defeat of the Spanish Republic or with the signing of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact, the victory at Stalingrad brought a sense of renewal. Painters, sculptors, novelists and poets found ways to express their admiration for the Soviet people, including Pablo Neruda who wrote Nuevo Canto de Amor a Stalingrad in honor of the victorious Russian people. The Nazi defeat also opened the door to new horrors. Arno Mayer argues convincingly in Why the Heavens Did not Darken that the Judeocide (his term--and one that makes sense to most scholars outside the Holocaust industry) was provoked by the disaster at Stalingrad. Prior to January 1943, Jews had been persecuted but there was no systematic attempt to exterminate them as a people. After this turning point, Hitler, probably understanding that his days were numbered, began to turn his sights on a defenseless people. The Jews became the ultimate scapegoat for the Third Reich's inability to impose its will on a people who did know how to defend themselves. German losses at Stalingrad were staggering. The Sixth Army, under the command of Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, began its campaign with 600,000 soldiers. On Jan. 31, 1943, Paulus disobeyed Hitler and surrendered. On February 2 the last of his remaining 91,000 troops turned themselves over to the Soviets. The Soviets recovered 250,000 German and Romanian corpses in and around Stalingrad and total Axis losses (Germans, Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians) are estimated to have been 800,000 dead. Of those taken captive, only 6,000 lived to return to their homeland. At one key battle for control of a factory, there were more casualties than during the entire campaign in France the previous year. Official Russian military historians estimate that 1,100,000 Soviet soldiers lost their lives in the campaign
